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Mirko Canevaro  
The documents in the public speeches of Demosthenes: authenticity and tradition 
 The thesis is concerned with the official documents (laws and decrees) preserved 
in the public speeches of the Demosthenic corpus (18, 21, 23, 24, 59). These documents 
purport to be Athenian statutes and, if authentic, would provide invaluable information 
about fourth-century Athenian history and institutions. 
 The introduction gives an account of the presence of the documents in the 
corpora of the orators and in the manuscript tradition, summarizes previous scholarship 
and delineates a new methodology for analyzing the documents. A specific section 
within the introduction analyzes the stichometric marks found in the medieval 
manuscripts of the Demosthenic corpus. Through those marks we can calculate whether 
a section of text was or was not present in the Urexemplar of the corpus: the documents 
in Dem. 23 and some of those in Dem. 24 were, but the others have been inserted later. 
 The following 4 chapters analyze in detail the documents found in Dem. 18, 19, 
23, 24 and 59, also providing the text of each document as it appears in the paradosis, 
with an apparatus criticus. This survey reveals that those documents that were part of 
the stichometric edition are in general more reliable than those inserted later. By 
contrast, many features of these last documents, such as anachronistic expressions, 
formulas never attested in Attic inscriptions, inconsistencies between the documents and 
the orator's summaries, betray forgery. 
 The conclusion argues that the stichometric documents have been inserted in the 
speeches in an Athenian environment at the beginning of the 3rd century BCE, 
presumably by Demochares of Leuconoe, the nephew of Demosthenes and an active 
politician himself. The non-stichometric documents are instead a very early product of 
the tradition of historical declamations and progymnasmata, witnesses of the 
development, side-by-side, of rhetorical education and antiquarianism. 
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1. Introduction 
The corpora of the Attic orators contain mostly forensic speeches. In these 
speeches the orators argue their legal cases with the help of laws, decrees, contracts, 
witness statements, lists of names and a variety of other documents. These documents, 
according to fourth-century procedure, were not read out directly by the litigant. Copies 
of them had to be produced at the preliminary hearings (at the anakrisis for public 
charges, at the diaita for most private suits) and were sealed into an echinos, a vase 
where they were kept until the actual trial.1 Those were the only admissible documents 
at the final stage of the trial in the lawcourt. Theophrastus' 'Man who has lost all sense' 
(ἀπονενοημένος)2 provides a vivid picture of how the documents were presented at the 
preliminary hearings. His character arrives at the hearings 'with a box-full of evidence 
in his coat pocket and strings of little documents in his hands' (ἔχων ἐχῖνον ἐν τῷ 
προκολπίῳ καὶ ὁρμαθοὺς γραμματιδίων ἐν ταῖς χερσίν). At the law-court stage of 
the trial the echinos was opened and when the litigants wanted the judges to hear a 
particular document they would ask the secretary of the court (the grammateus) to read 
it out. The water-clock timing the length of the speech was stopped during the reading.  
Requests by the speakers to the grammateus to read out specific pieces of 
evidence occur very often in the preserved speeches of the Attic orators. The speaker 
would simply say, e.g.: 'Read also the law about arbitrators' (Dem. 21.94: λέγε δὴ καὶ 
τὸν τῶν διαιτητῶν νόμον) and the grammateus would find it in the echinos and read it 
out. Demosthenes gives us a vivid sketch of this procedure in the speech Against 
Leptines at § 84 when he addresses the grammateus with the words 'Take now also the 
                                                
1 Cf. Sickinger 1999: 167; Thür 2008. It has been long believed, following [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 53.2-3, that 
this practice was used only when a public arbitration failed, but the discovery of the lid of an echinos with 
inscribed δ]ιαμαρτυρία ἐξ ἀνακρίσεως (SEG 32.329) has proven that the echinos was used also in 
public cases. See e.g. Boegehold Boegehold 1995: 79-81 and recently Faraguna 2009: 73-4. 
2 Cf. Theophr. Char. 6.8. Cf. Diggle 2005: 258-62 for an instructive commentary on this passage. 
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decree passed for Chabrias. Have a look then and search for it. It must indeed be 
somewhere there!' 
In the medieval manuscripts of the preserved speeches of the Attic orators, 
corresponding to the requests of the speakers to the grammateus to read out a particular 
piece of evidence, we find lemmata informing us that the document to be read out is a 
law (ΝΟΜΟΣ), or a decree (ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ) or the like, sometimes giving some 
additional information about the topic of the documents (e.g, Dem. 20.86 Ψηφίσματα 
τῶν Χαβρίου Τιμῶν; 24.105 Νόμοι Κλοπῆς, Κακώσεως Γονέων, Ἀστρατείας).3 
After these lemmata we sometimes find a text which purports to be the document 
requested, but more often the speech resumes with the words of the speaker 
commenting on a document that is not found in the manuscripts. 
There are no documents in the speeches of Hyperides, and the same is true for 
Isocrates, Antiphon and Deinarchus. Lysias (10.16), Lycurgus (1.81) and Isaeus (11.11) 
quote one isolated document each. By contrast, important laws and decrees are 
preserved by Andocides, On the Mysteries (but the witness statements are missing) and 
by Aeschines, Against Timarchus (all except the witness statements and the contract of 
§ 100, 104 and 115). Demosthenes has documents in the speech On the Crown (18) 
until § 187 (but two papyri of the II century add some documents for § 217-223),4 in the 
Against Meidias (21) until § 169 (except § 130), in the Against Aristocrates (23) until § 
87, in the Against Timocrates (24) until § 151. Moreover all the documents are found in 
the Against Lacritus (35), the Against Macartatus (43), the Against Stephanus A and B 
(45, 46), and the Against Neaera (59). One law, clearly copied from the adjoining text, 
is found in the Against Leptines (20.27), fragments of an ἔγκλημα in the Against 
                                                
3 For the debate about the origin and the authenticity of the lemmata see Schucht 1892: 11-17 and Drerup 
1898: 243-7. Schucht argues that the lemmata must have been added later on the basis of the orator's 
words, whereas Drerup advocates a more flexible approach. I tend to agree with Schucht, but this 
problem is here immaterial. 
4 P.Haun. 1.5 and P.Oxy. 42.3009. The document reported by P.Oxy. 42.3009 does not match the 
corresponding document in P.Haun. 1.5. See Wankel 1975. 
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Pantaenetus (37.22-9), and selections from a contract in the Against Dionysodorus 
(56.36, 38). 
The documents that we find in the medieval manuscripts of the Attic orators are 
only a fraction of those that the speakers ask to be read out. This makes clear that 
normal practice for the Attic orators was rather not to include in their drafts the texts of 
the documents they were to discuss.5 These documents were already sealed in the 
echinos and the grammateus was responsible for retrieving them when requested. 
Whilst we cannot assume that the orators were always consistent in their habits, this 
certainly poses questions about the nature and origin of the documents included in the 
manuscripts. Such questions have a long history in scholarship, which started when 
scholars noted that the information provided by some of these documents is inconsistent 
with the evidence found in other reliable sources. 
 
                                                
5 Unless we assume that the documents were eliminated from the texts at a later date, but see below pp. 
20-1. 
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1.1 History of scholarship and the birth of a scholarly issue 
The authenticity of the documentary texts found in the speeches of the Attic 
orators has been an issue since the 17th century. The first attempts to assess the value 
and take advantage of the information provided by many laws, decrees, witness 
statements and even official letters extensively quoted in the text of the speech On the 
Crown of Demosthenes were made in 1606 by the Venetian Vincenzo Contarini. In his 
Variae Lectiones he compared the single pieces of information with the general picture 
of the years of the fall of Greek liberty found in the other extant sources, and noticed 
significant problems with at least two decrees (Dem. 18.29, 37-38). He therefore 
expressed doubts about their authenticity.6 His example had no followers for more than 
two centuries.  
In 1668 Jacques de Paulmier (Jacobus Palmerius), in the Exercitationes in 
optimos fere auctores Graecos, noted another suspicious feature: the names of the 
eponymous archons as recorded by the documents do not correspond to the list given by 
Diodorus, for the years 480-302 BCE, in books XI-XX of his Bibliotheca. He did not 
however consider the documents to be forgeries. Instead, he tried to work out an 
explanation for the inconsistency: he proposed that the names quoted in the documents 
might not be the names of the eponymous archons, but rather referred to some other 
member of the panel (alium e Thesmothetis).7 The question appeared also in the 18th 
century English masterpiece on ancient chronology: Henry Dodwell advanced the 
alternative proposal that the names in the documents might be those of the epistateis of 
the Prytaneis, whose duty would have been to preside over the Athenian assembly in 
place of the eponymous archon.8 The entire controversy has been termed that of the 
Archontes Pseudeponymi. This name is found in Edoardo Corsini's Fasti Attici, 
                                                
6 Contarini 1606: 94. 
7 Palmerius 1668: 135. 
8 Dodwell 1701: III, p. 192. 
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published in Florence between 1744 and 1756. He proposed the following solution: the 
reason for the inconsistency is that the names mentioned by Diodorus are those of the 
archons nominated at the beginning of the Athenian year, whereas the documents record 
the eponymous archon at the time of the proposal. They, in the reconstruction of 
Corsini, may well be different, as the original archon could have been deposed or, even 
worse, could have died. Therefore every single decree quoted in Demosthenes’ On the 
Crown would happen to have been passed, presumably after some accident, by an 
archon suffectus, a substitute archon.9 
At the beginning of the 19th century, with the rise of German 
Altertumswissenschaft, many other adventurous hypotheses were advanced. The most 
popular of the previous theories by far was that proposed by Palmerius which, after the 
approval of Georg Friedrich Schömann,10 laid the foundations of the last great attempt 
to justify the inconsistency in the names of the archons, that by August Boeckh. 
Boeckh, in the Lektionsprogramm der Berliner Universität Winter 1827/8, tried to 
identify the archontes pseudeponymi with the γραμματεῖς κατὰ πρυτανείαν.11 
According to his interpretation all the documents, laws, decrees and official letters were 
preserved in Athens' national archive. They were gathered into particular files, one for 
each year. Thereby the name of the eponymous archon was appended to every file in 
just one single copy, presumably as a label.  Each document was then in turn more 
specifically dated by the indication of the γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν. After a 
time, when the alleged editor of the On the Crown accessed the archive in order to insert 
the appropriate documents into the speech, the labels had deteriorated and, eventually, 
disappeared. The only residual date indication, the name of the γραμματεὺς κατὰ 
                                                
9 Corsini 1744-56: I/7, p. 305. 
10 Schömann 1819: 136 ff. 
11 Boeckh 1874: 266-300. 
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πρυτανείαν, was thereby understood as the eponymous archon and reported in the 
speech. 
Αll these attempts relied mainly on guesswork. Although some prestigious 
scholars like Winiewski and Böhnecke in the following years endorsed the 
interpretation advanced by Boeckh,12 Lucius Spengel in 1828 finally demostrated that at 
least the dates and names are spurious.13 
The first to propose that some, if not all, of the documents in On the Crown might 
be forgeries was Peter Paul Dobree, who in 1833 wrote: 'suspicor haec duo decreta, et 
omnia fere in hac oratione citata, spuria esse: certe alterutrum spuriae ἐκδόσει orationis 
tribuendum'. This short statement came six years before the masterpiece by Johann 
Gustav Droysen: Die Urkunden in Demosthenes’ Rede vom Kranz. Droysen, with a 
thorough historical analysis of the documents, comparing their evidence with the speech 
itself and with other sources of information about the years of the final fall of Athenian 
power, was able to demonstrate unequivocally that every single document in On the 
Crown is a forgery.14 His achievements, though they met with some resistance in the 
years immediately following, are now universally accepted, and a new survey published 
in 1939 by Lothar Schläpfer, based on analysis of Athenian institutions and a 
comparison with epigraphical documents, confirmed the results of Droysen’s study. 
After the documents of On the Crown were finally exposed as forgeries, 
recognising other forgeries in every preserved speech of the corpora of the orators 
seemed a central concern for all the most important scholars of the time. I will not list 
every attempt, and I will leave a more systematic survey for the introductory chapters of 
my discussions of individual speeches. Here it will suffice to say that by the 1870s 
nearly all the documents in the orators were considered forgeries.  
                                                
12 Winiewski 1829: 291-361; Böhnecke 1843. 
13 Spengel 1828: 367-404. 
14 Droysen 1893: 95-266. 
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By the end of the century the situation had changed. The discovery in Athens of a 
substantial piece of the first axon containing the homicide laws attributed to Drakon (the 
republished version of 409 BCE, originally edited by Koehler, now IG I2 115 = IG I3 
104), with fragmentary remains occasionally matching a few laws preserved in 
Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates and Against Macartatus, led a new generation of 
scholars to reconsider most of the results of the previous studies, and to rehabilitate 
many documents (but not the documents of On the Crown). The end of this period and, 
for a long time, of any work about the authenticity of the documents can be dated to 
1898, with the momentous monograph Über die bei den attischen Rednern eingelegten 
Urkunden by Engelbert Drerup. The verdict was that every document had to be 
individually analysed, checking correspondences and inconsistencies with other 
historical material. In fact, Drerup attempted to argue that most documents were 
authentic by providing reconstructions of Athenian laws, institutions and procedures 
which were consistent with the information in the documents. Apart from the 
documents of Aeschines' Against Timarchus and, of course, those of Demosthenes' On 
the Crown, Drerup defended the authenticity of most documents.15 
The huge amount of work done on the documents during the 19th century was 
mainly based on comparison between single pieces of factual information and 
corresponding historical evidence. This could work well with obviously forged decrees 
and letters like those in On the Crown, as they are concerned with key moments of 
Athenian history, and can easily be checked through the abundant evidence provided by 
historians and lexicographers. Yet with other texts such an approach is doomed to rely 
hugely on guesswork, in particular if one is limited to the scanty epigraphic evidence 
available in the 19th century, when corpora were for the most part still works-in-
progress. 
                                                
15 Drerup 1898. 
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In the 20th century work on the documents virtually ceased, with a few exceptions. 
Schläpfer in 1939 grounded the results achieved by Droysen in his study of the 
documents of On the Crown on more solid historical analyses, and with the help of 
comparison with epigraphical evidence. Piero Treves in 1940 tried to find a context for 
these forgeries. In the following years many of the documents were used in historical 
reconstructions, in some (rare) cases with a short discussion of their authenticity16 but 
more often with no discussion at all.17 In 1990 Douglas MacDowell devoted some space 
to the analysis of the authenticity of the documents of the Against Meidias in his 
commentary on the speech, and treatments of some of the documents have also 
appeared in the commentaries on the Against Neaera by Carey and Kapparis and on 
Aeschines' Against Timarchus by Fisher.18 In the last few years some individual 
contributions about specific documents by scholars like Trevett, Harris, Scafuro, 
Kapparis and myself have appeared,19 but no one has developed a comprehensive 
methodology nor attempted a complete analysis of all the documents.20  
This thesis is intended as the first chapter of such a comprehensive study. I will 
give a general account of the situation of the documents in the medieval manuscript 
tradition, but I will then concentrate on those speeches among the public speeches of the 
Demosthenic corpus that have not yet received a satisfactory analysis.21 Among the 
Demosthenic public speeches Dem. 18, 21, 23, 24 and 59 preserve many documents, in 
                                                
16 Cf. e.g. Piérart 2000: 246-50. 
17 Cf. e.g. MacDowell 1962 and 1963 passim. Many examples will be found below in my discussions of 
individual speeches and documents. 
18 MacDowell 1990; Carey 1992; Kapparis 1999; Fisher 2001. 
19 Trevett 1992: 180-92; Harris, Review of MacDowell 1991, CP 87 (1992): 76-8 and 2008: 86–87, 89–
90, 103–104; Kapparis 1995; Scafuro 2004; 2005; 2006. See below the discussion of individual speeches 
for more examples. 
20 The absence of a methodology was lamented by Carey in his review of Kapparis 1999 in Phoenix 55 
(2000): 177. 
21 The only non-Demosthenic public speeches which contain documents are Aeschines’ Against 
Timarchus, which has been satisfactorily analyzed in Fisher 2001 passim, Andocides' On the Mysteries, 
which E. M. Harris and I have analyzed in a separate study (Canevaro-Harris 2012), and Lycurgus' 
Against Leocrates that contains just one document and has received plenty of attention (see e.g. Rhodes-
Osborne 2003: 440-7). The results of these studies will also be taken into account in the final chapters of 
this thesis. 
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fact most of the documents in the entire corpus.22 I will provide a synthetic account of 
the analyses of the speeches On the Crown (18) and Against Meidias (21) conducted by 
scholars like Schläpfer, MacDowell and Harris, and I will take their results into account 
in my final chapters, but I do not give here a detailed study of the documents of these 
speeches, as I deem their results satisfactory. I will concentrate instead on the laws and 
decrees of the speeches Against Aristocrates, Against Timocrates and Against Neaera 
(29 documents all in all), leaving other documents (e.g. the witness statements) for a 
future study.  
In order to lay the foundations for a systematic study of the documents, one needs 
to formulate a methodology and test it with documents for which a wide range of 
comparative material both in primary (epigraphical) and secondary sources is available. 
The documents found in these speeches are often key items for the study of Athenian 
law and institutions and fulfil this condition. In these speeches moreover we find both 
documents that are obviously forgeries, and documents for which an epigraphic parallel 
guarantees their trustworthiness. Finally, as I will show, in these speeches we find 
                                                
22 I consider the speech Against Neaera one of the demosioi logoi for various reasons: first, the speech is 
written for a graphe xenias, that is a public charge, like the speeches 18-26 of the Demosthenic corpus. 
Second, the medieval tradition preserves it right after the second speech Against Aristogeiton (26) in all 
its main testimonia (SFYR), and the only manuscripts that place it at the end of the private speeches are 
secondary ones: Q and D. Third, Libanius places his hypothesis of the Against Neaera right after that of 
Dem. 26, confirming that this was the arrangement common in antiquity. The reason for which modern 
editions follow a different order is that this was the arrangement of the Aldina. The Aldina derived from 
apographs of F, which, although it placed the speech after Dem. 26, had also an index, a list of the 
speeches where the Against Neaera appeared at the end of the private speeches. Either the scribe of one 
of the apographs, or Manutius and Carteromachus themselves decided that the order of the speeches was 
to agree with the list (see Cataldi Palau 1998: 99-100 and Hernandez Muñoz 2000). In fact it has been 
argued that the place of the speeches in the corpus is an important mark of their mutual relationship, and 
speeches that consistently appear next to each other in the tradition must have been part of a consistent 
group that was transmitted together through antiquity (see Christ 1882; Drerup 1899; Foerster 1903-27: 
vol. 8, p. 575 and recently Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 2.1, pp. 9-15). Kapparis' (1999: 73-74) objections to 
this reconstruction are inconclusive: Kapparis notes that Q and D have the Against Neaera at the end of 
the private speeches and argues that, for example, from 'F and Q, which almost certainly have the same 
exemplar, we can see that the scribes of these manuscripts for some reasons have placed the speech in 
different positions'. The position of a speech was determined only by the 'preferences of individual 
scribes'. In fact, the reason for which Q has the Against Neaera at the end of the private speeches is rather 
clear: the scribe decided (as happened with the Aldina) that the order of the speeches was to agree with 
the list preserved in F. That list probably derived from a pinax and the speech was there relegated to the 
end due to its dubious authenticity. Yet the medieval tradition and the ancient tradition clearly have the 
Against Neaera as one of the demosioi logoi, and this speech should therefore be studied in that context. 
 17 
documents that entered the corpus at different stages: some of them were present from a 
very early stage of transmission and some were inserted at a later time.23 For all these 
reasons these documents, and these speeches, seemed the right place to start. 
 
                                                
23 See below pp. 22-41. 
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1.2 The documents in the medieval tradition 
The first important clue about the documents in the Demosthenic corpus comes 
from the manuscript tradition. It has long been demonstrated that it is impossible to 
trace our testimonia to a single medieval archetype of the Demosthenic corpus, not even 
to a single line of development. The manuscripts still available for the modern scholar 
are medieval descendants of different lines of tradition stemming back to the ancient 
world. The nature of the ancestors of our Demosthenic codices is still a matter for 
investigation, but it seems safe enough to assume that the ancient corpora consisted of 
different rolls containing entire groups of speeches in the case of the shortest ones, and 
single speeches for the huge δημόσιοι. Therefore, single parts of the corpora, namely 
single groups or single speeches, could often move within the tradition. Accordingly no 
medieval manuscript is a perfect representative of an ancient line of transmission, as 
cross-contamination intervened during both ancient times and the Middle Ages, but 
many papyri found in the sands of Egypt seem to confirm the existence of diverse 
collections and the circulation of the rolls both in isolation and among the collections.24 
Therefore it is not mere guesswork to consult the vetustissimi, that is the most ancient 
and uncorrupted of the medieval manuscripts, in order to obtain evidence about the 
presence of the documents in different branches of the ancient tradition. 
The most ancient manuscripts of Demosthenes are S (Paris, Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France, ms. gr. 2934), A (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. 
                                                
24 This reconstruction of the medieval tradition of Demosthenes' corpus as stemming back from ancient 
editions of single speeches or groups of speeches excludes the existence of a medieval archetype. Drerup 
1899 first provided a picture of the tradition of the corpus implying that the medieval manuscripts derived 
from ancient editions, rather than from a medieval archetype. He still placed an archetype in imperial 
times, followed in this by Butcher-Rennie 1903-31: vol. 1 pp. 6-7. Pasquali 1934: 271-8 showed that the 
hypothesis of a medieval archetype is implausible, and dating it back to the ancient world means begging 
the question: the ancient papyri are as inconsistent, divergent and contaminated as the medieval 
manuscripts. Looking for the common origin of the different ancient editions (and therefore of the 
medieval families) means going as far back as before the tradition diverged, before it spread around the 
ancient world, that is in Athens, probably at the time of the composition of the very first Demosthenic 
collection (see below pp. 293-304). A sensible account of the ancient tradition of the corpus is provided 
in Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 pp. 65-98. Dilts 2002-9: vol. 1, pp. XVI-XVII agrees that all the main 
witnesses of the medieval families present variant readings that come from antiquity. 
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graec. 485), F (Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc. gr. 416) and Y (Paris, 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. gr. 2935). S and F contain the texts of all the 
speeches with documents, A lacks the two speeches Against Stephanus (45-6) and the 
speech Against Neaera (59), Y lacks the speeches 27-58 (among which 35, 37, 43, 45 
and 46 contain documents). 
Sometimes these manuscripts agree in the documents they present: they give all 
the extant documents of the Against Timocrates (24) and the Against Aristocrates (23), 
and the few fragments of the ἔγκλημα at Dem. 37.22-9 and of the συνθηκῶν at Dem. 
56.36, 38 (except for Y that lacks speeches 37 and 56 as a whole). The documents of the 
Against Neaera (59) are present in S, F and Y, but the speech as a whole is absent from 
A. Sometimes on the other hand the manuscripts consistently lack all the documents for 
entire speeches, such as in the Against Leptines (20, except for the small document at § 
27), in spite of the many times the orator calls the secretary to read them out.  
More frequently the documents are unevenly preserved by the different branches 
of the tradition. S lacks all the documents of the speeches Against Lacritus (35), Against 
Macartatus (43) and Against Stephanus A and B (45-46). In the case of the Against 
Stephanus A a few short witness statements are present at § 24-25, but one can explain 
the anomaly, as they are densely commented by the orator and so are very likely to have 
been included in the original draft. F is in all respects the most complete collection, 
since it provides all the extant documents except those of the Against Macartatus (43). 
A lacks all the documents of the two speeches Against Stephanus (45-46) except, again, 
the witness statements at § 24-25. Furthermore, it lacks all the documents of the 
Midiana (21) and those of the Crown (18) from § 77. In this last case it is probably 
better to understand the presence of the documents down to § 77 of On the Crown in A 
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as an example of cross-contamination, as suggested by Giorgio Pasquali.25 His argument 
relies on the absence of documents from all the medieval manuscripts according to a 
precise pattern: when they are present, the number of documents, and the section of a 
speech covered by their presence, is exactly the same in all the manuscripts; on the 
other hand, when they are absent, it happens for an entire speech, and they are never 
missing in only a single manuscript inside a covered section. Therefore the absence of 
the documents from both the Midiana and On the Crown from § 77 suggests that 
originally the branch of the tradition which resulted in A lacked all the documents in 
both speeches, yet the first part of the Crown has been at some point of the tradition 
filled with material copied from a witness of a different line of transmission. Y, the 
most contaminated of the vetustissimi, contains all the extant documents of the speeches 
On the Crown (18, yet they are added later in the margin), Against Meidias (21), 
Against Aristocrates (23) and Against Timocrates (24), but all the other speeches 
bearing documents are missing. 
This sketchy overview suggests some considerations. The fact that the documents 
are not present in part of the tradition can be explained in two ways: the documents 
could have been present in the orator’s original draft, and subsequently might have been 
removed for various reasons, such as an alleged lack of interest in legal and political 
matters on the part of rhetoricians or school masters in later times. In this case, the 
absence of some of them from specific branches of the tradition would mean nothing 
more than their removal from these particular branches. This was the original opinion of 
Droysen, who therefore explained the forgeries of On the Crown as documents 
originally removed from the speech and then forged by some later editor in order to 
restore a more complete version of such a masterpiece of Attic oratory: quite an 
involved process. The alternative explanation is that the documents were not included in 
                                                
25 Pasquali 1934: 276-7. 
 21 
the original draft, and were subsequently added by some later editor. Whether this editor 
took them from reliable sources or made them up, is a matter for investigation.  
In favour of this second hypothesis strong evidence comes both from the 
manuscript tradition itself and from the historical remarks about the procedure of the 
Attic lawsuit that I have given above. As far as the transmission is concerned, the 
stichometry provides the strongest argument against the possibility that most of the 
documents were included in any original draft. Let us consider more closely how 
stichometry works and how it can be used for our purpose. 
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1.3 Stichometry and the presence of the documents in the ancient tradition 
In the medieval tradition some manuscripts preserve for many of the surviving 
Demosthenes speeches Greek numbers both at the end of the text (total stichometry) and 
next to some of the lines (partial stichometry). The final figure indicates the total of 
stichoi, lines, which never corresponds to the total number of lines of the relevant 
manuscript, and which is shared by the codices in spite of their different size. 
Something similar happens for the numbers next to the lines: these are supposed to 
mark intervals of 100 lines, α for 100, β for 200 and so on, but they do not. Instead they 
recur irregularly and usually more often than every 100 lines. In spite of such an 
irregularity, and surprisingly, they are generally consistent among different manuscripts, 
and different families of manuscripts, in marking the same points of the text. This 
happens because these marks were originally applied to a very old copy of the speeches 
and measured the text according to standard units of 15-17 syllables, 34-38 letters: that 
is, the equivalent of a Homeric hexameter.26  
We can assume that this edition was very ancient because, as we have seen, there 
is no medieval archetype of Demosthenes and the medieval families derive from 
different ancient editions of the corpus or of single speeches. Therefore, since different 
families of medieval manuscripts present the same stichometric marks at the same 
points in the text and referring to equivalent portions of text in spite of the difference 
between the manuscripts (for example the presence or not of a document), the 
                                                
26 Cf. Graux 1878. Ohly 1928 is the standard work and gives abundant evidence of this. Cf. more recently 
Blum 1991: 157; Lang 1999. MacDowell 1990: 44 and Kapparis 1999: 56-7 argue that the stichometric 
numbers derived from measurements of the lines of a very ancient copy (perhaps the first edition) of 
Demosthenes (I endorse this hypothesis myself in Canevaro 2010: 345). Although it is generally agreed 
that stichometry was originally based on standard epic lines, MacDowell and Kapparis are probably right, 
since Hellenistic and Roman prose papyri very rarely agree with a hexametric line. Their lines are usually 
shorter. On the other hand, the Derveni papyrus, the only papyrus (with a prose text) from classical 
Greece, has hexametric lines. Moreover whatever the standard hexametric measure, stichometric marks 
applied on the base of independent calculations to different copies of a speech could hardly agree to the 
extent that our medieval manuscripts do. Cf. below p. 300 for a more complete discussion. Cf. also 
Kennedy 2010: 4-10. He discusses Plato's stichometry and advances an interesting, if controversial, 
hypothesis about its use in his dialogues. 
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stichometry must have been applied on a very early copy, before the tradition diverged. 
We can conventionally call this copy Urexemplar.27 Subsequently the marks were 
transcribed in every new manuscript, regardless of the size of its lines or of any section 
of text added or deleted, as a system of measurement of literary texts in ancient times.28 
How can these marks help us to find out whether these documents were part of the 
speeches from the beginning of their transmission or inserted later? In a single speech 
the 100-line sections marked by stichometry should cover comparable portions of text. 
If two 100-line sections contain portions of text very different from each other in length, 
either some text has fallen out of the shorter section or something has been added to the 
longer one at some stage of the tradition. By analyzing the speeches we will clearly see 
that in those sections of a speech where no documents are quoted, the 100-line sections 
always have very similar lengths. By contrast, where the text of a document is included, 
the sections are often highly inconsistent among themselves and with the sections 
without documents. On the other hand, often if we measure the length of the sections 
after removing their documents, we find them perfectly consistent among themselves 
and with the sections that do not contain any documents. When this is the case, we must 
admit that the edition on which the stichometry was first applied did not contain the text 
of these documents. 
The absence of a document from a very old edition, the Urexemplar, provides 
solid ground against any claim that the documents can derive from the orator's own 
draft. If they are absent from the Urexemplar, they must have been inserted later. Of 
course, the absence of a document from a very old stichometric edition does not mean 
that it could not have been later recovered from reliable sources. However, documents 
                                                
27 I will later argue that this in fact was the first edition of Demosthenes. MacDowell 1991: 44 makes this 
point very effectively. Pace Trevett 1992: 181-2. Cf. below pp. 293-304. 
28 Cf., again, Ohly 1928: 101-25; for the case of Demosthenes, Christ 1882; Burger 1887; Burger 1892; 
Drerup 1898: 235-237; Goodwin 1901: 350-355. 
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found in the Urexemplar and documents later inserted must have entered the speeches at 
very different times, in very different contexts and must be considered separate groups. 
Generalizations are acceptable only insofar as they are drawn from, and adopted for, 
documents of a single group. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the stichometry of the public speeches of 
Demosthenes to find out which documents can be plausibly demonstrated to have been 
part of the Urexemplar, and which ones have been inserted later.  
The speeches that fall within the scope of this survey are On the Crown, Against 
Meidias, Against Aristocrates, Against Timocrates and Against Neaera. Drerup, relying 
upon the work of Friedrich Burger, singled out three speeches where all or some of the 
documents were included in the Urexemplar: Against Aristocrates (23), Against 
Timocrates (24) and Against Pantaenetus (37).29 Although this last speech is not a 
public speech, I will take it into account in order to show that Burger's calculations are 
incorrect, and that it is not clear whether any of the documents in this speech were part 
of the Urexemplar. Burger's calculations for the other private speeches are generally 
correct, and all the documents there must have been later insertions.30 Thus, as will 
become clear in the following pages, Demosthenes' public speeches contain some 
documents that were part of the Urexemplar, whereas most of them are later insertions. 
Yet no stichometric document can be safely said to have been included in the private 
speeches. Therefore the scope of this survey will encompass all the safely stichometric 
documents and a significant number of later insertions. 
In the following pages I will present stichometric calculations done with a modern 
computer, using the tool “Character Count without Spaces” of Microsoft Word, after 
                                                
29 Drerup 1898: 236. Burger 1892 analyzed the stichometry of these speeches at pp. 10-12, 14, 17. 
30 Burger 1892: 11-3. 
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having removed from the text edited by Butcher and Rennie for the OCT series all the 
elements that could not have been part of an ancient book. 
It has been recognized that the documents of the speech On the Crown were not 
part of the stichometry since 1843, when Ritschl, on Sauppe's authority,31 announced 
that they cannot have been present in the stichometric edition. These conclusions were 
confirmed first by Christ, who made calculations based on the final total stichometry of 
the speech, and used Bekker's edition for Tauchnitz, and later by Goodwin and Burger, 
who checked the marginal marks of the partial stichometry respectively against the lines 
of the manuscript S and of Bekker's edition.32 Their calculations were basically right. 
My computer-aided calculations confirm their results. Manuscripts SFBYQ33 preserve 
the total stichometry for this speech: ΧΧ𐅅ΗΗ𐅄Δ𐅃ΙΙΙ, 2768 lines.34 S, F and B and Q 
also preserve marginal marks. S has Γ Δ Ε Θ Ι Λ Μ Ρ Β Γ. F has all the marks but the 
second Γ. B has all the marks except Z, I and the second Γ. Q has the same marks as F 
and the second Γ. The marks in common between different manuscripts mark the same 
points of the text. In general, the marks indicate that the text measures more than 2700 
stichometric lines, with a small section after the last mark. This measure approximately 
corresponds to the figure of the total stichometry. I will provide my calculations in a 
table: 
     Without documents  With documents 
 
Α μνησθήσομαι (§11)   3614  
Β ἐῶ γὰρ (§ 21)    3702  
Γ ἐξέλθοιθ' (§32)    3636     4286 
Δ προορωμένων (§ 45)   3621     4893 
Ε πεποιηκώς (§ 59)    3604     4531 
Ζ ἐπιχειρῶν (§ 71)    3582  
Η ἐπιτειχισμὸν (§ 87)   3464     6425 
Θ ἀλλὰ πάλιν (§ 99)   3478     4988 
Ι δεδηλῶσθαί (§ 110)   3546     4283 
                                                
31 Ritschl 1843: 453 n. 8. 
32 Christ 1882: 158, 193; Burger 1892: 6-7; Goodwin 1901: 352-3. 
33 B is  Monacensis gr. 85 and Q is Marcianus gr. 418. For the other manuscripts see above pp. 18-21. 
34 F and B's ΧΧ𐅅ΗΗΔ𐅃ΙΙΙ is slightly corrupted. 
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Κ καὶ βοᾷς (§ 122)    3544     5198 
Λ τοῦ ἱεροῦ (§ 134)    3719  
Μ καὶ τότ' εὐθὺς (§ 143)   3421    3986 
Ν πρόϕασιν τῶν (§ 156)   3468     4469 
Ξ ἀλλ ὡς ἔοικεν (§ 172)   3471     6370 
 Ο καὶ ἀπιστίαν (§ 188)   3547    6224 
Π ἀπολωλέναι (§ 198)   3479  
Ρ ἔθαψεν (§ 208)    3534  
Σ καὶ ἔγωγ' (§ 217)    3389  
Τ ῥᾳδίως οὐ (§ 229)   3510  
Υ χρήματα (§ 239)    3463  
Φ διώκουσιν (§ 250)   3551  
Χ λεύκῃ τοὺς (§ 260)   3498  
Ψ ῥήτορσιν (§ 272)    3513  
Ω εὐθέως ὡμολόγεις (§ 284)  3617  
Α αἰτίαν ἐπὶ (§ 294)    3878  
Β οὐδένες οὔτε (§ 304)   3548  
Γ ἢ πᾶσιν (§ 316)    3634  
From Γ to the end    2607 
 
The sections without documents have numbers of character ranging from 3389 to 
3719,35 and an average of 35.6 characters per line, whereas the figures for the sections 
with documents range from 3986 to 6425 characters and are clearly unacceptable. The 
figures for the same sections, after removing the documents, are perfectly consistent 
with those of the sections that do not present any document. Therefore, the documents 
were not part of the Urexemplar of this speech. The final section from Γ to the end of 
the speech measures 2607 characters, 73 three lines of 35.6 characters. If we add these 
lines to the 2700 lines marked by the partial stichometry we find a total, 2773, which is 
strikingly close to that given by the total stichometry. 
In accordance with the medieval tradition, the documents of this speech are 
unevenly preserved in ancient papyri: P.Köln 8.334 from about 200 AD reports the 
decree at § 29; PSI 14.1395 from the 3rd century AD lacks the decree of § 37 and the 
letter of § 39; P.Ant. 1.27 from the 3rd century AD has the decree at § 54; P.Ryl. 1.57 
                                                
35 The unusual length of Ω - A, 3878, must be due to a scribal error: some copyist misplaced these marks. 
S lacks this mark, so we cannot compare its position in F and B with a different branch of tradition. Still, 
this section is substantially shorter than any section with documents. 
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from the end of the 2nd or the beginning of the 3rd century AD lacks the documents at § 
164, 165, 166 and 167; P.Paramone 2 from 4th/5th century AD has the documents at § 
166 and 167; finally P.Oxy. 11.1377 from the 1st century BCE has the letter at § 167. In 
addition to these papyri, it is worth noting that P.Haun. 1.5 and P.Oxy. 42.3009, both 
from the 2nd century AD, show the texts of documents absent from the medieval 
tradition, and moreover the texts presented by the two papyri are not the same. It is easy 
to see from this picture that the ancient papyri confirm the impression given by the 
medieval tradition: the documents were present just in part of the tradition. 
Furthermore, these papyri confirm the results of the stichometric calculations and show 
that the documents were not part of the Urexemplar, and were inserted at a later time. 
The stichometric analysis of the speech Against Meidias yields similar results and 
my calculations will confirm Christ's, Goodwin's and Burger's results.36 For this speech 
manuscripts SFYB report a total stichometry of XXIII, 2003 lines. S has the following 
marginal marks: Α, Γ, Δ, Ε, Η, Κ, Μ, Ν, Ο, Π, Ρ, Τ, Υ. F and B have A, Δ, Η, Θ, Ι 
and K. When the same letter is found in different manuscripts, it marks the same point 
of the text. After the mark Υ we find a further substantial piece of text, which suggests 
that a further mark Φ must be missing in all the tradition. If this is the case the text must 
measure over 2100 stichometric lines, and therefore the total stichometry 2003 must be 
corrupted. A very economic emendation is that suggested by Goodwin: XXIII must be a 
scribal error, and the original number must have been XXHI, 2101, which is consistent 
with the partial stichometry.37 I will present the results of my calculations in a table. 
     Without documents  With documents 
Α καὶ κατὰ τῶν (§ 11)  3351     4001 
Γ πάλιν (§ 33)   6884 (3442 x2)  7347 (3673.5 x2) 
Δ ἐξαμαρτανόντων (§ 43)  3425  
Ε ἀσεβεῖν (§ 56)   3424     4812 
                                                
36 Christ 1882: 158, 193; Burger 1892: 354; Goodwin 1906: 177-9 
37 Goodwin 1906: 179. 
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Η ἀτιμαζόμενος (§ 74)  7028 (3514 x2) 
Θ οὗτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα (§ 86)  3540     3796 
Ι ἀσελγής ἐστι (§ 98)  3483     4360 
Κ ἀλλὰ μὴν (§ 106)   3531  
Μ πάντα μὲν δὴ (§ 129)  6973 (3486.5 x2)  8158 (4079 x2) 
Ν οὗπερ εἵνεκα (§ 140)  3676  
Ο τόν γε δὴ (§ 161)   7111 (3555.5 x2) 
Π οὓς πάλιν (§ 173)   3614     4087 
Ρ ἀδικοῦντα (§ 183)   3637  
Τ ἐπηρεάζειν (§ 205)  7152 (3576 x2) 
Υ ἕλκοντά με (§ 216)  3666  
From Y to the end   3735 
The sections without documents have figures from 3425 to 3666 characters. The 
sections with documents on the other hand show figures ranging from 3796 to 4360 
characters. The only exception is the section between A and Γ, which measures 7347 
characters: an average of 3673.5 a section, just slightly longer than the longest section 
without documents. On the other hand, this section has just one document, a witness 
statement at § 22 which contains 463 characters. This shows that if we had mark B, we 
would find here a section that is substantially longer (3905 characters) than any of those 
without documents, and one perfectly consistent with them (3442). The average number 
of characters a line in the sections without documents is 35.25 and according to this 
figure, the section from Y to the end of the speech measures 106 lines. If we add this 
figure to the 2000 lines marked by the partial stichometry, we have a total of 2106 lines, 
very close to the 2101 lines recorded in the (corrupted) total stichometry. Among the 
ancient papyri, only one, P.Oxy. 56.3849 from the 2nd/3rd century AD, reports a passage 
in which some medieval manuscripts quote two oracles, § 52-3. The oracles are also 
present in the papyrus. On the other hand it is worth noting that Harpocration does not 
quote once a word or an expression coming from one of the documents in this speech, 
and in general seems unaware of their existence. Thus, it seems that also in the case of 
the Against Meidias, the ancient tradition, like the medieval manuscripts, was divided 
and the documents were found in some copies but not in others. 
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I will deal with the speeches Against Aristocrates, Against Timocrates and 
Against Neaera in a more detailed manner, since the presence of documents that are part 
of the stichometry, and the smaller length of the lines of Against Neaera deserve more 
detailed analysis. The speech Against Aristocrates (23) has been the object of 
stichometric analysis by Wilhem Christ, Friedrich Burger and William Goodwin.38 
While Christ and Burger, working on the lines of Bekker’s edition for Tauchnitz, agree 
in considering the documents part of the Urexemplar, Goodwin has cast doubts on these 
results. Working directly on the lines of manuscript S, he concluded that just the 
documents between § 44 and 90, and one of the two documents between § 35 and 44 
(probably the one at § 37) were originally included.  
For this speech the total stichometry is not preserved in any manuscript. 
Nevertheless the stichometric marks referring to the partial stichometry are found in the 
manuscripts S (Α, Β, Γ, Δ), F and B (in both cases the marks are Β, Γ, Δ, Θ, Ι, Κ, Λ, 
Μ, Ν, Ξ, Π, Ρ, Σ, Τ, Υ, Φ, and the two manuscripts agree with each other and with S). 
The last mark, Φ (§ 208, next to οἰκοδομεῖτε), refers to 2100 lines of the Urexemplar. 
The documents are found in sections A-B (§ 12 ὁ δὲ δὴ γένει – 23 εἰ μὲν δὴ), Β-Γ (§ 
23 – 35 οὐδὲ τοὺς), Γ-Δ (§ 35 – 44 φανήσεται), Δ-Θ (§ 44 – 81 κρίσεως κολάζει), 
Θ-Ι (§ 81 – 90 ποιῆσαι). By contrast, the sections from the beginning to Α, and from I 
to Φ are devoid of documents in all the tradition, and can therefore be assumed to 
provide a reliable average of characters both per 100 lines and per line. The first section 
counts 3464 characters. The long piece of text between I and Φ counts 42236 
characters, an average of 3519 characters per 100 lines. Accordingly the average line 
can be assumed to present about 35 characters. It may also be useful to provide the 
figure for the longest section and for the shortest, in order to have a general idea of the 
                                                
38 Christ 1882: 195 calculated an average of 84 Bekker lines; Burger 1892: 10 got a slightly different 
result, 82-83 lines. Goodwin 1901: 354 calculated about 153.7 lines of S per 100 lines of the Urexemplar. 
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acceptable variation in length for a section, due mainly to the effect of repeated copying 
on the collocation of the marks. The longest section is found between Ι and Κ (§ 90 – 
102 ἵνα δ' ὡς), and measures 3597 characters, the shortest between the beginning and 
Α, 3465 characters. Any figure between these two will be generally considered 
acceptable. 
The first section to present quoted documents is found between Α and Β. This 
section presents just one law at § 22, and measures 3559 characters with this text tallied 
up, 3420 without it. The total calculation without the document seems too small, even if 
slightly. It would seem therefore that the document was indeed part of the Urexemplar, 
but because of the small difference between this measure and that of the section from 
the beginning to Α it will be safer to give a judgement about this particular document at 
a later point, according both to the internal evidence of the text itself and to the general 
trend of the stichometry for the entire speech. The next section does not present the 
same problems: between Β and Γ the law at § 28 must have been part of the 
Urexemplar, as the figure of characters with the document, 3554, is acceptable, while 
the one without it, 3336, is too low. The situation of the next section is even more 
straightforward: between Γ and Δ are found two laws (§ 37 and 44), and the count of 
characters without them, 3188, is far too low, while the figure with them, 3476 is 
perfectly consistent. The next preserved stichometric mark, Θ, marks 700 lines of the 
Urexemplar, and therefore the space between Δ and Θ corresponds to four sections of 
100 characters. This part presents in the extant manuscripts four documents at § 51, 53, 
60 and 62. The figure encompassing them, 14027, 3507 characters per 100 lines, is 
perfectly consistent with the other sections, while the one without them, 13594, about 
3398 characters per 100 lines, falls slightly short. It must be noted that this last figure is 
not completely impossible in itself, even if somewhat anomalous. However, in order to 
support the conclusion that the documents in this case were encompassed in the 
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Urexemplar, it will suffice to anticipate that the analysis of them does not reveal any 
significant difference in style and composition from those which are safely known to 
have been part of the stichometric edition. Moreover these documents in their entirety 
appear in every single witness of the text, both medieval and ancient. This can afford us 
the assumption that, if they were present in all the tradition, they must have been present 
from the beginning. The last section, from Θ to Ι, presents three laws, at § 82, 86, 87, 
and casts no doubts on their authenticity: the figure with them, 3485, is acceptable, 
while the one without, 3189, is far too low.  
With these results at hand it is very likely that the law at § 22 was present in the 
Urexemplar, since all the documents preserved in the extant manuscripts seem to have 
been part of the stichometric exemplar. These conclusions should not, however, be 
taken too far: at least for the last two sections, even though the general trend of this 
speech’s stichometry and the concurring tradition of the speech speak for the presence 
of all the documents in the Urexemplar, the possibility that one or more laws among the 
ones at § 51, 53, 60, 62, and one among the last two of § 86 and 87 were absent from 
the stichometric edition cannot be excluded on numerical grounds. In these cases 
therefore, as well as for the law at § 22, even though their presence in the Urexemplar is 
very likely, a final judgement must be postponed until after a close analysis of the texts. 
The presence, or absence, of significant discrepancies between these texts and the ones 
known to have been part of the stichometric edition will place the judgement on 
stronger grounds. 
Nevertheless further evidence of the presence of all the documents in the 
stichometric edition can be provided by the medieval tradition, in which every witness 
of the speech presents all of them, without significant differences in their text. A further 
reason for assuming a very ancient tradition of these insertions, actually as ancient as 
the tradition of the speech itself, is provided by the papyri. A witness of the 2nd century 
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AD, P.Mich. III.142, confirms the presence of the law at § 53, exactly as we read it, in 
all the tradition, and a short lemma in a lexicon to this speech dated 4th/5th century, 
P.Berol. 5008, reports and discusses one of the clauses of this law. P.Rain. I.9, of the 3rd 
century AD, presents also the last clause of the document at § 82. No witness of the 
speech, either ancient or medieval, presents any instance of a section where a document 
has been calculated to have been inserted in the stichometric edition, in which that 
document is actually not present. The indirect tradition for these documents is also 
wide, and all the relevant cases will be indicated in the apparatus criticus. 
Much more complicated is the situation of the speech Against Timocrates (24). 
This speech has already received thorough analysis from Christ,39 and the further survey 
by Burger40 mostly confirmed his results. It presents partial and total stichometry in the 
manuscripts F and B, while S is devoid of both, as happens for the speech Against 
Androtion (22), so that Christ thought that the two speeches could have been part of the 
same roll.41 
The total stichometry, preserved by B and Y, is ΧΧ (2000 lines), consistent with 
the partial one, which presents a substantial section, a little shorter than the average 
measure for 100 lines, after the mark Τ (1900 lines). The preserved marks for the partial 
stichometry are Α, Β, Γ, Δ, Ζ, Η, Θ, Ι, Λ, Μ, Ν, Ξ, Ο, Π, Ρ, Σ and Τ. One long law is 
preserved between Α and Β (§ 11 ὁσίων χρημάτων – 25 ἐν δὲ τῷ), one decree and 
one law between Β and Γ (§25 – 37 βέλτιστον), three laws, including the one by 
Timocrates indicted in the trial at issue, between Γ and Δ (§ 37 – 46 προστετίμηται). 
There follow six laws between Δ and Ζ (§ 46 – 68 οἶμαι), while between Ζ and Η (§ 
68 – 78 καὶ δεῖν) a part of Timocrates’ law is repeated. The next sections generally lack 
documents, except between Ι and Λ (§ 100 ὑπάρχοντας – 122 ἐνεθυμήθην), where 
                                                
39 Christ 1882: 194. 
40 Burger 1892: 10-11. 
41 Christ 1882: 221. Cf. Burger 1892: 10, n. 1. 
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one further law is found, and between the marks Ν and Ξ (§ 142 μὲν τοῦ Σόλωνος – 
156 ἂν μάλιστα), where the quotation reports the ὅρκος ἡλιαστῶν. On the other hand, 
the long part of text between Ξ and Τ is without documents and can be used to assess an 
average figure of characters per 100 lines, to be compared with the figures of the 
sections at issue. It contains all in all 17524 characters for five sections of 100 lines, 
which means about 3505 characters per 100 lines. It must therefore be noted that the 
number of characters per line in this speech, 35, is on average the same as for the speech 
Against Aristocrates (23). It is worth reporting moreover the figures for the shortest and 
the longest section, in order to single out a plausible range of acceptable measures per 
100 lines: the first section, which runs from the beginning to § 11 (Α, 100 lines), does 
not contain any document, and its figure for the characters is 3428, the lowest in this 
speech. The highest figure is instead that of the 100 lines between Η and Θ, 3642 
characters. Both these figures are probably altered by the copying process, but can 
nonetheless be a useful indication of what sort of variation in length can be expected for 
100 ancient lines, and eventually be accepted in the absence of any more solid evidence. 
The first section with quoted documents runs from Α to Β, and does not cast any 
doubt: the figure with the law is 5034, far too high, while without the document 3509 
characters is perfectly acceptable. The law on nomothesia at § 20-23 cannot have been 
part of the Urexemplar. The same conclusion is valid for the next section: between Β 
and Γ the figure with the decree at § 27 and the law at § 33, 4340, is too high, while if 
the documents are not encompassed the resulting number, 3527, is perfectly consistent 
with the other sections. A similar situation is found with the latest legal texts of the 
speech: if the law at § 105 is encompassed in the character count for the section 
between Ι and Λ, corresponding to 200 ancient lines, the total figure 7605, 3802 
characters per 100 lines, is too high, while without the document the number decreases 
to 7097, 3548 characters per 100 lines, an acceptable figure. The same happens for the 
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ὅρκος ἡλιαστῶν at § 149-151: the figure with the document is 4502, completely 
inconsistent with the average number of characters per section, while without the oath 
we get 3483, which is perfectly acceptable. 
According to these first calculations the documents of the Against Timocrates (24) 
were not part of the Urexemplar, yet the stichometric calculations for the paragraphs 
between § 37 and 78 (Γ-Η) give very different results. In the section between Γ and Δ 
the documents are absolutely needed in order to get a figure of characters consistent 
with the other sections: without tallying them up in fact the number of characters is 
2082, absolutely untenable, while with the documents the section provides a figure of 
3529 characters, perfectly acceptable. This means that in this case the three laws were 
part of the Urexemplar. The same happens with the section between Ζ and Η, where the 
repetition of some lines of Timocrates’ law is needed in order to get an acceptable 
figure: the characters without it are 3374, which is too low a figure, while 3614, the 
number obtained by tallying up the lines of the law, is consistent with the average 
length of the other sections.  
Much more complicated is the situation of the piece of text between Δ and Ζ. In 
this case the documents are many, six laws, and the figure of characters for these two 
sections of 100 lines seems inconsistent with the rest of the evidence both with the laws 
and without them: the figure without the laws, 6071, which means about 3035 
characters per 100 lines is far too low, but also the number of characters found from 
tallying up the documents is inconsistent. This is 7430, 3715 characters per 100 lines, 
about 70 characters higher than the longest section found in the rest of the speech. It 
must therefore be concluded that some of the documents in this section were part of the 
stichometric edition, but not all of them. It is impossible to find out which documents 
could have been part of the Urexemplar just from the stichometry. Yet a few useful 
indications for guiding the further survey on the specific documents can be given. The 
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number of characters for each law is a helpful parameter. We can assume that for the 
200 lines marked by Δ and Ζ every figure of characters between 6856 (twice the 
shortest section of the speech) and 7284 (twice the longest section) can be accepted. 
Therefore, we can easily point out that the absence of the law at § 63, with the short 
repetition of § 64, is alone sufficient in order to get the acceptable figure of 7240, which 
means 3445 characters per 100 lines. In this case all the other laws should be considered 
part of the stichometric edition, as the removal of any other document would produce an 
unreliable number. This is a plausible solution, but it is definitely not the only one: the 
removal of just the law at § 50 would produce an acceptable figure as well, 7096 
characters, about 3548 per 100 lines. Yet this removal would not exclude the possibility 
that one further text (or even one document and a half) among the ones at § 54, 56 and 
59, was not in the Urexemplar. Finally, the removal of any two texts among the ones at 
§ 54, 56 (I consider here the two short laws as one) and 59 would suffice in order to 
provide an acceptable figure, as well as the removal of the three of them. This cannot 
provide more than some guidance for the analysis of the single texts: if internal 
evidence, such as oddities of style or content, show that the law at § 63-64 cannot be 
considered consistent with the other ones present in the Urexemplar, this means that the 
other texts in this section actually were in the Urexemplar. A similar consideration must 
be kept in mind when dealing with the first laws of the section: if the document at § 51 
can be shown to have some inconsistent features, that will imply that among the 
following three laws no more than one, if any, can be excluded from the Urexemplar. 
As in the case of the Against Aristocrates (23), all the documents of this speech 
are present in all the medieval tradition. Evidence on papyrus are P.Oxy. 2.232, 2nd/3rd 
century AD, for a substantial part of the law at § 54 and for the second law at § 56, 
P.Oxy. 4.701, of the 2nd/3rd century AD for part of the law at § 63 and the one at § 64, 
and P.Oxy. 2.233, 3rd century AD, for part of the Heliastic Oath of § 149-151. Again 
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there is no instance of a document reckoned to have been part of the stichometric 
edition, which happens to be missing from any witness of the relevant passage. 
The last speech to have been traditionally reckoned to contain at least a few 
documents already included in the stichometric edition is the Against Pantaenetus (37). 
It is necessary therefore to assess these calculations, even though the speech is not a 
public speech. It presents five fragments of ἐγκλήματα between § 22 and 29, while 
other texts called to be read out by the secretary are not preserved in any manuscript. 
The situation for this speech is not really straightforward, mainly because no total 
stichometry is preserved, and the calculation can be based on just two marks, Α and Ε, 
both of them next to the same passages in the manuscripts S, F and B. The first mark, A 
is noted next to § 10, ὡς ἐλυπήθην, while the second, Ε, marks § 54, εἰς ἐκείνους. The 
first section, from the beginning to Α, counts 3507 characters, while the second, from Α 
to Ε, corresponding to 400 lines of the ancient text, provides a figure of 13822 
characters, which means an average of 3455 characters per 100 lines. If the documents 
are not tallied up the figure becomes 13197, about 3299 characters per 100 lines. 
These figures cannot in themselves provide any serious guidance for assessing the 
presence of the ἐγκλήματα in the Urexemplar, as they are not sufficient for singling 
out a range of acceptable measures per 100 lines, in regard to this speech. Yet in the 
Demosthenic corpus the measures per 100 lines of the Urexemplar are neither 
completely random nor different for every speech. Instead, as assessed by Friedrich 
Burger42, it is possible to single out standard measures shared by substantial groups of 
speeches. As has been shown before, the average number of characters per line for the 
speeches On the Crown (18), Against Meidias (21), Against Aristocrates (23) and 
Against Timocrates (24) is about the same, 35 characters, and this figure is shared by 
                                                
42 Burger 1892: 29-31. 
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nearly all the so-called δημόσιοι λόγοι and the δημηγορίαι,43 as well as by the 
Exordia and the Letters. Another substantial group of speeches, presenting in the 
stichometric edition an average number of characters per line which is widely coherent, 
consists in the so-called ἰδιοτικοὶ λόγοι, as well as in the ἐπιδεικτικοί ones. For these 
speeches the average figure is 33-34 characters a line. Exceptions to this general picture 
are the speeches Against Olympiodorus (48), which presents an anomalous measure per 
line, about 28 characters, shared just with one ancient edition of Herodotus,44 and 
Against Neaera, whose stichometry, 32 characters a line, finds a parallel just in the 
partial stichometry preserved in the manuscripts F and B for the speech On the False 
Embassy (19),45 The Against Pantaenetus (37) is one of the ἰδιοτικοὶ λόγοι, and the 
figure provided by the first section of 100 ancient lines, from the beginning to Α (3407 
characters), is not consistent with anything but the average line of these genre of 
speeches: 33-34 characters. The average figures of characters per 100 lines provided by 
the section of the Against Pantaenetus (37) from Α to Ε, 3455 with the documents and 
3299 without, are either a little bit too high or a little bit too low if compared with the 
average for other private speeches where no documents are found in the tradition. One 
one carefully checks the other private speeches however, it is easy to find out that both 
the figures are sometimes matched by particular sections of these speeches. Therefore, 
the stichometric evidence alone does not suffice the decide whether the documents in 
this speech were in the Urexemplar or not. 
Both Christ and Burger46 argued that the ἐγκλήματα were part of the Urexemplar 
on the ground of the number of lines in the text edited by Bekker for Tauchnitz per 
                                                
43 Except the so-called Hellenic δημηγoρίαι, that is the speeches On the symmories (14), On the freedom 
of the Rodians (15) and On the Megalopolitans (16), as well as the speech On the treaty with Alexander 
(17), which share their stichometry rather with the ἰδιοτικοί and the ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι. 
44 Cf. Burger 1892: 34-41. 
45 While the total stichometry in all the manuscripts, and the partial one in S, point to a book format 
similar to the one of the other δημόσιοι λόγοι. Cf. Burger 1892: 7-8, 21, 30. 
46 Christ 1882: 194; Burger 1892: 12, 17. 
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stichometric section. Burger found that the first section could be reckoned to occupy 79 
lines, a figure consistent with the other private speeches, while the second part 
presented 80.5 lines (on average) of text per 100 lines with the documents, and just 77 
without them. As the first figure is closer to that of the first section than the figure 
without documents, he concluded that the documents were part of the Urexemplar. As 
has been shown in the previous paragraph, the situation is far less straightforward: since 
both the figures with documents and those without them are acceptable, the conclusions 
reached by Burger can no longer be supported. The stichometry cannot provide solid 
evidence about the provenience of the ἐγκλήματα, and the question as to whether or 
not they were part of the Urexemplar cannot even tentatively be answered at this point. 
The Against Pantaenetus (37) cannot help us to understand the origin of the 
documents already inserted when the stichometric edition was composed. After the 
characteristics of stichometric and non-stichometric documents will be clear it will be 
possible, in a future study of the documents in the private speeches of Demosthenes, to 
assess the origin of these ἐγκλήματα. 
For the speech Against Neaera stichometric marks, both marginal and at the end 
of the text, are found in the manuscripts S and Q. In this speech many documents are 
preserved, namely three laws (§ 16, 52, 87), one official oath (§ 78), one decree (§ 104), 
many witness statements (§ 23, 25, 28, 32, 34, 40, 47, 48, 54, 61, 71, 84, 123), the text 
of a settlement decided by arbitrators (§ 71) and the actual challenge (πρόκλησις) 
issued against Stephanus (§ 124). The first scholar to attempt a calculation was Christ.47 
He took into account only the total stichometry at the end of the speech, 1451 lines, and 
compared this figure with the Teubner text, finding out that the number of Teubner lines 
every 100 lines of the stichometric edition is 72.8 without the documents, but 81.7 with 
                                                
47 Christ 1882: 195-196. 
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the documents. The first figure is completely inconsistent with other speeches, and so 
he concluded that the documents were part of the stichometric text.  
This calculation is wrong. In 1892 Burger,48 repeated the analysis taking into 
account the partial stichometry and reached very different results. My calculations 
mostly confirm Burger’s results. I will present here the results and an overview of the 
process. 
The marks I use are the ones provided by the manuscript S, which are almost 
entirely confirmed by the later codex, Q. Q is an apograph of F and therefore belongs to 
a different branch of the tradition of the speech.49 Therefore we can confidently state, 
for this speech as well as for those previously analyzed, that the stichometric marks 
derive from a very ancient copy, the Urexemplar, since they are consistent in different 
branches of the tradition that diverged very early. We can read Β (200 lines) next to 
Χαρισίου at § 18, Γ (300 lines) next to ἐν Κορίνθῳ at § 30, Δ (400 lines) next to καὶ 
εἰσάγει at § 39, Ι (1000 lines) next to ἐξέστω εἰσιέναι at § 87, Κ (1100 lines) next to 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι at § 96, and Μ (1300 lines) next to μετρίαν at § 113. The number of 
characters in the first section from the beginning to letter Β, that is the figure for two 
units of 100 lines, is 6662, ca. 3331 characters every 100 lines. This section has just a 
short document. The second section, from Β to Γ, with many documents, contains 3818 
characters. The third one, from Γ to Δ, contains 3818 characters. The next section, from 
Δ to Ι, that is, five units of 100 lines, also has several documents and contains 18682 
characters, which means 3867 characters a unit. The unit from Ι to Κ contains 3407 
characters, and preserves just two lines of a document. Finally, the space from Κ to Μ, 
namely two units of 100 lines, consists of 6783 characters, 3392 characters a unit, with 
a few documents. It is easy to see that these figures are heavily inconsistent when they 
                                                
48 Burger 1887: 654; Burger 1892: 26-27; his arguments are summarized in Drerup 1898: 236-237. 
Recently the entire question has been reassessed in Kapparis 1999: 56-58, with analogous results.  
49 Cf. Dilts 2002-9: vol. 4 p. VI. Burger 1892: 11 n. 1 and Trevett 1992: 181 seem unaware that 
stichometric marks are preserved also in Q. 
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should mark units of approximately the same length. It is also worth noting that the only 
two sections that contain a comparable number of characters are the ones with the 
fewest documents. 
Let us make the calculation again without including the documents. The first 
section, from the beginning to Β, contains 6407 characters, 3203 every 100 lines. From 
Β to Γ the characters are 3235, from Γ to Δ they are 3248, from Δ to Ι they are 15969 
for five sections, on average 3194 characters a section. From Ι to Κ we have 3315, the 
only very small irregularity, but in this section it is likely that the original mark slipped 
down a little bit because of a document inserted in the middle of the line originally 
marked with Κ. The last section, from Κ to Μ, the equivalent of two units of 100 lines, 
contains 6406 characters, that is, 3203 characters every 100 lines. 
The figures in this case are almost perfectly consistent, and the slight variations 
can be easily explained as effects of the transmission. We can even calculate from this 
data an average number of characters per line for this speech in the ancient stichometric 
edition: 32 letters. This allows us a rough calculation of the ancient lines between Μ 
and the end of the speech: 143, consequently with a further mark, Ν, at the end of § 
122. It is therefore clear that the inserted documents did not appear in the stichometric 
edition of the Against Neaera.50 This means that none of the documents included in the 
oration was an original part of the text. They were all inserted into the text of the speech 
at a later stage in the transmission of the Demosthenic corpus. 
The documents of this speech are preserved concurrently in all the medieval 
tradition. However, A, the ancestor of one of the main families of the medieval 
tradition, does not contain this speech, and therefore our picture of the presence of the 
                                                
50 The only remaining problem is the total stichometry of 1451 lines noted at the end of the speech in the 
manuscripts SFY and Q. This is patently inconsistent with our calculation of 1343 lines. It is probably 
right to accept in this respect the proposal of Drerup that an original ΧΗΗΗ𐅄Ι, 1351, close enough to 
our rough estimation, copied from some very ligated ancient manuscript, eventually gained a further H, 
becoming 1451.  
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documents in different editions of the speech is not complete. Moreover, we have no 
papyri reporting sections of the Against Neaera, and thus it is not possible to assess how 
widespread their presence in the speech was, and when they first appeared. 
This analysis has singled out two different groups of documents: some of the 
documents were already part of the Urexemplar of the speeches whereas some other 
documents have been certainly inserted at a later date. Generalizations about the nature 
of the documents therefore are meaningless if they don't take into account this 
fundamental division. Each document should be compared with similar documents, and 
generalizations about the origin of the documents should be made separately for each 
group. But before analyzing the documents it is important to lay down some 
methodological guidelines. 
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1.4 Methodological principles51 
It is quite obvious that in order to assess the reliability of documents, in particular 
laws and decrees found in the speeches of the orators, one must compare the 
information provided in the documents with other information found elsewhere about 
the same topic. The most obvious places to look for such information are the 
paraphrases in the speeches that either precede or follow the quotations, and the orators' 
discussions and interpretations of their provisions. As will be clear from the following 
chapters, the documents are often inconsistent with their paraphrases. However it is a 
very widespread assumption that the orators misreport the contents of laws, decrees and 
witness statements every time this serves to improve their argument. Therefore the fact 
that a document contradicts the information found in its paraphrase can sometimes be 
considered not to be enough evidence that the document is unreliable. To give a few 
examples, Kapparis in his analysis of the document at [Dem.] 59.104 actually states that 
'the differences between the decree and the context should be explained as deliberate 
distortions by the orator intended to present the terms of this award as more stringent 
than they actually were.' Pelling claims that 'an audience would find it difficult, even 
immediately after hearing it, to recall that it was only some priesthoods, not all, from 
which Plataeans were excluded; or that the distinction between first and second-
generation citizens applied only to the archonship, not to a priesthood. [...] Apollodorus 
is trying to persuade his audience that they have just heard something they have not.'52  
This argument however cannot withstand a careful reading of the orators: first, 
giving a misleading account of events which happened a long time ago, or even giving 
tendentious interpretations of legal texts, is a very different matter from misreporting 
the provisions of an official document just read out by the clerk. Texts as long as the 
                                                
51 This chapter is a revised and extended version of Canevaro 2010: 341-5 and Canevaro-Harris 2012 
(forthcoming). 
52 Kapparis 1995: 387; Pelling 2000: 65-67. 
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ones we are concerned with, and the following summaries, together are likely to be 
read, however emphatically, in no more than a few minutes, to an audience familiar 
with the language and terminology of official documents.53 The judges would therefore 
have immediately detected any inconsistency in paraphrases close to the actual 
quotations. This would have undermined the speaker's credibility and (if done by an 
accuser) would have been attacked by the defendant and used as evidence that his 
opponent was a liar. If a law or a decree does not support the speaker's argument, the 
best thing for the orator to do was not to ask the clerk to read it.  
With this I am not claiming that Athenian orators did not misinterpret the laws 
that they asked the secretary to read out, nor that they did not occasionally quote 
selectively and excerpt the laws to be read out in order better to support their 
arguments.54 When Andocides (1.88) interprets the law τοῖς νόμοις [...] χρῆσθαι ἀπ᾽ 
Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος as: 'Nobody should use the laws that have been enacted before 
the archonship of Eucleides' he is clearly 'speaking loosely'55 since the provision simply 
meant that offenses committed before the archonship of Eucleides could no longer be 
brought to trial.56 It did not mean that only laws and decrees passed from the archonship 
of Eucleides onwards were valid. Andocides is misinterpreting the statute here because 
he wishes the judges to believe that the decree of Isotimides (Andoc. 1.8, 71) is no 
longer valid. However, although Andocides is clearly misinterpreting the statute, he is 
not misquoting it, and his paraphrase is so accurate that it makes it possible for the 
modern interpreter to understand the true meaning of the provision, in spite of the 
orator's efforts to conceal it.57 As for selective quotation, it is enough to mention 
                                                
53 On the legal knowledge of the average Athenian cf. Harris-Leao-Rhodes 2010 passim and in particular 
the 'Introduction' by Harris at 1-7. 
54 The point about selective quotation is made by Gagarin 2008: 191-2 and Rubinstein 2009: 121-3. 
55 MacDowell 1962: 137. 
56 MacDowell 1962: 128-9. 
57 Another case of serious misinterpretation but not misquotation is Lys. 1.30-5. See Harris 2006: 283-95. 
Carey 1995: 408-10 also states that Lysias 'is guilty at least of a distortion'. 
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Demosthenes' reply to Aeschines' discussion (3.32) of the law restricting where 
proposed crowns could be awarded, in occasion of the trial of Ctesiphon in 330 BCE: 
'Are you not ashamed to bring a charge because of envy and not because of any actual 
wrong, modifying laws and removing parts from them when they should rightly be read 
out in their entirety to those who have sworn to vote according to the laws?' Moreover a 
quick look at Demosthenes' discussion of various sections of the homicide law in the 
speech Against Aristocrates shows that the orator quoted and discussed specific 
provisions of the law.58 This evidence shows that selective quotation happened.59 
However, selective quotation does not mean misquotation: whatever parts of a law a 
litigant decided to put in the sealed echinos, these must be the parts he discusses in his 
paraphrase. If a document contradicts the evidence of its paraphrase, or lacks some of 
the provisions discussed by the speaker, this is prima facie evidence against its 
authenticity. 
Moreover, if the speakers were in the habit of misrepresenting the contents of the 
documents, we would then expect to find different accounts of the same document when 
paraphrased by different speakers. Yet that is not what we find. At the trial of Ctesiphon 
in 330 BCE both Aeschines and Demosthenes refer to three laws, one requiring 
magistrates to undergo an audit (Aeschin. 3.17-22; Dem. 18.111-18), one about crowns 
for magistrates (Aeschin. 3.11, 31; Dem. 18.111-18) and one about the announcement 
of crowns in the theatre (Aeschin. 3.35-6; Dem. 18.120-22). Aeschines and 
Demosthenes differ in their interpretation of these rules, but not about their provisions 
                                                
58 See below pp. 58-108 passim. 
59 However, claiming, as Gagarin 2008: 192 does, that the orators rearranged the clauses of the laws and 
made small changes to their wording is unwarranted by the evidence. The penalty for citing a non-
existent law was death (Dem. 26.24). Moreover the only evidence adduced in support of this hypothesis is 
inconclusive: Gagarin notes that 'in a case having nothing to do with homicide (Dem. 43.57), the speaker 
rearranges the provisions he cites from Draco’s homicide law and makes one or two small changes in the 
wording'. The stichometry of this speech shows that the documents were not part of its Urexemplar and 
were inserted at a later date (see Burger 1892: 25-6). Therefore the arrangement of the provisions and the 
wording, whether the document is authentic or not, have nothing to do with the actual speaker. 
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and their basic terms.60 The same happens with a decree of the Council passed in 
Munichion 346, to which both Dem. 19.161 and Aeschin. 2.91, 98, 103 refer.61 
Quotations from a law about the validity of wills summarized in many of Isaeus' 
speeches (Is. 1.11; 3.1; 4.14, 16; 6.9, 21, 28; 9.11, 13, 37; 10.2, 9; cf. Dem 46.16 and 
Hyp. Ath. 17) do not show any inconsistency. Demosthenes discusses the procedure of 
nomothesia in his speeches Against Leptines and Against Timocrates. The two speeches 
serve very different purposes, and particular aspects of the procedure are stressed 
accordingly, but there is no major disagreement between the two accounts. The two 
accounts of the procedure are identical: proposals for new laws must be posted at the 
monument of the Eponymous Heroes for all to read (Dem. 20.94; 24.25) and any law 
contrary to the new proposal must first be repealed; if the proponent fails to do this, he 
can be charged in court (Dem. 20.93; 24.32).62 When one compares an orator's account 
of a document with the copy found in an inscription, they are completely consistent. In 
the speech Against Leptines Demosthenes summarizes the provisions of a decree 
granting ateleia to Epikerdes of Cyrene (Dem. 20.41-5), and several fragments of the 
actual decree confirm his words.63 The same happens with the accounts of two of the 
legal texts in Demosthenes' Against Aristocrates, one at paragraph 37-8 (which matches 
ll. 26-9 of IG I3 104) and one at paragraph 60-1 (cf. IG I3 104 ll. 37-8). In these cases 
the orator's accounts match the inscription almost word for word.64 The evidence shows 
that speakers, when discussing a document right before or after the clerk read it out, 
avoided misrepresenting its words.  
In short, there is no reason to believe that the orators deliberately distorted the 
provisions of a law or a decree. Their summaries should be considered basically 
                                                
60 Cf. Harris 2000:  59-67. 
61 Cf. Harris 1995: 79. 
62 See below pp. 122-35 for a detailed comparison of these two accounts of nomothesia. For further 
examples see below pp. 196-8 and 269-72. 
63 IG I3 25. Cf. Meritt 1970; West 1995. 
64 Cf. Stroud 1968: 53-4, 57. 
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reliable, and can and should be tested against each other when the same document is 
discussed more than once. Further details can also be added to the picture from evidence 
from outside the orators. The document's contents should then be tested against these 
reconstructions. 
It has now been established that the documents should not contradict the 
information found in their paraphrases, and should contain all the features there 
summarized. Sometimes however the documents also contain details absent from, or 
discrepancies with, their summary. This is sometimes understood as evidence for their 
authenticity. This assumption is unwarranted by the evidence. A quick look at the 
documents in Demosthenes' On the Crown and Aeschines' Against Timarchus clearly 
shows that the persons who composed the forged documents relied on the paraphrases 
found in the adjoining text but also added plenty of details to give the misleading 
impression that they had an independent source. Ironically enough, such attempts to 
make the document look authentic often resulted in introducing words or phrases that 
are inconsistent with the language and terminology of contemporary documents: 
features that prove that the document is not authentic. A good example of this is the law 
about hybris quoted at Aeschin. 1.16, universally recognised as a forgery.65 Aeschines, 
right before the quotation, states that 'in that law it is explicitly written, that 'if anyone 
commits hybris against a boy [...] or against a man or a woman, either free or slave, or if 
he does anything paranomon against anyone of these persons', in such a case the law 
has provided for indictments for hybris.' The forged law, however, starts with: 'If any of 
the Athenians commits hybris against a free boy...' and ends with 'There shall also be 
liable to these actions those who have offended against the body of slaves.' Apart from 
the wording deliberately altered in the forged law, the content is heavily inconsistent, 
since men and women are ignored, and many details about the procedure are added, 
                                                
65 Cf. Drerup 1898: 305-8; Fisher 2001: 138-40. The translation is also taken from Fisher. 
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'based on casual reading of the speech' and the forger's 'own ideas.' Even though the 
forged document contains some of Aeschines' phrasing, in Fisher's words, the document 
'does not reflect Aeschines' language at all closely.'66 This habit can be easily spotted in 
most of the documents of this speech, as well as in those of Demosthenes' On the 
Crown. A text of particular interest is the alleged Ctesiphon's decree honouring 
Demosthenes (Dem. 18.118). This text contains many independent, and clearly 
invented, details, in spite of the fact that Dem. 18 and Aeschin. 3 discuss at length the 
relevant decree. The material was by far enough for the forger to rely on and thus 
fabricate a consistent document, yet he actually added details and modified the 
information taken from the speeches.67 This evidence, coupled with the previous 
argument about the accuracy of the orators' paraphrases and summaries, shows that 
disagreement between the document and the orator's words, far from proving the 
authenticity of the document, may actually be grounds for declaring it a forgery. 
Another important methodological point concerns the texts of the documents: one 
should analyse them as they are found in the paradosis. Scholars often attempt to 
remove the problems found in the documents by means of transpositions, emendations, 
and deletions. These attempts to 'improve' the text are not methodologically sound. If 
one can determine on the basis of external evidence that a particular document is 
genuine, it is then legitimate to attribute minor errors to scribes copying the text. But to 
assume that a document is genuine and therefore to attribute every mistake to medieval 
scribes begs the question.68 Moreover, such hypotheses are often highly implausible on 
textual grounds. As we have seen, the Demosthenic corpus does not have a medieval 
archetype, and the medieval families have been shown to stem from different ancient 
editions, either of the entire corpus or of single speeches, all independent from the very 
                                                
66 Fisher 2001: 139. 
67 Cf. Schläpfer 1939: 79-91. 
68 So MacDowell, CR 35/2 (1985) 319. 
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beginning of the ancient tradition.69 This means that one must either argue that the same 
errors originated independently in different manuscripts or attribute them to the 
common ancestor of the families and conclude that the errors were present when the 
document was first inserted. The first possibility can safely be ruled out. Small 
problems with the text can certainly be scribal mistakes from a very early stage of 
transmission, before the corpus spread around the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, small 
mistakes are found sometimes in Demosthenes' text consistently in all the tradition, and 
must be ascribed to the original Urexemplar.70 But emendations, however small, should 
be proposed only when other tests for authenticity have been passed. But major 
problems with the text cannot be explained as scribal errors. They must be mistakes 
made by someone who composed the document after the Classical period and did not 
understand Athenian law and legal procedure. 
The last methodological point concerns the comparative material used when 
examining the language and terminology of a document: documents should conform to 
the language, style and conventions of Classical Athenian inscriptions of the same type. 
Developments through the period should be taken into account, and the comparative 
weight of inscriptions closer in time to the document is greater. Slight variations might 
not amount to decisive evidence of forgery, since standard formulas can 'in fact appear 
in several forms with small verbal differences',71 but the presence in a document of 
words or expressions never found in similar Attic inscriptions, or in any Attic 
inscription at all, casts serious doubts on the document's authenticity. Conversely, 
language and terminology of laws and decrees from other communities cannot be used 
                                                
69 See above pp. 47-8. 
70 Pasquali 1934: 273. 
71 Rhodes 1980: 309. 
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as parallels.72 Finally, parallels from literary prose cannot amount to decisive evidence 
for authenticity, since literary texts often present grammatical structures and 
terminology that is consistently absent from contemporary documents.73 
These methodological principles will guide my analysis of the documents. When 
these documents are inconsistent with their paraphrases, or present features that conflict 
with other reliable information about Athenian history, law and institutions, or language 
and formulas never found in contemporary inscriptions, I will deem them non-authentic. 
With this I mean that they do not descend through direct transmission from the actual 
texts of the documents discussed in the speeches and therefore someone fabricated them 
to fill gaps. Whether their details derive from the imagination of some forger, from 
passages in the orators (with some misunderstanding) or from other sources (again, with 
some misunderstanding), they are not reliable. At best they are very early and clumsy 
pseudo-scholarly attempts at reconstructing the lost documents, at worst pieces of 
historical fiction. In any case, they are not more reliable than the orators' paraphrases 
and historians should not use them in their reconstructions of facts, laws and 
procedures. 
In my study I will use the word 'forgery' interchangeably with 'non-authentic'. I 
am aware that studies of literary forgeries, and in particular Speyer's masterpiece, have 
developed a stricter definition of 'forgery', and I am also aware that by Speyer's 
definition, my documents could hardly be considered 'forgeries'. Speyer writes at the 
beginning of his study 'Die Fälschung kann als eine besondere Erscheinungsform der 
Pseudepigraphie bestimmt werden. Die Begriffe literarische Fälschung und 
Pseudepigraphie verhalten sich dann wie Species und Genus zueinander. Ein 
                                                
72 Cf. Rhodes with Lewis 1997 passim for plenty of examples of the differences between the language and 
formulas of decrees from different communities, and in particular pp. 550-63 for an account of influences 
and differences. 
73 A case is the third-person imperative in -τωσαν, often found in literary texts from Classical Athens but 
avoided in documentary texts before 351 BCE (and used very rarely between 350 and 322). Cf. Threatte 
1980-96: vol. 2, pp. 462-6 and Harris, CP 87 (1992): 76-87; 2008: 89 n. 48. 
 50 
Pseudepigraphon ist ein literarisches Werk, das nicht von dem Verfasser stammt, dem 
es der Titel (die Subscriptio), der Inhalt oder die Überlieferung zuweisen. Bei jedem 
antiken Schriftwerk ist zu prüfen, ob das behauptete Verhältnis von Verfasser und Werk 
zu Recht besteht. Eine Fälschung liegt dann vor, wenn der wirkliche Verfasser mit dem 
angegebenen nicht übereinstimmt und die Maske als Mittel gewählt wurde, um 
Absichten durchzusetzen, die außerhalb der Literatur, das heißt der Kunst, lagen. Nur 
wo Täuschungsabsicht, also dolus malus, vorliegt, wird der Tatbestand der Fälschung 
erfüllt.'74 If I were to stick to this definition, in order to call my non-authentic documents 
'forgeries' I should demonstrate that they were created with the intention to deceive. As 
will be clear in my conclusions, I do not believe that they were, and I would more 
comfortably call them 'reconstructions'. However, Speyer's definition is intended for 
literary texts, and does not account for the particular typology of such hybrid texts, 
which are in fact documentary fabrics inserted and transmitted in literary texts. 
Moreover the word 'reconstruction' would leave room for misunderstanding: it would 
give the impression that with some caution scholars could still take advantage of the 
information provided by those documents that I show not to be authentic. My aim is 
instead that of making clear that those documents shown to be non-authentic, whatever 
the intention of their creator(s), are as a whole unreliable and should not be used as 
sources for Athenian history. I will therefore use the word 'forgery' as a warning for 
historians. 
 
                                                
74 Speyer 1971: 13, 111. See for similar definitions Metzger 1972: 4 and Eco 2007: 203-18, especially 
203-4. 
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2. The documents of the speeches On the Crown (18) and Against Meidias (21) 
The documents of On the Crown (18) and Against Meidias (21) were all absent 
from the Urexemplar of these speeches, and are therefore later insertions. They have 
been the objects of careful analysis during the 19th and the 20th centuries and are mostly 
considered unreliable. I will content myself here with a short summary of the scholarly 
opinions about their authenticity. 
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2.1 The documents of the speech On the Crown (18) 
No doubt persists about the authenticity of the documents of the speech On the 
Crown. After the work of Droysen,75 based mainly on comparison between the 
historical information found in the documents and independent reliable evidence, they 
have been recognized as forgeries, and most of the relevant 19th century scholarship, as 
well as Piero Treves' influential article of 1940, was concerned with identifying a 
context for the forgeries.76 As for the original problem of the authenticity of the 
documents, no one in the 20th century questioned Droysen's conclusions, and in 1939 
Schläpfer confirmed them with a careful comparison between the language of these 
documents and Athenian official language as we find it mainly in inscriptions.77 
Wankel, in his extensive commentary on the speech, relies on Schläpfer's analysis.78 
The speech On the Crown includes 28 documents: 16 decrees (two Amphictyonic 
decrees at § 154 and 155, one decree of the Byzantians and the Perinthians, and one of 
the Chersonesians at § 90-1 and 92, 11 Athenian decrees, § 29, 37, 74, 75, 84, 115, 116, 
118, 164, 165, 181-7, and a prescript at § 155), 2 laws (§ 105, 120), 2 witness 
statements (§ 135, 137), 3 letters (§ 39, 77-8, 157), 2 registers (§ 106), 2 texts of 
responses of Philip (§ 166, 167) and the text of Aeschines' graphe against Ctesiphon (§ 
54-5). There is no need for a new detailed analysis of these documents. I will content 
myself with listing a few examples of typical historical errors and features inconsistent 
with the language and formulas of authentic documents. The most obvious signs of 
forgery are the names of the archons: to give a few examples, the text of the graphe at § 
54 has Chaerondas as Eponymous Archon, but Chaerondas was archon in 338/7 BCE, 
                                                
75 Droysen 1893: 95-266. His work encountered some hostility in the first few years after its publication, 
but was later widely accepted. See Drerup 1898: 223-9 and Schläpfer 1939: 12-8 for an account of the 
debate. 
76 See below pp. 305-8. 
77 Schläpfer 1939. 
78 Wankel 1976: passim. 
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and Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon's decree in 336.79 The decrees at § 29 and 37 have a 
Mnesiphilus as Eponymous Archon, but no Mnesiphilus is attested as archon in the 4th 
century. The same is true for the Neocles of the decree at § 73. In this decree, not only 
the archon's name is invented, but also Eubulus, the famous statesman son of 
Spintharus, from Anaphlystos, becomes Eubulus son of Mnesitheus from Kopros.80 At § 
75 moreover Aristophon of Azenia becomes Aristophon of Kollytos.81 At § 105 the 
archon Polycles is again invented, and so on in nearly every decree quoted in the 
speech. In the document at § 29 we find five members appointed for the Second 
Embassy to Philip, and the only name that matches with independent reliable 
information is that of Aeschines. In fact, we know that there were 10 ambassadors, not 
5, and Demosthenes was one of them.82 Another historical inaccuracy is the fact that at 
§ 90-1 we find a decree of the Byzantians and the Perinthians, whereas at § 89 
Demosthenes asks the clerk to read out two different decrees of each city. In fact, a 
unique decree for both cities presupposes their sympoliteia. However the sympoliteia 
between Byzantium and Perinthus dates to the 3rd century, was interrupted in 202/1 and 
resumed in 196.83 In addition to these problems, the texts often present language and 
formulas inconsistent with contemporary material, and in particular the prescripts of the 
decrees do not resemble Athenian prescripts: a striking example is the beginning of the 
decree at § 115 (Ἄρχων Δημόνικος Φλυεύς, βοηδρομιῶνος ἕκτῃ μετ᾽ εἰκάδα, 
γνώμη βουλῆς καὶ δήμου, Καλλίας Φρεάρριος εἶπεν, ὅτι δοκεῖ τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ 
δήμῳ στεφανῶσαι). Sometimes the documents also mention officials and procedures 
that did not exist in ancient Athens (e.g. the decree at § 73 refers to the commander of 
an Athenian fleet as ναύαρχος, which is not an Athenian office). Such features and 
                                                
79 See Harris 1995: 138-42. 
80 PAA s.v. Εὐβούλος (n. 428495). 
81 PAA s.v. Ἀριστοφῶν (n. 176170). 
82 Cf. Schläpfer 1939: 47 for more details about this document.  
83 Cf. Treves 1940: 158 and Wankel 1976: 497. About the sympoliteia see Robert 1935: 64 n. 2. 
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errors prove beyond doubt that the documents in the speech On the Crown are not 
authentic, and must be later forgeries. 
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2.2 The documents of the speech Against Meidias (21) 
The speech Against Meidias reports 13 documents: 5 laws (§ 8, 10, 47, 94, 113), 6 
witness statements (§ 22, 82, 93, 107, 121, 168) and two oracles (§ 52-3). These 
documents were the first to be questioned after Droysen's work about those of Dem. 18. 
Westermann in 1844 proved beyond doubt that all the witness statements preserved in 
the speech are later forgeries, and MacDowell confirmed his analyses in his 
commentary on the speech.84 These documents contain many post-classical forms: e.g. § 
22 has the words ἔπερχος, καταγίγνομαι and διάχρυσον that are unattested in Attic 
texts; § 82 has οἴδαμεν instead of ἴσμεν (the same form is found also in the documents 
at § 93 and 121) and κρίσιν λελογχότα instead of the Attic δίκην εἰληκότα; § 93 has 
τοῦ κακηγορίου instead of τῆς κακηγορίας, and the un-Attic expression 
καταβραβευθέντα. Similar problems are found also in the other witness statements.85 
In his work Westermann deemed also the 5 laws and the oracles forgeries, but his 
results have been sometimes criticized. In particular Hermann and later Lipsius tried to 
defend the authenticity of the law about hybris of § 47, whereas Muecke and notably 
Drerup brought further evidence of its inauthenticity.86 At § 94 the document inserted is 
a law about private arbitration, while Demosthenes is discussing a law about public 
arbitration. Some scholars have argued that the inserted document is the wrong law, yet 
is still an authentic statute, but this view has been rejected by Latte and Gernet.87 As for 
the other three laws, Westermann's results have been questioned by Drerup, who 
defended their authenticity.88 
More recently, MacDowell in his commentary on the speech sided with Latte and 
Gernet in rejecting the document at § 94, but defended the authenticity of the four other 
                                                
84 Westermann 1844: passim; Drerup 1898: 297, 313-4. MacDowell 1991: passim. 
85 See MacDowell 1990: 333, 343, 386. 
86 Hermann 1847; Lipsius 1905-15: 421-3. Muecke 1872; Drerup 1898: 297-300 
87 Latte, Gnomon 2/4 (1926): 211; Gernet 1939: 391 n. 3. 
88 Drerup 1898: 300-8. 
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laws and the two oracles.89 However in a detailed analysis of the documents at § 8 and 
47 published as part of a review of MacDowell's commentary Harris brought further 
evidence against their authenticity, and later strengthened his arguments and extended 
the analysis to all the documents in the speech.90 His surveys have convincingly 
demonstrated that also the documents at § 8, 10, 47, 52-3, 113, considered reliable by 
MacDowell, present features that speak against their authenticity.91 The law at § 8 has 
the prytaneis presiding over meetings of the Assembly, whereas from 378 BCE this 
duty belonged to the proedroi.92 The summary of Demosthenes at § 9 rightly has the 
proedroi. The document also has the form παραδιδότωσαν. Imperatives in -τωσαν 
never appear in Attic inscriptions before 352/1 BCE, and only once in the next half-
century, whereas they become common in Hellenistic times.93 In the documents in this 
speech they appear four times (in this document and in those at § 10 and 94).94 The 
document at § 10, apart from the imperative ἔστωσαν, mentions komoi as part of the 
City Dionysia, whereas the festival featured only children's choruses, men's choruses, 
tragedies and comedies (IG II2 2318) and fails to mention those that commit violence, 
discussed by Demosthenes in his summary.95 The law about hybris at § 47, unlike 
normal Athenian statutes, treats hybris not as a distinctive kind of offence, but rather as 
a generic category covering any kind of crime. Moreover, the expression γραφὰς ἰδίας 
                                                
89 MacDowell 1990: 317-8. See pp. 226-8; 230-5, 263-8, 337-8 for the other documents. 
90 Harris, CP 87 (1992): 76-8; 2008: 86-7 and passim. 
91 Cf. Faraguna, BMCR 2009.12.13. 
92 Rhodes 1972: 25-7; 1981: 533-4. 
93 Threatte 1996: 462-6. 
94 Harris, CP 87 (1992): 76-87; 2008: 89 n. 48. 
95 Harris 2008: 90 n. 50. Scafuro 2004: 130-4 defends the authenticity of this law, proposing or accepting 
emendations that would solve its problems, or explaining ignotum per ignotius. This approach begs the 
question, and Harris has shown that the problems are more numerous than those she discusses. In 
particular, she claims that the problem of the imperatives in -τωσαν 'is a blow not to the authenticity of 
the law, but to its integrity - the law is corrupt'. A Hellenistic scribe would have changed the correct form 
into the one current in his own day. This explanation is hardly conceivable: the Demosthenic corpus as a 
whole shows only five imperatives in -τωσαν, all of them in documents (Dem. 21.8, 10, 94, 56.38). Why 
would such a change occur only in the documents, and only for this particular form? In fact the speeches 
of Demosthenes, and indeed the whole of Classical Athenian literature preserved, show plenty of Attic 
forms that would have sounded strange to Hellenistic copyists, and nevertheless they are still there for us 
to read. Why should this case in particular be different? 
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does not make any sense in classical Attic Greek. It can be explained only if we 
understand ἴδιος as 'one's own', but this meaning is unattested before the Hellenistic 
time.96 The law at § 113 is inconsistent with contemporary laws on bribery. MacDowell 
explains this by postulating that this is an earlier law from the 6th century. However 
there are no archaic forms in its text that point to this hypothesis, and its provision could 
easily be the result of a forger's misunderstanding of Demosthenes' words.97 Finally, the 
oracles at § 52-3 do not conform to their description in Demosthenes' discussion, and 
although they are supposed to resemble Athenian laws about the Dionysia prescribing to 
institute choruses, make sacrifices and wear crowns, the first oracle does not mention 
any chorus and the second has nothing to do with Dionysos. MacDowell has argued 
that, although quite irrelevant to Demosthenes' argument, they might come from an 
Athenian collection of oracles, and be the best that Demosthenes could find. 
Alternatively, they might have been added later, but still in Athens, from such a 
collection of oracles, and the editor just chose the wrong texts. However, their mixture 
of Attic, Ionic/Epic and Doric forms is strange for Delphic oracles, and moreover the 
adjective ἴδιος is used with the meaning 'one's own', like at § 47, which points to a 
Hellenistic rather than Classical origin.98 
To sum up, most of the documents of the Against Meidias are generally 
considered forgeries, and none of the most debated laws withstands careful scrutiny. 
These documents were not present in the Urexemplar of the speech, and never spread to 
the whole tradition of this speech (they are lacking in A). They are probably forgeries 
inserted in the speech at a later stage of its transmission. 
 
                                                
96 Harris, CP 87 (1992): 77-8; Fisher 2001: 139 tried to defend this document but see Harris 2008: 103-4 
nn. 94-99. 
97 MacDowell 1983 but see Harris 2008: 127-8 n. 179. 
98 MacDowell 1990: 270-5 but see Harris 2008: 105-6 nn. 106-7. 
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3. The Against Aristocrates (23) 
The laws quoted in the Against Aristocrates (23) have been a key topic in 19th 
century analyses of the documents inserted in the speeches of the Attic orators. There 
was a long period, until about the middle of the century, in which every scholar seemed 
to find unacceptable inconsistencies in each document, and therefore considered every 
one of them a late forgery, including those in this speech. Friedrich Franke in 1848 was 
the first to deal specifically with this speech and considered its docuements forgeries. 
His work was influential in the following years and was still the polemical target of 
Drerup in 1898 when he was studying these documents once again.99 Nevertheless, the 
period of general conviction about all the documents was about to come to an end, and 
the homicide statutes reported by this speech were the first to be defended. A stele dated 
to 409/8 BCE, with the reinscribed text of Draco's law on homicide, was discovered and 
restored by U. Köhler, given the scant letters still readable, with the help of the Against 
Aristocrates and the Against Macartatus.100 This seemed to demonstrate that not all the 
documents were clumsy forgeries like those in the On the Crown (18). A further step, 
for the Against Aristocrates, was made by Theodor Bergk, who tried to find a place for 
nearly all the provisions of the speech in the inscription, thus stretching too far the 
correspondences between the statutes quoted in Demosthenes and the few letters read 
by Köhler.101 On the other side, A. Philippi repeatedly contested the authenticity of 
these documents and reasserted, despite the evidence of the inscription, Franke’s 
opinion. His conclusions were still followed by N. Wecklein in 1873 and by W. Herz in 
1878.102 
                                                
99 Franke, 1848; Drerup 1898: 230, 264-280. 
100 Köhler 1867: 27-36. The inscription has been published, after Köhler, as CIA I.61, IG I2 115 and 
finally, with the major improvements due to the work of Stroud 1968, as IG I3 104. Cf. also Dittenberger 
1915-1924, v. 1: 150 n. 194.10. 
101 Bergk 1873. 
102 Cf. Philippi 1872; Philippi 1874: 333-361; Wecklein 1873; Herz 1878. 
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The work on these documents, as the work on the entire question of the 
authenticity of the insertions in the Attic orators, virtually ceased with the 1898 survey 
by Drerup. He devoted an entire chapter to the Blutgesetze, and concluded it with the 
assertion: 'Die Fälschung der in die Rede gegen Aristokrates eingelegte Blutgesetze darf 
hiernach nicht mehr als erwiesen gelten.'103 This statement was repeated, with reference 
to Drerup, throughout the 20th century, and the authenticity of the documents has 
generally been accepted. For instance Volpis, in a singularly well informed school 
commentary on the Against Aristocrates published in 1936, considered the authenticity 
of the documents to be no longer under discussion,104 and the huge amount of work on 
Dracos's legislation done through the century never again questioned the documents, 
often quoting them as evidence for the reconstruction of the homicide regulations both 
in classical Athens and in the archaic period. It must be noted however that the assertion 
made by Drerup relied on a specific understanding of the nature and internal 
consistency of those regulations, and not, as did the surveys by Franke and Herz, on 
technical matters and mere confrontation with the words of the orator commenting on 
the statute or, later, on double-checking with the scanty remnants of the inscription. 
Drerup, although he discussed some technical problems of the texts, mainly based his 
defence of the documents on his own reconstruction of homicide procedures. It is odd to 
find references to his work as the definitive demonstration of the authenticity of these 
documents in 20th century accounts of the homicide regulations, when these accounts 
are actually alternative to his reconstruction, and therefore implicitly undermine it.105 A 
similar problem exists on the other hand with the only recent attempt to contest the 
authenticity of a document in this speech: Carawan tried to demonstrate that the law on 
                                                
103 Drerup 1898: 280. 
104 Volpis 1936: 22. 
105 Cf. e.g. Carawan 1998: 88 n. 5. Sealey 1983: 276 is more cautious and, while describing the context of 
Drerup’s work as a 'skeptical age', writes that in Drerup’s opinion the documents in the Against 
Aristocrates have not been demonstrated to be forgeries. Later he discusses the law at § 53, and even 
though he accepts it, his treatment is not uncritical. 
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just homicide quoted at § 53 is not the one intended by Demosthenes to be read out by 
the secretary, but a later one mistakenly inserted by a later editor of the speech.106 His 
arguments, as we will see, are tightly bound with his own reconstruction of the 
Athenian regulations about homicide, and accordingly are hardly tenable unless one 
endorses this reconstruction. A more thoughtful position, is that expressed by Louis 
Gernet in his introduction to the speech. He asserts that «Il n’y a pas lieu de poser, pour 
le Contre Aristocrate, la question de l’authenticité des lemmes des nos manuscrits: 
presque toujours, l’orateur les reprend textuellement et intégralement». This is certainly 
true. He adds then to his statement that it is possible to find «une correspondance 
rigoureuse entre les citations de l’orateur et le téxte epigraphique».107 
These statements will be the starting point of this survey. In fact, as far as the 
comparison with the epigraphical evidence is concerned, just two of the laws quoted in 
the speech can be confidently restored in the inscription: the law about the killer of a 
murderer who abides by his obligations (§ 37 at ll. 26-29), and that about just homicide 
if one’s own possessions are in danger (§ 60 at ll. 36-38). Other 19th century attempts to 
restore parts of the inscription,108 such as the law on abusing or blackmailing a murderer 
(§ 28, at ll. 30-31),109 proved impossible after the new edition of the stele by Ronald 
Stroud and the 218 new letters read by him. Both the passages are, as will become clear, 
closely commented on and repeated in Demosthenes’ text, except for a few differences 
in wording. These differences, however small, will be checked in order to understand 
whether the text of Demosthenes or the quoted documents best match the scant 
remnants on the stele. But the first assertion by Gernet deserves more attention: as I 
have said, it is certainly true that «presque toujours, l’orateur […] reprend textuellement 
et intégralement» the laws just quoted, but this does not always happen. In every law it 
                                                
106 Carawan 1998: 92-96. 
107 Gernet-Humbert 1959: 104. 
108 Cf. e.g. Bergk 1873. 
109 This restoration was first proposed by Köhler 1867: 35. 
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is possible to find slight differences in wording, which are worth checking, but 
sometimes the differences are more important, and can vary from different words in the 
documents to an entire clause that does not correspond to the comments by 
Demosthenes (§ 28). 
Given that the legal information provided by these documents is mainly reliable, 
since Demosthenes himself confirms it, the occasional oddities are the only clue to 
understanding how these documents came to be part of the stichometric edition. That is, 
they will be key for understanding whether these documents were already present in 
Demosthenes' text, or in a separate dossier kept by him with the speech, or whether it 
was the editor of the stichometric edition who added them. And in this case, did he 
collect them from stelai, from the archive or (more likely) from his own memory and 
with the help of the following Demosthenic paraphrases, or did he just invent them? In 
the next chapters I will analyse all the documents of the speech, closely comparing them 
with the corresponding comments by the orator. 
All these documents are quoted and discussed at § 22-64 of the speech.110 The aim 
of this section is to demonstrate that the decree proposed by Aristocrates for 
Charidemos is illegal. This decree makes whoever kills the general liable to arrest 
everywhere in Athens and in the allies’ territories.111 Demosthenes argues that it violates 
all Athenian regulations about homicide. These statutes are discussed to show how 
Aristocrates’ decree violates both their individual provisions and their general aim and 
spirit. They are collectively held to be part of the homicide regulations ascribed to 
Draco.112 Afterwards two further laws are quoted at § 86 and 87, the first forbidding 
                                                
110 For a recent general survey of the speech, mainly concerned with rhetorical matters, Cf. Papillon 1998. 
111 Cf. § 16: γέγραφ' εὐθὺς 'ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων εἶναι.’ 
112 This seems to imply the first comment on the law quoted at § 86, one of the two not concerned with 
homicide. Demosthenes explicitly states: ῎Εστι μὲν οὐκέτι τῶν φονικῶν ὅδ' ὁ νῦν ἀνεγνωσμένος 
νόμος. Cf. Gagarin 1981: 27 n. 49. At § 51 Demosthenes states that all the laws quoted up to that point 
are Draconian. This is probably a 4th century simplification, while the homicide provisions actually 
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leges ad hominem, and the second stating that a decree can never take precedence over a 
law. These laws will be analyzed only briefly here, since they are very short and are 
perfectly attested in the present form, the first by Demosthenes’ account following the 
document, the second by Andoc. 1.89 (and partly by § 87 itself, and by Dem. 24.30). 
The law forbidding leges ad hominem will be analysed more thoroughly later, in the 
context of the speech Against Timocrates where it presents itself in a slightly different 
way and with an additional clause.113  
 
                                                                                                                                          
encompassed statutes dating to different moments of the Athenian constitutional development. Cf. 
MacDowell 1963: 6; Gagarin 1981: 28; 
113 Cf. below p. 206-13. 
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3.1 Dem. 23.22: willing homicide and wounding, arson and poisoning 
ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ. 
Δικάζειν δὲ τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐκ 
προνοίας καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.  
 
ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ om. cod. V : del. Dindorf coll. 
51 : ΝΟΜΟΣ  rubro scriptum est in SYP : om. F 
 
LAW FROM THE LAWS ON HOMICIDE OF THE AREOPAGUS 
The council of the Areopagus shall judge cases of intentional homicide and 
wounding, of arson and of poisoning, if someone kills by giving poison. 
 
This law is not found in IG I3 104. It is quoted almost verbatim at § 24. The words 
of Demosthenes read: τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας καὶ 
πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς. The only differences between the 
document and Demosthenes’ comment are the word order at the beginning of the 
sentence, and the absence of the specification τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ in Demosthenes’ 
version.  The word order is in this case scarcely significant, as the evidence for archaic 
Athens is very scanty, and, even if we limit our survey to the law reinscribed in IG I3 
104, in the first three lines both the cases are easily found: δικάζεν δὲ τὸς βασιλέας at 
ll. 1-2 and τὸς δὲ ἐφέτας διαγνôναι at l. 3.  
More interesting is that the expression τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, related to τὴν 
βουλὴν, is absent from Demosthenes’ words. There is no doubt that this expression is 
correct. Demosthenes himself at § 67 states that the Areopagos is to judge homicide 
cases, and at § 66 he asserts that it has never been deprived of such a competence. 
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Furthermore Poll. 8.117114 and Ath.Pol. 57.3 confirm that its competence refers 
specifically to φόνος and τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας, πυρκαϊᾶς and φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις 
ἀποκτείνῃ δούς. Din. 1.6 also states that the Areopagus judged cases of φόνος ἐκ 
προνοίας. Nevertheless, the fact that the information provided by this expression is 
correct does not guarantee that it had a place in the law. 
Franke argued that the expression is actually superfluous, for it is clear from the 
lemma, pointing to some stele on the Areopagos, that the council concerned is the 
Areopagus.115 The argument as it stands is far from conclusive. Yet Herz rightly noted 
that the use of βουλή alone referring to the Areopagos Council is far from infrequent.116 
In fact, it recurs very often in the Attic orators: Herz gave as references Lys. 3.1, 3, 4, 5, 
9, 10, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 28, 35, 40, and in Lys. 4.1, 12, 18, 19. More significant than 
these, where the expression is always the vocative ὦ βουλὴ pointing to the judges in a 
case of τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας, it must be noted that βουλή alone recurs in both the 
already mentioned passages of Din. 1.6, which reads ἡ τῶν ἐκ  προνοίας φόνων 
ἀξιόπιστος οὖσα βουλὴ, and Ath.Pol. 57.3 (εἰσὶ δὲ φόν[ου] δίκαι  καὶ τραύματος, 
ἂν μὲν ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ τρώσῃ, ἐν  ’Αρείῳ πάγῳ, καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐὰν 
ἀποκτείνῃ δούς, καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἡ βουλὴ μόνα δικάζει). This second 
passage actually names the Areopagos, but just as a place, as it does a few lines later 
with the Palladion, the Delphinion and the Phreatto. Afterwards, when referring to the 
council sitting up there, the expression is again just ἡ βουλή. The same happens in the 
Against Aristocrates again at § 215, where the first quoted law is recalled and the 
Areopagos Council is called just βουλή (ὁ πρῶτος νόμος ἄντικρυς εἴρηκεν, ἄν τις 
ἀποκτείνῃ, τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν). These references are not conclusive either, but they 
probably recall the text of the law nearly word for word. Yet the condition for assuming 
                                                
114 Although the piece of information in this case could easily derive from the passage of Demosthenes 
discussed here. 
115 Franke 1848: 4, I, 6. 
116 Herz 1878: 17. 
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that the law presented just the word βουλή, without specific mention of the Areopagos, 
is that this law was part of a statute in which the reference to the Areopagos was self-
evident. Otherwise such vagueness would have led to misunderstandings.117 
Gagarin made a good case for a stele reporting all the regulations somehow 
relevant to the Areopagos Council.118 He mentioned as evidence for this, apart from the 
lemma preceding this law, Lys. 1.30 and 6.15. In the second case the topic is τραῦμα 
ἐκ προνοίας, and the wrongdoer is to be punished κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ἐξ Ἀρείου 
πάγου. This may refer to the law discussed here, perhaps with the addition of some 
more specific regulations concerned with intentional wounding. Lys. 1.30 on the other 
hand is more precise. The law mentioned there is clearly the one quoted and discussed 
at Dem. 23.53-55,119 and is said to come ἐκ τῆς στήλης τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου. The 
form βουλὴ without the mention of the Areopagos is not just attested by many 
references and actual rewordings of the law, but was understandable from the context of 
the law. 
Yet the stele, in Gagarin’s reconstruction, seems to encompass provisions like the 
one we read at § 53, which were originally part of other statutes, and were inscribed 
also but not only on the Areopagos.120 Was this law one of these? Ruschenbusch calls 
the provision 'Gesetz über die Blutgerichtsbarkeit des Areopag'.121 This definition could 
ascribe the provision to general regulations about homicide jurisdiction, and therefore to 
a context not specifically related to the Areopagos. It may well be true, as is argued by 
Gagarin,122 that this law served as an amendment to Draco’s homicide law, which 
                                                
117 Unless we follow [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 8.4, which states that the Council was created by Solon. If this piece 
of information is reliable, then no misunderstanding would have been possible, since before Solon the 
Areopagus Council would have been the only one in existence. In any case, even if we consider this piece 
of information unreliable, the mention of the Areopagus in the law is still not necessary: see below. 
118 Gagarin 1981: 26-29. 
119 The law on just homicide, and not on moicheia. Cf. Harris 2006: 283-296. 
120 Gagarin 1981: 27. 
121 Ruschenbusch 1960: 131. 
122 Gagarin 1981: 136. 
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granted to the Areopagites jurisdiction over φόνος ἐκ προνοίας,123 previously judged 
by the ephetai. However, the regulation itself does not seem to be part of a law about 
homicide. It is instead a law about the jurisdiction of the Areopagos Council, stating its 
competence not just over intentional homicide, but also over intentional wounding, 
arson and poisoning.124 It could easily have encompassed other provisions regarding the 
Council. The attempts to narrow the range of these competences, interpreting all these 
cases as related to homicide, are not convincing. If poisoning is linked by the text of the 
law itself to homicide, the interpretation of τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας as wounding with the 
intent to kill, 'premeditated homicide that failed' as Wallace calls it, is less 
straightforward. It is witnessed by the defendants in Lys. 3 and 4, and their 
interpretation has gained wide support among modern scholars.125 Yet it is clear that 
narrowing the meaning of προνοία so that the plaintiff must demonstrate not just that 
the wounding was intentional, but also that the aim was actually killing, serves the 
defendant well by making the task of the accuser much more difficult. The word 
προνοία has been identified as a case of open texture, and it is very doubtful whether 
the narrow interpretation of the term was the predominant one. In fact, it is likely that 
wounding, in order to be considered τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας, required no more than 
intent to wound.126 As for arson, Bonner and Smith maintain that this crime was 'closely 
connected with homicide cases, because arson might involve loss of life.'127 This is 
stretching the evidence. Killing by arson is not different from other kinds of homicide, 
as it could be intentional or not. Reading this passage as referring to homicide would 
                                                
123 ἐκ προνοίας is interpreted by MacDowell 1963: 45 as referring to at least both φόνος and τραύμα, as 
shown by [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 57.3. Gagarin 1981: 106 n. 12 on the other hand reads the expression as 
referring just to τραύμα. φόνος would indicate intentional killing by itself, without further 
specifications. It is easier to follow MacDowell in this case, as not just Ath.Pol. but also Din. 1.6 seems to 
support his reading. 
124 Cf. also Carawan 1998: 89-90. 
125 Cf. Lipsius 1905-1915: 605-607; Hansen 1981:14-16; Wallace 1989: 105. 
126 Cf. Phillips 2007: 85. See Loomis 1972 (with some misunderstandings) and Harris 2004: 245-51 for 
the meaning of ἐκ προνοίας. 
127 Bonner-Smith 1930: I, 258. Cf. also Gilbert-Brooks 1895: 280. Rhodes 1981: 642 considers this 
possible, but not definitely true. 
 67 
imply that killing by arson alone would have been judged by the Areopagos Council, in 
spite of whether it was intentional. The evidence is too scanty for supporting such an 
anomaly.128 The provision regarded the jurisdiction of the Areopagos Council, not 
specifically homicide. Therefore, even if Gagarin129 was wrong in thinking that it was 
inscribed just on the stele on the Areopagos, the topic of the law in general, the 
Areopagos Council, would have made clear which was the βουλή in question, wherever 
it was inscribed (or archived).130 
A piece of evidence provided by Hansen131 in order to support the assumption that 
this provision regarded homicide and not simply the jurisdiction of the Areopagos, 
deserves further discussion since it can shed some light on the tradition of the text. This 
evidence is the lemma ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ 
ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ. 
This lemma appears in the medieval manuscripts in a puzzling manner. In SYP 
the first word ΝΟΜΟΣ is written in red, followed by the rest of the expression in 
regular ink. In F on the other hand the word ΝΟΜΟΣ is completely missing, and just 
the following ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ is 
found. Finally, a later manuscript from the 15th century, the Coislinianus Graecus 339, 
does not give the second part at all. Dindorf interpreted this puzzling tradition as a sign 
of interpolation, and Sykutris considered the suggestion likely. The second part of the 
lemma would be a glossa derived from § 51: ‘Ο μὲν νόμος ἐστὶν οὗτος Δράκοντος, 
ὦ ἄνδρες ’Αθηναῖοι,  καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσους ἐκ τῶν φονικῶν νόμων 
παρεγραψάμην. The interpretation of the oddities in the tradition is not very 
straightforward. It is not clear which one would be the gloss, whether ΝΟΜΟΣ or ΕΚ 
ΤΩΝ ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ, since the manuscript 
                                                
128 Cf. MacDowell 1978: 150; Wallace 1989: 105-106. 
129 Gagarin 1981: 136. 
130 Pace Drerup 1898: 279. 
131 Hansen 1981: 14-16. 
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without the second part is a later one, and corruption is a plausible explanation. Yet the 
difference in color in SY and P shows that the two parts of the lemma did not remain on 
the same level. The lines of tradition represented by these manuscripts might have come 
to agree in showing such a strange feature either by contamination or through a 
common ancestor for this speech,132 but in both cases what seems evident is that at some 
stage something was added to an original reading, whether as a gloss or from another 
line of tradition it is not possible to tell. The manuscript F, which shows just the second 
part, might be a medieval witness of an ancient line in which the lemma did not 
encompass the word ΝΟΜΟΣ, but a corruption again cannot be excluded. In any case, 
what seems clear from such a variable tradition is that some work on the lemma was 
done both in the ancient times and in the Middle Ages, and nothing of it can be 
confidently said to stem back to an Urexemplar, let alone the orator’s own draft. The 
second part of the lemma was added at some point (here Dindorf was probably right)133 
according to what the orator says at § 51, but was not there at the beginning, nor, as the 
document here was already in the stichometric edition, when the document was first 
inserted. It cannot therefore provide any reliable information about the heading of the 
law, nor support in any way the claim that the law as a whole concerns homicide. 
Hansen claims also that even if we do not accept the information provided by the 
lemma, the orator’s assertion at § 51 that all the laws quoted come ἐκ τῶν φονικῶν 
νόμων is by itself enough evidence that also the first one is concerned primarily with 
homicide. This argument is not cogent either. In the same sentence Demosthenes states 
that these laws are all Draconian regulations, while it is clear that many of them cannot 
                                                
132 A specific and thorough analysis of the tradition of this speech is still missing. 
133 Cf. also Drerup 1898: 279. 
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be part of Draco's legislation as they mention institutions that came into being much 
later.134 
To sum up, there is no good evidence that this first law was technically speaking 
part of the homicide regulations, even if it is plausible that this text transferred the 
competence over intentional homicide to the Areopagos Council. It dealt with other 
matters such as intentional wounding and arson (and poisoning). The unifying character 
of the provision is therefore the Areopagos Council’s jurisdiction, and the lemma which 
precedes the document in Demosthenes’ text, apart from being very insecure on textual 
grounds, is inconsistent with the document itself insofar as it repeats a simplification 
asserted by the orator at § 51, where he attributes all the provisions to Draco and claims 
that they are all concerned with homicide. The law deals instead with the Areopagos 
Council and so, whether it was inscribed just on the Areopagos itself or anywhere else, 
it was clear from the context which βουλή was actually meant. This clearly accounts for 
the reliability of the form used by all the extant sources paraphrasing this statute, which 
is invariably just βουλή instead of a more complete expression like the one of the 
document, τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ. 
What does this imply for the history of the document inserted in the speech? 135 
First of all, it must be accepted that this text, as the other ones in the speech, was part of 
the stichometric edition. It does not contain any feature which can set it apart from the 
rest of the documents quoted later on. Secondly, following Dindorf, it can be 
confidently said that the lemma as we read it was not in the text when the document was 
                                                
134 The Areopagus Council as a βουλὴ was created and judged homicide cases just after Draco, Cf. Plut. 
Sol. 19; Gagarin 1981: 125-132; Carawan 1998: 6-17; Wallace 1989: 34-39, even if he argues that the 
Areopagos at the time of Solon had already been a site for homicide trials for a long time, accepts that the 
judges up there were, before Solon, 51 ephetai and not a βουλή. The Heliaia was created as a tribunal by 
Solon, cf. Hansen 1981-2 and Boegehold  1995: 3-6. About the 'doctrine of continuity' expressed in this 
speech (and elsewhere) see Phillips 2008: 152. 
135 Other features of the document usually discussed, such as the actual meaning of the expression 
φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς, or the position of ἐκ προνοίας, have not been thoroughly treated 
here as they are not relevant in explaining the tradition of the document. They appear in fact in the same 
fashion in the orator’s paraphrase, and every difficulty must be ascribed to the law itself, not to the 
document. 
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inserted. Moreover it is dubious, if we accept that the form in the statute was the simple 
βουλή, that the document in this form was already in the dossier handed by the orator 
to be read out during the trial. The specification τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ can in fact be 
considered an explanatory gloss, hardly needed by the orator or by the Athenian judges, 
let alone by the secretary of the court, and we know that the statutes sealed in the 
echinos and then spelled out during the trial had to be an accurate copy of the official 
ones.136 Accordingly, as far as we can tell at this point in the survey, the condition of the 
text can be explained in only a few ways. It is possible that the original text was an 
accurate one, and the gloss entered later, or it might have been inserted in this fashion 
from the beginning. In the first case, we should think of an accurate text that already 
accompanied the orator’s draft, possibly a copy of the dossier sealed in the echinos. 
This copy has been later inserted in the speech, and glossed before the speech (and the 
corpus) spread around the Mediterranean Sea. The manuscripts present a perfectly 
consistent text, and such a widespread, or better, total episode of contamination 
happening later in the transmission would be implausible. Therefore the gloss was 
inserted very early, before the stichometry was added and before the text traveled 
around the ancient world. We are talking again of the Urexemplar. The second 
possibility is that the text was inserted already with the specification. The text would 
again be the Urexemplar, before the stichometry was added, but in this case the person 
responsible for the preservation cannot be, as we saw, the orator. It is necessary to 
assume that both the text and the expression are the work of the early editor(s) of the 
Urexemplar.  
In the first case the addition, more than a deliberate forgery of the text, would be 
an attempt to make the law intelligible with a view to a wider circulation. The absence 
                                                
136 Cf. Rhodes 1995: 310-311; Rubinstein 2000: 72 and n. 143; Cobetto Ghiggia 2002: 190-193; Fezzi 
2004: 109-115; Faraguna 2009: 62-63 and passim. 
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at this stage of the mention of the Areopagos in the lemma made in fact such an addition 
very useful in order to understand the provision. On the other hand, the same reason can 
account for the addition also if the entire document was inserted in this fashion from the 
beginning. The text is no longer intended at this point to be spoken in front of the 
judges, but as a written work meant to be read and circulated. The addition of an 
explanatory gloss while integrating the documents into the speech does not mean 
therefore that the interpolation was inaccurate as a whole. The editor(s) may have added 
the gloss for intelligibility’s sake, but at the same time may have chosen to use the exact 
word order of the statute, instead of the one used by Demosthenes in his paraphrase.137  
These two hypotheses can be easily reduced to one: we know, as has been shown 
before, from many sources about Athenian judicial practice and from the very absence 
of a huge amount of documents not just from the stichometry but from all the 
manuscripts, both ancient and modern, of all the orators, that the orators’ drafts usually 
did not contain any document. Therefore, whatever the source of the text, a chart among 
Demosthenes’ possessions, a stele, a copy consulted in the archive or even the editor’s 
memory of a famous law helped by the following Demosthenes’ paraphrase, someone at 
some point decided to insert this document (and the following ones) while copying the 
speech. Thus this first document in the stichometry shows that some editorial work over 
the quoted laws was actually done in composing the Urexemplar. Furthermore, the 
general reliability of this document and of the following ones points towards the 
hypothesis of a competent editor, an expert in Athenian laws and institutions, acting at a 
very early stage of transmission. 
                                                
137 The hypothesis of two different versions of the same law, slightly different in wording and only in one 
case encompassing the further specification about the Areopagos cannot be completely ruled out. Also in 
this case, some editorial work in this first phase of tradition is clear, since the editor used a different 
version of the text for his insertion, ignoring the version paraphrased by Demosthenes. Nevertheless it 
must be admitted that all the evidence accounts at least for a much wider popularity of the provision 
without the further specification. 
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3.2 Dem. 23.28: prohibition of torture and ransom 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Τοὺς δ’ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς 
ἐν τῷ <αʹ> ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν 
ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ. εἰσφέρειν δ’ ἐ<ς> τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν 
ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. τὴν δ’ ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν. 
 
εἰσφέρειν- διαγιγνώσκειν Lex. Pat. ad loc. 
 
<αʹ> ἄξονι add. Cobet | ἀπαγορεύει A | δ’ ἐ<ς> add. Schelling : δὲ codd. : om. Y | 
ἀναγιγνώσκειν SaY 
 
It shall be lawful to kill murderers in our land, and to arrest them, as declared in 
the first axon, but not to maltreat them, nor to demand a ransom, otherwise twice 
the harm brought about shall be paid. It shall be possible for everyone who 
wishes to carry out the case to introduce it before the archons, according to their 
competence. The Heliaia is to give judgement. 
 
This law has been the object of much controversy, and its authenticity has often 
been questioned. In fact, just the first part of it is quoted in the following account given 
by the orator, whereas everything from ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν on is present only in the 
document. Demosthenes interprets it in a specific way: it is possible to ἀποκτείνειν (in 
the context ‘cause the death’, rather than just directly ‘kill’)138 and arrest convicted 
murderers (§ 29 τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους… § 31 ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν), yet 
not any way one pleases, but in accordance with the axon (ὡς ἐν τῷ ἄξονι εἴρηται). 
The axon states, according to the orator, that they must be brought to the thesmothetai. 
                                                
138 Harris 2006: 391-404. 
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The thesmothetai then have the power to kill them. This means, in Demosthenes’ 
interpretation, that the convicted murderer is punished by the law, and not by his 
personal enemies. The sense thus would be that the words ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν do 
not refer to different choices, but to different stages of the same procedure: seizing the 
murderer, carrying him off to the thesmothetai, and then having him killed by them. 
Demosthenes carries on quoting the words of the law λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ […] μή, μηδὲ 
ἀποινᾶν’: no one can maltreat a convicted murderer, or demand a ransom for him. 
Then the orator sums up, reporting that the statute asserts how a convicted murderer 
must be put to death, and the place for doing that: τὴν τοῦ πεπονθότος εἰπὼν 
πατρίδα. The relationship between this statute and Aristocrates’ decree is found at § 
35: the laws allow the seizure of a convicted murderer just ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, while 
Aristocrates wants to allow it also in the territory of the allies. Moreover, even when the 
seizure is allowed, it must be carried out in order to hand the murderer over to the 
thesmothetai (Demosthenes already told that this is what the axon states), therefore as 
an arrest, not as a private seizure. 
This is all we can get from Demosthenes’ explanation of the law read out by the 
secretary. The following part of the document has no parallel in his summary. For the 
purpose of understanding the nature of the document it will be useful first of all to 
analyse the consistency of the document’s words with the following paraphrase, as far 
as the parallel goes. It will then be possible to work on the second part, where no 
comparison is available and therefore the only criterion shall be the internal consistency 
of the statute. 
As for the first part of the statute, the only real differences between the document 
and the following account are the expression ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, and the verb ἀγορεύει 
instead of εἴρηται. The expression ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, even though it is not repeated 
immediately by Demosthenes, is found twice later at § 35, and the fact that some place 
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limitation on the applicability of the statute was imposed by the statute itself is openly 
stressed by Demosthenes at § 34-35. It is unlikely that he reserved so much space for a 
provision which was not even in the text read out by the secretary. Such a provision 
therefore must be postulated in the law to which Demosthenes is referring,139 and 
therefore there are no problems with this particular expression. ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ in fact 
seems to have been part of the law inserted at § 44, and is safely attested in IG I3 104 at 
l. 30;140 it was a common term in homicide statutes.141 As for the verb ἀγορεύει instead 
of εἴρηται, Franke asserted that this difference must be due to the forger, who tried to 
be at least a little bit detached from the text of the orator.142 This is hardly strong 
evidence against the document, since one single different word, a synonym, is not 
conclusive evidence. Nevertheless, it might be pertinent to quote Henri Weil on this 
matter: 'L’orateur a mis un équivalent pour ne pas dire ‘ἀγορεύει’ φησίν'.143 Indeed, 
here the variatio (namely the avoidance of two consecutive present indicatives) is in the 
orator’s version, and not in the document. 
Apart from the differences between this sentence and the following account, 
which have been demonstrated not to be sufficient evidence against the reliability of the 
first part of the document, the most puzzling feature is still the clause ὡς ἐν τῷ ἄξονι 
ἀγορεύει. Herz wrongly thought that this was written by Demosthenes not as a 
quotation of the law, but as an explanation of its provisions, mechanically taken by the 
forger as part of them, and therefore copied in the document.144 This assumption is 
untenable, since the clause is followed in Demosthenes’ account by φησίν, clearly 
pointing to the law. The same structure is found at § 29, where the quotation τοὺς 
                                                
139 Drerup 1898: 270 rightly made this point. 
140 It is also very common in the 5th century: Cf. IG I3 52, IG I3 372, IG I3 376, IG I3 378, IG I3 383. 
141 Pace Franke 1848: 4, II and Herz 1878: 18-19. Philippi 1872: 577 ff. defends the expression, thinking 
with Köhler 1867: 35 that this part of the sentence was present in IG I3 104 at ll. 30-31. This is 
questionable (see below), but Philippi in principle is probably right. 
142 Franke 1848: 5. Cf. also Herz 1878: 20-21. 
143 Weil 1886: 200 n. 5. Cf. also Drerup 1898: 270-271. He considered the orator’s variant nothing more 
than 'redaktioneller Art'. 
144 Herz 1878: 20-21. 
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ἀνδροφόνους is again followed by φησίν. Köhler on the other hand restored the whole 
first part of the document, up to καταβλάψῃ, with the exception of this clause, at ll. 30-
32 of IG I3 104. 145 The clause ὡς ἐν τῷ ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, together with the whole 
inserted document, would therefore be an allusion to Draco's axon in a later 
amendment, stating limitations to the original measures, which were aimed at 
strengthening the devices of self-help.146 Therefore Köhler corrected the text of the 
document, moving the reference to the axon after καταβλάψῃ, and considered the 
paradosis the result of textual corruption.147 Philippi,148 even though he considered the 
document a later amendment to Draco's law, contested this restoration, arguing, on the 
ground of Demosthenes’ interpretation of the statute,149 that the mention of the axon is 
not meant to allude to Draco's homicide laws, but to explain the range of applicability of 
the word ἀπάγειν by referring to Solon’s provisions on apagoge.150 The reference must 
therefore remain after ἀπάγειν. The same reading of the reference has been advanced 
by Gilbert.151 This first part of the provision would accordingly have been part of 
Draco's law, but just up to ἀπάγειν, without further explanation, as the mention of 
ἀπάγειν relied at the time of Draco on general knowledge. Afterwards, when an 
amendment was passed, the further specification was added in order to qualify the word 
ἀπάγειν in accordance with the new relevant regulations. Philippi and Gilbert have 
                                                
145 Köhler 1867: 35. 
146 This point has been made later by Hansen 1976: 100-103, 111-112, followed by Carawan 1998: 82. Cf. 
Democritus, B257-259 Diels-Kranz. 
147 He was also forced by the inscription to move ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ after both ἀποκτείνειν and ἀπάγειν. 
Stroud 1968: 55 n. 102 has followed him in this respect. Nevertheless, even if the integration is correct, 
this scarcely affects the document. It is not in any case a reproduction of Draco's law, but a later 
amendment, and therefore the word order of the stele is not reliable evidence on its own. 
148 Philippi 1874: 580-584. 
149 Cf. also Weber 1845: 158, who had already hinted at this possible interpretation. 
150 Herz 1878: 20-21, even though he did not understand that the document was not meant to be the 
original Draco's law but just an amendment to it, and therefore cast the reference to the axon out of it, still 
interpreted the same reference, when given by Demosthenes, as pointing to the statute about apagoge. He 
tried to support this view with the argument that Demosthenes says 'to kill and to arrest', understood as 
parts of the same procedure, otherwise they would have been 'to kill or to carry off'. This argument is 
pointless: the provision stated what is permitted by the law, and both the conjunctions fit just as well a list 
of actions, related to each other or not. 
151 Gilbert-Brooks 1895: 486. Cf. also Glotz 1973: 319 ff. 
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been demonstrated by Stroud152 to be right at least in restoring the inscription only up to 
ἀπάγειν, since the whole sentence up to καταβλάψῃ is incompatible with new letters 
read by him in the inscription.153 But are they right also in considering, with 
Demosthenes, the clause ὡς ἐν τῷ ἄξονι ἀγορεύει to refer to Solon’s apagoge 
regulations? This question is difficult to answer, but if the restoration of ll. 30-31 of IG 
I3 104 proposed by Stroud ([ἐξ]εῖ[ναι δὲ τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους ἀποκτείνειν ἢ ἀπάγειν, 
ἐὰν ἐν] τῇ ἡμεδ[απῇ...) is in principle correct,154 as the succession of the provisions in 
the statute makes very likely, then assuming with Philippi and Gilbert that the document 
was an amendment to Draco's law but that his internal reference pointed to some other 
statute about apagoge, is at least uneconomical. Demosthenes has probably 
misunderstood the reference, or twisted it in order to claim that no one was allowed to 
kill personally a convicted killer even in the Athenian territory, but had to bring him to 
the thesmothetai for execution. Thus he made Aristocrates’ decree seem even more 
illegal. The internal reference pointed to Draco’s law, of which our text is an 
amendment, and the discovery by Stroud of the heading of a 'second axon' at the bottom 
of the stele (IG I3 104)155 makes the proposal by Cobet of integrating αʹ to indicate the 
number of the axon very likely.156 
At this point in the enquiry we have an arguably reliable document reproducing, 
at least in its first part, an amendment to a provision originally found in Draco's law. 
                                                
152 Stroud 1968: 54-55. 
153 Drerup 1898: 268, even though he did not employ any new evidence provided by the inscription, 
endorsed their conclusions with some very pertinent considerations: if Draco's law contained also the 
prohibition on maltreatment and ransom, then one should expect the means for enforcing this provision to 
be clearly stated as well. In other words, we cannot imagine that this part was in the law, without 
admitting that the following provisions on the penalty and the competent magistrates must also have been 
encompassed. But they definitely cannot fit the inscription. Therefore everything after ἀπάγειν must be 
ruled out. 
154 Stroud 1968: 54-56, in particular n. 102. His integration is suggested just exempli gratia, and Gagarin 
1981: 61 n. 85 is probably right in pointing out that, according to the general usage of the stele, we would 
expect here the verb κτείνειν rather than ἀποκτείνειν. But, even with a slight rewording, such as the καὶ 
κτείνειν κἀπάγειν proposed by Gagarin, Stroud’s guess is still valid. 
155 Stroud 1968: 55 n. 101. 
156 Cf. also Gagarin 1981: 25 n. 44 (pace Ruschenbusch 2010: 45). Against this integration is Carawan 
1998: 91 n. 9, who thinks that the amendment was inscribed before the relevant axon, and therefore did 
not need any further specification. 
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This amendment was therefore later than Draco, and added to the original right to kill or 
arrest the murderer the prohibition on maltreating him or asking a ransom. The 
following account given by Demosthenes widely confirms the document up to this point 
and, when some difference is found, the document seems to be acceptable. By contrast, 
as for the second part of the document, no parallel by the orator is available. 
This second part begins with the statement of the penalty for people who maltreat 
the convicted murderer, or demand a ransom for him. This must be the payment of 
twice the harm brought about. A similar provision is found in Dem. 21.43. 
Demosthenes is there talking about the law on damage, which states that a damage, if 
caused voluntarily, must be compensated by twice its original value, whereas if it is 
involuntary, by the single amount. Franke argues that this must be the source of the 
forger, since a provision about blabe has nothing to do with a law on homicide, and 
hence the punishment for such offences must have been administered according to the 
law on damage, without any need to repeat here the relevant penalty.157 With just this 
clause as evidence nothing definitive can be said about this matter, except that the 
statement of the penalty at this point, even though it seems the same as in the case of a 
normal dike blabes, would not be pointless. A dike blabes, inasmuch as it is a dike, can 
be brought just by the victim of the offence. Now, in this particular case, the victim is 
atimos because of the conviction in the previous homicide trial, and therefore has no 
possibility of prosecuting the offender. As a result, this statute, if it is reliable, does not 
repeat a provision of the dike blabes, but states the same penalty, for a similar offence, 
in a different kind of trial, arguably a graphe brought by τῷ βουλομένῳ.158 So the 
provision is not in itself unacceptable; however, this does not mean that it is authentic. 
                                                
157 Franke 1848: 5. The same position is held by Philippi 1874: 338-346 and Herz 1878: 21-22. 
158 Cf. Drerup 1898: 268-269. On the distinction between dikai and graphai cf. Lipsius 1905-1915: 237-
244; Harrison 1971: 74-78; Rhodes 1993: 160. 
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The same conclusion can be reached for the reference to the Heliaia in the last 
sentence. Herz deemed it to be no more than guesswork by the forger.159 This follows 
from the fact that he considered the statute referred to in this context a law of Draco. 
Therefore any allusion to the Heliaia was for him nonsense, since there is no evidence 
that the Heliaia actually existed, and had judicial functions before Solon.160 But since 
the provision has been recognized as an amendment to Draco's law, there is no reason to 
consider the mention of the Heliaia out of place in this context. On the contrary, the 
Heliaia is exactly the body we would expect to judge these cases. Again this is not 
enough evidence for the authenticity of the clause, since this argument might easily 
have come to the mind of an ancient forger, and information about the jurisdiction of 
the Heliaia was at the time probably even more abundant than now. Yet on the other 
hand the clause does not provide, as Herz suggested, an argument against the reliability 
of the text. 
Some more difficulties are created by the next clause. As it stands in the 
paradosis, it does not make any sense. εἰσφέρειν δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας […] τῷ 
βουλομένῳ consists of the accusative ‘the archons’ as the subject of an unlikely 
εἰσφέρειν, which holds an even more unlikely dativus commodi τῷ βουλομένῳ (for 
everyone who wishes to carry it out).161 Therefore, the archons should introduce the case 
(or the offender) to the court (all this is understood) for anyone162 who wishes to carry it 
out. First of all, Franke rightly pointed out that the proper Attic verb for causam aut rem 
in iudicium adducere, when the subject is an official, is εἰσάγειν.163 However, if the 
                                                
159 Herz 1878: 26. 
160 [Arist.] Ath.Pol.7.3, 9.1. Cf. Hignett 1952: 97; Hansen 1981-1982; Hansen 1989: 258-262; Boegehold 
1995: 17-20. Pace Bonner, Smith 1930: I, 158, who thought that Solon just reorganized a pre-existing 
Heliaia. 
161 Reiske and Weber ad locum understood it as a dativus commodi, but Franke 1848: 6; Herz 1878: 25-
26; and even Drerup 1898: 268 pointed out its ungewöhnlichkeit. 
162 Gagarin 1981: 25 n. 45 advanced the hypothesis that the dative be understood as ‘on behalf of anyone 
who wishes…’, but then admitted that this would be too stretched, and hardly Greek. 
163 E.g. Dem. 46.22; 47.24, 26, 27, 28; Plat. Gor. 521c, 521d. Cf. Franke 1848: 6; Herz 1878: 24-25; 
Drerup 1898: 268 presented just two, rather far apart, parallels to the verb in similar cases and with this 
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amendment is very archaic, then the formula might not yet have been fixed. But even if 
we assume that the sentence is grammatically acceptable, the procedure it explains is 
unlike normal Athenian practice.164 In Athenian legal practice the accuser summons the 
defendant before the appropriate official, and the official, when he accepts the case, 
introduces the case to a lawcourt. 
Because of this difficulty, many scholars have tried to emend the text to make it 
consistent with normal Athenian procedure. This is circular reasoning. There is no point 
in making a text acceptable through emendation and then claiming that because of its 
internal consistency it must be held as a trustworthy source. What is needed in order to 
justify such a correction is external evidence of its likely trustworthiness. In this 
particular case such evidence exists (which does not justify similar interventions in 
other documents). This is the peculiar usage of δικασταί, and the verb διαγιγνώσκειν. 
δικάζειν referred in archaic times to the activity of a magistrate (or the king), namely 
pronouncing the sentence in a trial, 'stating the right' as Wolff defined his role,165 while 
διαγιγνώσκειν meant actually deciding between two options on the basis of 
evidence.166 The contrast between the two terms is found clearly in IG I3 104, and finds 
a parallel in the couple καταδικάζειν and κρίνειν in the Gortyn Code (1.4, 1.8, 5.43-
44, 5.54, 11.30).167 This opposition does not exist in later times,168 and δικάζειν quickly 
comes to mean simply ‘to judge’, the function previously (and here) expressed by 
διαγιγνώσκειν. This is also a strong ground for the reliability of this second section of 
the document, which must have been part of the Solonian code, or have been passed 
                                                                                                                                          
sense: IG IX, 1, 694 (from Corcyra) ὁ[ι] δὲ εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια φερέτω, and Lex.Seg. 250.11-12 τῶν δὲ 
ἐνδείξεων εἰσέφερον εἰς δικαστήριον ἃς μὲν οἱ ἕνδεκα, ἃς δὲ οἱ θεσμοθέται. Yet he also concluded 
that the case is rather unlikely. 
164 When εἰσάγειν is followed by a dative, the dative always refer to the defendant, never to the accuser. 
Cf. e.g. [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 58.3, 59.4, 61.1. 
165 Wolff 1946: 75-76. 
166 Cf. id. and Gagarin 1981: 47-48; Hansen 1981-1982: 27; Humphreys 1983: 235 n. 1; Boegehold 1995: 
17-18 n. 3; Carawan 1998: 49-68. These interpretations, and others that I have not listed, do not 
completely agree about the meaning of the two words, but all accept the antiquity of their opposition. 
167 Cf. Wolff 1946: 75-76; Harrison 1971: 38 n. 1. 
168 Gernet-Humbert 1959: 189-190. 
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right after him,169 and clearly speaks for a conscientious insertion made by the editor of 
the text, confirming the impression given by the first law quoted at § 22. 
Since the document seems to be reliable, the expression εἰσφέρειν δὲ τοὺς 
ἄρχοντας […] τῷ βουλομένῳ must be fixed. The best solution is the one proposed by 
Schelling.170 He proposed considering τῷ βουλομένῳ as held by an understood 
ἐξεῖναι. The meaning would be: it is therefore possible, for anyone who wishes, to 
εἰσφέρειν δ’ ἐ<ς> τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Assuming a small corruption the sense of the 
clause is restored. The magistrates are no longer introducing the case to the individual 
citizens, but rather the individual citizens are bringing the case before the magistrates. 
The sentence is still strange but this might be explained by its antiquity, and moreover it 
resembles the expression ἀποφέρειν γραφὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα found Ps.-Dem. 
58.32 (cf. also Lex.Pat. 149.2). Furthermore, Plato in his Laws (772c) preserves a 
perfect parallel of the expression when he writes εἰσφέρειν εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας. 
Here, whichever is the object of εἰσφέρειν, that object is understood as in our passage, 
and the names of the officials are introduced by εἰς.  
The further specification, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, cannot affect the question 
of the authenticity. It refers to the attributions τῶν ἀρχόντων. The charges (understood 
in the text) must be brought before the archons according to their jurisdiction. ὧν thus 
refers to to the understood 'charges'.171 
                                                
169 Cf. Gagarin 1981: 25-26 for a cautious approach, while Boegehold 1995: 19 n. 14 and Carawan 1998: 
90 attribute it to Solon, and Ruschenbusch 1966 inserts it among the Solonian fragments as F16. 
170 Schelling 1842: 68, hence generally accepted by all the editors and commentators. 
171 An understood ταῦτα (which Weber even tried to integrate in the text), or more explicitly τὰς 
γραφὰς περὶ τούτων. Cf. Drerup 1898: 168. More recent works have generally endorsed this 
interpretation: Cf. e.g. Gagarin 1981: 25; Boegehold, Camp 1995: 18 n. 3; Carawan 1998: 90. I leave 
aside the perfect correspondence with Dem. 47.71 since in that case the expression comes from an 
inserted document, and its reliability is still to be demonstrated. The interpretation I just gave of this 
specification has been challenged by Weil 1886: 199 n. 1, with the argument that the passage presents the 
plural ἕκαστοι, which cannot mean 'each archon', for which we would expect the singular ἕκαστος. The 
plural would be instead a collective subject, indicating the magistrates in general, all performing the 
functions of δικασταί. The lawgiver would have left the competent magistrate unspecified in order to 
make his provision valid in spite of future procedural changes, and not because λυμαίνεσθαι and 
ἀποινᾶν are different charges to be handled by different magistrates, since this meaning is not suitable to 
the other occurrence of the expression in Dem. 47.71, in which the charge dealt with is just one. As I said, 
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that occurrence might not be reliable, since it is found in a document absent from the stichometry, and 
therefore inserted much later. The reading given by Weil overcomplicates the passage. As I have already 
explained, ὧν refers to an understood ταύτα, and the plural ἕκαστοι does not cause problems for my 
interpretation. In fact ἕκαστοι as indicating a group, as a collective plural, is just one of the possible 
meanings of the pronoun. It is as often used in the sense of 'each one of a group separatly' (Il. 1.550; 
Aesch. Supp. 932; Pl. Leg. 799a), which is exactly the meaning implied in this passage. 
 82 
3.3 Dem. 23.37: the killing of a murderer 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Ἐὰν δέ τις τὸν ἀνδροφόνον κτείνῃ ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς 
ἐφορίας καὶ ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον 
κτείναντα, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας. 
 
ὥσπερ- ἐφέτας Lex. Pat. ad loc. 
 
δέ om. SYPa | ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν καὶ ἄθλων Herz | 
ἐφυρείας Fa | ἐν del. van Herwenden Herz cf. § 41 
 
If then someone kills the murderer or is the cause of his death, as far as the 
murderer steers clear of the frontier markets, of the athletic contests and of the 
Amphictyonic rites, he is to be liable to the same punishment as if he kills an 
Athenian citizen, and is to be judged by the Ephetai. 
 
This law was long ago shown by Köhler172 to be consistent with ll. 26-29 of IG I3 
104, and new letters discovered by Stroud173 have confirmed his judgment. It’s text is 
consistent, almost word for word, with the orator’s following account at § 38 ('ἐάν τις 
ἀποκτείνῃ τὸν ἀνδροφόνον’ φησὶν ‘ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον ἀγορᾶς 
ἐφορίας καὶ ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, 
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας').  
Some expressions, though difficult to explain and so explained by many scholars 
in very different ways, cannot be doubted, as the document and the following quotation 
perfectly agree in terminology. Namely, the adjective Ἀμφικτυονικῶν must refer just 
                                                
172 Köhler 1867: 34-35. 
173 Stroud 1968: 53-54. 
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to the rites. With the exclusion of the convicted killer from them and from all the 
ἄθλων, as Demosthenes interprets the expression, the lawgiver must have pursued the 
aim to avoid any encounter between the killer and the relatives of the victim.174 The 
ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας (frontier-markets) should be interpreted as a relic.175 Demosthenes at 
§ 39 defines them as the places where the borderers in old times used to gather with 
their neighbours, but their existence at the time of the republication of the law, let alone 
at the time of Demosthenes, is very unlikely.176 The most controversial point is the 
competence assigned by the statute to the ephetai. Cases of homicide committed against 
exiled murderers who keep clear of the prohibited places should be mainly intentional, 
due to the wish for revenge of the relatives of the victim, and should therefore, 
according to the law quoted at § 22, be handled by the Areopagos Council. The 
explanations for this anomaly have been many. Both Drerup and De Sanctis,177 trying to 
give an explanation which was synchronically consistent with all we know about 
homicide statutes, imagined that this law did not actually state that an exiled murderer, 
when killed, was treated as an Athenian citizen. It only states that the killer must be 
punished as though he killed an Athenian. But it is possible at the same time that the 
killed murderer was still considered bereft of his rights. He was judged therefore by the 
ephetai in the Palladion, as happened to metics and foreigners. The evidence about the 
earliest phases of the homicide regulations, as stated by MacDowell,178 is too scanty to 
be conclusive on this issue. To mention just the most recent alternative hypotheses, it is 
                                                
174 Pace Latte RE VI, s.v. Mord: 286-287, who thinks that the adjective must refer to both the games and 
the rites, since the Athenian state has no power to exclude anyone from places outside its jurisdiction. Cf. 
against this view MacDowell 1963: 121 and Stroud 1968: 53-54. Nevertheless, supporting this view does 
not mean accepting the emendation by Herz 1878: 26-27, who changes the word order of the provision in 
καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν καὶ ἄθλων in order to make it match Demosthenes' discussion at § 39-40. 
175 Ruschenbusch 2010: 47 admits that they are unbekannt. 
176 Stroud 1968: 53-54 mentions several reasons for ruling out their existence at the time of the 
republication, namely that the Spartans were at the time in control of Deceleia, the Boeotian cavalry in 
410 attacked Athens (Xen. Hell.1.1.34; Diod. 13.65) and the Megarians endangered the west border (and 
were eventually defeated by the Athenians in 410/109; Cf. Hell.Oxy. 1.1; Diod. 13.65). 
177 Drerup 1898: 272-273; De Sanctis 1975: 179. 
178 MacDowell 1963: 5-7. 
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also possible that at the time of Draco the Areopagos was not concerned with homicide 
at all, as stated recently by Gagarin and Carawan,179 and therefore the ephetai were to 
judge all the cases of homicide. Afterwards the ephetai came to be intended as homicide 
judges, encompassing also the Areopagites. Alternatively Wallace could be right in 
assuming that the Areopagos was already in charge of intentional homicide, but at the 
time of Draco it was not a Council that was summoned on the hill of Ares, as after 
Solon, but precisely the ephetai.180 In any case, the text of the document is confirmed 
nearly word for word in the following account by the orator, and there is no question 
about its authenticity. 
The only slight differences are in the first clause; the document presents a further 
δέ, though not in all the medieval tradition, and the verb ἀποκτείνῃ, instead of κτείνῃ, 
before and not after τὸν ἀνδροφόνον. As previously stated, slight differences in 
wording are scarcely significant, since they can be explained as casual miscopying, or 
even as stemming from slightly different official copies of the same law.181 In addition, 
in Demosthenes’ words (§ 39) we read also the version found in the document, a few 
lines later, just without the δέ. One cannot draw any firm conclusions from this. But it 
is a fact that IG I3 104 at ll. 26-27 presents the provision exactly as it stands in the 
document, also with the δέ. It is possible, as believed by Herz,182 that the editor of the 
document just happened to choose the right version from the two presented by 
Demosthenes’ text. And the δέ itself, since it is not present in all the tradition, could be 
a lucky emendation by some later scribe, added on account of the beginnings of other 
provisions in the same speech. But this is just guesswork. What is clear again is that 
                                                
179 Gagarin 1981: 133-135; Carawan 1998: 161. 
180 Wallace 1989: 17-18. 
181 For instance, as noted by Stroud 1968: 54, IG I3 104 at l. 28 contains 52 characters, instead of the 
expected 50. This could be a simple imprecision due to the inscriber, but it is also possible that the text in 
the speech came from a different copy of the same statute, and therefore presented slight differences. The 
restoration in this case would be almost, but not completely, correct. 
182 Herz 1878: 26-27. 
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some editorial work has been done at the time of the insertion, and the epigraphic 
parallel proves it correct.183 
 
                                                
183 The stele with Draco's laws is of no help in the case of ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, which is repeated 
by Demosthenes both in the same form and without the ἐν. L. 29 of the inscription in fact consists of 51 
letters, just one more than the standard measure of 50. This figure is anomalous, but if we delete the 
preposition, the figure 49 is still as anomalous. Herz 1878: 26-27 asserted that the form without ἐν is 
preferable, but I cannot see why. The form ἐνέχεσθαι plus ἐν with the dative is perfectly usual for stating 
a penalty. Cf. Gagarin 1981: 40 n. 30. 
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3.4 Dem. 23.44: persecution and plunder of a murderer 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Ἐάν τίς τινα τῶν ἀνδροφόνων τῶν ἐξεληλυθότων, ὧν τὰ χρήματα 
ἐπίτιμα, πέρα ὅρου ἐλαύνῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ, τὰ ἴσα ὀφείλειν ὅσα περ ἂν ἐν τῇ 
ἡμεδαπῇ δράσῃ. 
 
τινα om. SFaY | ἢ φέρῃ del. Herwerden Westermann Herz coll. 49 (sed cf. 46) cf. 60, 61 | 
ὀφείλει SFY 
 
If someone, beyond the border, pursues or despoils some murderer in exile from 
the territory, whose goods are not confiscated, he is to incur the same penalty as 
if he did it in our land. 
 
This statute is not found in IG I3 104.184 Demosthenes quotes it while discussing 
its provisions almost word for word at § 45-46. 
Many hypotheses have been advanced in order to set this provision in the context 
of the other homicide statutes. It has been mainly considered Draconian, or, as Drerup 
argued, with a Draconian influence, even if it does not appear in the preserved stele.185 
This may well be true, but the possibility cannot be excluded that the provision was part 
of the amendment to the original Draco law for which the statute at § 28 is evidence.186 
As far as we know in fact, Draco's law contained a provision which allowed anyone to 
kill an exiled murderer who had come back into the Athenian territory (ll. 30-31), and 
another provision forbidding it when the murderer steers clear of the prohibited places 
(ll. 26-29). If, as Gagarin pointed out, the provision quoted at § 28 is an amendment to 
                                                
184 Cf. Stroud 1968: 42. 
185 Carawan 1998: 77; Drerup 1898: 271. 
186 Cf. the compelling argument made by Gagarin 1981: 24-26. Gilbert-Brooks 1895: 516 already dated it 
soon after Draco. 
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ll. 30-31 of the inscription, still allowing the killing of the exiled murderers found in the 
Athenian territory, but forbidding torture and ransom, this statute could well be an 
amendment adding further provisions for murderers who steer clear of the Athenian 
territory. In fact, it shares with the former the characteristic of referring to other statutes. 
§ 28 refers to the first axon, ll. 30-31, whereas this law refers specifically to the 
provisions valid in the Athenian territory.187 
The first clause is perfectly identical in both instances, while the second one, τὰ 
ἴσα ὀφείλειν ὅσα περ ἂν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ δράσῃ, presents slight differences. The 
words in the orator’s comment are in fact γράψας ταὐτὰ ὀφείλειν ἅπερ ἂν οἴκοι 
δράσῃ. Both Franke and Herz resolutely asserted that the correct form must be the one 
reported by the orator, and the expression ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ would have been chosen by 
the later editor according to § 35, for variation.188 This assertion is arbitrary. The text of 
the document does not present any grammatical problem, and the provision is too old 
for drawing any conclusion on the ground of terminology. Moreover, part of the 
expression ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ is clearly read in IG I3 104 l. 30, and it is also very likely to 
have been part of the statute witnessed by § 28 and 35 of this speech (perhaps an 
amendment to that section of Draco's law). So, whatever the origin of the provision here 
discussed, the expression ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ is attested,189 and is as possible as anything 
else. Anyway, the adverb οἴκοι is not an impossible choice either, as it is quite an 
archaic form, and attested, even though just in one case, in the 5th century: IG I3 
21=SEG 31.6. Nothing conclusive can be said in this case about the difference between 
the document and the orator’s comment. Both the variants are acceptable; the orator 
                                                
187 Furthermore, the provision assessing the payment of double the damage caused seems to recall the law 
about dikai blabes mentioned at Dem. 21.43. See also Ruschenbusch 2010: 47. 
188 Franke 1848: p. 7, IV; Herz 1878: 27-28. 
189 This is the only evidence for this adjective in Athenian inscriptions dated before the beginning of the 
5th century, but in the 5th century it is attested quite widely: Cf. IG I3 52, IG I3 372, IG I3 376, IG I3 378, IG 
I3 383. 
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might have combined quotation and paraphrase, or it is even possible that both variants 
already existed in different copies of the law. 
But what does this provision actually forbid, and what kind of murderers does it 
cover? The application of this statute is expressly restricted to unwilling killers. This is 
clear from the specification ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἐπίτιμα, and is confirmed both by the 
following comment made by Demosthenes and by Harpocration, s.v. Ὅτι οἱ ἁλόντες 
ἐπ’ ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶχον εἰς διοίκησιν τῶν ἰδίων, Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ 
κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους ὑποσημαίνει καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ ιγʹ τῶν Νόμων δηλοῖ 
(ο42 Keaney), who mentions this passage and the twelfth book of Theophrastos’ Laws. 
There is no reason to doubt this evidence.190 
The second line of the document refers to the man who πέρα ὅρου ἐλαύνῃ ἢ 
φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ a convicted murderer. He is to be punished with the same penalty as if he 
did it at home. The passage is not clear. Herz, following some remarks made by 
Herwerden and Westermann,191 noted that, while in the text and in the immediately 
following summary at the beginning of § 46 the expression is ἐλαύνῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ ἄγῃ, 
afterwards, both at the end of this same paragraph and again at § 49, the verbs are just 
ἐλαύνειν καὶ ἄγειν. Furthermore at § 46 Demosthenes, when referring to these verbs, 
says πέρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἐᾷ τούτων οὐδέτερον ποιεῖν, alluding to only two verbs, and not 
three. All these scholars drew from this fact the conclusion that the text reported by 
Demosthenes is the better one, and the reading of the document must be rejected. The 
argument they made in order to support their claim is that φέρειν ἢ ἄγειν is the Greek 
form for the Latin ferre et agere,192 meaning to plunder, to despoil for booty.193 This 
                                                
190 This evidence is not doubted by Ruschenbusch 1960: 140, MacDowell 1963: 121, Gagarin 1981: 60 n. 
83, Ruschenbusch 2010: 46. Pace Carawan 1998: 77 n. 79, 151 n. 19, who refers to Gagarin but 
misunderstands his statement. 
191 Herz 1878: 27-28. Cf. Westermann 1865: III, 27; Volpis 1936: 71. 
192 Cf. e.g. Liv. 3.37; 38.18. 
193 The remark is certainly correct. Cf. IG I3 72; Il.5.484, 23.512, Eur. Tr. 1310; Ar. Nub. 248; Hdt. 1.48, 
3.39; Xen. Hell. 3.2.2 and LSJ: s.v. ἄγω I.3; φέρω V.2 for other examples. 
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expression is generally found with the accusative of place, and ἄγειν means to seize and 
drive away animals and human beings (slaves), while φέρειν points to the goods. Now, 
while this meaning is appropriate for the law quoted at § 60-61 of this speech, where the 
matters discussed are goods and booty, here the law would be, in these scholars' 
interpretation, concerned just with ἐλαύνειν καὶ ἄγειν, to pursue and to arrest, to drive 
away the murderer. This, according to Demosthenes’ explanation, would be possible 
just from inside the border τῆς τοῦ παθόντος πατρίδος, but not πέρα ὅρου. The 
decree of Aristocrates therefore, stating that the killer of Charidemus ἀγώγιμος ἔστω 
everywhere, would conflict with the present provision.  
The deletion of ἢ φέρῃ proposed by Herwerden, Westermann and Herz, while 
noted in the apparatus, has never been accepted. Nevertheless, the interpretation given 
by Demosthenes has often been followed in the translations. Vince translates: 'If any 
man outside the frontier pursues or violently seizes the person of any homicide who has 
quitted the country…' MacDowell does the same: 'Anyone who beyond the frontier 
drives or carries or leads an exiled killer…'194 Phillips believes that this provision was 
enacted 'to prevent overzelous relatives from forcibly repatriating an exiled killer so as 
to declare him in trespass and punish him accordingly'.195 These intepretations are 
certainly possible, since sometimes φέρειν ἢ ἄγειν means just 'bear and carry' (cf. Pl. 
Phdr. 279c; Leg. 817a; Xen. Cyr. 3.3.2). Yet the expression with this meaning, and 
without any link to booty, is rather rare. ἐλαύνειν itself is often used in archaic times 
with the meaning of 'carry off, drive away', referring mainly to stolen cattle and horses 
(Cf. Od. 9.237, 12.253; Il. 4.299, 5.236; but still Xen. Hell. 4.8.18). Accordingly, the 
whole sentence seems to present a rather concrete vocabulary, as noted by Gernet,196 
consistently pointing to the circumstance of plundering for booty. Therefore, 
                                                
194 MacDowell 1963: 121. 
195 Phillips 2008: 64, 79. 
196 Gernet-Humbert 1959: 190. He rightly translates: 'Quiconque, en dehors des frontières, exercera 
poursuite et pillage sur un meurtrieur émigré…'. 
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Westermann was probably right in his analysis of the expression as referring to goods 
instead of to the person of the murderer (as was argued by Demosthenes).197 Yet this is 
not a good reason to emend the expression. Demosthenes could well have avoided in his 
comment the φέρειν, leaving the single ἄγειν, in order to support his claim that the 
decree proposed by Aristocrates, inasmuch as it declares the killer of Charidemus 
ἀγώγιμος, contravenes this law. But Demosthenes was probably twisting, as he often 
does, the meaning of the law in order to make it fit his argument. On the contrary, it is 
likely that this law had nothing to do with seizing and carrying off a person. It was 
concerned with the goods of the exiled murderer (involuntary homicide). Those which 
he had at home were already protected, since they were still, as stated by the statute 
itself, ἐπίτιμα. This law, possibly an amendment of the original one, protected also the 
goods the murderer owned outside the territory of Athens, stating that any hostile action 
against his property carried out abroad would have been punished as though it had 
happened in the territory of Athens. 
The text of this document is therefore consistent in itself, it does not present any 
problematic feature and, when it happens to endorse one reading of the following 
paraphrase against another, it sides with the right one. The general impression is thus 
the same as that given by the preceding documents: a conscientious editorial work, 
presumably done in Athens at a very early stage of the tradition, by someone who knew 
very well the homicide laws of Athens. 
 
                                                
197 Ruschenbusch 2010: 46 has it both ways: '[...] Repressalien verübt, indem er das Vieh wegtreibt, seine 
Habe wegträgt oder ihn selbst abführt...' 
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3.5 Dem. 23.51: charges of homicide for indictments against murderers 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Φόνου δὲ δίκας μὴ εἶναι μηδαμοῦ κατὰ τῶν τοὺς φεύγοντας 
ἐνδεικνύντων, ἐάν τις κατίῃ ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστιν. 
 
P. Mich. III 142 | κατὰ - ἐνδεικνύντων Schol.D.22.33.97c 
 
No private action for homicide shall be brought anywhere against people who 
present an indictment against an exile, if he returns where he is not allowed to. 
 
This law is not reported by IG I3 104. Yet it is quoted almost word for word in the 
following account by the orator. The text there is: ‘κατὰ τῶν ἐνδεικνύντων’ φησὶ 
‘τοὺς κατιόντας ἀνδροφόνους ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστι δίκας φόνου μὴ εἶναι.’  
The main difference is in the word order, while the last clause ἐάν τις κατίῃ, 
though different from the section of the paraphrase just quoted, is reported afterwards, 
at § 52, with the same words. Herz198 opted for the form κατιόντας, which would be 
confirmed, he claimed, by IG I3 104. Philippi in fact considered this text to follow those 
of § 28 and 37.199 Those texts seem to appear at ll. 26-31 of IG I3 104 with a rather 
different word order, according to a restoration proposed by Köhler, and therefore some 
difference should be postulated for this provision as well. This is not a conclusive 
argument at all. Moreover, a further restoration of this provision after ll. 26-31 has long 
been demonstrated to be unacceptable.200 The problem of whether the wording of the 
document or the one in Demosthenes’ summary is the original one cannot be solved; 
                                                
198 Herz 1878: 22. 
199 Philippi 1874: 338-346. 
200 Herz himself a few lines later expressed some doubt. 
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both alternatives have equal chances of being correct, and they could even have been 
part of variants of the same law appearing in different copies of it. 
Other differences which trouble scholars are τοὺς φεύγοντας of the document 
instead of τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους of the following paraphrase, and the adverb μηδαμοῦ, 
present just in the document. Both these readings of the document have been doubted by 
Franke, supported by Herz.201 They argue that the reading τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους is used 
by Demosthenes in what is supposed to be an exact quotation.202 In the following 
paragraph the verb φεύγειν is found three times, and the alleged forger of the document 
would have chosen this verb for variation. This may well be true. But it must be pointed 
out that in this section Demosthenes has mostly been concerned with showing that in all 
the quoted provisions the killer is alluded to as ἀνδροφόνος, which would mean in his 
interpretation 'convicted murderer'. This would imply that a trial is indispensable, 
whereas Aristocrates’ decree declares the killer ἀγώγιμος without any trial. Therefore a 
slight change in wording made by Demosthenes is not impossible, and could be 
motivated by the attempt to make the provisions even more consistent with his purpose 
than they actually were.203 Moreover, the restoration of φεύγεν as the penalty for 
involuntary homicide at l. 11 of IG I3 104, proposed by Köhler on the ground of this 
passage, has remained unquestioned, and a new epsilon read by Stroud204 seems to 
confirm it. None of these arguments can be taken as conclusive, and nothing solid can 
be said on this matter. In any case, even if the document were wrong, a single word, 
                                                
201 Franke 1848: 8 and Herz 1878: 22. 
202 Franke 1848: 8 argues moreover that this law must be closely connected with the provision at § 37, 
and there the reading is τὸν ἀνδροφόνον. Therefore we should accept such a reading also in this 
provision. Drerup 1898: 278 has rightly pointed out that at § 28 the topic is ἀποκτείνειν and ἀπάγειν, 
not just endeixis. So he concluded that even if a connection existed, it must have been looser than Franke 
assumed. His point is definitely correct, since the restoration of the provision after ll. 26-31 of IG I3 104 
is, as we saw, impossible. 
203 Cf. Phillips 2008: 122-3 suggests that Draco was actually referring to exiles in general, and not to 
exiles due to homicide. 
204 Stroud 1968: 41-42. 
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which is in fact not misleading, cannot alone compromise the reliability of the editor of 
these documents. 
The same can be said for the adverb μηδαμοῦ. Against the remark that it esse 
ineptum apparet (Herz) since Athenis quid fieri velle, praecepit Draco, non quid in aliis 
terris (Franke) many attempts have been made to justify its presence.205 Henri Weil206 
gives the most likely explanation of the adverb, commenting 'le mot μηδαμοῦ n’a rien 
d’étrange, quoi qu’on en ait dit'. It means 'nulle part, devant aucun tribunal'. Charges of 
homicide concerning the author of an indictment against an exiled murderer who did not 
abide by the terms of his exile were not to be heard by any court: the official was to 
drop them immediately. μηδαμοῦ is therefore not inconsistent with the general sense of 
this statute. 
Yet the question of the position of this provision among the other statutes 
concerning homicide, and its meaning, is still open. The provision actually asserts that 
no charge can be brought, and no legal action can be held, against the author of an 
indictment (ἐνδείξις) against a murderer who does not abide by his exile. The most 
likely explanation is that given by Westermann: he thought that this law was somehow 
connected with the one at § 37. In that case the matter was the prohibition on killing a 
convicted murderer who steers clear of the forbidden places. Yet the provision did not 
talk just of killers, but also of αἴτιος φόνου. This further provision would be a 
specification ex abundanti cautela that the author of an indictment by which a convicted 
                                                
205 Drerup 1898: 278 argued that the adverb must be intended to cover all the places mentioned at § 28 as 
prohibited to exiled killers, which are not part of the Attic territory, namely the athletic games and the 
Amphictyonic rites. In those cases killing the homicide would have been an offence against the God, 
because of the God’s Peace. Accordingly, the only option for the person who met the killer of a relative 
on such occasions was to denounce the manslayer in front of a local authority, and to have the question 
handled in loco or the homicide extradited to Athens. The explanation is fascinating, but it must be noted 
that the provision does not seem concerned with the treatment of homicides (at home or anywhere), just 
with the treatment of the author of the endeixis against a killer. To support Drerup’s interpretation we 
would need at least another provision directly concerned with the matter. Moreover, μηδαμοῦ is not 
connected with the endeixis, but with dikai phonou against the author of an endeixis. The point is not 
where the indictment actually happens, but that a subsequent trial against its author is impossible, 
regardless of its setting (that is, regardless of the court, as we will see). 
206 Weil 1886: 208 n. 2. 
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murderer is executed cannot be considered αἴτιος φόνου.207 The legitimacy of ἐνδείξις 
(in that case apagoge)208 is in fact expressly asserted by the provision of § 28. This does 
not mean of course that this provision physically followed the other one on a stele. 
To sum up, the document does not present any trace of a later insertion, and must 
be accepted as part of the stichometric edition. However, in this case it is very difficult 
to assess the reliability of the editor in inserting the document, mostly for lack of 
parallel evidence. 
                                                
207 Cf. Westermann 1865: 29; Volpis 1936: 26-77 and 76-7. Pace Herz 1878: 22. 
208 About ἐνδείξις in general and in this particular case cf. MacDowell 1963: 122 and Hansen 1976: 100-
103, 111-118. The interpretation just given is also implied in the treatments of the provision in 
MacDowell 1963: 122 and Carawan 1998: 82. 
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3.6 Dem. 23.53: lawful homicide 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἄκων, ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ 
ἀγνοήσας, ἢ ἐπὶ δάμαρτι ἢ ἐπὶ μητρὶ ἢ ἐπ’ ἀδελφῇ ἢ ἐπὶ θυγατρί, ἢ ἐπὶ 
παλλακῇ ἣν ἂν ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν ἔχῃ, τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν 
κτείναντα.  
 
P. Mich. III 142 | ἢ- καθελὼν Harp. k 5, o 2 Sud. o 47 Eust. 1.110.5 
 
ἢ ἐπὶ μητρὶ om. S 
 
If someone kills someone else unintentionally during athletic contests, or 
overcoming him on the road, or in war without being aware of it, or catching him 
in intercourse with the wife, the mother, the sister, the daughter or the concubine 
held for the purpose of free children, on that account the killer is not to flee into 
exile. 
 
This law about lawful homicide has always been the object of much controversy. 
Despite an attempt by Theodore Bergk,209 supported by Philippi, to restore its provisions 
at IG I3 104 l. 36, it has been demonstrated by Dittenberger that the statute cannot 
possibly fit the lacuna, because of one single epsilon already read by Köhler.210 His 
point has been reinforced by the discovery of three new letters at l. 36, and others at l. 
37, due to the work of Stroud.211 Therefore, the statute was not in the section of Draco's 
laws still preserved to us on stone. Nevertheless the reliability of most of the clauses is 
                                                
209 Bergk 1873: 669 ff; Philippi 1874: 351. 
210 Dittenberger 1883: 1.89 n. 52. 
211 Stroud 1968: 36 ff. 
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indisputable, since they are repeated word for word in Demosthenes’ account.212 Yet a 
few differences have troubled interpreters, namely the clause ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν, 
neither reported nor hinted at in the following paragraphs, the participle ἄκων, which is 
absent as well, and the conclusion τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα, instead of 
which Demosthenes uses expressions like οὐκ ἀδικεῖν, εἶναι καθαρόν, οὐ δίκην 
ὑπέχειν, ἀθῷον ποιεῖν (§ 55). These differences are key to assessing the nature of the 
document. 
A strong indication against these clauses, and therefore against the reliability of 
the document, comes from Ath.Pol. 57.3. There this law is clearly alluded to, and the 
provisions listed are exactly the same as those in Demosthenes’ account, although in 
reverse order: ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀποκτεῖναι μέν τις ὁμολογῇ, φῇ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, οἷον 
μοιχὸν λαβών, ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας, ἢ ἐν ἄθλῳ ἀγωνιζόμενος, τούτῳ ἐπὶ 
Δελφινίῳ δικάζουσιν.213 It can easily be noticed that the passage does not show any 
trace of the further expressions just quoted. Furthermore, the textual witnesses of this 
passage are absolutely consistent. Except for the expression ἢ ἐπὶ μητρὶ, which is 
absent from S (its absence is easily explainable as a mechanical mistake by a scribe who 
missed this entry off the list because of the repetition of ἢ ἐπὶ), the document is present 
and consistent in all the medieval tradition. Moreover, all the ancient witnesses agree in 
presenting also the problematic expressions. A papyrus of the 2nd century AD, P.Mich. 
III.142, presents the whole text, including all three puzzling elements. Other witnesses 
show that the passage, in particular the expression ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν, also puzzled the 
ancient commentators. Harpocration discusses it twice (under the entries καθελὼν and 
                                                
212 They are also alluded to in other passages, both in the orators and in other sources. The cases listed 
here were not the only occasions in which lawful homicide was contemplated, but their presence in a 
single statute, listed together, is granted by [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 57.3, Cf. below. For a survey of all the cases 
of lawful homicide cf. MacDowell 1963: 70-81; Gagarin 1978. 
213 'And one who admits homicide but declares it to have been legal (for instance when he has killed a 
man caught as a seducer), or who in war has killed a fellow-citizen in ignorance, or in an athletic contest, 
is tried at the Delphinium…' 
 97 
ὁδός), Souda gives the same account as Harpocration (under ὁδός), and traces of this 
discussion are found also in Eust. 1.110.5. The same question is addressed also in a 
lexicon of the Against Aristocrates found in an Egyptian papyrus dated to the 4th or 5th 
century AD (P.Berol. 5008).214 It might be observed that none of these witnesses dates 
earlier than the II century AD, and therefore they are not old enough to exclude a 
corruption which made its way into the document later than the original insertion in the 
stichometric edition. However, Harpocration shows traces of two different explanations 
for the expression, and though one of them might be his own, there is a good chance 
that both stem back to previous works. Moreover, all together these witnesses, both 
ancient and medieval, offer a glimpse into a wide range of ancient editions of this 
speech, which makes cross-contamination quite an unlikely possibility, since the 
original edition quickly spread all around the Mediterranean. To sum up, there is a very 
good chance that the document was originally inserted in this particular form. 
Therefore, if the puzzling expressions should prove clearly untenable, this would have 
consequences in our consideration of the overall reliability of that first editor. 
First of all, it must be observed that the passage of the Ath.Pol. is not supposed to 
be an exact quotation of the statute, and accordingly a perfect identity in wording 
between it and the document is not needed. The first suspect feature is the participle 
ἄκων. It has been generally accepted as authentic and even restored in Demosthenes’ 
text, yet on account of the mistaken reading of l. 36 of IG I3 104 proposed by Bergk.215 
Herz went so far as to think that the participle was on the stele, yet Demosthenes failed 
to report it in his account, and a forger, guessing its presence from οὐ τὸ συμβὰν 
ἐσκέψατο, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ δεδρακότος διάνοιαν (§ 54), happened to be right.216 Now 
this reconstruction is very bold, mainly since the restoration in the stele has proven 
                                                
214 Cf. Gibson 2002: 165-166. 
215 Bergk 1873: 669 ff; Philippi 1874: 351. 
216 Herz 1878: 28-29. 
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impossible, but some of the arguments used to support it still have value. In fact, the 
comment of Demosthenes quoted above is probably trustworthy, and on the other hand 
it is quite unlikely that every sort of homicide was to be lawful just because it happened 
during the athletic games. The lack of intention to kill as a condition for lawfulness is in 
this case self-evident, and this can account for the omission both in Demosthenes’ 
account and in the Ath.Pol.217 The only serious challenge to the actual possibility of 
finding such a participle in this context has come from Carawan.218 He contests the 
possibility that the discriminating factor in the case of homicide committed during an 
athletic contest was intentionality, since he argues that at the time of Draco the ephetai 
did not usually judge matters of intent.219 Therefore, the law to which Demosthenes is 
alluding in the passage would be Draco's law, since there is no hint at intentionality in 
his account (except the mention of διάνοια which Carawan dismisses as a rhetorical 
device), while the one quoted would be a forgery or, more likely, a different, later law. 
We would have, then, two laws about the same topic, the earlier one without hints at 
intentionality (the one alluded to by Demosthenes), and a later one (with these hints) 
mistakenly inserted by an editor in the wrong place. This seems to me a circular 
argument.  
All we can say about ἄκων is that it does make sense, it is attested independently 
in IG I3 104 (twice) at l. 17 and, though it is not in Demosthenes and Aristotle, it is 
found in the corresponding provision in Plat. Leg. 9.865a (εἴ τις ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ ἄθλοις 
δημοσίοις ἄκων). This is not enough to prove that it was present in the original law; 
nor, however, does it prove that it was not. 
The same can be said of the last sentence of the document, τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ 
φεύγειν κτείναντα. Carawan postulated a different formula for every different 
                                                
217 Cf. also Drerup 1898: 276. 
218 Carawan 1998: 92-96. 
219 Carawan 1998: 93 and more generally about intent in archaic law 33-83. 
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circumstance, as we find in the following account (§ 54-55): οὐκ ἀδικεῖν for the killer 
in athletic contexts, εἶναι καθαρόν and οὐ δίκην ὑπέχειν for the man who kills in 
warfare, finally ἀθῷον ποιεῖν for the killer of a seducer.220 The formula of the 
document would be therefore forged, or part of a later, simplified, statute. This 
argument does not seem to me very compelling. Demosthenes is giving explanations for 
every case mentioned by the law, and the different ways in which he marks the 
lawfulness of a homicide are just due to desire for variatio. Moreover, the presence in 
an archaic homicide statute of the expression εἶναι καθαρόν would be very strange, 
since Draco, through all his homicide law, actually avoids any mention of matters of 
pollution relating to homicide.221 The clause τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα on 
the other hand, though it cannot be safely demonstrated as authentic, is fairly 
acceptable, and the mention of φεύγειν is very likely, since exile is the only penalty 
against homicide explicitly stated in the Draco's law stele.222 Again the provision cannot 
obviously be shown to be authentic without further evidence, but none of its features 
makes it untenable.223 
The last difference between the document and the following account is the 
presence of ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν. This expression has puzzled interpreters since 
antiquity, and many attempts have been made to explain its meaning: none of them 
definitive. Many scholars have accepted the ancient interpretation of Harpocration, 
Souda and P.Berol. 5008: the expression would refer to a case in which one kills on the 
road a highwayman waiting in ambush (ἐν λόχῳ καὶ ἐνέδρᾳ).224 Thalheim on the other 
hand has advanced the hypothesis that the provision may refer to a death caused by 
                                                
220 Carawan 1998: 94-95. 
221 Both MacDowell 1963: 1-5; 141-150 and Gagarin 1981: 164-167 have argued against the impact of 
pollution doctrine on legal statutes and practice. Cf. also Carawan 1998: 17-20 and, for a restatement of 
the question, Parker 1983: 104-143, 367-392. 
222 Death penalty was probably not explicitly stated, but came as a consequence of a condition of atimia, 
in case the homicide did not go into exile. Cf. Gagarin 1981: 120-125. 
223 Cf. Drerup 1898: 276. 
224 See Bergk 1873: 669-673; Lipsius 1905-1915: 616 n. 59 (strangely he rejects Harpocration, but then 
advances the same hypothesis); MacDowell 1963: 75-76; Carawan 1998: 92 n. 12 and many others. 
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unintentionally making someone fall from a mountain path.225 Drerup gave up any 
attempt to explain the formula as it stands, and considered it either very archaic and no 
longer understandable, not even by the orator and Aristotle, who therefore do not quote 
it, or corrupted, in which case he proposed the emendation ἐν ὅπλῳ καθελὼν, 
connecting the expression with the following case of a homicide committed in war 
ἀγνοήσας.226 
This is obviously nothing more than guesswork, both by the ancient and by the 
modern scholars mentioned, and therefore I will not attempt here any other explanation 
or emendation, which would not be any more reliable than those just listed. The 
evidence is just too scanty to allow us to explain or amend this expression with 
confidence. What then are the consequences for the reliability of the document? The 
first option, endorsed by Franke and Herz,227 would be to declare the expression not 
original but forged. The author of such a forgery might have been either the original 
editor of the speech, and this would have consequences for the overall reliability of the 
documents inserted here, or a later scribe, a less likely possibility, because we should in 
this case postulate a very early interpolation, just after the original editing, or an 
enormous case of cross-contamination. The overwhelming problem with this solution is 
a methodological one: assuming forgery is a very weak solution when it is not possible, 
as here, to understand what the forger wanted to say. 
Drerup rightly pointed out the problems with this interpretation, and advanced 
three different hypotheses. The first, as just shown, is corruption. It is the weakest 
hypothesis, since it presents the same problems as the possibility of a forger who added 
just this expression. Either he must have intervened in the earliest stages of 
transmission, or his forgery must have spread in a huge instance of cross-contamination. 
                                                
225 Thalheim 1894: 50 n. 4. 
226 Drerup 1898: 277. 
227 Franke 1848: 9-11; Herz 1878: 29-31. 
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Nevertheless this hypothesis is possible, and cannot be completely ruled out. The 
second option is that the expression is not comprehensible because it is very archaic, 
and refers to something that even the Athenians of classical times could no longer 
understand. The statute was thus reworked by the Athenians at a later stage, casting off 
the relic of too old provisions. The new statute would be that commented on by 
Demosthenes (and paraphrased by Aristotle), while the editor inserted the original one. 
This hypothesis too is possible in principle, but is somewhat uneconomical. The third 
hypothesis is the most plausible: the expression was indeed very old, and the editor has 
been also in this case very conscientious in quoting the law in its entirety. Yet 
Demosthenes and Aristotle avoided its mention exactly because they did not understand 
it, and therefore would not have been able to explain its meaning.228 
It is easy to see that the text of this law is not straightforwardly acceptable, and 
nothing very solid can be extracted from analysis of it. As it stands, neither the 
hypothesis of originality nor that of fabrication seem to account perfectly for its 
condition. The document however is the most attested in the tradition, both ancient and 
medieval, and widely quoted with this very wording in the indirect sources, which 
accounts for its antiquity, and for its integrity. It can therefore confidently be confirmed 
as already present in the Urexemplar, together with all the other documents in this 
speech. Its text presents just one main difficulty, while other differences between it and 
the following account can easily be explained. In fact, in the case of these differences, 
the document seems even more consistent with the homicide laws than Demosthenes’ 
words. Instead, one particular expression seems unexplainable, but 'si ces mots sont 
obscures, ce n’est pas la une raison d’accuser la licence d’un faussaire, tant s’en faut'.229  
 
                                                
228 Cf. also Weil 1886: 209 n. 5: 'il n’est pas absolument impossible […] que l’orateur se soit dispensé 
d’expliquer  ce qu’il ne comprenait pas'.  
229 Weil 1886: 209 n. 5. 
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3.7 Dem.23.60: killing in defence of one’s own goods is legitimate 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Καὶ ἐὰν φέροντα ἢ ἄγοντα βίᾳ ἀδίκως εὐθὺς ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, νηποινεὶ 
τεθνάναι. 
 
νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι cf. Andoc.1.95 Pl. Leg.874c Meletemata 22, Epig.App.40 
 
And if someone kills straight off in defence the man who is violently and 
illegally seizing (spoiling) him, the killing is not to be punished. 
 
This provision is both found in this form in IG I3 104, ll. 37-38,230 and reported 
word for word in the following account by Demosthenes. The only slight difference, but 
a completely insignificant one, is the word order ἄγοντα ἢ φέροντα at § 61 instead of 
the document’s φέροντα ἢ ἄγοντα.231 
The law concerns seizure of one’s property,232 and allows in this case the 
immediate killing of the thief in defence: but only if he is seizing the property with 
violence. Gagarin argued that the very existence of this law is evidence that not every 
episode of self-defence involved the killing of the attacker, and self-defence was not a 
                                                
230 The integration, already proposed by Köhler, has been confirmed by the discovery of new letters made 
by Stroud 1968: 57. 
231 Demosthenes might have changed the word order to avoid hiatus. 
232 Cf. above pp. 88-90 for the meaning of the expression φέρειν ἢ ἄγειν. That the expression refers just 
to goods here is accepted by Westermann 1865: 27; Herz 1878: 33-34; Volpis 1936: 83-84; Gernet-
Humbert 1959: 125 'Si on tue sur-le-champ, et en se défendant l’auteur d’une dépossession violente et 
commise sans droit…'; MacDowell 1963: 76; Stroud 1968: 57; Christ 1998: 522; Pierro in Canfora 1974-
2000: vol. 3 pp. 238-239 and n. 23 '…colui che lo depreda violentemente e ingiustamente dei suoi 
averi…'. Gagarin 1978: 113 and n. 9, supported by Carawan 1998: 91, on the other hand argues that the 
reference is to the seizing of both men and property. Gagarin 1981: 63 repeats this view, and claims that 
the target of the provision was mainly pirates and highwaymen, not burglars. In both cases he provides as 
evidence for his claim the next paragraph (§ 61). I cannot see how this might support his view. At § 62, 
about the eventuality that Charidemus may φέρειν ἢ ἄγειν, Demosthenes writes: ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ 
ὅτι πάντες οἱ στράτευμ᾽ ἔχοντες, ὧν ἂν οἴωνται κρείττους ἔσεσθαι, ἄγουσι καὶ φέρουσι χρήματ᾽ 
αἰτοῦντες. The matter seems again to be just χρήματα. 
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generally applied principle of justification in homicide cases.233 Killing in defence was 
allowed just in this particular case.234 Cases against murderers who claimed they had 
committed just homicide were probably held at the Delphinium, as in all the cases listed 
by the law at § 53. 
The document is in this case perfectly consistent with both the summary and the 
inscription, and does not present any problem or clue of either skilful or clumsy editing, 
nor does it show any feature which can set it apart from the other insertions of this 
speech. 
 
                                                
233 Cf. Gagarin 1978. 
234 As well as in case someone steals something at night, as the law discussed at Dem. 24.113 shows. 
Christ 1998: 522 argues that this other statute was specifically implemented in order to cover, at least at 
night, cases of thieves acting without violence. Cf. below pp. 226-7. 
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3.8 Dem. 23.62: the entrenchment clause 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
Ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ 
μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ παῖδας ἀτίμους καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου. 
 
<τοῦ> τὸν add. Lamb. | ἀτίμους del Taylor 
 
Whoever, whether among the magistrates or a private citizen, is cause of the 
violation of this statute, or will modify it, is to be disfranchised, with his children 
and his goods. 
 
This law is quoted extensively by Demosthenes in his following comment of § 62: 
ὃς ἂν ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ μεταποιήσῃ 
αὐτόν, ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου. The text there is almost perfectly 
consistent with that of the document, except for minor features, like the imperative 
ἔστω instead of εἶναι, and the absence of the repeated ἀτίμους. Köhler tried to restore 
this text at l. 47 of IGI3 104, on the basis of the alleged reading μετ]απ[ο]έ[σει], but 
Stroud showed that this restoration is 'epigraphically impossible'.235  
The provision must nevertheless be very old, as the form θεσμὸς shows.236 
Ruschenbusch in his Solonos Nomoi presents this law as a possible fragment of a statute 
by Solon (F22), on account of two passages, Dio Chrys. 80.6 (F93a) and Gell. N.A. 2.12 
(F93b), which hint at some entrenchment clause referring to the laws of Solon.237 These 
passages provide a paraphrase which at least in the first case238 somewhat resembles the 
                                                
235 Stroud 1968: 58. 
236 Cf. Gagarin 1981: 23; Carawan 1998: 91-92. 
237 Ruschenbusch 1966: F22 and FF93a-b. Cf. also Wallace 1989: 58. 
238 Dio Chrys. 80.6: καὶ τὴν ἀράν, ἣν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τῶν Σόλωνος ἔθεντο νόμων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι 
καταλύειν, ἀγνοεῖτε κυριωτέραν οὖσαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸν συγχέοντα 
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words of this law. Gagarin and Carawan on the other hand suggest that this law was 
originally Draconian, as after the next quoted law in the speech (§ 82) Demosthenes 
asserts that every law previously mentioned concerns homicide.239 They may well be 
right, since the impossibility of restoring the provision in the part of Draco’s law we 
have does not exclude the possibility that it was set somewhere else, maybe at the end 
of the second axon the heading of which Stroud has been able to read at the bottom of 
our preserved text.240 The evidence provided by Dio Chrysostomus is not in fact 
conclusive, as the text on which Ruschenbusch relies is heavily emended in order to 
resemble this Demosthenic passage. 
The only real difference between the document and the following paraphrase is, as 
we have seen, the infinitive εἶναι instead of the imperative ἔστω of Demosthenes’ 
account. Both Franke and Herz241 have considered the imperative preferable, on account 
of Dem. 20.156 (ἐάν τις ἀπαιτήσῃ χάριν ὑμᾶς, ‘ἄτιμος ἔστω’ φησὶ ‘καὶ ἡ οὐσία 
δημοσία ἔστω.’). Yet this passage clearly refers to another law, the law of Leptines, 
and its usage of the imperative does not account in any way for the imperative in a 
much older statute. In fact, both the options are plausible, as the text of the Draco’s law 
preserved in IG I3 104 shows: it presents in a few lines both the infinitive (ll.11-13 
φεύγεν, δικάζεν, διαγν[ο̑]ν̣[α]ι ̣, αἰδέσασθαι…) and the imperative (ll. 18-20 
ἐσέσθον, hαιρέσθον, ἐνεχέσθον…).  
The repetition of ἀτίμους in the document is hardly significant. Franke has 
interpreted it, following Taylor, Schäfer, as another sign that the forger was fond of 
variatio, and has mentioned three similar passages (Dem. 9.42, 43 and Dem. 19.271) in 
                                                                                                                                          
τὸ θεσμὸν ἄτιμον ὑπάρχειν, πλὴν παῖδας καὶ γένος οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν, ὡς ἐκεῖ, τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων, 
ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος αὑτῷ γίγνεται τῆς ἀτυχίας αἴτιος. 
239 Gagarin 1981: 23 and Carawan 1998: 79, 92. 
240 Stroud 1968: 58-60. 
241 Franke 1848: 11-2; Herz 1878: 33-34. 
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which the adjective is not repeated.242 Some epigraphical instances of similar 
entrenchment formulas could also be added (e.g. IG I3 46, ll. 26-27; IG II2 43 with 
ἀτίμος)243 to confirm that this repetition was in classical times quite unusual, but the 
early date of the text does not allow us to draw any conclusions from the later standard 
usage. Weber rightly commented: at nihil in Dracoins lege mutandum est, libris 
adversantibus, neque haerendum in repetitione v. ἀτίμους, quam legislatoris 
diligentiae concedamus.244 
To sum up, this document is largely consistent with the following account, and the 
very slight oddities do not provide enough material for assessing which version of the 
provision was the original one, and whether the document has just been drawn from the 
orator’s paraphrase or has a different origin. Nevertheless, it shows no features that can 
speak against its presence in the Urexemplar, and therefore its presence in the 
stichometry must be confirmed. Moreover, also in this case, the text provides no reasons 
against the hypothesis of a conscientious editing. 
 
 
                                                
242 Franke 1848: 11-2. 
243 An analogous construction is the one used for the statement clauses of the citizenship grants. In that 
case too, the repetition of the adjective is never found. Cf. Henry 1983: 64-68. 
244 Weber 1845: ad locum. Cf. also Drerup 1898: 279. 
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3.9 Dem. 23.82: hostages 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς 
ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἢ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας 
ἐκδῶσι. τὴν δὲ ἀνδροληψίαν εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή. 
 
ἀνδροληψίαν- μή P. Rainer I 9 
 
If someone dies a violent death, it is to be possible on his account for the 
relatives to take hostages, until they undergo a trial for homicide or hand over the 
actual murderers. The hostages are to be up to three, no more. 
 
This law allows the family of a victim to take hostages in case the killer of their 
relative is not handed to be judged in court. It must be mainly concerned with killings 
which happened outside Attica, and taking hostages was a means for having the killer 
extradited by his polis (or the polis in which he lives).245  
This provision is not found in IG I3 104, and while Ruschenbusch includes it 
among the laws of Solon (as part of Draco’s homicide law, which was confirmed by 
Solon),246 Gagarin and more recently Phillips take the expression βιαίῳ θανάτῳ as 
representative of a later date, not before the 5th century (no epigraphical examples exist 
before the middle of the 5th century, and the first instance of the adjective is found in 
                                                
245 For detailed interpretations of this statute Cf. Dareste 1889; Lipsius 1905-1915: 267 especially n. 8; 
MacDowell 1963: 28-31; Bravo 1982; Phillips 2008: 241-7. 
246 Cf. Ruschenbusch 1960:140-142; Ruschenbusch 1966: F13. He argues that the provision was 
originally intended to cover killings committed in Attica, as a means to force the killer to submit to 
justice. He restated this position recently in Ruschenbusch 2010: 40-2. This position is endorsed by 
Carawan 1998: 43. See also Bravo 1982: 133 n. 10 for other references. Contra Lipsius 1905-15: 267 
Bravo 1982; Todd 1993: 331. 
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Herodotus).247 The provision would therefore date to the 5th century, the imperial 
decrees of which match very well with the tone of the provision. 
The provision is quoted in the following account given by the orator at § 83 
exactly word for word, except for one minimal difference: in Demosthenes’ account we 
read twice ἀνδροληψίον instead of ἀνδροληψίαν. The difference between the two 
terms has been stated by Weber, followed by Herz and Lipsius:248 ἀνδροληψία would 
be the actual seizure of a hostage, whereas ἀνδροληψίον is the ius comprehensionis, in 
the words of Herz.249 Both terms are acceptable in this context, and both are attested in 
other sources about this provision, namely Poll. 8.50-51 and Lex.Seg. 213.30-214.2. No 
conclusion about the quality of the editing of this document can be drawn from this text. 
 
 
                                                
247 Gagarin 1981: 143 and Phillips 2008: 241-7. 
248 Weber 1845: apud § 82; Herz 1878: 39; Lipsius 1905-1915: 267 n. 8. Cf. also MacDowell 1963: 27; 
Bravo 1982: 142. 
249 Drerup 1898: 279 reverses the distinction, and thinks that the right is expressed by the plural 
ἀνδροληψίαι. This does not make any difference for our purpose. Nonetheless, the traditional distinction 
seems more convincing. 
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3.10 Dem. 23.86: laws ad hominem 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις. 
 
Μηδὲ - Ἀθηναίοις Andoc.1.87, Dem.24.59, 46.12 
 
ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ νόμον Andoc.1.87 : ἐξεῖναι ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ Dem.24.59, 46.12 
 
No law shall be passed regarding an individual without applying to all citizens alike. 
 
The orator, right after the law is read out, explicitly states that this statute does not 
come from the laws on homicide, but is as relevant. From Andoc. 1.85-9 we know that 
it was passed by a newly appointed board of nomothetai after the restoration of 
democracy and the revision of the 'laws of Draco and Solon' in 404/3.250 However, 
Demosthenes' argument here is specious: he claims that since laws cannot address 
individuals, and it is generally agreed that decrees ought to be drafted according to the 
laws, then a decree should not address an individual. The a fortiori argument is 
obviously unjustified, since the very distinction between decrees and laws makes sense 
just inasmuch as decrees cover the individual cases that laws are not allowed to. 
The wording of the document corresponds almost exactly to the summary of the 
orator in the same paragraph (we have there ἐφ' ἅπασιν instead of ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
Ἀθηναίοις), and therefore nothing substantial about sources and accuracy of the editor 
can be inferred from this document.  
The provision with this very wording (except for negligible differences) is 
reported also in other passages of the orators: in this speech it is repeated again at § 218 
                                                
250 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
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(οὐκ ἐᾷ νόμον, ἂν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τιθῇ τις, εἰσφέρειν: ὁ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ 
γράφει ψήφισμ᾽ ἴδιον), and elsewhere it is found in Andoc. 1.89, Dem. 24.18, 59, 116, 
159, 188, and Dem. 46.2. Furthermore, the provision is reported as a document in 
Andoc. 1.87 and Dem.24.59. In these two cases however another clause is added, 
stating in one case that a law ad personam is possible if voted by secret ballot with a 
quorum of 6000, in the other that a law must apply to all the citizens and be voted by 
secret ballot with a quorum of six thousand. These further provisions in both versions 
can hardly be reconciled with our other sources on Athenian legislative practices, and 
this casts doubt on the authenticity of those two documents. The issue will be discussed 
more thoroughly in connection with Dem. 24.59.251 
 
                                                
251 Cf. below pp. 206-13 and Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
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3.11 Dem. 23.87: the hierarchy of laws and decrees 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. 
 
ψήφισμα - εἶναι Andoc.1.87, cf. Dem.24.30 
 
νόμου om. F 
 
No decree, whether of the Council or Assembly, shall override a law.  
 
This last provision comes as a seal to this section of the speech. After mentioning 
all the laws which Aristocrates' decree allegedly contradicts (whether correctly or not), 
Demosthenes asks the clerk to read out a statute explicitly forbidding that a decree shall 
override a law. This statute, creating a hierarchy between laws and decrees,252 should 
prove conclusively that Aristocrates' decree is illegal. This provision, like the previous 
one, was approved in the context of the restoration of democracy in 404/3, and the two 
are paraphrased together in Andoc. 1.89.  
The content of the document is confirmed by Demosthenes' following summary 
(ὁπότε τοίνυν τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁμολογεῖται γράφειν),253 and 
§ 218 (οὐκ ἐᾷ ψήφισμ᾽ ὁ νόμος κυριώτερον εἶναι νόμου) closely follows its 
wording. The same wording is found elsewhere in the orators: Dem. 24.30 has εἰδότα 
δ᾽ οὐκ ἐῶνθ᾽ ἕτερον νόμον ψήφισμ᾽ οὐδέν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἔννομον ᾖ, νόμου 
κυριώτερον εἶναι, Hyp. 5.22 ὁ [μὲν Σόλων οὐδ᾽ ὃ] δικαίως ἔγραφεν ψήφ[ισμά τις 
τοῦ νόμου] οἴεται δεῖν κυριώ[τερον εἶναι...]. Furthermore, the previously mentioned 
passage by Andocides presents a text which is exactly identical to our document: 
                                                
252 For the importance of this provision in making the distinction between nomoi and psephismata cf. 
Hansen 1979: 28-9. 
253 This interpretation of the provision is found also in Dem. 20.92; 22.43. 
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ψήφισμα δὲ <μηδὲν> μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου <νόμου> κυριώτερον εἶναι .254 The 
specification μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου is not otiose, nor does it need to be a gloss 
from the orator: the existence of decrees of the Council alone, even if subsidiary to 
those of the Assembly, is confirmed by plenty of epigraphical evidence255 and therefore 
the formula seems perfectly appropriate. 
To sum up, the document does not present any feature incompatible with its 
summary, nor with any other source on Athenian legislation. Its wording is confirmed 
by many sources and does not present problems. However, the absence of any piece of 
information that one could not deduce either from the speech or from other passages of 
the orators does not allow us to infer anything new about the editorial work on this 
speech. 
 
                                                
254 The emendations of Blass and Reiske in Andocides' text seem necessary, and are confirmed by all the 
other passages of the orators. The same wording is also found in the document quoted at Andoc. 1.87, but 
the legal documents in this speech seem generally the work of a forger. In this particular case the speech 
itself probably provided the forger with the text to insert. Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming) 
255 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 271-5 for a comprehensive list of decrees of the Council, and pp. 82-7, 126-7 for full 
discussion of the issue. 
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4. The Against Timocrates (24) 
After Droysen showed that the documents preserved in the speech On the Crown 
are forgeries, the first two scholars to assess the authenticity of the documents preserved 
in the other speeches of the Attic orators were Friedrich Franke and Anton Westermann. 
In 1844, while Westermann was examining the documents of the speech Against 
Meidias,256 Franke, in a review of Schelling' De Solonis legibus apud oratores Atticos, 
doubted the authenticity of many other documents: among which some of the most 
important contained in the Against Timocrates.257  In 1850, in the first part of his 
ground-breaking Untersuchung über die in die attischen Reden eingelegten Urkunden, 
Westermann offered a close analysis of the documents of the Against Timocrates 
reported at § 20-3, 27, 33, 39, 40, 59 and deemed all of them forgeries.258 Finally, in 
1859, Westermann published three Leipziger Universitätprogrammen that dealt with the 
document reported at § 149-51 of this speech, and showed that it cannot be the original 
Athenian Heliastic oath.259  
Westermann's condemnation of these documents was widely endorsed in 
subsequent years. In particular, his arguments were summarized by Benseler in his 1861 
German commentary of the speech, and by Wayte in his 1882 English commentary.260 
Moreover, Max Fränkel in 1878 published an excellent study of the Athenian Heliastic 
oath261 that strengthened Westermann's verdict that the document at § 149-51 was 
inauthentic. However, from 1886 onwards, Westermann's views started to be 
questioned. In this year Henri Weil, in his edition and commentary of the speech, 
criticized Westermann's approach to most documents, and claimed that even where an 
effective defence of the documents is impossible, namely for the first and the last 
                                                
256 Westermann 1844. 
257 Franke 1844. 
258 Westermann 1850. 
259 Westermann 1859. 
260 Benseler 1861; Wayte 1882. 
261 Fränkel 1878. 
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document of the speech, this was due to our defective knowledge of Athenian law.262 In 
the same year Schöll published a lengthy study of Athenian nomothesia263 in which he 
argued against Westermann for the authenticity of the documents at § 20-3, 27 and 33, 
and Hoffman argued, in a Straßburger Dissertation dedicated to Schöll,264 for the 
authenticity of the document purportedly reporting the Heliastic oath. In 1896 however 
Ludwig Ott gave a balanced account of the arguments for and against the authenticity of 
the Heliastic oath as reported at § 149-51 of this speech and sided with Westermann and 
Fränkel against Hoffman.265 Finally, in 1898 Drerup defended the authenticity of the 
documents at § 20-3, 27, 33, 59, 149-51 and part of 71 of the Against Timocrates, 
partially following Schöll and partially arguing directly against Westermann.266 
After the work of Schöll and Drerup the authenticity of the documents reported in 
the Against Timocrates has generally been accepted. The documents that were the 
object of their studies have been used in many reconstructions of Athenian 
nomothesia,267 and those that were just implied to be authentic have been uncritically 
employed as historical documents.268 Exceptions are only the last two documents 
reported in the speech. The authenticity of the two parts of the document quoted at § 
105, although generally accepted, has been doubted by Hillgruber and by Scafuro, who 
have deemed the text either forged or heavily corrupted.269 As for the Heliastic oath 
reported at § 149-51, the communis opinio is that this text is a later forgery and scholars 
usually follow Fränkel's reconstruction.270 
                                                
262 Weil 1886: 67-8 and passim. 
263 Schöll 1886. 
264 Hoffman 1886. 
265 Ott: 1986: 97-102. 
266 Drerup: 1898: 248-64. 
267 Cf. the works mentioned below at pp. 118-21 
268 Cf. for examples many of the studies mentioned in the notes to this chapter. 
269 Hillgruber 1988: 66-8 and Scafuro 2005. 
270 Cf. e.g. Cronin 1936: 18; Bonner-Smith 1938: 152-6; Scafuro 1997: 50-1; Mirhady 2007, even if he 
does not follow Fränkel uncritically; Harris 2006a. Lipsius 1905-15: 151-2 advanced the hypothesis that 
some parts might be authentic and some interpolated, but see Ott 1896: 97-102 and below p. 248. 
 115 
None of the scholars discussing these documents has formulated a systematic 
methodology for evaluating their authenticity. To give an example, MacDowell in 1975 
wrote about the documents of the Against Timocrates: 'The documents in that speech 
are now generally accepted as genuine, and I so accept them here. The correct approach 
to such texts is never to reject them out of hand, but to try to explain them. Only if they 
cannot be reconciled with other evidence should they be dismissed as forgeries; and in 
fact the Timokrates documents fit into our picture of nomothesia satisfactorily.'271 This 
has been in general the methodology employed in assessing the reliability of the 
documents in this speech: they have been used to build complicated hypotheses about 
Athenian legislation and they have been considered reliable as long as they were 
consistent with these hypotheses. This has been done both explicitly, such as in the 
works of Schöll and Drerup who tried to prove the authenticity of these documents by 
offering reconstructions where they could fit, and implicitly, as in the works of 
MacDowell, Rhodes and Hansen about nomothesia.272 In fact, the weaknesses of this 
method are evident from the very fact that these reconstructions never agree with each 
other, and that none of them has won general consent.273 A more sensible approach, as I 
explained in the chapter on methodology, is to analyze the orator's summaries and 
paraphrases of the laws and decrees and to compare them with each other and with 
external evidence. This account must then be compared with the document, in order to 
assess its reliability. The language and formulas found in the document must also be 
checked against contemporary inscriptions. 
Another important issue in the assessment of the documents of this speech is 
provided by stichometric calculations: these documents were not inserted in the speech 
all at the same time. Some of them, namely those at § 39-40, 42, 45 and 71, were part of 
                                                
271 MacDowell 1975: 62. Cf. also MacDowell 2009: 186. 
272 MacDowell 1975; Hansen 1979-80; Rhodes 1984; Hansen 1985; Rhodes 2003. 
273 I will deal in detail with these works below at pp. 118-21 when discussing the accounts of nomothesia 
in Demosthenes. Cf. my extensive discussion of these reconstructions in Canevaro 2012 (forthcoming). 
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the Urexemplar of the speech like those of the speech Against Aristocrates. These 
documents must therefore be checked to find out whether or not they share some 
features with those of Dem. 23, and whether they are as reliable. The documents at § 
20-3, 27, 33, 105 and 149-51 on the other hand cannot have been part of the 
Urexemplar and are later insertions. Finally, it is impossible to determine through 
stichometry whether the documents at 50, 54, 56, 59 and 63 were part of the 
Urexemplar. The features of each of these documents must therefore be checked against 
both the stichometric and the non-stichometric documents to find out whether they 
belong to the group of the later insertions or were present already in the Urexemplar. To 
sum up, in analyzing these documents one must be aware that one is dealing with two 
different groups of texts, inserted into the speech at different times, in different contexts 
and by different editors. 
Most of the documents in the Against Timocrates are quoted in the first half of the 
speech. In the first part of this section Demosthenes tries to demonstrate that the 
procedure followed by Timocrates in enacting his law violates the law about 
nomothesia. Thus at § 20-3 he asks the secretary to read out this law, and then proceeds 
to explain how Timocrates did not follow this procedure. At § 27, to prove his point he 
asks the secretary to read out the decree of appointment of the nomothetai, to show that 
Timocrates did not abide by the times imposed in the law on nomothesia. In the second 
part of this section Demosthenes argues that Timocrates' law has not only been enacted 
in violation of the correct procedure, but it also violates many existing statutes. At § 33 
Demosthenes asks the grammateus to read out a law forbidding anyone from enacting a 
law contradicting an existing law without first repealing it. Following the discussion of 
this law, Demosthenes first quotes and analyzes the law of Timocrates (§ 39-40) and 
then lists and and discusses a series of existing statutes whose provisions Timocrates' 
law contradicts (§ 41-67). The bulk of the documents are found in this part of the 
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speech. Demosthenes then proceeds to show why Timocrates' law is also poorly drafted 
and harmful for the polis. The last two documents found in the speech purport to be a 
law about thieves and trespassing atimoi (§ 105), whom Timocrates' law would save 
from imprisonment, and the Heliastic oath, which is fully quoted to show the judges that 
they have never sworn not to imprison Athenian citizens, and they have every right to 
do so when the laws prescribe it. 
The analysis of the documents in the speech will begin with a discussion of 
nomothesia, which is necessary in order to assess the documents inserted at § 20-3 and 
33. These two documents will be analyzed first, and then the rest of the documents will 
be studied in the order in which they appear in the speech. 
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4.1 The documents on nomothesia (Dem. 24.20-3 and 33) 
The two documents inserted in the speech at § 20-3 and 33 purport to be two parts 
of the Athenian legislation on nomothesia. This procedure did not exist in the fifth 
century, and was created after the archonship of Eucleides. In the fifth century BCE the 
Athenians did not make any distinction between laws (nomoi) and decrees 
(psephismata). The Assembly passed both kinds of measures in the same way, and both 
general enactments and short-term provisions held the same legal status. At the end of 
the fifth century however the Athenians decided to make a distinction between the two 
kinds of measures and created the rule that no decree would be superior to a law 
(Andoc. 1.86; Dem. 23.86, 218; 24.18, 59, 116, 188; 46.2).274 The Assembly continued 
to pass decrees in the same way, but a new body of nomothetai was created to ratify 
laws (nomoi). There were also two separate procedures for rescinding the two kinds of 
measures: one could bring a graphe paranomon (a public action against an illegal 
decree) against a psephisma and a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai (a public action 
against an inexpedient law) against a nomos. This much is clear; scholars do not agree 
however about the procedure for passing a new law (nomothesia) in fourth-century 
Athens. 
The most notable reconstructions of the procedure are those of D. M. MacDowell, 
P. J. Rhodes and M. H. Hansen. All of these reconstructions rely on the documents at § 
20-3 and 33 as the main evidence for the procedure. MacDowell identified no fewer 
than five different procedures.275 One of these procedures was concerned with enacting 
new laws (Dem. 20.92) and replaced an older procedure (Dem. 20.89-91, 93-4). The 
other procedures are described in Aeschines' Against Ktesiphon (3.38-40) and in the two 
                                                
274 For the difference between laws and decrees in the fourth century see Hansen 1978; Hansen 1979. See 
also Hansen, 1991; Rhodes 1987; R. Sealey 1987: 41-5. Note however that the documents quoted at 
Andoc. 1.87 (cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 forthcoming) and Dem. 24.59 (see below pp. 206-13) are 
forgeries. 
275 MacDowell 1975. 
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documents of Demosthenes' Against Timocrates (24.20-3 and 33), the second being 
again a procedure laid down later in the fourth century. There are several problems with 
his reconstruction. In particular, Demosthenes at 20.91-2 does not seem to discuss an 
actual law; he is only describing how bad politicians break the law. If MacDowell were 
correct in his chronology of the different procedures, there would have simultaneously 
been two different panels of nomothetai in the middle of the fourth century, one 
appointed from those who had sworn the Heliastic Oath (Dem. 24.20-23) and another 
panel appointed from all Athenians (Dem. 20.92), both performing exactly the same 
functions. This is hardly credible.276 Furthermore, if MacDowell's chronology is right, 
Demosthenes (20.92) would be claiming that a law which had been repealed many years 
before was still valid. 
Rhodes followed MacDowell in his belief that nomothesia went through several 
stages in the early fourth century, but offered a different reconstruction.277  Rhodes 
believes that Dem. 20.89-94 refers to the procedures found in documents inserted at 
Dem. 24.20-23 and 33. The latter was originally a rider to the former but gradually 
became an independent statute. During this time the law at Dem. 24.20-23, which 
required that new legislation could only be enacted in Hekatombaion, was forgotten. As 
a result, politicians started enacting laws at various points of the year. At both trials 
Demosthenes was attempting to restore the correct practice. This reconstruction also 
presents some problems: first, the law described at Dem. 20.89-94 does not correspond 
to the procedures described in the documents found in Against Timocrates. The law at 
Dem. 20.89-94 concerns the procedure for enacting new legislation; the two documents 
in Against Timocrates concern a general confirmation of the law code and the procedure 
for repealing laws. Nor do the individual provisions match, and the documents in 
                                                
276 Cf. Rhodes 1984: 56. 
277 Rhodes 1980: 305-6. 
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Against Timocrates do not lay down the procedure for the public action against an 
inexpedient law. Rhodes also believes that early in the fourth century legislation could 
only be enacted at the beginning of the year and only to replace existing statutes 
repealed on 11 Hekatombaion. This, however, would have made it impossible for the 
Athenians to enact necessary legislation during the rest of the year (e.g. ad hoc changes 
of the merismos for the purpose of funding a festival or a grant of honours like those 
prescribed in IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254). It is also unlikely that the 
Athenians ignored a valid law on such an important issue for several years before 
Demosthenes brought the violation to everyone's attention. 
Hansen278 reduces the procedures to three. The first procedure is described in the 
document found at Dem. 24.20-23, the second in the document found at Dem. 24.33 
(which Hansen believes is the same procedure which is discussed at Dem. 20.89-94), 
and the third at Aeschin. 3.38-40 (a procedure for removing contradictory laws). 
According to Hansen, the first two procedures existed simultaneously and were used to 
appoint nomothetai. In this reconstruction the law at Dem. 24.20-23 provides a 
procedure to modify, repeal or introduce new laws starting at a meeting of the Assembly 
to be held on 11 Hekatombaion and ending with a decision of the nomothetai. The 
procedure in the document at Dem. 24.33 would lead to the same outcome, but through 
a procedure which could be initiated at any time of the year. This reconstruction also 
encounters several objections. First, the document found at Dem. 24.33 does not 
correspond to the description of the procedure discussed at Dem. 20.89-94. Many 
provisions mentioned in the latter are missing in the document (like the precise times of 
the procedure and the requirement of posting the new laws before the Eponymous 
Heroes). Hansen tries to evade this objection by claiming that the document at Dem. 
24.33 is incomplete and that the complete document would have contained the missing 
                                                
278 Hansen 1979-80 and 1985. 
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provisions. Yet many of these missing provisions are in fact found in the document at 
Dem. 24.20-23; it would have been strange for the Athenians to enact two different laws 
at the same time for the same purpose and with almost identical contents. Finally, it 
strains credibility to believe that in the Against Leptines Demosthenes (20.89-94) 
describes a statute about repealing existing laws (document at Dem. 24.33) as one about 
enacting new laws.279 
All these reconstructions present problems, and none of them accounts for all the 
evidence and is therefore clearly superior to the others. The reason why none of these 
reconstructions has been successful is that the evidence they attempt to explain is itself 
contradictory. The documents' reliability must be assessed before using them to 
reconstruct the procedure, and to evaluate them it is necessary to study the orators' 
paraphrases to find out the basic features of nomothesia without using the information 
in the documents. This will provide us with a reconstruction of the procedure, against 
which the documents can be checked. 
The main evidence for the procedure of nomothesia is found in Demosthenes' 
summaries of the statutes on nomothesia in this speech and in the speech Against 
Leptines (20), where Demosthenes (20.92) asks for a single law about nomothesia to be 
read out and then discusses its contents, which concern the procedure for enacting new 
laws. The manuscripts of the speech do not however preserve a text of this law. A 
passage from Aeschines' Against Ktesiphon (3.38-40) discusses the procedure to be 
followed for ensuring that there are no contradictions among the laws, but this evidence 
is not pertinent to the topic of the two laws.280  
                                                
279 Even though the statute could be interpreted as allowing enacting new laws to replace old ones, one 
cannot deny that the wording of the document at Dem. 24.33 makes it clear that the topic is repealing old 
laws. See below p. 148. 
280 What is not clear is the relationship between this passage and the ad hoc commissioners elected by the 
people to remove contradictory laws mentioned in Dem. 20.91. MacDowell 1975: 72 and Rhodes 1984: 
60 think that the thesmothetai at some point were put in charge of the procedure instead of the 
commissioners. Hansen 1985: 356 thinks that thesmothetai and commissioners worked together.  
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To begin with, some preliminary evidence about nomothesia can be elicited from 
contemporary inscriptions reporting fourth-century laws.281 First, the motion and the 
enactment formulas for a law are usually 'be it resolved by the nomothetai' and the 
'nomothetai have resolved' (δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις or ἔδοξε τοῖς νομοθέταις) 282 
and do not mention the Council or the Assembly.283 Decisions of the Council 
subsequently passed by the Assembly mention both (ἔδοξε τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, 
or a probouleumatic formula requiring that the proposal be submitted to the Assembly). 
The formula ἔδοξε τῆι βουλῆι is consistently used for decisions of the Council that do 
not need any further approval by the Assembly.284 By analogy, the decisions of the 
nomothetai, since the Assembly is never mentioned, must be final.285 Second, the 
prescripts of the nomoi preserved in contemporary inscriptions indicate that they were 
passed not at one time of the year but at different dates throughout the year.286 Sessions 
of the nomothetai could therefore be summoned at any time during the year, and laws 
could be passed in any prytany. Third, three decrees of the Assembly order that a 
proposal be submitted to the nomothetai.287 One of them, IG VII 4254 ll. 39-40 employs 
the expression ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις νομοθέταις, which implies that minor legislation did 
not require a session of specially appointed nomothetai, but could wait for the first one 
available. 
                                                
281 In chronological order SEG 26.72; Stroud 1998; Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished); IG 
II2 140; IG II2 244; SEG 12.87; IG II2 334 + SEG 18.13; IG II2 333; SEG 35.83. Cf. also the regulations 
for the Mysteries at Eleusis in a fourth-century inscription (Clinton 2005: no. 138 and 2008: 116). 
282 δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις is found in Agora Inv. 7495 (unpublished, see Alessandrì 1982: 7-11), IG 
II2 240, IG II2 244, SEG 12.87, SEG 35.83, IG II2 334 + SEG 18.13. SEG 26.82 has ἔδοξε τοῖς 
νομοθέταις.  
283 The only exception is Stroud 1998, which mentions neither the nomothetai nor the Assembly nor the 
Council. Also, in IG II2 333 νομο[θετῶν ἕδρα] has been restored by Foucart, but Lambert 2005: 40 
restores νόμο[ς περὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως τῶν, which is likely to be correct. 
284 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 82-7, 271-5. 
285 Cf. MacDowell 1975: 63. Pace Atkinson 1939: 113. 
286 IG II2 333 is enacted on Skirophorion 8, SEG 12.87 in the ninth prytany, IG II2 240 in the fifth, the 
seventh or the tenth prytany. 
287 IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254. 
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In Against Timocrates Demosthenes (24.17) starts the main part of his legal case 
by saying that he wishes first to explain the statutes which Timocrates has violated in 
passing his law.288 He claims that the laws are clear about the procedures to be followed 
when enacting a new law (περὶ τῶν μελλόντων τεθήσεσθαι νόμων). At 18 he states 
that first (πρῶτον) there is a time (χρόνος) during which one must legislate 
(νομοθετεῖν). Then (εἶτα), even at that time (τότε) one is not allowed to legislate as he 
pleases but must first place a copy of his proposed law in front of the monument of the 
Eponymous Heroes for everyone to see (σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ). Next (μετὰ ταῦτα), 
the proposed law must be the same for all citizens, and in addition to all this (πρὸς 
τούτοις) all opposing laws must be repealed (λύειν τοὺς ἐναντίους). Demosthenes 
mentions the fact that the laws contain other provisions that are not relevant for his case. 
Finally he states that if the proposer of legislation fails to follow any of these 
provisions, any Athenian who wishes is allowed to bring a public charge against him 
(τῷ βουλομένῳ δίδωσι γράφεσθαι). The provisions listed are linked by connectives 
like πρῶτον, εἶτα, μετὰ ταῦτα, πρὸς τούτοις, whose exact meaning here is unclear. 
Some of the provisions describe the procedure to be followed when enacting new laws; 
others contain rules about the substance of new laws. There is no need to think that 
Demosthenes follows the order of the provisions found in the actual statute. He has 
more likely selected only those provisions relevant to his case and placed them in an 
order determined by the sequence of his arguments.  
At §19 Demosthenes accuses Timocrates of violating every provision listed so far. 
He will start with the fact that Timocrates enacted his law in defiance of all the laws 
(παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους ἐνομοθέτει), and afterwards he will deal with his other 
offences. Then he asks the grammateus to take and read the relevant laws (in the plural: 
                                                
288 I accept the Demosthenic authorship of the speech and refer to Demosthenes as the author, although I 
am aware that Diodorus pronounced it in court. Cf. Dem. 24.6-16 with MacDowell 2009: 181-5. 
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καί μοι λαβὲ τουτουσὶ τοὺς νόμους). Demosthenes' legal discussion follows this 
arrangement: it starts with a section about the procedural violations committed by 
Timocrates (§ 24-32), then discusses the rule requiring the repeal of any law with 
clauses contradicting the new law to be enacted (§34-39). Finally, after the law of 
Timocrates is read out, Demosthenes lists the opposing laws which should have been 
repealed but were not (§39-67). In this last section we find the statute ordering that a 
law must be the same for all the Athenians (§ 59).289 
Demosthenes' account continues at § 24, where he starts to discuss the law just 
read by the grammateus. After a general praise of the statute, at § 25 he states that first 
(πρῶτον) there must be a διαχειροτονία about whether a new law is to be proposed 
(πότερον εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς) or the laws in force are considered sufficient. 
This vote must be held ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν, which must be interpreted here as 'in the Assembly', 
since the stage at which the nomothetai are summoned is still to come, and the word 
διαχειροτονία is never used in Athenian sources for a vote by judges in court.290 After 
this stage (μετὰ ταῦτα), if the Assembly votes that proposals for new legislation can be 
introduced (ἂν χειροτονῆτ' εἰσφέρειν), it is however not permitted for anyone to enact 
new statutes immediately (οὐκ εὐθὺς τιθέναι προσέταξαν). The law orders that the 
appointment of the nomothetai be discussed at the third meeting of the Assembly (and 
does not allow legislation to be enacted at that time either). In the meantime whoever 
wants to propose a new law must post it before the monument of the Eponymous 
Heroes for everyone to read (τοῖς βουλομένοις εἰσφέρειν ἐκτιθέναι τοὺς νόμους 
πρόσθεν τῶν ἐπωνύμων).  
Up to this point the procedure prescribed by the law asked to be read out at § 20 is 
quite clear. To submit new laws a vote about whether new legislation can be proposed 
                                                
289 The document inserted at that point is not authentic. See below pp. 206-13. 
290 Cf. Staveley 1972: 84-5; MacDowell 1975: 70; Hansen 1977: 123-37: 124; Hansen 1985: 93-4; 
Rhodes 2003: 126-7. 
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must be held in the Assembly. If the decision is positive, copies of the proposals must 
be placed before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes. At the third Assembly the 
method for appointing nomothetai must be discussed, and, presumably, a decree of 
appointment must be passed. In my discussion I have consistently used the plural, 
speaking of 'proposals' for 'new laws'. That the preliminary vote must have been a 
general vote, allowing, if positive, to propose laws in general, is clear from the clause 
τοῖς βουλομένοις εἰσφέρειν ἐκτιθέναι τοὺς νόμους. This inference is confirmed by 
IG VII 4254 ll. 39-40: the Assembly prescribes in a decree that the prytaneis submit a 
piece of legislation ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις νομοθέταις, in the first available meeting of the 
nomothetai. As soon as the procedure for new legislation was begun after a preliminary 
vote, one had to submit a proposal to the nomothetai on behalf of the Assembly, but 
there did not have to be another preliminary vote for that proposal. This implies that the 
preliminary vote, if positive, would have allowed several proposals to be made, and was 
therefore a general invitation to submit proposals. 
What Demosthenes says about nomothesia up to this point is sufficiently clear. It 
is equally important to pay attention to what Demosthenes does not say in this section. 
At § 26 Demosthenes lists the violations committed by Timocrates: he did not place a 
copy of his proposal before the Eponymous Heroes and did not therefore give the 
Athenians a chance to read it. Most important, he did not observe the times prescribed 
in the laws (οὔτ' ἀνέμεινεν οὐδένα τῶν τεταγμένων χρόνων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις): 'the 
meeting of the Assembly at which you voted on the laws being on 11 Hekatombaion (ἐν 
ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε, οὔσης ἑνδεκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός), 
he proposed his law on the 12th of the same month.' 
What about the specific clause ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε at § 26? 
The key to understanding this clause is the meaning of ἐπιχειροτονεῖν. Scholars, under 
the influence of the document at § 20-23, have always interpreted this sentence as 
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referring to an ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων, a general approval (confirmation) of all the 
laws to be held every year on the 11th of the first prytany. Such an interpretation 
however would imply that Demosthenes is alluding here in passing to a general, annual 
vote on the laws, the key element of the procedure he is commenting on, after having 
ignored it all through his account. I believe the verb should be interpreted in a less 
specific way as 'to put a matter to the vote' and refers to the διαχειροτονία described at 
§ 24. 
In the Demosthenic corpus the verb, or the substantive ἐπιχειροτονία, occurs ten 
times (excluding our case): it occurs twice in spurious documents of On the Crown 
(Dem. 18.29 and 105), which cannot be used to determine its meaning. Moreover, six 
other occurrences are in Demosthenes' Against Timocrates. The First Philippic (Dem. 
4) and the speech Against Theocrines ([Dem.] 58) yield one each. Three are in the 
document at Dem. 24.20-3. The remaining three occurrences in the Against Timocrates 
refer to different contexts. At § 39 the verb is used in the document reporting the law of 
Timocrates, and its wording is confirmed by § 84: the law prescribes that τοὺς δὲ 
προέδρους ἐπιχειροτονεῖν ἐπάναγκες, ὅταν τις καθιστάναι βούληται sureties for 
their debt. The meaning in this context is clearly the etymological one: to put a 
particular matter to the vote, in this case the approval of sureties.291 At § 50 the word 
ἐπιχειροτονία is used in a document that purports to be a law about supplication to the 
Council or the Assembly on behalf of a debtor. The proedroi shall not allow an 
ἐπιχειροτονία before the debtor has paid his debt. Whether authentic or not,292 this 
document uses the word, again, with the simple etymological meaning 'a vote on' a 
matter. Particularly useful is the occurrence of the verb at Dem. 4.30: ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ 
ἐπιχειροτονῆτε τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, χειροτονήσετε. In this passage the 
                                                
291 Cf. Rhodes 1981: 452, pace LSJ s.v. ἐπιχειροτονέω 2. 
292 The stichometry of the manuscript does not allow one to decide whether the document was part of the 
Urexemplar or not. Cf. below pp. 34-5. 
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action of 'putting proposals to vote' is followed by the approval (χειροτονήσετε) of one 
of them. As Gilbert A. Davies rightly pointed out 'there is no sound support for Liddell 
and Scott's rendering ‘sanction by vote’: also τὰς γνώμας means ‘all the proposals 
before you,’ i.e. my own and others which may be made; and they cannot all be 
sanctioned.'293 This particular meaning is the essential one, and is found also in the 
Ath.Pol. At § 43.5 we read that in the sixth prytany the prytaneis put to the vote whether 
there shall be an ostracism or not (ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἕκτης πρυτανείας [...] περὶ τῆς 
ὀστρακοφορίας ἐπιχειροτονίαν διδόασιν, εἰ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ μή). At § 37.1 the 
Thirty present two laws to the Council and order them to be put to the vote (νόμους 
εἰσήνεγκαν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν δύο κελεύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν).294 Rhodes singles out a 
more specialized use of the verb (and of the connected substantive) meaning 'to confirm 
a decision already taken'.295 The verb is used in this sense in regard to a particular vote 
held in every kuria Assembly on whether the magistrates are satisfyingly performing 
their duties or not. This vote is mentioned in Ath.Pol. 43.4, 61.2 and 61.4 and [Dem.] 
58.27. However, it is clear that such a specialized meaning is secondary, and derived 
from the primary one: 'to put a matter to the vote'. Ath.Pol. 55.4 makes this passage 
clear; the dokimasia of the nine Archons is held in front of the Council, and then in a 
tribunal. The procedure leads to an ἐπιχειροτονία in the Council, and to a ψῆφος in 
the tribunal (δίδωσιν ἐν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ 
τὴν ψῆφον). Although the vote in the Council is technically speaking a vote of 
confidence (a 'confirmation of a decision already taken'), it is apparent that the reason 
                                                
293 Davies 1949 ad locum. 
294 Rhodes 1981: 452 singles out here a specific meaning 'vote in approval of'. von Fritz - Kapp 1950:183 
stick to the more generic meaning 'put the matter to vote.' I believe with Rhodes that the context makes 
clear that the two laws had to be approved; yet I do not think that we need to postulate a further technical 
meaning here. The passage simply says that the Thirty ordered the Council to put a vote on the two laws. 
That the outcome of the vote could not be anything else than approval is implied. 
295 Rhodes 1981: 452, 523, 619, 682, 686. 
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for its name is that it is a 'vote on' the archons held by raising of hands. The main 
meaning of ἐπιχειροτονείν is simply 'to put a matter to the vote.'296 
Now, nothing in Demosthenes' account of the law on nomothesia points to any 
other meaning for ἐπιχειροτονείν than 'put a matter to the vote'. At Dem. 24.24 he 
describes, as we have seen, a διαχειροτονία on whether new laws can be proposed or 
not. After the vote, if positive, anyone could present proposals for new laws. The vote is 
on πότερον εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς, whether a new law can be proposed, and 
not a vote of approval of the 'code' of Athenian laws. The διαχειροτονία was held in 
two stages, at which voting by raising of hands followed each one of two questions: the 
first question was probably 'Who thinks that a new law is to be brought in (εἰσοιστέος 
ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς)?' The second was therefore 'Who thinks that the existing laws are 
sufficient (ἀρκεῖν οἱ κείμενοι [νόμοι])?'297 This needs have nothing to do with a vote 
of approval of the 'code' of law. A parallel for such a preliminary vote allowing 
proposals is provided by the law on adeia discussed at § 45-6 of this speech: no 
proposal is allowed about the condition of atimoi and debtors of the public treasury 
unless a preliminary vote (with a quorum of six thousand) in the Assembly grants adeia 
to consider such matters.  
The obvious reading of ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε at § 26 is therefore 
'at which you voted on the laws' (plural), meaning 'on whether laws can be proposed'. 
Basically the same concept (in a different context) is expressed at Ath.Pol. 43.5 with 
περὶ τῆς ὀστρακοφορίας ἐπιχειροτονίαν διδόασιν, εἰ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ μή. The verb 
ἐπεχειροτονήσατε is only a brief way of describing the entire process described at §24, 
and does not refer to a general vote of confidence on the 'code' of laws.  This meaning is 
found in our sources only in connection with the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν ἀρχῶν, and even 
                                                
296 The verb (or the connected substantive) appears thrice in Athenian inscriptions: in IG II2 24, SEG 
21.528 and 41.51 
297 Cf. Hansen 1977: 124; Hansen 1979-80: 94 n. 5; Hansen 1985: 365-8; Rhodes 1981: 126-7. 
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in that case it is subordinated to the primary, generic meaning of 'putting the conduct of 
the magistrates to the vote.' Demosthenes here only refers, again, to a preliminary vote 
about whether to allow proposals of new laws. 
The last issue to discuss in relation to Demosthenes' account of the text read out at 
§ 20 is the 'times prescribed by the laws' (§ 26 τεταγμένων χρόνων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις) 
that Timocrates has not respected. 'Times' had already been mentioned at § 18. At § 26 
Demosthenes, as we have seen, lists the infractions committed by Timocrates. He does 
not discuss here other provisions of the law; he just lists which provisions Timocrates 
has not respected, and then tells the judges what he has done instead. Every violation in 
the list corresponds to one of the clauses in the law presented at 25: the bills must be 
published before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes for everybody to see and 
make up their mind, while Timocrates has neither published his proposal nor allowed 
the Athenians the chance to consider it. Moreover he did not respect the 'times' 
prescribed by the law. Demosthenes is here alluding, again in passing, to something he 
has already discussed: after the preliminary vote the appointment of nomothetai must be 
discussed in the third Assembly (§ 25 τὴν τρίτην ἀπέδειξαν ἐκκλησίαν). These are 
the τεταγμένοι χρόνοι Demosthenes is alluding to. In fact, he proceeds to show how 
Timocrates infringed this provision: the preliminary vote was held on the 11th of 
Hekatombaion, and Timocrates enacted his law on the 12th of the same month, without 
waiting for the third Assembly to discuss the appointment of the nomothetai. The ἀλλὰ 
in the middle of the sentence, creating a strong opposition between the τεταγμένοι 
χρόνοι and Timocrates's behaviour grants this. Therefore, Demosthenes is not alluding 
here to a provision of the law on nomothesia setting a compulsory vote on the 11th of 
Hekatombaion. At § 28 Demosthenes emphasizes again that Timocrates' offence was to 
propose that his law be enacted on the next day (ἔγραψεν αὔριον νομοθετεῖν). 
Demosthenes never states nor implies that there was a requirement to hold a vote about 
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the laws on 11 Hekatombaion. If there was to be such a vote, he would have listed it 
with the other provisions at § 25. Nothing in Demosthenes' account of nomothesia in 
this section is inconsistent with the epigraphic evidence, which shows that one could 
initiate the nomothesia procedure at any time of the year. 
I will now discuss Demosthenes' account of the law read out at § 33, and I will 
then compare my provisional results with the discussion of nomothesia in the Against 
Leptines. After listing Timocrates' infractions the grammateus reads out (§ 27) a decree 
summoning the nomothetai the day immediately after the preliminary vote, with the 
excuse of the arrangements for the Panathenaia.298 The discussion of the procedural 
infractions committed by Timocrates carries on to § 31. At § 32 Demosthenes closes 
this section of his discussion and introduces a new topic, already anticipated at § 18: 
Timocrates enacted a law that violates many other statutes. This, Demosthenes 
anticipates, is illegal because a law prescribes that nobody can present new laws 
contrary to existing ones. If one does, a public action can be brought against the 
proposer (ἀνάγνωθι δέ μοι λαβὼν τουτονὶ πρῶτον τὸν νόμον, ὃς διαρρήδην οὐκ 
ἐᾷ νόμον οὐδέν' ἐναντίον εἰσφέρειν, ἐὰν δέ τις εἰσφέρῃ, γράφεσθαι κελεύει).299 
What is the relationship between this law and the one discussed at §§24-26? This law is 
described by Demosthenes as new and different from the previous one (τουτονὶ 
πρῶτον τὸν νόμον). However, a law such as the one summarized here obviously 
concerns legislation, and defines what the previous one ignored: it states what a new 
law cannot contain, and provides a procedure to bring against new laws that do not 
respect its provisions. Hansen rightly points out that 'nomos can mean anything from 
one line of a law to complete legislation', and adduces as evidence of this the case of the 
                                                
298 This decree has been recently shown to be a forgery by Piérart 2000: 245-50. Rhodes 2003: 125 n. 8 
does not rely on it in his argument. See below pp. 151-61 for a fuller analysis of this document. 
299 I translate here κελεύει with 'authorizes' since the verb in similar contexts does not mean 'orders' but 
simply 'provides for it'. Athens did not know compulsory prosecution for any crime. Cf. Dem. 29.9 with 
MacDowell 1989: 257-72 and MacDowell 2009: 46-7. See also Harris 2006: 131 for another example. 
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Against Aristocrates, where at § 37 and 60 Demosthenes discusses as different laws two 
texts that are found in the same inscription as part of a single statute (IG I3 104 ll. 26-29, 
37-8).300 Therefore the law read out by the grammateus at § 33 of the Against 
Timocrates is likely to be a further section of the legislation on nomothesia. The law 
one would expect to find here would be one prohibiting anyone from proposing a law 
that contradicts an existing one and providing public actions against an inexpedient law 
if such a law is enacted by the nomothetai. 
The account of the law at § 34 is consistent with what has been anticipated at § 
32: Demosthenes again clearly states that one cannot pass a law contradicting other 
statutes. Demosthenes adds that if anyone proposes such a law, he must repeal the 
opposing laws to enact the new one (οὐκ ἐᾷ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι νόμοις ἐναντίον 
εἰσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ λύσῃ τὸν πρότερον κείμενον). Demosthenes proceeds to explain 
the rationale behind this rule: this provision is necessary in order to let the judges cast a 
righteous vote (πρῶτον μὲν ἵν' ὑμῖν ἐξῇ τὰ δίκαια ψηφίζεσθαι μετ' εὐσεβείας). In 
fact, if there were laws contradicting each other, the judges would not be able to make 
decisions and would be forced to violate their pledge in the judicial oath to vote 
according to the laws because they would have to follow one law and not follow another 
law (§35).301 The lawgiver enacted such rules in order to protect the judges against this 
hypothetical situation. The law just read out therefore prescribes that no law 
contradicting existing statutes can be proposed, unless these statutes are repealed. If 
anybody fails to follow these provisions, anyone can accuse him through a γραφὴ 
νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι. 
Demosthenes also states here (καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ) that the lawgiver enacted 
such provisions in order to make 'you' guardians of the laws (βουλόμενος φύλακας 
                                                
300 Hansen 1985: 359. 
301 See on judicial oath Harris 2006a: 157-81. 
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ὑμᾶς τῶν νόμων καταστῆσαι). The word ὑμᾶς in forensic speeches can refer to the 
judges only, or to the entire citizen body. Because he is describing how difficult it is to 
render verdicts according to the oath, it is clear that here ὑμᾶς refers explicitly to the 
judges, those among the Athenians who swore the annual Heliastic Oath. However 
Demosthenes in the following passage at § 37-8 seems to extend this claim to the people 
of Athens as a whole: he lists many different safeguards of the laws, claiming that none 
of them is in itself sufficient and concludes with: τίς οὖν μόνη φυλακὴ καὶ δικαία 
καὶ βέβαιος τῶν νόμων; ὑμεῖς οἱ πολλοί.  
In this section Demosthenes, following his claim that his audience are the real 
guardians of the laws, provides, as we have seen, a list of 'insufficient' safeguards. Here 
Demosthenes is no longer summarizing the provisions of the law read out at § 33. He is 
just singling out all the mechanisms of control deployed through the procedure of 
nomothesia, to reveal their weaknesses. There is no need therefore to attribute all these 
mechanisms to the law at § 33.302 Two of the mechanisms discussed here have already 
been mentioned: the provision for publication of the proposals before the monument of 
the Eponymous Heroes has been mentioned at § 25, and must have been contained in 
the law read out at § 20. The provision granting everybody the right to bring a γραφὴ 
νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι is mentioned at § 32 and must have been the final 
provision of the law read out at § 33, and possibly the last of the provisions on 
nomothesia, providing a procedure for prosecuting whoever infringes any of the rules 
previously stated. Demosthenes however mentions here a further safeguard: the election 
of synegoroi (τοὺς συνηγόρους,  οὓς χειροτονεῖτε).303 He does not give many details 
about their role, and simply points out that they might be ineffective, because somebody 
could convince them to stay silent. We can assume however that such synegoroi must 
                                                
302 Pace Hansen 1985: 348. 
303 Cf. Rubinstein 2000: 44. 
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have been elected to speak in defence of the opposing laws that would have been 
repealed before the enactment of a new one. There is in fact no need for elected 
synegoroi speaking for the new law, since the proposer himself would have argued his 
case in person. Such a function is consistent with the role of the four syndikoi elected 
(ᾕρηνται) to assist Leptines in defending his law (Dem. 20.146, 152, 153), whatever 
the differences between the two cases and the two procedures followed.304 At what point 
of the procedure were they appointed? Schöll more than one century ago correctly 
pointed out that the election in Athens was used only when experts were needed, and 
this must be the case here.305 In our reconstruction such an observation carries even 
greater weight, since, as we have seen, the preliminary vote opened the doors to any 
proposal, and it was impossible before the 'third Assembly' to know what laws had been 
proposed, and what opposing laws had therefore to be repealed. Electing the synegoroi 
at any point before the 'third Assembly' would have been pointless, because it would not 
have been possible to select experts of the laws to be repealed. Moreover, the very 
mechanism of the publicity in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes in order 
to let the Athenians make up their minds seems to be established explicitly in order to 
have, at the 'third Assembly', candidates for the election of the synegoroi. To sum up, 
the election of the synegoroi is likely to have happened at the 'third Assembly', together 
with the appointment of the nomothetai. A provision about this was certainly contained 
in the legislation on nomothesia, but it is impossible to tell whether it was part of the 
section read out at § 20-3, or the section read out at § 33. 
                                                
304 I do not discuss here the legal context of the Against Leptines, to which I plan to come back in a 
separate essay. For various interpretations of what happened in that case see Wolff 1970: 35-7; Calabi 
Limentani 1982: 357-368; Hansen 1979-80: 95-99 and 1985: 368-71. With Hansen I believe that the four 
syndikoi were elected with that procedure in mind. The synegoroi are identified with the syndikoi also by 
Schöll 1886: 109 and Wotke RE Suppl. 8.579. Pace Atkinson 1939: 110 and MacDowell 1975: 67. 
305 He therefore athetized the final clause of the document at § 20-3 which set their election at the same 
time as the preliminary vote, since electing experts before the proposals were published would have been 
nonsense (Schöll 1886: 108). Cf. also Atkinson 1939: 113. MacDowell 1975: 67 reports Schöll's opinion, 
but points out that in that first Assembly the people voted on the sections of the 'code' of laws, and 
therefore synegoroi could be appointed that were experts of the particular section to revise. We have seen 
that there is no reason to believe that an annual approval of the 'code' of laws ever existed. 
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At this point our reconstruction of the Athenian nomothesia based on the Against 
Timocrates seems to be consistent in itself and with the epigraphical material. We need 
now to check it against the other Demosthenic speech written for a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι: the Against Leptines.306 I will concentrate on the summary of the 
legislation on nomothesia (§ 93-4) provided immediately after the grammateus read out 
the relevant law. That is the place where Demosthenes is more likely to give a faithful 
picture of the law(s) about nomothesia. 
At § 93 the speaker starts his account by claiming that it is clear to anyone who 
has listened to the text of the law how excellent are Solon's provisions for the enactment 
of new laws (ὃν τρόπον [...] ὁ Σόλων τοὺς νόμους ὡς καλῶς κελεύει τιθέναι). This 
is consistent with Dem. 24.18 (περὶ τῶν μελλόντων τεθήσεσθαι νόμων) and 24 
(πότερον εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς): the topic of the statute is the enactment of 
new laws. Demosthenes also states that opposing laws must be repealed when enacting 
a new law.307 This provision is recalled at Dem. 24.32 and 34 as the main topic of the 
law read out at § 33. The reasons given for this provision, mainly to avoid confusion for 
the judges, are consistent in both speeches. Demosthenes then (§ 94) turns to stages of 
the procedures prior to those just listed (καὶ πρὸ τούτων) and recalls that the proposals 
must be first published before the Eponymous Heroes, as we know from Dem. 24.25 
and 37. He then adds that the bills must be read 'often' in the Assembly by the 
grammateus (καὶ τῷ γραμματεῖ παραδοῦναι, τοῦτον δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις 
ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἵν' ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀκούσας πολλάκις). This rule is not found in the 
Against Timocrates, but is confirmed by Din. 1.42 and supplies a further detail about 
the procedure. 
                                                
306 For the political context of this speech see Canevaro 2009. 
307 I do not discuss here the identity of the nomothetai. This, together with the procedure for repealing 
laws described in Demosthenes' speech Against Leptines and Aeschines' speech Against Ctesiphon (3.38-
40) will be the subject of a separate essay. 
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It is easy to see that this short account is coherent with the reconstruction we have 
drawn from the Against Timocrates. The two accounts are consistent with each other 
and confirmed in some parts by the epigraphical material to provide the following rules: 
1) a preliminary vote in the Assembly, at any point of the year, had to be held in order 
to allow new laws to be proposed (Dem. 24.25); 2) the new proposals had to be posted 
in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94); 3) the bills 
had to be read out by the grammateus in each Assembly until the appointment of the 
nomothetai, to allow everyone to make up their minds (Dem. 20.94); 4) in the third 
Assembly after the preliminary vote, on the basis of the bills presented, the people had 
to discuss the appointment of the nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment (Dem. 
24.25; 20.92); 5) presumably in the same context expert synegoroi were elected to 
defend those laws whose repeal was necessary for enacting the new laws (Dem. 24.36; 
20.146); 6) opposing laws had to be repealed in order to be able to enact new laws 
(Dem. 24.32, 34-5; Dem. 20.93); 7) if the proposer of a new law failed to abide by any 
of these provisions, anyone could bring him to trial through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι (Dem. 24.32). 
This reconstruction must now be compared with the procedure laid down in the 
two documents at § 20-3 and 33. 
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4.1.1 Dem. 24.20-3: the procedure of nomothesia 
ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑ ΝΟΜΩΝ.   
’Επὶ δὲ τῆς πρώτης πρυτανείας τῇ ἑνδεκάτῃ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ 
κῆρυξ, ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν βουλευτικῶν, 
δεύτερον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, εἶτα οἳ κεῖνται  τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν, εἶτα τῶν ἄλλων 
ἀρχῶν. ἡ δὲ χειροτονία ἔστω ἡ προτέρα, ὅτῳ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν οἱ νόμοι οἱ 
βουλευτικοί, ἡ δ' ὑστέρα, ὅτῳ μὴ δοκοῦσιν· εἶτα τῶν κοινῶν κατὰ ταὐτά. τὴν 
δ' ἐπιχειροτονίαν εἶναι τῶν νόμων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους. ἐὰν δέ 
τινες τῶν νόμων τῶν κειμένων ἀποχειροτονηθῶσι, τοὺς πρυτάνεις, ἐφ' ὧν ἂν 
ἡ ἐπιχειροτονία γένηται, ποιεῖν  περὶ τῶν ἀποχειροτονηθέντων τὴν τελευταίαν 
τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν· τοὺς δὲ προέδρους, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσι προεδρεύοντες ἐν 
ταύτῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, χρηματίζειν ἐπάναγκες πρῶτον μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ περὶ τῶν 
νομοθετῶν, καθ' ὅ τι καθεδοῦνται, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὁπόθεν τοῖς 
νομοθέταις ἔσται· τοὺς δὲ νομοθέτας εἶναι ἐκ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων τὸν 
ἡλιαστικὸν ὅρκον. ἐὰν δ' οἱ πρυτάνεις μὴ ποιήσωσι κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα τὴν 
ἐκκλησίαν ἢ οἱ πρόεδροι μὴ χρηματίσωσι κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὀφείλειν τῶν 
μὲν πρυτάνεων ἕκαστον χιλίας δραχμὰς ἱερὰς τῇ ’Αθηνᾷ, τῶν δὲ προέδρων 
ἕκαστος ὀφειλέτω τετταράκοντα δραχμὰς ἱερὰς τῇ ’Αθηνᾷ. καὶ ἔνδειξις 
αὐτῶν ἔστω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, καθάπερ ἐάν τις ἄρχῃ ὀφείλων τῷ 
δημοσίῳ· οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται τοὺς ἐνδειχθέντας εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον 
κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἢ μὴ ἀνιόντων εἰς ῎Αρειον πάγον, ὡς καταλύοντες τὴν 
ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν νόμων. πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ὁ βουλόμενος ’Αθηναίων 
ἐκτιθέτω πρόσθε τῶν ἐπωνύμων γράψας   τοὺς νόμους οὓς ἂν τιθῇ, ὅπως ἂν 
πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τεθέντων νόμων ψηφίσηται ὁ δῆμος περὶ τοῦ χρόνου τοῖς 
νομοθέταις. ὁ δὲ τιθεὶς τὸν καινὸν νόμον ἀναγράψας εἰς λεύκωμα ἐκτιθέτω 
πρόσθεν τῶν ἐπωνύμων ὁσημέραι, ἕως ἂν ἐκκλησία γένηται. αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ 
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τοὺς συναπολογησομένους τὸν δῆμον τοῖς νόμοις, οἳ ἂν ἐν τοῖς νομοθέταις 
λύωνται, πέντε ἄνδρας ἐξ ’Αθηναίων ἁπάντων, τῇ ἑνδεκάτῃ τοῦ 
ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός. 
 
1 EΠΙ ΧΕΙΡΟΤΟΝΙΑΝ S | 2 περὶ del. Schöll | 2-3 περὶ τῶν κοινῶν A | 3 ἡ δὲ χειροτονία S : ἡ δ' 
ἐπιχειροτονία A F Y P | ἀρχῶν susp. Dobree | 5 κοινῶν codd. : λοιπῶν Westermann : κοινῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἀλλῶν Sykutris | κατὰ ταὐτά F : κατὰ αὐτά S : κατ' αὐτά A (apostr. add. manus secunda) | 7 
ἀποχειροτονία A Y P (Pγρ. ἐπιχειροτονία) | 9 τυγχάνωσι A P Schol. ad loc. : τύχωσι S F Y | 
παρεδρεύοντες S Y | 10 τοῦ om. S F Y P | 11 τὸν om. A | 12 ποιῶσι S F Y P | κατὰ τὰ 
προγεγραμμένα  A F Y P | 13 κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα (προγεγραμμένα F Y P) om. A | ὀφείλειν 
τῶν codd. : ὀφειλόντων A | 15 ἔστω αὐτῶν A | 18 ’Αθηναίων νομοθετεῖν  F | 20 ἐκτεθέντων F | 
22 <ἡ> ἐκκλησία add. Dobree | 23 οἷοι A | 23-4 τῇ ἑνδεκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός del. 
Schoell cf. 26 
 
THE APPROVAL OF THE LAWS 
On the eleventh day of the first prytany in the Assembly; after the herald says the 
prayers, the approval of laws shall proceed as follows: first those laws concerning the 
Council, second the general ones, then those concerning the nine archons and then 
those of the other magistrates. First, those satisfied with the laws about the Council 
will raise their hands and then those who are not satisfied, and later in the same way 
they shall vote about the general statutes. The approval of laws shall be conducted 
according to the existing laws. If some existing laws are rejected, the prytaneis in 
whose term the voting takes place shall devote the last of the three Assemblies to 
discussing the rejected laws; the chairmen of this Assembly shall, immediately after 
the religious observances, put the question about the sessions of nomothetai and the 
fund from which their payment is to be drawn. Only persons who have sworn the 
judicial oath can be appointed as nomothetai. If the prytaneis do not convene the 
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Assembly as above or the chairmen do not put the question in discussion, each 
prytanis shall owe a thousand drachmas sacred to Athena and each chairman forty 
drachmas sacred to Athena. And an endeixis shall be lodged with the thesmothetai as 
in the case of anyone who holds office while in debt to the public treasury; and the 
thesmothetai are to introduce the cases of those against whom information was given 
to the court according to the law, otherwise they are not going to become members of 
the Areopagus on the ground of obstructing the rectification of the laws. Before the 
day of the Assembly any Athenian who wishes may display in front of the monument 
of the Eponymous Heroes the laws he proposed, in order that the Assembly may vote 
about the time allowed to the nomothetai with due regard to the number of the 
proposed laws. Anyone proposing a new law shall write it on a white board and 
display it in front of the Eponymous Heroes as many days as remain until the day of 
the Assembly. The Assembly, on the eleventh of the month Hekatombaion, shall 
elect five persons from all the Athenians who will defend the laws under repeal in 
front of the nomothetai.308 
 
Stichometric calculations have shown that this document cannot have been part of 
the Urexemplar of the speech. However, the scholia contain many remarks about the 
text of this document that show that it was present in copies of the speech circulating in 
late antiquity.309 
There are major differences between the document and Demosthenes' accounts in 
this speech and in the Against Leptines. 1) The procedure described by Demosthenes is 
one for enacting new laws, whereas the document provides for an annual vote of 
approval of the entire 'code' of laws and for the rejection of some. 2) Demosthenes 
                                                
308 This translation is adapted from Arnaoutoglou 1998: 88-9. 
309 If, following Heath 2004: 132-83, we attribute many of these scholia to Menander, we can at least 
keep the late 3rd century AD as a terminus ante quem. 
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describes a preliminary vote to allow new proposals (plural) to be made whereas the 
document describes a vote of approval for the existing laws section by section. 3) The 
document sets this vote of approval in the 11th day of the first prytany of every year and 
provides, in case some laws are not approved, for the appointment of the nomothetai 
following a discussion in 'the last of the three Assemblies'. Demosthenes, on the other 
hand, supported by the epigraphical evidence, shows that the nomothetai could be 
appointed at any point of the year. 4) The document provides for the election of five 
synegoroi in the same Assembly on the 11th of the first prytany. Demosthenes, on the 
other hand, implies that they were appointed later after the proposals for new laws were 
presented. A closer analysis of the features of the document confirms that it cannot be 
an authentic Athenian statute. 
1) The expression 'after the herald says the prayers' (ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ) 
to indicate that a matter must be the first item on the agenda of an Assembly meeting, 
just after the sacrifices, is unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions. The customary 
expression, in Athens and elsewhere, was μετὰ τὰ ἱερά, 'after the sacrifices.’310 
2) In the document we find the phrase ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων. The 
verb ποιεῖν is in the active, but there is no subject for it. The subject should be the 
proedroi or the people. Even if we assume that the subject is understood, the expression 
is nevertheless unparalleled. In Athenian inscriptions the proedroi put to the vote 
(ἐπιψηφίζειν), they never ποιεῖν χειροτονίαν (or words derived from the same root), 
it is always the δήμος (or the βουλή) that (ἐπι- or δια-) votes by show of hands 
(χειροτονῆσαι).311 In literary sources the verb used with χειροτονίαν (or derivates) is 
                                                
310 This expression is found in the document later at § 21. It was widespread in the Greek world. A search 
in the PHI database yields 34 occurrences in Athenian inscriptions (e.g. IG II2 107.16; 185.8; 212.57; 238 
fr. bc1.13-4), but 345 from the Aegean Islands and Crete, and 69 from Asia Minor. τὰ ἱερά refers to the 
sacrifices, cf. Harris 2006: 91-2. 
311 Cf. e.g. IG II2 28.14, 22-3; 211.5-6; 244.28 for the people, 244.10 for the Council. 
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invariably δίδωμι.312 It is easy to see where a later forger could find such an expression: 
at § 25 Demosthenes writes καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἐποίησαν διαχειροτονίαν. 
However, the subject of ἐποίησαν is there οἱ νόμοι, specifically those about 
nomothesia. The expression means 'and first the laws set a vote among you (in the 
Assembly)', and in this sense is perfectly normal. The forger took it from this context 
and misunderstood it. 
3) The document describes the procedure for ἐπιχειροτονία and orders the 
confirmation πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν βουλευτικῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, εἶτα οἳ 
κεῖνται  τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν, εἶτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. Scholars have seen in these 
categories the organization of the Athenian 'code' of laws. Laws would have been 
grouped in these broad categories, in the Stoa Basileios or in the archives, according to 
the official responsible for them.313 The second part of the Ath.Pol. would be based on 
the actual arrangement of the laws of Athens, and would confirm the content of the 
document.314 MacDowell has also, accordingly, argued that if the laws were arranged 
according to the officials in charge of them, then the category τῶν κοινῶν cannot refer 
to laws common to all citizens, but must refer to laws common to all the officials.  
This is not the place to discuss the hypothesis of a 'code' of laws arranged by the 
names of the competent officials. I shall limit myself to pointing out a few difficulties in 
the text of the document. First, the grammar of the clause does not work: the clause 
ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων requires a genitive of category, and περὶ τῶν 
                                                
312 Cf. for the 5th and 4th century Aeschin. 3.39, Dem. 24.25, 50, 22.9 and Ath.Pol. 43.5, 55.4. They 
confirm that the correct verb is δίδωμι. The only exception seems to be Dem. 21.6, where we find 
καταχειροτονίαν ὁ δῆμος ἐποιήσατο. However καταχειροτονία in this case does not mean simply a 
vote, it means a vote of censure in a probole, although without legal effects (see Harris 2008: 79). The 
expression therefore does not mean, as in all the other cases, 'to put a matter to the vote', but ‘to 
condemn'. ποιεῖν with χειροτονία becomes common in later periods. Cf. e.g. Plut. Nicias 12.5; Paus. Att. 
Att.On. 1.9; Didymus Caecus, Comm. 2.256; Lib. Orat. 15.5; Socr. Schol. Hist. 2.24, 6.14 etc. 
313 Cf. Schöll 1886: 85-95; Kahrstedt 1938: 11; Ruschenbusch 1966: 27-31; MacDowell 1975: 67; Rhodes 
1981: 33-9; Sickinger 1999: 149-50. 
314 Cf. the essays quoted in the note above and in particular Rhodes 1981: 33-4. This correspondence is 
not beyond doubt. For the arrangement of the second part of the Ath.Pol. see also Hansen 1974: 10-12 
and Harris 2006: 30-2. 
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βουλευτικῶν ('make a vote of confirmation about the laws about the bouleutic [sc. 
laws]') as it stands does not make any sense.315 Moreover τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν as it 
stands recalls the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν ἀρχῶν, a procedure that has nothing to do with 
an approval of the Athenian 'code of laws', and is, unlike this procedure, well attested 
(cf. Ath.Pol.43.4, 61.2 and 61.4 and [Dem.] 58.27). Schöll, in order to save the 
provision, proposes that τῶν ἀρχῶν is haplography for τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.  
A second difficulty is in the next sentence (ἡ δὲ χειροτονία ἔστω ἡ προτέρα, 
ὅτῳ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν οἱ νόμοι οἱ βουλευτικοί, ἡ δ' ὑστέρα, ὅτῳ μὴ δοκοῦσιν· εἶτα 
τῶν κοινῶν κατὰ ταὐτά). The document spells out the procedure of approval, but 
stops with the 'common laws' and does not say anything about the last two categories. 
Their absence from the description of the actual procedure points to an interpretation of 
the last categories not as subdivisions of the 'code' of laws, but rather as an actual 
ἐπιχειροτονία of the officials, which has nothing to do with the legislation on 
nomothesia.316  
The third difficulty is that later in the document we read that ἐὰν δέ τινες τῶν 
νόμων τῶν κειμένων ἀποχειροτονηθῶσι ('if some existing laws are rejected'), a later 
Assembly must discuss the appointment of the nomothetai περὶ τῶν 
ἀποχειροτονηθέντων. This passage refers to actual laws rejected in the annual vote of 
approval, but the document provides only for approval of macro-sections of the 'code'. 
When and how 'were some of the existing laws rejected' (τινες τῶν νόμων τῶν 
κειμένων ἀποχειροτονηθῶσι)? One might argue that the Athenians voted on every 
single law section by section, but this would have taken far longer than one meeting of 
the Assembly. A further, general difficulty in accepting a vote kapitelweise is that we 
never find in our sources, neither literary nor epigraphic, any mention of such 
                                                
315 Schöll 1886: 86, in order to save the provision, has athetized περὶ. 
316 This was already noted by Westermann 1850: 14. 
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categories. If these categories were listed and spelt out every year in the Assembly, we 
would expect the Athenians to be generally aware of them, and the orators to refer to 
them in order to make the statutes mentioned easily recognized. Instead, we find 
νόμους τελωνικούς (Dem. 24.101), φονικοὺς νόμους (Dem. 23.51), a μεταλλικὸν 
νόμον (Dem. 37.35), ἐμπορικοὺς νόμους (Dem. 35.3), περὶ διαθηκῶν νόμους (Hyp. 
3.17), a περὶ τῆς κακηγορίας νόμον (Isoc. 20.3), a περὶ τῆς ἀργίας νόμον (Dem. 
57.32), but never a single mention of any of the categories found in the document.317 
4) The next clause in the document, τὴν δ' ἐπιχειροτονίαν εἶναι τῶν νόμων 
κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους, is otiose. The document reports the statute about 
the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων, and it lays down the procedure for approval. Thus there 
is no point in specifying that the vote of approval is given κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς 
κειμένους: either there were no pre-existing laws on the topic, or the new procedure 
overrode them. The rule therefore makes no sense.318 
5) The next sentence provides that in case any of the laws is rejected, the 
prytaneis must schedule the discussion of the rejected laws τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν 
ἐκκλησιῶν. Such an expression (or similar) is unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions and 
has troubled many scholars. Its meaning seems to be clear: it specifies a total of three 
Assemblies that were held, presumably, every prytany, and prescribes that discussion on 
the rejected laws must be scheduled for the third of these meetings in the first prytany. 
However Ath.Pol. 43.3 clearly states that οἱ δὲ πρυτανεύοντες [...]συνάγουσιν [...] 
τὸν δὲ δῆμον τετράκις τῆς πρυτανείας ἑκάστης. Hansen and Mitchel319 have 
proposed that the system of four meetings of the Assembly every prytany must be dated 
later than this speech, as late as about 350 BCE, and previously, in accordance with the 
document, there were only three meetings per prytany. Demosthenes (§ 25) however 
                                                
317 A forthcoming essay by E. M. Harris provides more examples and shows that Athenian laws were 
organized not by procedure but by substantive content. 
318 The same remarks have been made by Westermann 1850: 19 and Schöll 1886: 99-100. 
319 Hansen - Mitchel 1984: 13-19. 
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states that the discussion about the appointment of the nomothetai must be held τὴν 
τρίτην [...] ἐκκλησίαν. Schöll rightly noted that in Athenian inscriptions εἰς τὴν 
πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν always refers to the following Assembly (e.g. IG II2 103 l. 14) and 
therefore τὴν τρίτην [...] ἐκκλησίαν must refer to the third Assembly after the first 
one.320 This would confirm the figure of four Assemblies per prytany provided by the 
Ath.Pol. 
Hansen tries to refute Schöll's argument by pointing out that the Greeks usually 
counted inclusively, and the fact that τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν means 'the following 
Assembly' does not prove that τὴν δευτέραν ἐκκλησίαν means 'the second Assembly' 
after the original one. I doubt whether such an ambiguity would have been acceptable in 
official language: if Hansen is right, ideally it would have been possible to refer to the 
'following Assembly' both with τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν and τὴν δευτέραν 
ἐκκλησίαν, and this second expression would have meant both 'the following 
Assembly' and 'the second Assembly' after the original one. No evidence supports this 
implausible hypothesis. Moreover at Dem. 20.94 we read that the bills had to be read 
many times (πολλάκις) in the Assembly. One could not call one meeting of the 
Assembly, or even two, 'many times'. It would require at least three meetings. Moreover 
Din. 1.42 states that Demosthenes μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν νόμον (his 
trierarchic law) καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν. Again, I find it hard to believe that ἑκάστην 
ἐκκλησίαν can refer to one, or even two (it would have been ἑκατέραν) meetings of 
the Assembly. Hansen counters this argument by claiming that in the first case the 
procedure was probably a different one, and in the second the number of Assemblies per 
prytany had already been changed. However, Demosthenes' wording clearly points to 
'the third Assembly' after the original one. The document is clearly in disagreement with 
the orator. Schöll tried to solve this difficulty by hypothesizing that τὴν τελευταίαν 
                                                
320 Schöll 1886: 101. 
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τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν might mean 'the last of the three (remaining) Assemblies'. But 
this interpretation strains the Greek and is less satisfactory than the straightforward 
reading of the phrase.  
However, an alternative solution exists. If we look at the scholia to this passage 
(24.20 Dilts) we read κατὰ μῆνα τρεῖς ἐκκλησίας ἐποιοῦντο, and then a list of 
typical days for Assemblies that is confirmed by the epigraphical evidence.321 This piece 
of information is found also in Schol.Dem. 18.73, 19.123, 154 Dilts, Schol.Aesch. 1.60, 
3.24 Schultz, Schol.Ar. Ac.19, Phot. s.v. κυρία ἐκκλησία. All these texts are likely to 
derive from an independent source which was, as the widespread attestations show, well 
known from at least the 2nd century AD (Harpocration s.v. σύγκλητος  ἐκκλησία 
provides the terminus ante quem). A later forger, independently aware of this piece of 
information and faced with τὴν τρίτην [...] ἐκκλησίαν in Demosthenes' account, might 
have easily concluded that the orator was referring to the third Assembly of the month. 
Yet this is not what Demosthenes says. He states that the discussion about the 
appointment of the nomothetai is to take place at the third meeting of the Assembly 
after the initial vote to allow new legislation: no sooner, no later. 
6) The date at the beginning of the document is given according to the bouleutic 
calendar, whereas at the end we find 'on the eleventh of the month Hekatombaion', 
which follows the festival calendar. However in the fourth century we never find the 
date expressed according to the festival calendar in inscriptions before 341/0.322 This 
law, if authentic, would have been enacted at the end of the fifth or at the beginning of 
the fourth century. The speech itself dates from the 350s. The presence of a date 
expressed according to the festival calendar is unacceptable.323 
                                                
321 Harris 1991: 325-41. Hansen 1987: 35-50 claims that the information applies only to the period of the 
twelve tribes but see Harris 2006:  118-120. 
322 IG II2 229.4-5. Cf. Henry 1977: 37. 
323 Harris 2006: 104 n. 5; Hansen 1993: 99-113 at 101-2. 
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8) There follows a long section about the penalties for prytaneis, proedroi, and 
thesmothetai who do not perform their duties. Afterwards the document requires that 
copies of the proposals be placed before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes, in 
order to allow the people to assess the time needed by the nomothetai and appoint them 
accordingly. The last provision deals with the election (αἱρεῖσθαι) of advocates of the 
laws to be repealed (τοὺς συναπολογησομένους τοῖς νόμοις). We have seen above 
that the rationale for the election of advocates of the laws would require them to be 
chosen when the laws to be repealed are known, that is 'in the third Assembly'. One 
could not know what opposing laws (if any) were to be repealed until after the proposals 
for new laws were made at subsequent meetings of the Assembly.324 In the document 
they are nevertheless appointed τῇ ἑνδεκάτῃ τοῦ ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνός. Schöll, in 
order to solve this problem, has proposed to athetize the indication of the date. Such an 
emendation is not acceptable unless the document's authenticity can be independently 
confirmed. 
9) Demosthenes at § 36 calls the advocates of a law συνηγόρους. At Dem. 
20.146 he calls them σύνδικοι. Both these terms are attested in contemporary Athenian 
inscriptions.325 Instead, the participle συναπολογησομένους or any other form of the 
verb συναπολογέομαι are unattested in Attic inscriptions. The two words employed by 
Demosthenes are technical terms, yet the participle in the document, where we should 
expect official language, is not.326 
The person who composed the document at Dem. 24.20-23 was a skilful forger, 
one who knew the Attic orators and possibly had access to a lexicon or commentary. 
                                                
324 Cf. above pp. 129-30 and 133. 
325 σύνδικος is found in inscriptions up to the end of the fourth century in SEG 3.117.7; 42.217.8-9; 
GRBS 26:165.49.5; 51.17. συνήγορος is found in IG II2 1183.14; 1237.32; 1251.10-1; III App. 38.6-7; 
Ziebarth, Neue Verfluchungstafeln, SPAW 1 (1934) 2.2; SEG 44.226.6, 10; 28.103.41-2. For differences 
between the two terms, and the overlap in their application see Rubinstein 2000: 43-5. 
326 Participles of συναπολογέομαι are found in fourth-century prose only at Dem. 25.56; Hyp. 1.10; 
Lycurg. 1.138. They are never employed as technical terms but simply mean 'one who joins in mounting 
one's defence'. It is also interesting that the verb is found in the Demosthenic corpus only in two other 
places: Dem. 24.157, 159, both in the speech where we find the document. 
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Whatever he knew, the document is not consistent with Demosthenes' accounts in 
Against Leptines and Against Timocrates and contains features that find no parallel in 
contemporary documents. 
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4.1.2 Dem. 24.33: nomothesia and opposing laws 
ΝΟΜΟΣ. 
Τῶν δὲ νόμων τῶν κειμένων μὴ ἐξεῖναι λῦσαι μηδένα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν νομοθέταις. 
τότε δ' ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ ’Αθηναίων λύειν, ἕτερον τιθέντι ἀνθ' ὅτου ἂν 
λύῃ. διαχειροτονίαν δὲ ποιεῖν τοὺς προέδρους περὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων, 
πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τοῦ κειμένου, εἰ δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ 
’Αθηναίων ἢ οὔ, ἔπειτα περὶ τοῦ τιθεμένου.  ὁπότερον δ' ἂν χειροτονήσωσιν 
οἱ νομοθέται, τοῦτον κύριον εἶναι. ἐναντίον δὲ νόμον μὴ ἐξεῖναι τιθέναι τῶν 
νόμων τῶν κειμένων μηδενί. ἐὰν δέ τις λύσας τινὰ τῶν νόμων τῶν κειμένων 
ἕτερον ἀντιθῇ μὴ ἐπιτήδειον τῷ δήμῳ τῷ ’Αθηναίων ἢ ἐναντίον τῶν κειμένων 
τῳ, τὰς γραφὰς εἶναι κατ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς κεῖται ἐάν τις μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θῇ νόμον. 
 
4 τῷ ’Αθηναίων codd. : τῷ ’Αθηναίῳ S | 5 τοῦτον τὸν κύριον S | 6-7 μηδενί - κειμένων om. P 
add. in marg. | 7 ἀντιθῇ codd. : ἀντιτιθῇ Sc (m.a.) |  8 ἢ om. Sa |  
 
It is prohibited to repeal any existing law except at a session of nomothetai. And 
then, any Athenian who wishes to repeal a law shall propose a new law to replace the 
one repealed. And the chairmen shall take a vote by show of hands about those laws, 
first about the existing one, if it seems that the law is advantageous to the Athenians 
or not, and then about the proposed one. The law which the nomothetai vote for shall 
be the valid one. It is not allowed to introduce a law in conflict with existing laws, 
and if anyone, having repealed an existing law, proposes a new law not advantageous 
for the Athenians or in conflict with any of the existing laws, indictments shall be 
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lodged against him according to the existing law regarding the proposer of an 
unsuitable law.327 
 
The stichometry shows that this document was not present in the Urexemplar of 
the speech. The scholia provide comments on the document, which show that it was 
present in manuscripts circulating in late antiquity. 
Demosthenes, both in his adjacent summary (§ 32-5) and in his summary of the 
law about nomothesia in the Against Leptines (Dem. 20.93-4), clearly states that the 
statute supposed to be read here by the grammateus ordered that those who proposed 
new laws according to the procedure previously described had to propose the repeal of 
any contradictory law. If they failed to do so, they were liable to a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι. This document instead provides a procedure for repealing existing 
laws to which Demosthenes never refers, and orders that those who repeal a law have to 
propose a new law in its place. This reverses the order of the procedure's steps in 
Demosthenes' paraphrase. If the law proposed to replace the existing law contradicted 
existing statutes, the repeal of those laws had to be proposed too. This procedure has 
nothing to do with the straightforward provisions summarized by Demosthenes. 
Moreover, the document's content is contradictory, and some of its features reveal 
that it cannot be a genuine document. 
1) The document contradicts itself; in its first sentence it states that 'it is 
prohibited to repeal any existing law except at a session of nomothetai',328 but in its last 
sentence it provides a different way to do it, through a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον 
θεῖναι, which had to be heard by judges, not nomothetai. That a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι, if successful, resulted in the repeal of the law enacted by the 
                                                
327 This translation is adapted from Arnaoutoglou 1998: 89-91. 
328 The forger might have been misled by Dem. 3.10. This passage mentions the possibility of appointing 
nomothetai for the sole purpose of repealing laws, but his language makes it clear that their normal 
function was to ratify laws and that his own proposal would have been an innovation. 
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defendant, is witnessed by the very existence of the speeches Against Timocrates and 
Against Leptines. In fact, we know that the charge brought by Apsephion was 
successful and resulted in the repeal of Leptines' law.329 Both cases were heard by 
judges, not by a panel of nomothetai.330 
2) The sentence 'the chairmen shall take a vote by show of hands about those 
laws' (διαχειροτονίαν δὲ ποιεῖν τοὺς προέδρους περὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων) is 
unparalleled. In all our sources the proedroi always give (διδόναι) a διαχειροτονίαν. 
This expression derives, again, from § 25 (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἐποίησαν 
διαχειροτονίαν: ‘and first the laws set a vote among you'), where the subject was 
however the laws on nomothesia. 
3) At § 32 Demosthenes states that the law about to be read by the grammateus, in 
case someone enacts a law in contrast with existing statutes, γράφεσθαι κελεύει. This 
expression means that the law permits anyone to bring a public action and lays down the 
procedure for it.331 The document on the other hand does not lay down any procedure, 
but states that if one enacts a law in contrast with existing statutes and does not repeal 
them, the γραφαὶ 'shall be lodged against him according to the existing law regarding 
the proposer of an unsuitable law.' Instead of describing the proper procedure, the 
document refers to a further law: τὸν νόμον ὃς κεῖται ἐάν τις μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θῇ 
νόμον. 
                                                
329 See Dio Chrys. 31.128 with Harris 2008: 20-21. 
330 The orator addresses the audience with the words ἄνδρες δικασταί at Dem. 20.1, 15, 29, 36, 45, 55, 
64, 67, 69, 79, 87, 95; 24.1, 19, 24, 43, 51, 64, 72, 111, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 130, 134, 136, 139, 
140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 153, 154, 167, 200, 212. Hansen 1985: 350 postulates that 
during the first year after its enactment a law was not fully in force, but had an intermediate status, and 
could be repealed in a tribunal. After one year it became one τῶν δὲ νόμων τῶν κειμένων, a part of the 
'code', and could be repealed only by the nomothetai. This seems to me to explain ignotum per ignotius. 
This intermediate status is clearly excluded by the law of Diokles, quoted and discussed at Dem. 24.42-4, 
which states that τοὺς νόμους [...] τοὺς δὲ μετ᾽ Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τιθεμένους 
κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη. This document was, according to the stichometry, 
part of the Urexemplar (see p. 34), and Hansen 1990 himself accepts it as an authentic statute. Cf. below 
pp. 173-80. 
331 Cf. Dem. 29.9 with MacDowell 1989: 257-72, MacDowell 2009: 46-7. Demosthenes obviously does 
not mean that the law 'orders' the prosecution of the law's proposer. 
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The provisions described in this document are quite inconsistent with 
Demosthenes' accounts of nomothesia in the Against Leptines and Against Timocrates. 
They are also contradictory, and one phrase finds no parallel in contemporary 
inscriptions. Moreover there is no reason to believe that the additional information 
found in the inserted document that is not found in the accompanying summary derives 
from an independent source and is reliable. The disagreements between the document 
and the orator's account can be more likely explained as due to clumsy composition 
from the orator's words. 
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4.2 Dem. 24.27: Epicrates' decree 
ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ 
Ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος πρώτης, ἑνδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας, Ἐπικράτης εἶπεν, 
ὅπως ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ θύηται καὶ ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ γένηται καὶ εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ πρὸς 
τὰ Παναθήναια διοικηθῇ, τοὺς πρυτάνεις τοὺς τῆς Πανδιονίδος καθίσαι 
νομοθέτας αὔριον, τοὺς δὲ νομοθέτας εἶναι ἕνα καὶ χιλίους ἐκ τῶν 
ὀμωμοκότων, συννομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν βουλήν. 
 
ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ Sc | Ἐπικράτης A Y Schol. ad loc. : Τιμοκράτης  S F P | ὡς 
κάλλιστα ante θύηται add. Schoell cf. 28 | πῶς ἡ διοίκησις S | προσδεῖ A | τοὺς ante πρυτάνεις 
om. A 
 
During the first Pandionis, on the eleventh of the prytany, Epicrates proposed: in 
order that the sacrifices may be offered, the funds for them may be sufficient, and if 
anything is needed for the Panathenaea funds may be provided, the prytaneis from 
Pandionis should have the nomothetai meet tomorrow, there should be 1001 
nomothetai from those who have sworn the oath and they should pass laws in 
conjunction with the Council. 
 
The stichometry has shown that this document cannot have been part of the 
Urexemplar of the speech. It has therefore been inserted at a later date, but early enough 
to allow the name Epikrates to appear in the scholia ad locum (24.27 Dilts). 
In the passage preceding the document Demosthenes discussed the regulations on 
nomothesia and explained the correct procedure for passing new legislation. In 
particular, he points out that the discussion about the actual appointment of the 
nomothetai must happen in the 'third Assembly' after the preliminary vote on 
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nomothesia, and the nomothetai must be appointed even later. At § 26 he states that the 
law of Timocrates has been enacted on the 12th of Hekatombaion, the very day after the 
preliminary vote. Timocrates has not respected the times required by the law. Moreover, 
on the 12th of Hekatombaion the Athenians celebrate the feast of the Cronia, and 
therefore the Council is adjourned (καὶ διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀφειμένης τῆς βουλῆς). 
Nevertheless Timocrates, with others involved in the plot (μετὰ τῶν ὑμῖν 
ἐπιβουλευόντων), contrived to summon the nomothetai by decree on that date with the 
pretext of the Panathenaia. Demosthenes then asks the grammateus to read out the 
decree (§ 27), in order to show the judges that 'they' (Timocrates and his allies) did not 
leave anything to chance, and deliberately plotted to violate the regulations about 
nomothesia. After the decree is read out, at § 28, the orator wants the judges to notice 
how ingeniously the proposer of the decree (ὁ γράφων αὐτὸ), with the excuse of 
financial needs and of the approaching Panathenaia (τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς 
προστησάμενος κατεπεῖγον), ignored the times prescribed by the law and ordered to 
'legislate tomorrow' (αὔριον νομοθετεῖν). Demosthenes immediately dismisses the 
reason for summoning the nomothetai provided in the decree. They are summoned οὐχ 
ἵν᾽ ὡς κάλλιστα γένοιτό τι τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν. These words seem to be modelled 
on and parody those of the actual decree: we find in contemporary inscriptions 
expressions such as ὅπως ἂν τῆι] Ἀθηνᾶι ἡ θυσία ὡς καλλίστ[η ἦι Παναθηναίοις 
τοῖς μ]ικροῖς (Agora 16.55 ll. 5-6 ), ὅπως ἂ]ν ὡς κάλλι[σ]τα γίγν[ωνται τὰ 
Διονύσια τῶ]ι θεῶι (IG II2 712 ll. 9-11), ὅπως ἂν ἡ θυσία γίγνηται ὡς καλλίστη̣ (SEG 
28.103 ll. 5-6), or ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα γένηται τὰ Διονύ[σ]ια (IG II2 1186 ll. 10-11).332 
Something similar is likely to have been in the decree. Demosthenes then states what he 
believes to be the true reason for such a decree, namely to enact the law of Timocrates 
                                                
332 See also Piérart 2000: 246, who believes however that 'la formule qui figurait dans le décret est 
indiquée sans doute possible par Démosthène lui-même'. These words therefore would not be modelled 
on the decree; they would be the very words of the decree.  
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(he uses the plural αὐτοῖς: 'for them', 'that law of theirs') without anyone being aware of 
it and therefore without opposition. At § 29 Demosthenes proves his allegations by 
pointing out that no business concerning the finances and the festival was dealt with the 
day after, and Τιμοκράτης οὑτοσὶ κατὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐνομοθέτει. 
This account makes clear what must have been the content of the decree: it was 
passed on the 11th of Hekatombaion, and summoned the nomothetai for the day after 
(αὔριον) to deal with the re-allocation of part of the city budget in order to fund any 
last-minute costs of the Panathenaia.333 The procedure is well known: the city budget 
(διοίκησις) was at this time pre-allocated in fixed quotas, and this division was called 
μερισμός. The μερισμός was fixed by law, and therefore could not be modified by 
decree. When extraordinary expenses arose, the Assembly decreed the appointment of 
the nomothetai in order to modify temporarily the μερισμός and allocate part of the city 
budget to these extraordinary expenses.334 Such a procedure is attested in contemporary 
inscriptions: IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254 are honorary decrees that require 
the Assembly to make extraordinary expenditures and ask the nomothetai to modify the 
μερισμός in order to increase the Assembly's allowance, so that these expenses can be 
covered. IG VII 4253 moreover honours Phanodemus for having legislated correctly 
about the sacrifices and the festival of Amphiaraus (ll. 10-5: καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως 
νενομοθέτηκεν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου ὅπως ἂν ἥ τε πεντετηρὶς ὡς 
κάλλιστη γίγνηται καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι θυσίαι τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ 
Ἀμφιαράου). He is honoured for having correctly performed the same procedure 
followed in this decree. This is why Demosthenes states twice that the decree 
(allegedly) concerned the διοίκησις and the Panathenaia (§ 28: τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸ 
                                                
333 This is the meaning of διοίκησις. See Stroud 1998: 81: 'a general fund in the financial administration 
of the polis, which was not otherwise targeted for individual use'. 
334 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 50 n. 1, 101. 
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τῆς ἑορτῆς προστησάμενος κατεπεῖγον; § 29: τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ τῶν 
Παναθηναίων). 
The orator's account also implies that the proposer of this decree was not 
Timocrates: at § 26 he contrives his plan μετὰ τῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλευόντων, at § 28 the 
proposer of the decree is called generically ὁ γράφων αὐτὸ, and the aim of the decree 
is to enact the law αὐτοῖς ('for them', 'of theirs') without opposition. When the subject is 
again Timocrates in person, Demosthenes clearly states it (at § 29: Τιμοκράτης 
οὑτοσὶ). 
A close analysis of the document shows that many of its features either betray 
clumsy rewording of the orator's paraphrase or are inconsistent with the language and 
terminology of contemporary inscriptions. The document starts with a very short 
prescript (Ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος πρώτης, ἑνδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας, Ἐπικράτης 
εἶπεν), dating the decree to the 11th of the first prytany, that is to the 11th of 
Hekatombaion, the first month of the year, since at this time the archon-year and the 
Council-year coincided. Demosthenes provides this date at § 26. However, we do not 
find anywhere in the speech the indication of the tribe in prytany, and the inscriptions at 
the moment do not allow us to confirm or to deny that in 354/3 that tribe was Pandionis. 
The same prescript (except for the fact that the date is there the 12th instead of the 11th) 
is also found in the two documents allegedly reporting the law of Timocrates at § 39-40 
and 71: both, according to the stichometry, part of the Urexemplar. The second of these 
documents also gives the name of the chairman of the proedroi. The difficulty in 
accepting both the name of the chairman and the Pandionis tribe, and therefore the 
reliability of this information will be discussed in that context.335 Here it will suffice to 
say that the prescript in this form lacks many standard features. The normal formula of 
dating at this time was ἐπὶ τῆς ---ίδος + ordinal + πρυτανείας and ordinal of the day + 
                                                
335 Cf. below pp. 169-71. 
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πρυτανείας,336 usually but not invariably (e.g. IG II2 127 ll. 4-7) with the name of the 
chairman of the proedroi in the middle. Thus the dating formula that we find in the 
document lacks at least the word πρυτανείας after the first ordinal. Yet such an 
arrangement is not unparalleled: cf. ἐπ[ὶ] τῆς Ἐρεχ[θ]ηΐδο[ς ἐνάτης] (IG II2 114 l. 1, 
the space at the end of the line is too short for πρυτανείας),337 ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀκαμαντίδος 
ἐνάτης (IG II2 218 ll. 3-4), ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰγηΐδος δεκάτης· τετάρτ[ηι τ]ῆς πρυτανείας 
(IG II2 224 ll. 3-4). However, even if we accept the wording of the dating formula, the 
prescript still lacks the names of the archon, the secretary, and the chairman of the 
proedroi, and the enactment formula. Often Athenian inscriptions of this period lack 
some of the formulas providing this information, but they never lack so many and such 
fundamental ones. To sum up, we cannot at this stage confirm or reject the date 
provided in the document, but we do know that its prescript cannot be the full one. 
Either it has been forged at a later date, or it is an extract of the authentic prescript.338 
And even in this case, it can hardly prove the authenticity of the document, since the 
same information is provided in the two documents reporting the law of Timocrates (§ 
39-40 and 71), present in the text since the Urexemplar and the likely source of the 
information.339 
More striking is the clause ὅπως ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ θύηται καὶ ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ 
γένηται. θύηται is not unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions, but it is very infrequent. 
We find it only twice: ὅπως ἂν τῶι Ἡρακλεῖ τῶι ἐν Ἄκριδι πρόσοδος ἦι̣ ὡς 
πλείστη κ̣αὶ ἡ θυσία θύηται ὡς καλλίστη (SEG 28.103 ll. 19-20) and ὅπως ἂν 
τά τε προθύµατα θύηται ἃ ἐξ̣ηγε̑ται Εὐθύ[δ]η[µ]ος ἱερεὺς το̑ Ἀσκληπιο̑ καὶ ἡ 
                                                
336 Cf. Henry 1977: 27. 
337 Cf. Schöll 1886: 120. 
338 Schöll 1886: 119-21 comes to the same conclusion. 
339 Cf. below pp. 168-9 
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ἄλλη θυσία γίγνηται ὑπὲρ το̑ δήµο το̑ Ἀθηναίων (IG II2 47 l. 25).340 The orator's 
account, as we have seen, suggests that the expression needed here would involve ὡς 
κάλλιστα, and possibly the verb γίγνομαι.341 SEG 28.103 ll. 19-20 quoted above would 
be a good example. Even more standard, and perfectly consistent with Demosthenes' 
words, is the formula found earlier in the same inscription (SEG 28.103 ll. 5-6: ὅπως 
ἂν ἡ θυσία γίγνηται ὡς καλλίστη) and in Agora 16.55 ll. 5-6 (a law on the 
Panathenaia of 336/5: ὅπως ἂν τῆι] Ἀθηνᾶι ἡ θυσία ὡς καλλίστ[η ἦι Παναθηναίοις 
τοῖς μ]ικροῖς). A further example is the decree honouring Phanodemus (IG VII 4253 ll. 
13-4: ὅπως ἂν ἥ τε πεντετηρὶς ὡς κάλλιστη γίγνηται καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι θυσίαι τοῖς 
θεοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου). More generic formulas like ὅπως ἂ]ν ὡς 
κάλλι[σ]τα γίγν[ωνται τὰ Διονύσια τῶ]ι θεῶι (IG II2 712 ll. 9-11) and ὅπως ὡς 
κάλλιστα γένηται τὰ Διονύ[σ]ια (IG II2 1186 ll. 10-11) would match Demosthenes' 
paraphrase even better. His account in fact always mentions the διοίκησις and 
Panathenaia, but never refers specifically to sacrifices. Demosthenes clearly states at § 
29 that the nomothetai were summoned περὶ μὲν τούτων, τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ τῶν 
Παναθηναίων. At any rate, Demosthenes' wording here is consistent with many 
inscriptions and indicates that the formula in the decree must have involved the words 
ὡς κάλλιστα.342 Its absence casts doubts on the authenticity of the document. 
The expression ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ γένηται is unparalleled and incorrect. It is 
probably due to clumsy paraphrasing of Demosthenes' words at § 28 and 29. As we 
have seen above, Demosthenes uses διοίκησις to allude to a very specific procedure for 
modifying the merismos of the city-budget. διοίκησις is often found in contemporary 
inscriptions and in the orators, and its generic meaning is 'general administration, 
                                                
340 In SEG 21.253 l. 24 and in IG II2 43 l. 17 the verb is restored, and the restorations are far from safe. In 
literary sources we find this form only in Xen. Lac. Pol. 13.3 and [Dem.] 59.75. 
341 Piérart 2000: 246 comes to similar conclusions on this expression. 
342 It is also notable that the only occurrence of such provisions for the funding of a festival without ὡς 
κάλλιστα (or an analogous superlative expression) is IG II2 47 l. 25, dating to the very beginning of the 
4th century. By the 50's of the century this habit was probably fully established. 
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government' (cf. e.g. Isoc. 1.37, 12.128). More often however, especially in 
inscriptions,343 it is used in its technical financial sense of 'general financial 
administration', or more simply 'city-budget' (e.g. § 97).344 The meaning required in the 
document, that of 'assuring sufficient funding', is unattested and incorrect.345 This use 
clearly points to the hypothesis of a forger who misunderstood Demosthenes' words 
because he did not know about the procedures concerning the merismos. 
The next clause, καὶ εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τὰ Παναθήναια διοικηθῇ, is again 
unparalleled. ἐνδεῖ is found in Athenian inscriptions only in inventories, and the 
expression εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ is never found either in inscriptions or in literary texts. The 
verb διοικέω in the aorist passive form διοικηθῇ (or in any other person of the aorist 
passive) is never used in classical Greek, and expressions resembling the present one 
occur only in three Egyptian papyri (PCairo, Zenon 2, 59217 l. 5; PLille 1, 16 l. 9; PSI 
10, 110 l. 21, from the 3rd and 2nd century BCE).346 
The next sentence, τοὺς πρυτάνεις τοὺς τῆς Πανδιονίδος καθίσαι νομοθέτας 
αὔριον, lacks epigraphical parallels, since no decree of appointment of the nomothetai 
has survived. That the prytaneis had to summon the nomothetai must be correct, and yet 
this information, found also in the document at § 20-3, does not need to be drawn from 
any independent source. Dem. 18.73 and 169-70 make clear that they were in charge of 
summoning the Assembly and Aeschin. 3.39 links them to the nomothetai.347 The 
expression καθίσαι νομοθέτας is drawn from § 25, 26 and 29 of this speech. That the 
appointment was for αὔριον is clear from the context and explicitly stated at § 28. 
However, a search in the PHI database among the surviving inscriptions from Attica 
                                                
343 Cf. e.g. Stroud 1998 l. 59; IG II2 223 l. b11; IG II2 463 l. 84; IG II2 488 l. 18; IG II2 1202 l. 11; SEG 
43.26 l. 13. The integration proposed at ll. 18-19 in IG II2 674 (διαχειροτονῆσαι τὸν δῆμον, ὁπόσον 
δεῖ αὐτοῖς μερίσαι εἰς τὴ[ν διοίκησιν τῆς θυσίας] cannot therefore be correct. I would suggest instead 
εἰς τὴ[ν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς θυσίας] (cf. Agora 16.86 l. 13). 
344 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 106-10; 1981: 514-6, Stroud 1998: 81 and in particular Rhodes 2007. 
345 Cf. also Piérart 2000: 246-7. 
346 Cf. Piérart 2000: 247. 
347 On their duties see [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 43.3-4, 44.4 with Rhodes 1972: 20-22 and 1981: 520-6. 
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shows that αὔριον, to mean 'tomorrow', is never found by itself in official language. 
Out of 177 entries the word is used 174 times after εἰς (or ἐς), and three times in the 
expression ἡ αὔριον ἡμέρα (IG I3 73 ll. 43-4; Agora 16.22 l. b11; SEG 22.274 l. 20).348 
The next provision in the document prescribes that τοὺς δὲ νομοθέτας εἶναι ἕνα 
καὶ χιλίους ἐκ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων. The document at § 20-3 also reports that the 
nomothetai had to be appointed among those who had sworn the Heliastic Oath. The 
source of both documents on this can easily have been Dem. 20.93. Piérart has rightly 
pointed out that if the nomothetai were by definition appointed ἐκ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων, 
and such a provision was already in the laws on nomothesia in general, its repetition 
here in a decree of appointment is superfluous.349 If they were not, the presence of this 
expression here is unacceptable. The number of 1001 nomothetai given here can be 
neither confirmed nor rejected. Piérart notes that Poll. 8.101 gives the number of 1000 
nomothetai, and therefore hypothesizes that Pollux, far from drawing this information 
from the speech,350 might share a source with our document.351 This is not impossible, 
but it is probably safer to conclude that a forger could easily make up such information 
from other sources: we know from abundant evidence that dikasteria for public trials 
were usually composed of 501 judges, but could be extended to 1001, 1501 and even to 
6000: the entire Heliaia. Harp. s.v. ἡλιάια καὶ ἡλίασις states than the Heliaia was 
composed of 1000 or 1500 judges.352 A forger who had such information could have 
easily inferred that the system of appointment and the size of the panels were the same 
for the nomothetai. It is also remarkable that the only passage in the orators giving the 
                                                
348 The occurrences in the orators seem to conform to this pattern: the only occurrence of αὔριον by itself 
is in Antiph. 6.21, from the 5th century. In the 4th century we find εἰς αὔριον in Lys. 23.9 and Aeschin. 
2.46, ἡ αὔριον ἡμέρα in Lys. 26.6 and Hyp. In Dem. 9, and αὔριον alone, not surprisingly, only in Dem. 
24.28, in the account of this decree. 
349 Piérart 2000: 247. 
350 This was the opinion of Schöll 1886: 102, 123. 
351 Piérart 2000: 249-50. 
352 Cf. Hansen 1995: 10 n. 14 for references to other sources providing similar information. 
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number of 1001 for a dikasterion is in this very speech, at § 9. This passage might well 
have suggested the number of 1001 to a forger. 
The last clause of the document, συννομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν βουλήν, presents 
many problems. None of the prescripts of the laws preserved in inscriptions mention the 
Council.353 They only mention the nomothetai. The abundant evidence of decrees on 
stone shows that when the Council participated in drafting decrees, the enactment 
formula was invariably 'resolved by the Council and the People'.354 If the Council had to 
συννομοθετεῖν with the nomothetai,355 why is it never mentioned in the prescripts of 
the laws? Hansen on the other hand has proposed that the work of the Council might 
have consisted of no more than drafting the agenda for the meeting.356 However, this 
was the duty of the prytaneis, and they have already been independently mentioned in 
the document. That the task of the Council in the document can be reduced to that of the 
prytaneis must therefore be excluded.  
Hansen however believes that summoning the Council was necessary since the 
prytaneis needed a probouleuma to draft the agenda, and on the 12th of Hekatombaion 
the Council was adjourned because of the Cronia. He suggests therefore that the decree 
of Epicrates was an emergency decree and proposes this course of events on the 12th of 
Hekatombaion: 'the Council met in the morning, appointed a board of proedroi and 
passed a probouleuma in accordance with which the prytaneis were instructed to 
summon the nomothetai'.357 This reconstruction cannot be accepted for two reasons: 
first, in IG II2 222, IG II2 330 and IG VII 4254, involving similar procedures, the 
Assembly orders that proposals be presented to the nomothetai, but no further 
probouleuma is needed. Second and more important, at § 47 Demosthenes clearly states 
                                                
353 See above p. 121-2 and n. 181. 
354 See Rhodes 1972: 52-81. 
355 See MacDowell 1975: 69. 
356 Hansen 1985: 364. At n. 45 he refers to Hansen 1978, but part of his argument there is based on the 
identity of the proedroi of the nomothetai, about which he has in Hansen 1985 changed his mind. 
357 Hansen 1978: 157. 
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that Timocrates enacted his law surreptitiously, when the Council was adjourned (ἐν 
παραβύστῳ, τῆς βουλῆς μὲν ἀφειμένης). Thus the decree cannot have provided for 
summoning the Council in spite of the Cronia, since the Council was not actually 
summoned, and the law of Timocrates was nevertheless enacted. This evidence also 
rules out the hypothesis that the collaboration between nomothetai and the Council in 
taking decisions about new laws was in this case exceptional. The Council was 
adjourned, thus no collaboration was possible. Moreover IG II2 333 l. 13 attests a 
meeting of the nomothetai on the 6th of Skirophorion, a festival day to Artemis.358 Either 
that was a further extraodinary occasion or, more likely, the nomothetai, like the 
dikasteria, still met on monthly festival days. To sum up, it is impossible to reconcile 
the provision συννομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν βουλήν both with the evidence of the speech 
and with that of inscriptions.359 It must be the work of a later forger.  
Where did the forger find such information? It is likely that this provision of the 
document derives from a misreading of Demosthenes' allusions to the fact that the 
Council was adjourned (§ 28, 29, 47). Because of these allusions the forger must have 
assumed that the Council played an active part in the work of the nomothetai. It must be 
noted however that Demosthenes never explicitly says that it is illegal to summon the 
nomothetai during the Cronia. If it were, he would certainly have added this to his list of 
violations of the laws committed by Timocrates and his associates. Instead, he mentions 
only that the Council was adjourned. This, combined with the evidence of IG II2 333 l. 
13, allows us to understand Demosthenes’ rhetorical trick: he cannot argue that the 
nomothetai could not be summoned during the Cronia, since that would have been false. 
Lawcourts and nomothetai could indeed be summoned on monthly festival days. He 
therefore stresses the fact that the Council was adjourned to give the judges the 
                                                
358 See Mikalson 1975: 168. 
359 Piérart 2000: 247-9 also notes that the verb συννομοθετεῖν is found only once in Classical sources: at 
Plat. Leg. 7.833e, about collaboration between legislators and specialists: nothing to do with our 
document. 
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impression that political activity tout court was suspended, without overtly lying. A 
later forger did not understand the sense of Demosthenes' allusions to the Council and 
assumed that it had an active role in legislation. 
This analysis has shown that the document cannot be reconciled with the orator's 
account and that its wording and provisions conflict with contemporary inscriptions. It 
cannot therefore be an authentic Athenian decree. 
The last question to discuss is the name of the proposer. Epicrates is found among 
the main manuscripts in AY, and in the scholia ad locum. Timocrates is found instead 
in SFP. All the editors follow Dindorf in choosing Epicrates, since this is clearly the 
lectio difficilior. A forger might have invented a name, as often happens in the decrees 
of On the Crown. In fact, as noted above, the speech clearly points to a different 
proposer for this decree,360 and that might have been noticed by the forger. However an 
unpublished law for the funding of a festival (Agora inv. 7495) dating to 354/3, 
(around) the same year as our speech,361 shows an Epicrates as its proposer. Piérart 
(among others)362 has concluded that this Epicrates must be the same as the proposer of 
our decree, and the name in the document must therefore be correct. Since he rejects the 
authenticity of the document as a whole, he has postulated that the name Epicrates must 
have been preserved independently, perhaps in a lost version of the lemma preceding 
the document. Nothing conclusive can be said to confirm or refute this hypothesis. It is 
possible that the name has been preserved independently. However, a search in the 
LGPN yields 562 results, 159 of which are from Attica. Epicrates was a rather popular 
name in antiquity, and chance cannot be ruled out as the reason for the correspondence.  
                                                
360 Cf. also Wayte 1882: 109; Piérart 2000: 248. 
361 Lewis 1954: 32 dates the speech to this year. Sealey 1955: 74 and Cawkwell 1962: 40-2 accept Dion. 
Hal. Amm. 1.4 and date the speech to 353/2. 
362 Cf. Develin 1989: 287-8; Piérart 2000: 248. 
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4.3 Dem. 24.39-40 and 71: the law of Timocrates 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
[39...] ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος πρώτης, δωδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας, Τιμοκράτης 
εἶπεν, καὶ εἴ τινι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ προστετίμηται κατὰ νόμον ἢ 
κατὰ ψήφισμα δεσμοῦ ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν προστιμηθῇ, εἶναι αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ 
ἐκείνου ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι τοῦ ὀφλήματος, οὓς ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ, ἦ 
μὴν ἐκτείσειν τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ ὦφλεν. τοὺς δὲ προέδρους ἐπιχειροτονεῖν 
ἐπάναγκες, ὅταν τις καθιστάναι βούληται. [40] τῷ δὲ καταστήσαντι τοὺς 
ἐγγυητάς, ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τῇ πόλει τὸ ἀργύριον ἐφ᾽ ᾧ κατέστησε τοὺς ἐγγυητάς, 
ἀφεῖσθαι τὸν δεσμὸν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ καταβάλῃ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ ἐγγυηταὶ 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας, τὸν μὲν ἐξεγγυηθέντα δεδέσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐγγυητῶν 
δημοσίαν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ὠνουμένων τὰ τέλη καὶ τῶν 
ἐγγυωμένων καὶ ἐκλεγόντων, καὶ τῶν τὰ μισθώσιμα μισθουμένων καὶ 
ἐγγυωμένων, τὰς πράξεις εἶναι τῇ πόλει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους. 
ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης <ἢ δεκάτης> πρυτανείας ὄφλῃ, τοῦ ὑστέρου ἐνιαυτοῦ 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης [ἢ δεκάτης] πρυτανείας ἐκτίνειν. 
 
1 πρώτης om. SFYa | 3 ἦ om. Ya | ὀφειλήματος S cf. 42.28| 4 ἦ μὴν codd. : ἡμῖν Sa | ἐκτίσειν 
SAFYP : corr. Blass | 6 ἐφ᾽ οἷς SF | 7 τὸν δεσμὸν SaYP : τῶν δεσμῶν ScAF : τοῦ δεσμοῦ Liban. 
Arg. 1.1 et Bu. coll. 86, 93 | 9 ἐκλεγέντων A | μισθώματα SFYP | 10 <τῶν> ἐγγυωμένων Ald. | 11 
ἢ δεκάτης add. Dobree | 12 ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης ἢ δεκάτης πρυτανείας del. Dobree Dilts : ἢ δεκάτης 
del. Westermann 
 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
[71...] ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος πρώτης πρυτανείας δωδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας τῶν 
προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν Ἀριστοκλῆς Μυρρινούσιος, Τιμοκράτης εἶπεν: καὶ εἴ 
τινι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ προστετίμηται κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατὰ ψήφισμα 
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δεσμοῦ ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν προστιμηθῇ, εἶναι αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐγγυητὰς 
καταστῆσαι. 
 
καὶ εἴ - δεσμοῦ AB 175.23 | καὶ εἴ - προστιμηθῇ Schol. Dem. 24.68.152c Dilts 
 
πρώτης πρυτανείας δωδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας ScAYP : πρώτης πρυτανείας δωδεκάτῃ F : 
πρώτης πρυτανείας Sa : πρώτης δωδεκάτῃ τῆς πρυτανείας Weil cf. 27, 39 | ἐπεψήφιζεν Schoell |  
 
[39...] During the prytany of Pandionis, on the twelfth day of the prytany, [of the 
proedroi Aristocles of Myrrinous put to vote,] Timocrates proposed: even if, in 
accordance with a law or a decree, an additional penalty of imprisonment has been 
imposed, or shall be imposed in future, on anyone of those in debt to the public 
treasury, it is to be permitted for him, or for another man on his behalf, to provide as 
sureties of the debt any man whom the people approves by a vote, to guarantee that 
he will make the payment which he incurred. The proedroi must put it to the vote 
whenever anyone wishes to provide sureties. [40] If the man who has provided the 
sureties pays to the city the money for which he provided them, he is to be granted 
release from imprisonment. If the money is not paid either by him or by the sureties 
in the ninth prytany, the man who has received a guarantee is to be imprisoned and 
the sureties' property is to be confiscated. With regard to those who have purchased 
[the right to collect] taxes and their sureties and collectors, and lessees of leased 
property and their sureties, payments are to be exacted by the city in accordance with 
the existing laws. If he incurs payment in the ninth prytany, he is to pay up in the 
ninth or tenth prytany of the following year.363 
 
                                                
363 The translation is adapted from MacDowell 2009: 184. 
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The law of Timocrates, the object of Diodorus' accusation, is read out first at § 39-
40 before the orator begins a closer scrutiny of its provisions, and later its first section is 
repeated at § 71. The stichometric analysis shows that both of the documents, at least in 
part, were in the Urexemplar of the speech. No ancient papyri containing this section of 
the text are preserved, and only one clause of it is found in the scholia (24.68.152c 
Dilts), in relation to § 71, which only discusses the rhetoric of the passage. This 
confirms that the document was present in the text during antiquity. The stichometry 
shows that it was there from the beginning. Libanius also reports a version of the law in 
his hypothesis to the speech, mainly consistent with the documents, although shorter 
and with some rephrasing. 
The texts of the two documents reporting the law are consistent, except for the 
fact that the second has the name of the chairman of the proedroi, absent from the first. 
The second document however stops at ἢ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι. 
The law of Timocrates is discussed through the whole legal section of the Against 
Timocrates. After the law is read out at § 39-40 the orator shows that Timocrates failed 
to repeal contradictory laws as prescribed by the norms on nomothesia. At § 71 
Demosthenes wants the law to be read out again, but stops the grammateus half way 
through (ἐπίσχες: αὐτίκα γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀναγνώσει). He then discusses the 
provisions showing how and why they will be harmful to the city. Through the 
discussion of the provisions most of the law of Timocrates is actually quoted by 
Demosthenes, and the bulk of both documents' text is perfectly consistent with 
Demosthenes' quotations. The first sentence, present in both the documents (καὶ εἴ τινι 
τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ προστετίμηται κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατὰ ψήφισμα δεσμοῦ 
ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν προστιμηθῇ, εἶναι αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι 
τοῦ ὀφλήματος, οὓς ἂν ὁ δῆμος χειροτονήσῃ, ἦ μὴν ἐκτείσειν τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ 
ὦφλεν), is quoted word for word at § 79 of the speech, and parts of it are found at § 41, 
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44, 55, 64, 72, 73 (in a mock law used by Demosthenes to make fun of Timocrates' bill), 
77, 82, 83, 93 and 207. The next sentence (τοὺς δὲ προέδρους ἐπιχειροτονεῖν 
ἐπάναγκες, ὅταν τις καθιστάναι βούληται) is quoted word for word at § 84 and 
paraphrased, yet with very close wording, at § 55.  
The next one (τῷ δὲ καταστήσαντι τοὺς ἐγγυητάς, ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τῇ πόλει τὸ 
ἀργύριον ἐφ᾽ ᾧ κατέστησε τοὺς ἐγγυητάς, ἀφεῖσθαι τὸν δεσμὸν) is found mostly 
at § 86, and the expression ἀφεῖσθαι τὸν δεσμὸν is quoted or paraphrased at § 77, 93 
and 207. Some of the manuscripts (ScAF) give the genitive plural τῶν δεσμῶν, and 
Libanius' hypothesis has τοῦ δεσμοῦ, as we find at § 93 in Demosthenes' words. 
Libanius and some of the medieval copyists obviously found a genitive more 
appropriate here. This is because ἀφίημι with accusativum personae and genitivum rei 
means 'release from a thing' (LSJ s.v. II.1b). The expression would therefore mean 
'release from prison' with the plural 'τῶν δεσμῶν', and 'release from imprisonment' with 
the singular τοῦ δεσμοῦ. The expression with this meaning is ambiguous: 
Demosthenes makes it clear that the law of Timocrates did not release debtors from 
prison; it rather provided that, if they presented sureties of their debts, they were not to 
go to prison in the first place. At § 64 Demosthenes in fact contrasts the law of 
Timocrates with a previous law of his and clearly states: 'is it possible for a man to 
enact two more contradictory provisions than these: that convicted malefactors shall be 
kept in prison until they have paid their fines, and that these same malefactors may 
present sureties, and not be imprisoned?' (ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ἐναντιώτερά τις δύο 
θείη τοῦ δεδέσθαι, τέως ἂν ἐκτείσωσι, τοὺς ἁλόντας, καὶ τοῦ καθιστάναι τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐγγυητάς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δεῖν;). The genitive plural is therefore 
unacceptable, and the genitive singular used by Demosthenes himself at § 93 is slightly 
imprecise, or perhaps is used in a figurative sense; releasing from imprisonment means 
remitting the punishment of imprisonment. In fact, correct Attic Greek for 'remitting 
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somebody from a charge' or 'a punishment' is ἀφίημι with dativum personae and 
accusativum rei.364 This is the structure used by Demosthenes himself in his paraphrase 
of this very sentence at § 207: εἴ τινι προστετίμηται δεσμοῦ κἂν τὸ λοιπόν τινι 
προστιμήσητε, τοῦτον ἀφεῖσθαι. This is the structure we would expect in the actual 
law, since the person is expressed with the dativus τινι. To confirm that the document 
shows an appropriate structure it will suffice to quote an inscription presenting exactly 
the same structure: τοῖς δὲ ποιησαμέν[οι]ς συμμαχίαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίος καὶ τὸς 
συμ[μ]άχος ἀφεῖναι τὸν δῆμον τὰ ἐγκτήματα ὅποσ' ἂν τυγχάνηι ὄντα ἢ ἴδια ἢ 
[δ]ημόσια (IG II2 43 ll. 25-9). The document therefore presents here an appropriate 
structure, superior to Demosthenes' quotation at § 93. 
The next section of the document (ἐὰν δὲ μὴ καταβάλῃ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ 
οἱ ἐγγυηταὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας, τὸν μὲν ἐξεγγυηθέντα δεδέσθαι, τῶν δὲ 
ἐγγυητῶν δημοσίαν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν) is found with the same words in Demosthenes' 
quotation at § 87. The same happens for the sentence περὶ δὲ τῶν ὠνουμένων τὰ τέλη 
καὶ τῶν ἐγγυωμένων καὶ ἐκλεγόντων, καὶ τῶν τὰ μισθώσιμα μισθουμένων καὶ 
ἐγγυωμένων, found in slightly paraphrased versions at § 41 and 59. The expression 
τὰς πράξεις εἶναι τῇ πόλει κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους is found in a 
provision reported by Demosthenes at § 100, where he claims it should have been 
extended more widely to all the debtors, and not only to the purchasers of taxes (καὶ 
κατὰ τούτων εἶναι τὰς πράξεις κατὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους). It can also be 
noted that the expression ὑπάρχοντας νόμους is never found in inscriptions, whereas 
τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους as in the document is attested (cf. IG II2 98 ll. 9-10). 
The bulk of the document is therefore perfectly consistent with the orator's 
paraphrases, and when the document uses a different word from that found in the 
                                                
364 See [Dem.] 59.30 (ἀφιέναι οὖν αὐτῇ ἔφασαν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν χιλίας δραχμάς), Dem.21.79 (τὰς 
δίκας ὡς αὐτῶν οὔσας ἀφίεσαν τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ), Ar. Nub. 1426 (ὅσας δὲ πληγὰς εἴχομεν πρὶν τὸν 
νόμον τεθῆναι, ἀφίεμεν, καὶ δίδομεν αὐτοῖς προῖκα συγκεκόφθαι), Plb. 21.24.8 (μόνον ταύταις 
ἀφεῖσθαι τὸν φόρον). 
 167 
speech, the former is more consistent with documentary language than the latter. 
However, the section analyzed is preceded by a prescript and followed by a further 
provision. Neither of them is found in Demosthenes, and both present problems. 
The last provision, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας ὄφλῃ, τοῦ ὑστέρου 
ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης ἢ δεκάτης πρυτανείας ἐκτίνειν, does not make any sense 
as it stands. Ath.Pol. 47.3 and 54.2365 make it clear that the standard date for payments 
to the public treasure, although not the only one,366 was the ninth prytany. This 
document, in the section confirmed by the orator's account, gives the same date. The 
ninth prytany is confirmed also by Andoc. 1.73 and [Dem.] 59.7. We would expect that, 
if such a provision existed, it would have moved the deadline to the ninth prytany of the 
following year. No ancient source in fact mentions the tenth prytany, or the ninth and 
the tenth prytany together, as a deadline for payments and, in Wayte's words, 'the 
expression ἐνάτης ἢ δεκάτης is too vague for the language of a law'.367 Benseler and 
Wayte used this provision as evidence of the overall inauthenticity of the document.368  
The provision is obviously unacceptable as it stands, yet a very economical 
emendation of the text, proposed first by Westermann and later by Schöll,369 cannot be 
rejected out of hand. They simply moved ἢ δεκάτης from the second πρυτανείας to 
the first, obtaining a sensible provision which gave a fair amount of time for payment 
also to those who incurred debts at the end of the year. In the introduction I explained 
why it is dangerous to postulate corruptions in the text of Demosthenes when the 
paradosis is consistent. Since a medieval archetype never existed, such corruptions 
must have happened at a very early stage of transmission, before the corpus (or the 
                                                
365 The second passage with a slightly different wording: πρὸ τῆς θ' πρυτανείας. Cf. MacDowell 1962: 
110 and Rhodes 1981: 599. 
366 Harrison 1971: 173-175 and Rhodes 1972: 150 note that not all the payments were due in the ninth 
prytany; some were due every prytany, and some every three months. However, the standard date for 
most of the payments was the ninth prytany. See Hunter 2000: 26-7. 
367 Wayte 1882: 121. 
368 Benseler 1861: 217; Wayte 1882: 121. 
369 Westermann 1850: 57; Schöll 1886: 132 n. 1. 
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document, when it has been inserted later) spread around the ancient world. This 
militates against explaining massive inconsistencies between a document and the 
orator's account as corruptions that occurred in the document during the transmission of 
the text of Demosthenes. Instead they are likely to have been there from the beginning. 
In this case however the document appeared already in the Urexemplar, and such a 
small corruption (a numeral copied from the wrong line, between two expressions 
which are otherwise exactly the same) could easily have occurred even in the very first 
copies of the speech. Or it might be an original mistake of the editor, the small size of 
which cannot jeopardize the reliability of the document as a whole. 
Another problem is found in the prescript of the document. This section, as it 
appears at § 39, is vulnerable to the same objecions as the prescript of the decree of 
Epicrates at § 27: the formula is not unattested, and no epigraphical evidence speaks 
against the fact that Pandionis was the first tribe in prytany in the year in which the law 
was passed. However, no inscription confirms this either, and the prescipt lacks too 
many features to be a complete one. It can either have been forged like (or together 
with) that at § 27, or be an extract of the original prescript, and therefore the source of 
that at § 27.  The reason for such an extract, focusing only on the date of the law, would 
be connected with Demosthenes' argument. He has claimed at § 24-6 that Timocrates 
has not respected the times prescribed in the legislation on nomothesia, and has enacted 
his law the day after the preliminary vote in the Assembly. The date of the law is 
therefore good evidence, whereas other features are not important in this context.370 This 
would provide an acceptable rationale for mentioning only the date, in the case of both 
the orator himself and the editor of the Urexemplar. On the other hand, no other 
document present in the Urexemplar, neither of Dem. 23 nor of Dem. 24, has any 
prescript, and Dem. 24 shows two different stages of tradition: some documents were in 
                                                
370 See above pp. 129-30. 
 169 
the Urexemplar and some were added later. It is not impossible that clauses and further 
specifications were added to the older documents when the newer were eventually 
inserted. 
The situation here is further complicated by the version of the prescript quoted at 
§ 71. There the name of the chairman of the proedroi is added: τῶν προέδρων 
ἐπεψήφισεν Ἀριστοκλῆς Μυρρινούσιος. The demotic however cannot be accepted. 
Myrrhinous is part of the tribe Pandionis, and therefore Aristocles was one of the 
current prytaneis; he could not be chairman of the proedroi of the Council at the same 
time.371 This has been regarded by Westermann, and more recently by Mossé, as the 
main reason to reject the document's authenticity.372 The question has however been 
reopened by Rhodes and MacDowell373 who brought IG II2 222 ll. 49-50 as evidence 
that the proedroi of the nomothetai are not the same as those of the Council and of the 
Assembly, and therefore the rule against the tribe in prytany did not apply to them. The 
inscription has in fact: οἱ [πρ]όεδροι καὶ [ὁ ἐπιστά]της τῶν νομοθετῶν. Hansen has 
subsequently accepted this reconstruction and claimed: 'The only reason, however, for 
suspecting the law quoted is precisely that the proedros is one of the prytaneis. This is 
to beg the question, and so I now accept the quotation of Timokrates' law as genuine'.374 
Hansen himself however in a previous article provided plenty of reasons to reject this 
reconstruction.375 Although he has later retracted his view on this point, I believe that 
his original treatment of the question was basically correct, and we cannot single out 
specific proedroi of the nomothetai. 
                                                
371 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 25-8. 
372 Westermann 1850: 55-6; Mossé 2004: 97. 
373 Rhodes 1972: 28; MacDowell 1975: 63. Before them nobody doubted that the proedroi presiding over 
the nomothetai were the same body as those presiding over the Council and the Assembly. See 
Westermann 1950: 55; Schöll 1886: 132 n. 1; Drerup 1898: 255-6; Kahrstedt 1938: 3; Atkinson 1939: 
125. 
374 Hansen 1979-80: 103 n. 17. 
375 Hansen 1978a. 
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I will now summarise his points, to show that there are good reasons to reject the 
proedroi of the nomothetai. First, in all the laws and decrees referring to the nomothetai 
the proedroi are always called simply proedroi, with no further specification.376 Second, 
the first part of IG II2 222 is damaged. Hansen assumes for the sake of argument that the 
decree is probouleumatic. In the damaged section we would in that case expect a 
formula like ἐψηφίσθαι τῆι βουλῆι τοὺς προέδρους οἳ ἂν λάχωσι προεδρεύειν ἐν 
τῶι δήμωι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν.377 The decree then prescribes honours for 
Peisitheides of Delos, among which there is a pension to be paid monthly to him. The 
approval of such a pension must be referred to the nomothetai by the proedroi of the 
relevant day (ll. 4-6 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νομοθέται[ς] τ[οὺς προέδρ]ους οἳ ἂν προεδρεύωσιν 
[καὶ τὸν ἐ]π[ισ]τάτην προσνομοθετῆ[σαι τὸ ἀρ]γύριον τ[ο]ῦτο μερίζειν τ[οὺς 
ἀποδ]έκτας τῶι ταμίαι τοῦ δήμ[ου εἰς τὸ]ν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον).378 At ll. 48-52 the 
decree prescibes a punishment in case the proedroi fail to present the bill. Which 
proedroi? The ones presiding in the Assembly (τοὺς προέδρους οἳ ἂν λάχωσι 
προεδρεύειν ἐν τῶι δήμωι) on day X or the ones presiding over the nomothetai (ἐν δὲ 
τοῖς νομοθέται[ς] τ[οὺς προέδρ]ους οἳ ἂν προεδρεύωσιν) on day Y, presumably a 
few days later? The secretary drafting the decree probably wrote οἱ [πρ]όεδροι καὶ [ὁ 
ἐπιστά]της τῶν νομοθετῶν to make clear that the punishment was intended for the 
proedroi of day Y. Hansen shows with this argument that the inscription is not 
necessarily evidence of separate proedroi. He then provides more circumstancial 
evidence for the identification. The agenda for the nomothetai, as that for the Assembly, 
was drafted by the prytaneis.379 Moreover the secretary of the Council was in charge of 
publishing not only decrees, but also laws, and had therefore to be present at the 
                                                
376 For the references see above pp. 121-2 and n. 181. 
377 Rhodes 1972: 65. 
378 According to the procedure described above pp. 153-4. 
379 See Aeschin. 3.39 and above p. 125. 
 171 
sessions of the nomothetai.380 This evidence shows in my opinion that the proedroi of 
the nomothetai were none other than the proedroi of the Council and of the Assembly. 
This leaves us with the problem of Aristocles’ demotic. The possibilities are: the 
demotic is wrong; the name of the tribe is wrong; they are both wrong and forged. If we 
accept this last possibility, the consequence is that at least part of the document has been 
invented. This would be the only case among the documents already in the Urexemplar 
in which a piece of information seems to have been completely made up. However, as I 
noted before, since the speech was tampered with at a later stage of transmission, it is 
not impossible that someone added the prescript to a document already present from the 
beginning. The error would not therefore affect the reliability of the rest of the 
stichometric documents. The fact that τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν Ἀριστοκλῆς 
Μυρρινούσιος appears only in the second quotation of the law at § 71 but not at § 39 
might also suggest that only this formula was inserted later, while the date itself was 
there from the beginning. Still, we have no way to test this against the epigraphical 
evidence. A further possibility, proposed first by Meier and endorsed by Schöll, Drerup 
and Lewis,381 is to envisage a corruption in the demotic, presumably due to a misreading 
of an abbreviation: Μυρρινούσιος would be a misreading of the abbreviation for ἐγ 
Μυρρινούττης. The same considerations as for the last clause of the document are 
valid here. The corruption is a small one, even more so if we postulate an abbreviation, 
and this possibility cannot be rejected out of hand.  
To sum up, the bulk of the document is consistent with the orator's account and 
with contemporary inscriptions. Its features are very similar to those of the other 
documents of the Urexemplar and its wording seems reliable. However, the prescript 
and the last provision present problems. Both problems can be explained as minor 
                                                
380 IG II2 140 l. 31; SEG 12.87 ll. 23-4; SEG 26.72 ll. 47-8. 
381 Schöll 1886: 132 n. 1; Drerup 1898: 255-6; Lewis 1954: 32; Piérart 2000: 132. Cf. also Westermann 
1950: 55. 
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corruptions and solved by minor emendations. This option leads however to no more 
than well-grounded guesswork. It is as likely that all or part of these sections have been 
forged. But even in that case, the variable nature and dating of the documents of this 
speech mean that the invented details cannot necessarily be attributed to the 
Urexemplar, and the features of the other stichometric documents, as well as those of 
the central section of the present one, advise against it. The most likely hypotheses are 
either that the prescript and the last provision are slightly corrupted, and they have been 
so from the very earliest stages of transmission, or that all or part of them was added 
much later together with the forged documents in the speech. Nothing more than this 
can be confidently drawn from this analysis. 
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4.4 Dem. 24.42: Diocles' law 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
Διοκλῆς εἶπεν: τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ 
ὅσοι ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἐτέθησαν καὶ εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι, κυρίους εἶναι. τοὺς 
δὲ μετ᾽ Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τιθεμένους κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἴ τῳ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ 
ἄρχειν. ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς 
τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων, προσγραφέτω 
παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη. 
 
Diocles said: the laws enacted before the archonship of Eucleides under the 
democracy and those that were enacted in the achonship of Eucleides and have been 
written up shall be in force. Those enacted after the archonship of Eucleides and 
enacted henceforth shall be in effect from the day in which each was enacted, except 
in case the time from which one must be in effect is specified. The secretary shall 
add this provision to the laws now in effect within thirty days; henceforth, whoever 
happens to be the secretary, shall immediately add that the law is in effect from the 
day in which it was enacted. 
 
This document, as the stichometry has shown, was definitely part of the 
Urexemplar of the speech. The context of the quotation and the content of the law are 
clear: Demosthenes has just asked the clerk to read out in full the law of Timocrates (§ 
39-40). He anticipates at § 41 that the clauses of the law most vulnerable to criticism are 
the ones providing that the statute must apply to past as well as future cases, and the one 
providing that this law must not apply to tax-farmers and lessees. This second clause 
allegedly contrasts with the prohibition on passing laws ad hominem (§ 59), and will be 
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discussed below. The first clause is instead immediately discussed: Demosthenes (§ 43) 
explains that, since the statute just read out by the clerk (§ 42) asserts that laws are to be 
valid from the day they were passed, the law of Timocrates must be invalid, as it states 
that its provisions must apply also to previous actions. Then, the orator discusses a 
particular provision of the law just read out granting that, in case a law explicitly 
expresses from what date it must apply, this date must be respected. Demosthenes 
discusses this particular provision to make it clear that it does not allow Timocrates to 
extend the range of application of his law to the past. In fact, Demosthenes claims, the 
exception is aimed at respecting specifications like 'this law is to be valid from the year 
of the archon after the present one.' After making clear the intent of the legislator, 
Demosthenes carries on and notes (§ 44) that the law of Timocrates refers to the past 
generically, without providing any starting date for its application. 
It is clear from this brief summary that the orator's account confirms only the 
central section of the document we read at § 42. The speech (§ 43) informs us that the 
law κελεύει γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἡμέρας ἐτέθη κύριον εἶναι, πλὴν εἴ τῳ χρόνος 
προσγέγραπται, τούτῳ δὲ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἄρχειν. At § 44 it is repeated that the 
law κελεύει τὸν γεγραμμένον χρόνον ἢ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἂν τεθῇ κυρίαν εἶναι. 
These paraphrases are consistent with the contents of the document and, for the most 
part, with its wording. The slight differences do not pose a problem, since no form in 
this section of the document is unattested in contemporary Athenian inscriptions.382 
The additional pieces of information provided by the document must be analysed 
on their own merits. The first part of the document prescribes different rules for laws 
enacted at different times. The first sentence concerns the laws enacted before the 
archonship of Eucleides: they must be valid, on the condition that they were passed 
                                                
382 The expression ὅντινα δεῖ ἄρχειν is clear in meaning and perfectly Attic in form. It is obvious that 
the word to be understood in connection with ὅντινα is χρόνον. Cf. Wayte 1882: 123, following Jurinus, 
Dobree, Dindorf and Benseler. Contra Schäfer 1827: 198 who supplies ἄρχοντα, overcomplicating the 
sentence. 
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under democracy. The wording of this sentence does not present any suspicious feature: 
the word δημοκρατία is rare in Athenian inscriptions, but the decree of Theozotides383 
attests its official use right after the restoration of democracy in 403/2, possibly 
earlier,384 and the law of Eucrates of 337/6 BCE (Agora 16.73), closely resembling the 
wording of the laws concerned with tyranny mentioned in Andodoc. 1.95 (as a Solonian 
law), Dem. 20.159 and Lyc. 1.124-7 (as a decree of Demophantus), confirms that its 
presence is appropriate.385  
The contents on the other hand seem to clash with information found in other 
ancient sources, mainly in Andoc. 1.82-89. It is therefore necessary to provide here an 
accurate discussion of Andocides' argument in order to find out whether our document 
really contradicts some of the provisions listed there. Andocides argues at length that 
the laws passed before the archonship of Eucleides are no longer valid. This would 
serve his purpose in demonstrating that he is no longer liable to the provisions of a 
decree of Isotimides, stating that those who have committed impiety and have confessed 
cannot enter the temples (§ 71). He mentions (§ 82) that after the restoration of 
democracy the Assembly ordered a revision of the laws of Draco and Solon. The laws 
approved had to be inscribed in the Stoa Basileios.386 Then he claims (§ 85-6) that after 
the laws were inscribed (ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγράφησαν) the Athenians passed a further statute 
ordering that ἀγράφῳ δὲ νόμῳ τὰς ἀρχὰς μὴ χρῆσθαι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνός. What he is 
trying to argue is that ἄγραφος in this case was contrasted to ἀναγεγραμμένος, and 
therefore after the archonship of Eucleides a magistrate could bring a case to trial only 
κατὰ τοὺς ἀναγεγραμμένους νόμους, that is according to the laws revised, approved 
                                                
383 Stroud 1971: 281 l. 6. 
384 I am informed by P. J. Rhodes, whom I thank, that a forthcoming article by Matthaiou pre-dates this 
text to 410 or soon afterwards. 
385 For a discussion of these texts cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). For the word δημοκρατία cf. 
Sealey 1973. 
386 See Droysen 1873: 37; MacDowell 1962: 121; Ostwald 1986: 513, n. 60, 519. Robertson 1990: 46-52 
proposes the courtyard of the Prytaneion, but see Rhodes 1991: 99.  
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and inscribed in the Stoa Basileios.387 Many modern scholars have endorsed this 
interpretation.388 Now, if Andocides' interpretation of this statute is right, the first 
provision of the law of Diocles is inconsistent with it.389 This interpretation is however 
very problematic: Andocides himself mentions at § 116 a statute inscribed in the 
Eleusinium, and considers it valid. Moreover, as Clinton has rightly pointed out,390 the 
adjective ἄγραφος is more likely to be contrasted with γεγραμμένος than with 
ἀναγεγραμμένος. Unwritten laws are contrasted with generically written ones, not 
necessarily with re-inscribed ones.391 This statute, far from contradicting the document 
we are here concerned with, is very likely to have been overinterpreted by Andocides in 
order to make his case stronger.392 If the interpretation that he proposes were right, and 
the decree of Isotimides had not been inscribed in the Stoa Basileios, then there would 
be no case: this law would have been enough to grant him acquittal.393 Yet he feels the 
need to carry on discussing other statutes. 
One of these is mentioned by Andocides at § 88. It states that τοῖς δὲ νόμοις 
χρῆσθαι ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος, and seems, again, to contradict the first provision 
of our document: it is implied, but not clearly stated, by Andocides here, at § 89 and 
                                                
387 Andocides gives this same interpretation at § 89. 
388 Harrison 1955: 33; MacDowell 1962: 126-7; Ostwald 1973: 91-2; Sealey 1987: 37; Rhodes 1991: 97; 
Sickinger 1999: 100.  
389 The scholars just mentioned seem to overlook the consequences of Andocides’ interpretation, with the 
exception of Rhodes 1991: 90-1, who tries to account for the contradiction by noting that 'Athenian laws 
were not always impeccably drafted.' 
390 Clinton 1982: 34. 
391 Without claiming with Joyce 2008: 517 n. 47 that the unwritten laws are here the customary rules 
mentioned by Pericles in Thuc. 2.37.3, it is better to understand 'unwritten laws' simply as laws not 
passed by the Athenians, and therefore not recorded, or repealed, and thus not recorded anymore. 
392 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
393 MacDowell 1962: 202-3 argues that the decree of Isotimides, being a decree and not a law, was not 
affected by this statute, and therefore Andocides would here be trying to make a case for interpreting 
regulations relative to laws as applying also to decrees. The distinction between laws and decrees had not 
yet been implemented in 415. According to the words Andocides uses to describe the decree of 
Isotimides, its text prescribed that εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν τοὺς ἀσεβήσαντας καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας. This 
seems to me to be a general rule, applying forever and not for a short time: exactly the sort of rule the 
Athenians in the fourth century would call a law. Therefore there is no point in claiming that the laws 
quoted by Andocides at § 85-9 did not apply to this statute since it was not a law. Either the statute 
declaring unwritten laws invalid refers to all the laws not inscribed in the Stoa Basileios, and therefore the 
decree of Isotimides is no longer valid, or it does not, and the decree of Isotimides is still valid. 
Andocides piles up provisions each one of which, if interpreted as he proposes, would be enough to grant 
him acquittal. 
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again at § 93 and 99, that the meaning of the provision is that only the laws passed after 
the archonship of Eucleides must be employed. However, at § 89, when Andocides 
states that no decree passed before 403/2 is valid, he is discussing the effect of all the 
laws previously quoted, and not just of this one. If, because of this single law, no statute 
passed before 403/2 was valid, then there would again be no case, and no need to quote 
any other law. In fact the Greek, if read literally, has a different meaning: 'the laws are 
to be followed from the archonship of Eucleides.'394 That is, crimes committed against 
the laws before the archonship of Eucleides can no longer be brought to trial.395 This 
interpretation makes perfect sense in the context of the other provisions usually 
mentioned together with this one. These provisions state that judgements and 
arbitrations already given under democracy must be valid, but the acts of the Thirty 
must not.396 The law as a whole was clearly concerned with stating which offences 
could still be brought to court after the restoration of democracy. It had nothing to do 
with the validity of laws in general. Again, a closer look shows that this law does not 
contradict the first section of the document at Dem. 24.42. The very effort made by 
Andocides to prove his case, and the fact that such a case was brought to trial, is 
evidence that rules explicitly contradictory to this provision did not in fact exist, and 
make the existence of the provision we find in our document very likely.397 
The first section of the document also deals with laws passed and 'posted' in the 
archonship of Eucleides, stating that they are to be valid. This provision again does not 
conflict with any other account, and is confirmed in some of its details by other sources, 
both epigraphic and literary. Hansen has proposed interpreting the specification 
                                                
394 Cf. MacDowell 1962: 128-9. 
395 Such a rule is clearly alluded to in Aeschin. 1.39. 
396 Cf. below for a discussion of these provisions. 
397 This is not the place to discuss the implications of this document for the reconstruction of the alleged 
'recodification' of the end of 5th century. Clinton 1982 denies that such a recodification encompassed more 
than the laws of Draco and Solon, whereas Hansen 1990 claims that a complete re-codification happened, 
but the anagrapheis proceded to destroy all the steles which were no longer to be valid, and thus the code 
consisted of the laws in the Stoa Basileios and of all the steles, wherever they were standing, which 
survived the action of the anagrapheis. 
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ἀναγεγραμμένοι as referring not to the general act of inscribing a text,398 as in many 
Athenian inscriptions,399 but to the activity of the anagrapheis attested by the speech 
Against Nicomachus of Lysias (30) and by Andoc. 1.82 ff. The prescript of the 
reinscribed version of the law of Draco on homicide, IG I3 104 ll. 1-10, makes clear that 
the activity of the anagrapheis was recorded on the relevant inscriptions. Declaring 
valid the laws ἀναγεγραμμένους in this context means referring explicitly to the 
republication of the laws of Draco and Solon mentioned in Andoc. 1.81-2, 85, 89 for 
403/2. IG I3 104 also confirms that after the restoration of democracy a number of laws 
were so defined. To understand the rationale behind this provision it is important to 
remember that the laws of Draco and Solon revised and inscribed in 403/2 were not new 
measures. Therefore, the lawgiver could not include them in the category of the laws 
passed after the restoration of democracy, which had to be valid from the day on which 
they had been passed. These laws had already been valid for a long time, and their 
confirmation by the anagrapheis simply stated that they were allowed to continue being 
valid. Thus, this provision seems justified by its context, and confirmed in one of its 
details by an inscription. To sum up, given the position of the archonship of Eucleides 
as an institutional watershed, the precise definition, some time after the restoration of 
democracy, of the validity of all the different measures passed in different regimes and 
in different ways seems particularly appropriate, and no feature speaks against its 
authenticity. 
After the next section of the document, consistent with the orator's account, 
stating that laws passed after the archonship of Eucleides are to be valid from the day on 
which they were passed, except if differently stated in their text, we read ἐπιγράψαι δὲ 
τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ 
                                                
398 Hansen 1990: 64-5. 
399 E.g. IG II2 27 ll. 9-10 ἀναγράψαι αὐτὸν ἐστήληι λιθίνηι. 
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λοιπόν, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον 
κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη. The wording of this provision seems 
distinctively Attic. ἐπιγράφειν is the appropriate verb for 'adding' or 'appending' 
something to an existing document, and is widely used in Athenian inscriptions.400 The 
role implied for the secretary of the Council, namely dealing with (and publishing) laws 
and decrees, is confirmed by many epigraphic sources, and the reference to the secretary 
of the Council instead of the γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν is particularly accurate, 
since by 363/2 the system had changed, and the new γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν 
dealing with laws and decrees was no longer a member of the Council.401 The 
requirement that the secretary of the Council add to the existing laws the time 
specification within thirty days is not problematic. The requirement to perform a task in 
a fixed number of days is often found in Athenian official practice,402 and a requirement 
of thirty days is not unparalleled: the logistai had thirty days to present the financial 
accounts of all the magistrates dealing with public money in front of a lawcourt over 
which they themselves presided;403 all the archai had to submit themselves to 
dokimasiai if they stayed in charge more than thirty days;404 in IG I3 46 ll. 33-4 a 
provision orders the colonists to leave Athens within thirty days. τὸ λοιπόν is the 
normal expression found in inscriptions to mean 'henceforth'.405 The expression ὃς ἂν 
τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων is again not unparalleled: the most widely attested Attic way 
of expressing this concept is ἀεὶ with the participle,406 but we often find also the relative 
with ἂν, a form of τυγχάνω and the participle.407 Finally, the word παραχρῆμα to 
                                                
400 Cf. e.g. IG I3 76 ll. 28-9 ἐπι[γράφσ]αντες ἐν ταῖ[ς στέλαις το̑ν ἀρχόν]τον τὰ ὀνόμα[τα... 
401 Cf. for full discussion of the sources Rhodes 1972: 134-8. 
402 Cf. e.g. IG I3 45 ll. 7-14; IG I3 40 ll. 12-4; IG I3 64 ll. 6-7; IG I3 85 ll. 7-12; IG I3 93 l. 15; IG I3 105 ll. 
38-9, 51. See in general Sickinger 1999: 88, 225 n.130. 
403 [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 54.2. Harp. s.v. λογισταί. 
404 Aeschin. 3.14 
405 Cf. Harris 2006: 425-7 for full discussion and examples of the expression. 
406 Cf. e.g. IG II2 226 ll. 9-10 καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ἀεὶ στρατηγοῦντας. 
407 Cf. e.g. IG II2 106 ll. 8-9 οἳ ἂν [τ]υγχά[νωσι προεδρ]υέοντες, and IG I3 71 l. 27; IG II2 128 ll. 10-1; 
IG II2 145 ll. 17-8; IG II2 152 ll. 13-4; IG II2 172 ll. 11-2; IG II2 188 ll. 2-3; IG II2 192 ll. 5-6; IG II2 553 
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require immediate action is not unattested in Athenian inscriptions.408 One could object 
to this provision that not all fourth-century laws preserved on stone include the 
implementation date. However, as Sickinger has shown, there is plenty of evidence for 
implementation dates on archival copies of official documents from the fifth century,409 
and it is very likely that this provision refers to an obligation to add implementation 
dates on all the archival copies of new laws.410 
To sum up, there are no discrepancies between this document and the following 
account by the orator. Where the document provides additional information, this does 
not conflict with any other ancient source. The details can often be confirmed by other 
sources, both literary and epigraphic. The language is appropriate for a late fifth-century 
Athenian law, both grammatically and in the specific, almost formulaic, expressions 
employed. There is therefore no reason to suspect its authenticity.411 This text, like 
many of the documents that were present in the Urexemplar, is evidence of careful 
editing at that stage of transmission, and must be considered reliable. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
ll. 16-7; Agora 16.52 ll. 17-8; Agora 16.52 ll. 10-11; SEG 16.52 ll. 7-8; SEG 32.50 ll. 10-1; SEG 34.72 fr. 
b1 l. 2. 
408 Cf. Threatte 1996: 410 n. 12. 
409 Sickinger 1999: 83-91. 
410 Cf. Sickinger 1999: 117, 150. 
411 Pace Wayte 1882: 122. 
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4.5 Dem. 24.45: adeia for atimoi and debtors412 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
μηδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων, ὅπως χρὴ ἐπιτίμους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, μηδὲ περὶ τῶν 
ὀφειλόντων τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων περὶ ἀφέσεως τοῦ 
ὀφλήματος ἢ τάξεως, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων τὴν ἄδειαν πρῶτον μὴ 
ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων, οἷς ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις. τότε δ᾽ ἐξεῖναι 
χρηματίζειν καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ. 
 
δημοσίῳ S F: δήμῳ Sγρ. A Pγρ. | τῷ AF : τῶν S Y P | ψηφισαμένοις P super lineam 
 
... neither about disfranchised citizens, that they need to be re-enfranchised, nor about 
debtors to the gods or to the public treasury of the Athenians, on the remission or 
composition of the debt, if permission is not granted by no less than 6000 Athenians, 
who so resolve voting by secret ballot. Then it shall be permitted to deliberate 
according to what the Council and the Assembly have resolved. 
 
This document must have been part of the Urexemplar of the speech, since its 
absence would make the stichometry of this section unacceptable. The presence of at 
least two quotations from it in the Schol. ad loc. (ἐπιτίμους; περὶ ἀφέσεως τοῦ 
ὀφλήματος ἢ τάξεως) provides another glimpse of the diffusion of this document in 
ancient editions: this document is not only present in all the preserved medieval 
manuscripts, but was present also in the edition used by the scholiast, or by the 
commentator whose work has been excerpted in the scholia. A section of this document 
is also quoted in Andocides' On the Mysteries (§ 77), but that document is a forgery, 
                                                
412 This is not the place to discuss the meaning of the word adeia, its various uses, and the legal 
implications of this norm. For general discussion cf. McElwee 1975, Miller 2007: 307-9. 
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and the relevant part was probably created on the basis of this speech. The speech of 
Andocides cannot therefore be used as a parallel.413 
The contents of the document correspond closely to the following discussion by 
the orator. Demosthenes in his paraphrase states that the law does not allow anyone to 
speak or any official to bring to discussion the situation of the atimoi, nor of the debtors, 
to consider remitting or composing414 their debts, unless they have been given 
permission by six thousand Athenians voting by secret ballot (ἄλλος οὗτος νόμος, 
οὐκ ἐῶν περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων οὐδὲ τῶν ὀφειλόντων λέγειν οὐδὲ χρηματίζειν περὶ 
ἀφέσεως τῶν ὀφλημάτων οὐδὲ τάξεως, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης 
μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων ψηφισαμένων). According to the orator, Timocrates, 
disregarding this law, has pardoned those who have been sentenced to prison, providing 
that they present sureties, without any preliminary vote by the Assembly. Moreover, the 
law provides that even if the Assembly gives the permission, no Athenian is allowed to 
act as he wishes on these matters, but has to proceed in accordance with the 
deliberations of the Council and the Assembly (καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος, οὐδ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τὴν 
ἄδειαν εὕρηταί τις, ἔδωκεν ὡς ἂν βούληται πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ 
τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ). Timocrates has not followed any of these provisions, but passed his 
law when the Council could not be summoned because of the Sacred Month. The orator 
then sums up Timocrates' infractions: he should have first asked the Council to schedule 
the discussion of the issue of adeia in the next Assembly, then he should have 
convinced the Assembly to grant him adeia and only later should he have proceeded to 
legislate according to the rules of nomothesia (πρῶτον μὲν πρόσοδον γράψασθαι 
                                                
413 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
414 The meaning of τάξις in this context seems unparalleled in the ancient sources. However, the word is 
used in the same way in the document and in the orator's account. Its presence therefore should not worry 
us. Schol.Dem. ad § 45 provides a reasonable explanation for this usage: παρακαλέσαι τὸν δῆμον μὴ 
περὶ παντελοῦς ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ χρέους, ἀλλὰ περὶ μέρους, ἵνα μέρος μὲν καταβάλῃ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο 
μέρος συγχωρηθῇ. ἄφεσις involves complete cancellation of debts, whereas τάξις is an arrangement to 
pay only a part of it. Cf. Wayte 1882: 127 and Pecorella Longo 2004: 85 n. 2. 
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πρὸς τὴν βουλήν, εἶτα τῷ δήμῳ διαλεχθῆναι, κᾆθ᾽ οὕτως, εἰ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις 
ἐδόκει, γράφειν καὶ νομοθετεῖν περὶ τούτων...). MacDowell has rightly noted that 
the orator's argument is questionable. The speaker claims that Timocrates has granted 
ἄφεσις to the debtors providing that they present sureties, which the law explicitly 
prohibits, yet the law, in the orator's words, discusses ἄφεσις τῶν ὀφλημάτων, not 
from prison, and the debtors, although they avoid prison, do not cease to be debtors as a 
result of Timocrates' law.415 Thus, the fact that Demosthenes' summary allows us to 
refute his own argument guarantees that here he is not loosely paraphrasing. Instead he 
is likely to be following closely the words of the law. 
The wording of the document is strikingly similar to the paraphrase of the orator. 
Since the orator, as we have seen, is likely to keep close to the wording of the law, this 
close similarity does not in itself betray forgery. The document could on the other hand 
have been reconstructed from the context. To assess its reliability it is therefore 
necessary to examine the differences between the document and the following 
summary. The speech does not provide any detail that is missing in the document. I will 
here concentrate on the wording of the document, in the sections in which it closely 
resembles the paraphrase, in order to analyze the few slight differences between the 
two, and in the additional details provided by the document. 
First, it must be noted that the document cannot, as it stands, report the complete 
text of the law: its text in fact starts ex abrupto with μηδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων, and 
continues listing the second category of people about whom it is not possible to 
deliberate; it then states the exception, namely the grant of adeia by the Assembly. The 
main verb is missing. The following paraphrase has χρηματίζειν, which is likely to be 
the right verb here. This verb is often used with the meaning 'to bring to discussion', 
said of officials, with a legal connotation, in the literary sources (e.g. Dem. 24.55; Ar. 
                                                
415 MacDowell 2009: 188. 
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Th. 377; Arist. Pol. 1298b29; Rh. 1359b3), and this usage is confirmed by many 
Athenian inscriptions from the classical period (e.g. IG I3 71 ll. 18, 20, 29, 35; 89 l. 21; 
138 l. 18; 254 l. 39; IG II2 1 l. 50; 103 l. 16).416 The paraphrase has also the verb λέγειν, 
which is used for 'giving speeches' and 'discuss'. Whatever the right verb here, its 
absence alone cannot provide grounds against the authenticity of the document. The 
provision is still comprehensible, and the hypothesis of an oversight made by an 
otherwise careful editor is in itself as likely as that of careless forgery.  
In the first sentence the mention of both the atimoi and the debtors could appear 
redundant, since the debtors were a subcategory of the atimoi. One could therefore 
argue that such a repetition is appropriate, as an explanation, in the paraphrase of the 
orator but not in the law itself. However, the distinction is found not only here, but is 
often repeated in legal contexts in other fourth-century sources.417 The fact that the 
expression is found in this form in different ancient places points to the hypothesis of a 
close paraphrase. Moreover, if the provision is carefully analyzed, the expression is not 
otiose. Obviously the mention of the two categories separately does not mean that the 
debtors were not atimoi. The distinction rather concerns how the rights could be 
recovered.418 Atimoi had lost their rights for good (καθάπαξ in Dem. 21.32, 87). The 
Assembly was therefore required to restore their status altogether. Debtors on the other 
hand recovered their rights as soon as they no longer owed anything to the state. Thus, a 
request to the assembly on their behalf would not be explicitly concerned with making 
them epitimoi, but rather with cancelling their debts. They would be restored in their 
rights as a result of the cancellation of their debts. Consequently, although the result of 
proposals dealing with atimoi and debtors was the same, the proposals themselves were 
likely to be very different. If the law had mentioned only the atimoi, a viable line of 
                                                
416 A search in the PHI database of Greek inscriptions yields 303 results. 
417 Dem. 25.30; 58.45; Plat. Pol. 555d; [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 63.3; Hyp. fr.33. Cf. also Schol.Dem. 20.156 
Dilts.  
418 See Hansen 1976: 67-8 n. 3 and Hansen 1981a: 350-1. 
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argument for debtors would have been that their proposals did not mention explicitly 
their status of atimoi, nor did they explicitly require in their bills to be reinstated in their 
civic rights, and therefore they did not need any adeia. By clearly stating the distinction, 
the legislator in this case avoided any confusion about the actual range of application of 
the norm: adeia was necessary for restoration of civil rights in all cases, whether the 
restoration was explicit or indirect. If this interpretation is correct, then it is easy to see 
that the additional clause ὅπως χρὴ ἐπιτίμους αὐτοὺς εἶναι in the document is 
perfectly appropriate, as it states clearly what cannot be discussed in the Assembly in 
regard to atimoi, right before a further clause stating what cannot be discussed in regard 
to debtors. 
The next discrepancy with the paraphrase encountered in the document is the 
specification τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων in connection with the 
debtors.419 This specification however is not problematic. The orators often refer to 
ὀφείλοντες τῷ δημοσίῳ (Andoc. 1.73; Isoc. 12.10; Dem. 22.33; 24.123; 58.45; 59.5; 
cf. also Ath.Pol. 63.3), but the complete formula τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων is never 
found in literary sources.420 It is found instead in one Athenian inscription, Agora 19 = 
Poletai P26 ll. 1-2.421 Inscriptions moreover often record the names of debtors of the 
treasury of a specific god (e.g. IG I3 10 ll. 21-2; IG I3 153 ll. 17-8; IG II2 1237 ll. 90-2; 
IG II2 1194 ll. 15-7; IG II2 1361 ll. 8, 13-4, 15; Agora 16.36[1] ll. 36-8) and debts τοῖς 
θεοῖς in general (IG I3 32 ll. 15-6; IG I3 52 ll. a1-2, 8, b23). The two specifications are 
never found together in inscriptions, but this is not surprising: inscriptions record single 
debtors owing sums of money, and these sums must be due to a specific treasury. The 
expressions τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων would be nonsense there. To 
                                                
419 On the status of public debtors cf. Hansen 1976: 67-72; 84-8; 92-8 and Hunter 2000: 21-5. 
420 Thuc. 5.18.7 is not a literary parallel, since the expression recurs in the quotation of the text of the 
Peace of Nicias: not in literary prose, but in an official text. Moreover the expression there refers to 
Athenian prisons, not to the Athenian treasury. 
421 The simple formula ὀφείλοντες τῷ δημοσίῳ occurs in inscriptions. Cf. e.g. IG I3 59 fr. e l. 47 for the 
5th century and Agora 19 = Poletai P26 fr. b col. 4 ll. 469, 504, 527-8.  
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confirm that the mention of the two categories of debtors together in official documents 
is not problematic, it will suffice to quote the paraphrase of a law at Dem. 58.14: 
ἕτερον δὲ τρίτον, ὃς ὁμοίως κελεύει κατά τε τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ τὰς 
ἐνδείξεις τὸν βουλόμενον ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἐάν τις ὀφείλῃ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἢ 
τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ἢ τῶν ἐπωνύμων τῳ ('There is a third law also, which enacts that 
any one of the citizens who pleases may lodge criminal information against those who 
owe money to the treasury, or if any man is indebted to Athena or to any one of the rest 
of the gods, or to the eponymous heroes'). The following paragraph, after the actual 
reading of the law, asks the judges to pay attention to the words ἢ τῶν ἐπωνύμων τῳ, 
confirming that the paraphrase was very close. Therefore, although our document here 
provides a detail absent from the paraphrase of the orator, the additional expression is 
confirmed by legal quotations in the orators and by epigraphical evidence. 
The regulations for ἀδεία are expressed in the orator's paraphrase with these 
words: ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων 
ψηφισαμένων. The document presents a more concise ἐὰν μὴ ψηφισαμένων 
Ἀθηναίων τὴν ἄδειαν πρῶτον μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων. The language of the 
document is here perfectly consistent with the epigraphical usage. The document then 
adds the requirement of secret ballot (οἷς ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις). This 
requirement is absent from the text of the speech, but is found in relation to a quorum 
stipulation in the regulations on naturalization paraphrased in [Dem.] 59.89.422 As 
Hansen has convincingly argued, based on both literary and epigraphical sources, voting 
by ballot in the Assembly had less to do with secrecy than with the need for an accurate 
counting of votes.423 This need must have been particularly felt when a quorum of six 
                                                
422 The requirement of a secret ballot is found in Athenian inscriptions in IG II2 1141 = Agora 16.44 l. 6 
and 1183 ll. 17-18.  
423 Hansen 1977: 131-3. On this specific aspect of voting by ballot (but not on the general reconstruction 
of the voting procedures) the same conclusion was also reached by Boegehold 1963: 368-72. Hansen's 
reconstruction is now generally accepted: cf. Rhodes 1981: 126-7. 
 187 
thousand was required. A prescription to vote by secret ballot is therefore necessary in 
this context, and its addition in the document appropriate. No other discrepancies occur 
between the document and the paraphrase of the orator.  
This analysis has shown that this document, consistently with the other documents 
present in the Urexemplar of Demosthenes' speeches, does not present any idiosyncratic 
feature that may speak against its authenticity.424 Its text is mainly confirmed by the 
paraphrase of the orator, and where there are discrepancies, the document has plausible 
wording consistent with contemporary inscriptions. The few additional details provided 
by the document are all accounted for by contemporary sources, both literary and 
epigraphical, and can often be shown to be necessary to the working of such a statute. 
To sum up, this document must be considered reliable, and its insertion is evidence of 
careful editing at an early stage of the transmission of the speech.  
                                                
424 Pace Wayte 1882: 126 and Navarre - Orsini 1954: 145 n. 1. 
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4.6 Dem. 24.50: the law on supplication 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
ἐὰν δέ τις ἱκετεύῃ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ ὧν δικαστήριον ἢ ἡ βουλὴ ἢ 
ὁ δῆμος κατέγνω, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ ὀφλὼν ἱκετεύῃ πρὶν ἐκτεῖσαι, ἔνδειξιν εἶναι 
αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἐάν τις ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ ἡλιάζηται· ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄλλος ὑπὲρ 
τοῦ ὠφληκότος ἱκετεύῃ πρὶν ἐκτεῖσαι, δημοσία ἔστω αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἅπασα. 
ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν προέδρων δῷ τινι τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν, ἢ αὐτῷ τῷ ὠφληκότι ἢ 
ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, πρὶν ἐκτεῖσαι, ἄτιμος ἔστω. 
 
1 ἢ om. S | ἡ om. F | 2 ἱκετεύσῃ Aa | 2, 4, 5 ἐκτεῖσαι corr. Blass : ἐκτῖσαι SAFYP | 2 <κατ'> αὐτοῦ 
AFYP | 3 ὠφληκότως (?) Fa | 4 αὐτοῦ ἔστω A | πᾶσα  
 
If anyone makes a supplication in the Council or in the Assembly about those that a 
tribunal, the Council or the Assembly convicted, if the convicted himself makes the 
supplication before he has paid, there shall be an endeixis against him in the same 
way as if some debtor of the public treasury sits as a judge; and if someone else 
makes the supplication on behalf of the convicted before he has paid, all his 
substances shall become public property. If one of the proedroi puts the matter to the 
vote either for the convicted himself or for another on his behalf before he has paid, 
he shall be atimos. 
 
It is impossible from the stichometric analysis to determine whether this 
document was part of the Urexemplar. It is therefore necessary to rely entirely on the 
comparison with the orator's account and on close analysis of the wording. 
Demosthenes' reason for quoting this law and his argument here are weak. He 
claims that the law of Timocrates conflicts with many different laws, and the one just 
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read out is one of them (§ 51). The orator proceeds to interpret the lawgiver's reason for 
enacting such a law: he knew Athenians' humanity and gentleness and was afraid that 
they could harm their own public interests (τὰ κοινὰ § 52). He therefore enacted that 
the convicted wrongdoers (τοὺς μετὰ τῶν νόμων κρίσει καὶ δικαστηρίῳ μὴ δίκαια 
ποιεῖν) were not allowed to take advantage of the people's good nature, and to beg and 
make supplications with the excuse of some misfortune. Thus he forbade making any 
supplications on matters regarding such people. They were instead to stay silent and do 
what is right (ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια σιγῇ). At § 53 Demosthenes explains his 
argument: begging is better than giving orders, and placing a suppliant branch (οἱ 
τιθέντες δὲ τὰς ἱκετηρίας δέονται) is begging, whereas enacting a law is giving an 
order (οἱ νόμοι μὲν ἅπαντες προστάττουσιν ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν). Timocrates enacted a law 
to save Androtion from prison, when even making a supplication about any matter 
concerning him would have been illegal. He is therefore even guiltier. The argument is 
clearly specious: from Demosthenes' words it is clear that the law is concerned with 
supplications and has nothing to do with enacting laws. The argument a fortiori is a 
good rhetorical device, but is not persuasive from a legal point of view.425  
Demosthenes' words have generally been interpreted as referring to the principle 
of res iudicata.426 No convicted wrongdoer was allowed to make supplication to cancel 
or reduce his penalty. However this interpretation is not warranted by the text: 
Demosthenes states that convicted wrongdoers are not allowed to make supplications 
with the excuse of some misfortune (μετὰ συμφορᾶς ἱκετεύειν ἔχοντας φορμήν), 
and that supplications are forbidden about matters concerning such people (μήθ' 
ἱκετεύειν μήτε λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων). He never says that the law is concerned 
only with supplications about the sentences and the penalties passed against 
                                                
425 Cf. also MacDowell 2009: 188. 
426 This is the interpretation of Demosthenes's account provided by Naiden 2004: 75 and 2006: 179. Cf. 
also MacDowell 2009: 188. 
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wrongdoers. It is concerned with supplications made μετὰ συμφορᾶς [...] ἔχοντας 
ἀφορμήν. It is difficult to interpret this phrase as referring exclusively to sentences and 
penalties. The expression is deliberately vague, and the absence of the article before 
συμφορᾶς suggests that Demosthenes means simply 'some, whatever misfortune'. The 
expression ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων again is vague, and can refer to any affair concerning 
the convicted wrongdoers. So the law, as far as Demosthenes' paraphrase is concerned, 
states that convicted wrongdoers are not allowed to make any supplication whatsoever, 
nor is anyone else on their behalf. There is no hint of any specific concern with 
penalties and sentences. 
Before checking whether the document conforms to this description, the usual 
understanding of its provisions must, again, be challenged. The first clause (ἐὰν δέ τις 
ἱκετεύῃ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ ὧν δικαστήριον ἢ ἡ βουλὴ ἢ ὁ δῆμος 
κατέγνω) is translated thus by Murray is his Loeb translation: 'If any person make 
petition to the Council or to the Assembly in respect of any sentence of a Court of 
Justice or of the Council or of the Assembly.' MacDowell writes: 'a law forbids 
supplication in the Boule or the Ekklesia against a penalty imposed by a court or the 
Boule or the Ekklesia until after the penalty has been paid.'427 This interpretation makes 
no sense: what is the point in making a supplication for relief from a penalty after the 
penalty has been paid? This reading, according to which the document would be, again, 
concerned with res iudicata, is however neither the only one nor the preferable one. In 
fact the verb καταγιγνώσκω in all its constructions428 always points to someone (either 
in the genitive or in the accusative) that has been accused or convicted. This is 
sometimes understood, but it is always clear from the context. Instead the verb is found 
with the absolute meaning of 'giving a sentence' only in the expression δίκην 
                                                
427 MacDowell 2009: 188. 
428 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
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καταγιγνώσκειν (cf. e.g. Ar. Eq. 1360). Since in our clause δίκην is missing, it is 
much more natural to read the clause as 'if anyone makes a supplication in the Council 
or in the Assembly about those that a tribunal, the Council or the Assembly convicted'. 
This interpretation is moreover consistent with Demosthenes' account: the document 
prescribes that no supplication about any issue shall be allowed on matters regarding 
those who have been convicted, exactly as the orator reports. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with the general atimia of public debtors, who are excluded from the 
workings of the polis as a whole. 
The document however contains many other details that must be checked against 
the other sources. The first clause of the document tells us that supplications to the 
Athenians were made before the Council and before the Assembly, and that trials were 
held and sentences passed in Athens by lawcourts, the Council or the Assembly. Both 
pieces of information are arguably correct. Wherever a bough is placed, at the altar of 
the Council (IG II2 218), at that of the Twelve Gods (Plut. Per. 31.2; Hdt. 6.108.4; Lyc. 
1.93) or of Artemis at Mounychia (Dem. 18.107), the supplication is dealt with by the 
Council and the Assembly. The first step is the evaluation of supplications by the 
Council, which can reject them or send them to the Assembly (with a probouleuma) 
recommending approval or rejection, or without any recommendation at all. The second 
and definitive step is the assessment by the Assembly.429 As for the list of bodies that 
heard trials and gave sentences, namely tribunals, the Council and the Assembly, no 
objection can be raised against the document. Ath.Pol. 45.2 describes the jurisdiction of 
the Council and Dem. 47.43 makes clear that the Council had the power to impose fines 
                                                
429 The procedure is thoroughly explored, on the basis of the epigraphical and literary material, by Naiden 
2004: 80-3 and 2006: 173-83. IG II2 218 shows clearly the whole procedure. Rhodes 1972: 55-7 and 
1981: 528 has argued that sometimes the Council may have been bypassed, since specific Assemblies 
were scheduled for hearing supplications, and supplications made then did not need previous approval by 
the Council. This does not contrast with the wording of the document. 
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of up to 500 drachmas.430 The sources show clearly that the Assembly, at least until the 
mid-fourth century, tried important political cases, and inflicted heavy penalties, 
sometimes even death.431 Finally, δικαστήριον can refer in our sources both to the 
people's court and to homicide courts. All the different homicide courts are in fact 
called δικαστήρια in the long account of Dem. 23.67-76. Thus the document is actually 
forbidding supplications about those whose sentences have been passed by any body 
with the power of hearing trials. The clause is perfectly consistent with what we know 
of Athenian law and institutions, and adds important information to the orator's account. 
The phrase at § 52 in the orator's account, τοὺς μετὰ τῶν νόμων κρίσει καὶ 
δικαστηρίῳ μὴ δίκαια ποιεῖν ἐγνωσμένους, with its slightly convoluted construction, 
could well be a paraphrase of this clause. Notably, κρίσις is also used of trials held by 
the Council and the Assembly,432 and its presence next to δικαστηρίῳ (otherwise a 
reduplication)433 might allude to the document's wording. To sum up, this clause does 
not contain any idiosyncratic feature, and the construction with ἐὰν δέ τις is attested in 
a great number of Athenian inscriptions.434 
The document proceeds to single out different penalties for the convicted 
wrongdoer, if he makes the supplication in person, and for anybody else doing it on his 
behalf. The second clause of the document (ἐὰν μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ ὀφλὼν ἱκετεύῃ πρὶν 
ἐκτεῖσαι, ἔνδειξιν εἶναι αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἐάν τις ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ ἡλιάζηται) 
specifies that the charge and punishment for making supplications in person before one 
has paid the penalty inflicted for his crime is the same as when an atimos sits as judge. 
                                                
430 Cf. also SEG 26.72 ll. 32-6. On the power of inflicting fines of up to 500 drachmas cf. Rhodes 1972: 
147 and 1981: 540. In general on the jurisdiction of the Council cf. Rhodes 1972: 144-207 and 1981: 477-
8, 489-90, 537-43, 549. For eisangeliai cf. below pp. 216. 
431 Cf. Dem. 49.10 and the famous trial of the strategoi after the battle at the Arginousai (Xen. Hell. 1.7). 
Another case heard by the Assembly was that for which Lysias wrote the Against Ergocles (Lys. 28). For 
other cases cf. Hansen 1975: catalogue pp. 66-120 nos. 2, 3, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 15-7 for the 
change between 362 and 355. 
432 E.g. [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 41.2, 45.2. Cf. Hansen 1987: 107-8. 
433 But Wayte 1882: 131 points out that this can also be read as a hendiadys. 
434 Cf. Threatte 1996: 340. A search in the Attic inscriptions of the PHI database yields 148 results. 
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ὁ ὀφλὼν, aorist participle of ὀφλισκάνω, is common in inscriptions.435 πρὶν with 
infinitive is also widely found in inscriptions,436 as is ἐκτίνω.437 The contents of this 
provision are impossible to check against the orator's account. His summary is very 
vague on the details of the law just read out. His paraphrase does not in fact follow the 
text of the law, but comments on the legislator's alleged intent in writing it. Expressions 
like μὴ δίκαια ποιεῖν ἐγνωσμένους438 and ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια σιγῇ are utterly vague, 
and are used to express general principles. The document focuses on people sentenced 
to pay a fine,439 and prescribes that no supplications can be made by them or about them 
before they have paid it. That people convicted to pay a fine were the focus of the law is 
neither confirmed nor refuted by the orator's account, yet the provision as it stands is 
intrinsically coherent, and the phrase πρὶν ἐκτεῖσαι makes good sense. No source in 
fact suggests that when an Athenian was convicted to pay a fine and paid it his citizen 
rights remained curtailed in any way. He fully regained his status. The provision πρὶν 
ἐκτεῖσαι is therefore necessary.  
The procedure prescribed against the convicted man making a supplication in 
person is the same as in case a debtor ἡλιάζηται. Prescribing as penalty for a crime the 
same as was prescribed for a different crime was not a rare practice in Athens. At Dem. 
20.156 the orator quotes among the penalties prescribed by Leptines in his law ἐὰν δ᾽ 
ἁλῷ, ἔνοχος ἔστω τῷ νόμῳ ὃς κεῖται, ἐάν τις ὀφείλων ἄρχῃ τῷ δημοσίῳ. The 
sentence is remarkably similar. In that case, Demosthenes explains that the intended 
penalty is death. In the case of a debtor of the state sitting as a judge the procedure is 
                                                
435 Cf. IG I3 6 ll. 31, 39; 21 l. 59; Agora 16.339 l. b12; Poletai P26 ll. 459, 506. For ὀφλισκάνω in 
inscriptions cf. Threatte 1996: 481, 486, 544-5, 567, 582. 
436 Cf. e.g. IG I3 84 l. 9; 105 l. 45; 1453 l. 17; II2 1196 l. 9; 1673 l. 44. 
437 Cf. e.g. IG I3 41 l. 116; II2 30 ll. 8, 16; 412 l. 6; Poletai P26 l. 491; SEG 32.81 l. 6. 
438 Demosthenes always uses this expression in general statements or for a wide variety of behaviours or 
offenses, never to refer to a specific crime or legal condition. Cf. Dem. 15.28; 18.104, 107; 19.153; 40.5; 
41.23. 
439 ὀφλὼν can from time to time mean simply 'convicted' (LSJ s.v. A), but ἐκτίνω means 'to pay' and the 
more general meaning 'to serve a sentence' is relegated to the expression δίκην ἐκτίνειν (LSJ s.v.). In 
fact, epigraphical and literary sources, to encompass both corporal and financial punishments, employ the 
expression πάθειν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι (cf. e.g. Agora 16.56 l. 33; Dem. 24.118). 
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endeixis and the penalty must be decided by the judges (agon timetos). If they opt for a 
fine, the debtor must be imprisoned until he pays both the fine and the original debt (cf. 
Ath.Pol. 63.3). But the penalty could be even harsher, and Dem. 21.182 informs us 
about the case of Pyrrhus, one of the Eteobutadae, in which the penalty was death.440 
Slightly suspect is here the word ἡλιάζηται. The usual word for 'sitting as a judge in a 
popular court' in literary sources is δικάζειν, and ἡλιάζεσθαι never appears in Attic 
inscriptions. However I could not find any clear example in inscriptions of δικάζειν 
used in this sense either. ἡλιάζεσθαι is used precisely in this sense, almost as a 
technical term in Phryn. fr. 63 Kock, Ar. Eq. 798, Lys. 980 and Ves. 772 and by Harp. 
s.v. ἡλιαία καὶ ἡλίασις, attributing the usage to Lysias, and there is no reason to doubt 
it.441 
The next provision concerns anyone making a supplication on behalf of τοῦ 
ὠφληκότος. The punishment in this case is: δημοσία ἔστω αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἅπασα. 
This penalty is attested with the very same words in Agora 16.73 l. 21 (ἡ οὐσία 
δημοσία ἔστω αὐτοῦ; cf. also IG II2 1631 l. 362-3; 111 l. 41-2). 
The last clause prescribes atimia if one of the proedroi puts something to the vote 
ἢ αὐτῷ τῷ ὠφληκότι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου before he pays. The only slightly suspect 
element in this clause is τις τῶν προέδρων δῷ τινι τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν. 
ἐπιχειροτονία, in the accusative, is found once in Attic inscriptions (SEG 45.51 l. 9), 
but the text is too fragmentary and we cannot guess either the relevant verb or the 
context. The literary sources confirm that the correct verb here is δίδωμι,442 and not 
ποιεῖν as in the document at § 20-3. Thus, although the construction is not exactly 
paralleled in inscriptions, its grammar is correct. The verb usually found with the 
proedroi is ἐπιψηφίζειν, but always in the formulaic construction τῶν προέδρων 
                                                
440 Cf. in general Hansen 1976: 96-8. 
441 On legal terms in Attic comedy and drama see Harris 2006: 425-30 and Harris - Leão - Rhodes 2010 
passim. 
442 Cf. above pp. 139-40 n. 312. 
 195 
ἐπεψήφιζεν ὁ δεῖνα, and with no variation or elaboration whatsoever. The clause we 
find here is instead specifically constructed for the purpose of this provision, with a 
distinctive meaning ('to put something to the vote for somebody'), and there is no reason 
to reject it. 
To sum up, the document is generally consistent with the orator's account. None 
of the information provided conflicts with any other source about Athenian laws and 
institutions. Its provisions are inherently consistent and not contradictory. Its grammar 
is correct, and its language mainly conforms to contemporary inscriptions, without 
presenting any feature patently unacceptable. The stichometry does not allow us to tell 
whether it was present in the Urexemplar or not, but its characteristics advise us to 
consider it so. As many other stichometric documents it seems carefully drafted, and 
does not contain any trivial error. Its provisions are likely to be on the whole reliable. 
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4.7 Dem. 24.54: res iudicata 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
ὅσων δίκη πρότερον ἐγένετο ἢ εὔθυνα ἢ διαδικασία περί του ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, 
ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, ἢ τὸ δημόσιον ἀπέδοτο, μὴ εἰσάγειν περὶ τούτων εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον μηδ᾽ ἐπιψηφίζειν τῶν ἀρχόντων μηδένα, μηδὲ κατηγορεῖν 
ἐώντων ἃ οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι. 
 
ὅσων - ἐπιψηφίζειν P.Oxy.2.232 
 
τοῦ Aa | ἢ ἰδία ἢ δημοσία A 
 
On matters about which there has been a previous prosecution, or an euthyna or a 
diadikasia on something in court, whether in a public or in a private trial, or the state 
has been the vendor, none of the magistrates shall bring a trial to court, nor shall he 
put the matter to the vote, and they shan't allow accusations that are not allowed by 
the laws. 
 
The stichometry of the speech does not allow us to tell whether the document was 
part of the Urexemplar. The presence of part of it in P.Oxy. 2.232, dating from 2nd/3rd 
century AD, provides the terminus ante quem for its insertion. 
The rationale for the reading and discussion of the law at § 54-5 is as follow: 
Demosthenes claims that Timocrates has infringed the provisions of this law from the 
very beginning of his statute. The law just read out forbids the reconsidering of matters 
already decided by a tribunal (ὁ μέν γ' οὐκ ἐᾷ περὶ ὧν ἂν ἅπαξ γνῷ δικαστήριον 
πάλιν χρηματίζειν). Timocrates instead orders that the Assembly must reconsider the 
penalty inflicted by the tribunals and cancel the additional imprisonment if the 
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convicted presents sureties. Moreover the law forbids magistrates to put such matters to 
the vote (καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος μηδ᾽ ἐπιψηφίζειν φησὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων παρὰ ταῦτα 
μηδένα) whereas Timocrates' law orders the proedroi to put sureties to the vote 
whenever any debtor wishes.  
The law, as Demosthenes summarizes it, states the principle of res iudicata and 
makes courts' decisions binding. The law of Timocrates does not order that 
imprisonment cannot be inflicted as a penalty at once, but only after the ninth prytany if 
the convicted has not paid his fine. This would regulate what penalties a court can and 
cannot inflict, and would therefore be perfectly acceptable. Instead it gives the 
Assembly the power to change penalties already inflicted by courts, and in fact forces it 
to do so when a debtor presents sureties. This clearly contrasts with the provisions 
reported by the orator. However, we do not know whether the actual law forbade 
magistrates to put such matters to the vote only in tribunals or anywhere.443 If the law 
were concerned only with courts, then Demosthenes' argument would be specious. This 
is in fact suggested by other allusions to this law elsewhere. At Dem. 20.147 we read οἱ 
νόμοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐῶσι δὶς πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε δίκας οὔτ᾽ εὐθύνας 
οὔτε διαδικασίαν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τοιοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲν εἶναι. This account suggests that the law 
is concerned specifically with trials, and not with any kind of vote. It also adds 
euthynai, diadikasiai and 'other similar things' to normal dikai. The decisions given in 
all these actions must be binding. At Dem. 38.16 the speaker again states ἅπαξ περὶ 
τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰς δίκας. The wording of all these passages is 
very close and must reflect the language of the actual law. Other passages in the orators 
seem to allude to the same law. Dem. 36.24 discusses the law about paragraphe444 and 
claims that it does not allow a charge to be brought on matters about which a release or 
                                                
443 This point is made by MacDowell 2009: 188, who relies however on the document. 
444 For this procedure cf. Wolff 1966; Isager - Hansen 1975: 123-31, 227; MacDowell 1978: 214-7. 
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discharge has already been given (οὐκ ἐώντων τῶν νόμων δίκας ὧν ἂν ἀφῇ τις 
ἅπαξ λαγχάνειν, cf. also Dem. 37.1). After the law is read out the orator discusses it 
and states (§ 25) that the law mentions discharges and releases together with other cases 
when a new charge cannot be brought (τά τ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ὧν μὴ εἶναι δίκας, καὶ ὅσα τις 
ἀφῆκεν ἢ ἀπήλλαξεν). The argument proceeds: εἰ γάρ ἐστι δίκαιον, ὧν ἂν ἅπαξ 
γένηται δίκη, μηκέτ᾽ ἐξεῖναι δικάζεσθαι, all the more it is unjust to bring a charge 
when a release or discharge has been given. The prohibition mentioned again concerns 
bringing a charge twice about the same matter. The law seems to be the same. This very 
argument is found with few differences also at Dem. 37.19-20: after stating that ὧν ἂν 
ἀφῇ καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃ τις, μηκέτι τὰς δίκας εἶναι the orator lists some of the other cases 
in which a charge cannot be brought, to stress that his own case is the most shameful. 
The first example concerns public sales (ἃ μὲν γὰρ τὸ δημόσιον πέπρακεν). The 
second concerns decisions taken by a court (περὶ ὧν ἔγνω τὸ δικαστήριον). It is again 
the case of holding trials twice on the same matter. The orator then hints at the fact that 
the law lists other cases (καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ).  
From all these allusions it is possible to draw quite an accurate account of the law: 
it forbids to hold dikai, euthynai, diadikasiai on matters already decided with similar 
procedures, or settled with a release or a discharge, or that have been the object of a 
public sale. No magistrate shall put such a matter to the vote. If anyone does bring such 
a charge, the defendant has the right to bring a paragraphe against him.445 
The document's contents are only partially consistent with this description. As for 
the information provided in the document, nothing requires the use of an independent 
                                                
445 This does not mean that Demosthenes is here discussing the law on paragraphe. The original law on 
paragraphe was probably that of Archinus (Isoc. 18.1-3) and dealt with prosecutions brought in violation 
of the reconciliation agreement of 403 (but Rhodes 1981: 473 does not believe the procedure was created 
and employed then for the first time). New laws later enacted extended the scope of paragraphe to cover 
many other cases. The provisions discussed in the passages I have mentioned must have had exactly this 
purpose. They all deal with the principle of res iudicata and, in the words of Isager and Hansen (1975: 
127), were 'collected in one law'. 
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source, and all the details are found in the Demosthenic corpus. Yet the document lacks 
two elements that were, according to the other sources, mentioned in the law: it does not 
list releases and discharges, and it does not name paragraphe, the procedure available 
against charges brought against its provisions. 
The wording presents a few striking features. First, it does not at all resemble the 
wording of Dem. 20.147 and 38.16, which seem to quote the law very faithfully. 
Furthermore εὔθυνα, out of 210 occurrences in Attic inscriptions,446 is never found in 
the singular. In fact, the paraphrase of the law at Dem. 20.147 has the plural, which is 
consistent with the epigraphical usage.447 Moreover ἢ διαδικασία περί του is 
unparalleled both in inscriptions and in literary sources. περί του is an utterly vague 
expression, and του is found in Attic inscriptions only in formuas like ἐάν του 
δέωνται (cf. e.g. IG II2 448 l. 81). That διαδικασία did not need further qualification, 
unless one wanted to make explicit to what διαδικασία he was referring, is shown by 
IG II2 1237 ll. 13-6: ὁπόσοι μήπω διεδικάσθησαν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν 
Δημοτιωνιδῶν, διαδικάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν τὸς φράτερας αὐτίκα μάλα. There was no 
need to state explicitly that the law referred to those who διεδικάσθησαν 'about 
something'. It might be only coincidental, but the only other occurrence of περί του in 
the orators is in this very speech at § 51.  
The last clause of the document (μηδὲ κατηγορεῖν ἐώντων ἃ οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ 
νόμοι) is difficult to accept. The two previous clauses express orders and have verbs in 
the infinitive (μὴ εἰσάγειν [...] μηδ᾽ ἐπιψηφίζειν) held by accusative singulars (τῶν 
                                                
446 According to the PHI database. 
447 In literary sources from the 5th and 4th centuries, TLG yields 145 results for the stem of εὔθυνα, and 
only 7 (Lys. 10.27; 11.9; 25.30; Aeschin. 3.17; [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 48.5; Arist. Rh. 1411b; Ar. Vesp. 571) in 
the singular. In [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 48.5 the singular is due to the expression πάλιν εἰσάγουσιν ταύτην τὴν 
εὔθυναν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. Arist. Rh. 1411b has the singular because of βλάβη τις, but immediately 
before it shows the normal plural (καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας 
διδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν). In Aeschin. 3.17 it is due to the expression εἰ μή τις 
ἐστὶν εὐνοίας εὔθυνα (τις requires the singular). Lys. 10.27 has οὔτε τοῖς πολίταις οὐδεμίαν πώποτε 
ὦφλεν εὐθύνην (the negative needs the singular). It is clear that the technical usage of the word is in the 
plural, and the singular is found only due to expressive needs in literary prose or poetry. 
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ἀρχόντων μηδένα). The last clause expresses a further order, on the same level as the 
previous ones, but does it with a present participle in the genitive plural. This participle 
seems to be held by τῶν ἀρχόντων, a specification of the original subject μηδένα. 
Even if we accepted a genitive here, we would expect it to refer to μηδένα, and not to 
its specification, τῶν ἀρχόντων. This structure, in a clause giving an order, is 
unparalleled and grammatically hard to accept, in particular in what purports to be 
official language. This last clause moreover does not make any sense: it provides that 
the magistrates shall not allow accusations that the laws do not allow (ἃ οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ 
νόμοι). The clause refers to 'the laws' in general, and seems to allude to other, different 
laws. Yet this is supposed to be the law concerned with forbidden accusations and it is 
not clear to what other laws it should refer.448 
To sum up, although it has no blatantly incorrect provisions, the document does 
not present any independent detail. All of its features could easily have been drawn 
from the Demosthenic corpus. On the other hand, some features are missing which we 
know from our sources were part of the law. The wording of the document moreover 
does not conform to any of Demosthenes' summaries, not even when several summaries 
report identical formulas. Moreover, some words and expressions are unparalleled in 
Attic inscriptions and are never found in official Athenian language. The document 
seems therefore to be a well-informed, yet clumsy reconstruction made by someone 
who was well-versed in the Demosthenic corpus, but whose work was not very 
accurate. The stichometry does not allow us to tell whether the document was part of 
the Urexemplar, but our analysis suggests that it was not. Its features resemble more 
closely the non-stichometric documents of this and other speeches. 
 
                                                
448 Cf. also Wayte 1882: 132. 
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4.8 Dem. 24.56: valid and invalid acts after the Thirty 
ΝΟΜΟΣ   
τὰς δίκας καὶ τὰς διαίτας, ὅσαι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ 
τῇ πόλει, κυρίας εἶναι. 
ΝΟΜΟΣ   
ὁπόσα δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐπράχθη ἢ δίκη ἐδικάσθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, 
ἄκυρα εἶναι. 
 
τὰς - εἶναι Andoc.1.87 | ὁπόσα - εἶναι P.Oxy.2.232 
 
ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις om. Andoc.1.87 | ὁπόσα codd. : οὗτος ἃ A | δίκῃ F | ἰδία ἢ δημοσία A P.Oxy.2.232 
ut videtur 
 
All judgements and arbitrations shall be valid, where given under the democracy 
according to the laws. 
But what was done under the Thirty, or the judgement(s) delivered, whether in 
private or in public, shall be invalid. 
 
The stichometry does not indicate whether these documents were part of the 
Urexemplar of the speech. On the other hand, the presence of the second document in 
P.Oxy. 2.232 provides a terminus ante quem for its insertion: late 2nd or early 3rd century 
BCE. 
No feature of these two documents contrasts with the following summary by the 
orator. After the clerk reads the first provision stating that judgements and arbitrations 
given under the democracy shall be valid, the orator comments that at least those 
judgements which punished the culprit with imprisonment are not going to be valid 
anymore because of the law of Timocrates. Afterwards (§ 57), after the second 
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provision is read out, the orator claims that since the acts of the Thirty are to be invalid 
according to the law quoted, the law of Timocrates, making some judgements given 
under democracy invalid, implicitly equates democracy with the Thirty. 
The first document corresponds word for word with the document quoted in 
Andoc.1.87. The documents in Andocides' speech On the Mysteries' are usually 
unreliable,449 yet the particular document we are concerned with repeats verbatim the 
words of Andocides in the following paragraph.450 We know from that passage that this 
was one of the laws proposed by the nomothetai right after the restoration of democracy 
in 403, and its aim was probably that of deciding what sentences had to be valid, and 
what crimes from the previous years could or could not be prosecuted. Thus, it stated 
that judgements and arbitrations451 delivered under democratic regimes had to be valid. 
It also stated, as Andocides' speech reports, that 'the laws are to be followed from the 
archonship of Eucleides.' This means that trials already held had to stay valid, but no 
new trial could be held for crimes committed before 404/3.452 In this context, the further 
provision alluded to by Demosthenes at § 57, which states that the acts of the Thirty are 
not to be valid, makes perfect sense.453 
This however does not prove that the documents are genuine, likely to have been 
present in the Urexemplar, or that they were added later on the basis of an independent 
and reliable source. The first document in fact could easily have been drawn from 
Andocides' passage. As for the second, it does not provide any information that could 
not be found in Demosthenes' discussion, and its presence in P.Oxy. 2.232 attests only 
                                                
449 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
450 Evidence that Andocides was actually quoting, and not paraphrasing, is the use of dike as 'judgement' 
at § 88. In all the speeches of Andocides this is the only case in which the word has this meaning, instead 
of the usual 'punishment' or 'atonement'. Cf. Wolf 1950-6: vol. 3 part 2 p. 178; MacDowell 1962: 129. 
451 Since the public arbitrators did not exist in Athens earlier than 399 (cf. MacDowell 1971: 267-73, 
Rhodes 1995: 305-6, contra Gernet 1939: 392-4), the law probably referred to private arbitrations, or 
arbitrations carried out by the deme-judges. Cf. MacDowell 1962: 128. 
452 Cf. above pp. 176-7. 
453 This provision is also alluded to in Aeschin. 1.39, and the scholion to the passage paraphrases it. 
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that it was possible to find it in the speech between the end of the 2nd, or the beginning 
of the 3rd century AD. 
To provide a tentative hypothesis for the origin of these documents it is necessary 
to focus on the very few discrepancies with the orators' accounts (§ 57 and Andoc.1.88-
9). The first document presents just a minor discrepancy with Andocides' speech: we 
find, in addition to the requirement that the judgements and arbitrations, in order to be 
valid, must have been given under a democratic regime, the expression ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις. 
A specification to the effect that the judgements and arbitrations, to be valid, need to be 
given according to the laws does not seem to involve any difficulty, and MacDowell has 
proposed that it be restored also in Andocides' text.454 However, this terminology is 
unparalleled. In classical Athenian texts, both epigraphic and literary, the invariable 
expression for 'according to the laws' is κατὰ τοὺς νόμους.455 ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις is never 
found in inscriptions, and just once in literary texts from 5th and 4th century, in Plat. 
Leges. 719e in the expression ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις ('the one who is in charge 
of our laws'), with a very different meaning from the one implied here.456 To sum up, 
this document seems to be drawn from Andoc. 1.87-8, and the only addition to that text 
is distinctively un-Attic. 
The second document again does not present any discrepancy in content with the 
following discussion by the orator. Its words closely follow Demosthenes' paraphrase at 
§ 57: ὁ γοῦν νόμος οὑτοσί, εὐλαβούμενος, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπεῖπε τὰ 
πραχθέντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων (i.e. ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα) μὴ κύρι᾽ εἶναι. The only addition in 
the document is the expression ἢ δίκη ἐδικάσθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. There is no need 
of an independent source for such a piece of information; that trials are meant is implied 
                                                
454 MacDowell 1962: 128. 
455 I do not provide here a list of the occurrences, since it would be too extensive. It will suffice to say that 
a search in the PHI database of inscriptions yields 70 results for Attica, and a TLG search in 5th and 4th 
century texts 145. 
456 The translation given is by Pangle 1988: 106. For a discussion of the passage of the Laws cf. 
Schöpsdau 2003: 234 
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by the context, and the orator explicitly mentions the courts at § 58, when he claims that 
if the judges confirm the law of Timocrates, they implicitly admit that the tribunals of 
the democracy are responsible for the same injustices as those of the Thirty. Therefore, 
the mention of judgements in the provision is neither necessary nor impossible, and 
nothing can be said about the nature of the document on the basis of its content. 
However its grammar, in Wayte's words, is 'not happy'. Reiske proposes to understand ἢ 
δίκη ἐδικάσθη as ἢ ὁπόση δίκη ἐδικάσθη. Yet there are to my knowledge no cases in 
Attic of ὁπόσος (understood or not) making a singular noun collective: in the singular 
ὁπόσος invariably denotes size or space, whereas it denotes number in the plural (cf. 
LSJ s.v.). The correct Attic form would be ὁπόσαι δίκαι or ἐάν τις δίκη.457 
This grammatical problem alone does not disqualify the document. However, 
since no independent information is provided in either of the texts, and in both cases the 
only expressions not drawn directly from Demosthenes' words present difficulties, it is 
safer to believe that these two inserts have been reconstructed on the basis of Andoc. 
1.87-8 and of the discussion at § 57-8 of this speech. Accordingly, even though the 
stichometry does not allow us to tell whether these documents were already in the 
Urexeplar, it is more likely that they have been added at a later stage of transmission. 
 
                                                
457 Cf. Wayte 1882: 135 and Schäfer 1827: 208. 
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4.9 Dem. 24.59: prohibition on laws ad hominem 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
μηδὲ νόμον ἐξεῖναι ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις 
τιθῇ ψηφισαμένων μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων οἷς ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην 
ψηφιζομένοις. 
 
μηδὲ - Ἀθηναίοις Dem.23.86 , 46.12, Andoc.1.87 
 
μηδένα ΥPa | ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι Dem.23.86, 46.12 (FQ) : ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ νόμον ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι 
Andoc.1.87, 89 | ἐὰν μὴ - Ἀθηναίοις om. A | τιθῇ del. Blass | ἢ add. Reiske post τιθῇ | <ἐὰν μὴ> 
add. Petit post τιθῇ | ψηφισαμένων - ψηφιζομένοις del. Dindorf 
 
No law shall be enacted regarding an individual, if it is not enacted regarding all 
citizens alike and approved by no less than six thousand that so decide voting by 
secret ballot. 
 
The first part of this law has already been discussed in connection with Dem. 
23.86.458 The following discussion by the orator confirms its provisions, claiming that 
the law οὐκ ἐᾷ νόμον ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέναι κατὰ τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων. The 
content of this part is confirmed also by other passages in this speech, namely § 18, 116, 
159 and 188. The very wording of the provision, except for negligible differences, is 
found elsewhere in the orators: Dem. 23.86, as we have seen, reports it both in a 
stichometric document and in the following paraphrase (μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι 
θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἅπασιν, cf. also Dem. 23.218), and so do Dem. 46.2 
(μηδὲ νόμον ἐξεῖναι ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ θεῖναι, ἂν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφ᾽ ἅπασιν Ἀθηναίοις) and 
                                                
458 Cf. above pp. 109-10. 
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Andoc. 1.89 (μηδ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ νόμον τιθέναι ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
Ἀθηναίοις). 
The second part however is not found in Demosthenes' paraphrase, nor in any 
other paraphrase elsewhere in the orators. The stichometric document at Dem. 23.86 
also ignores it. The only other place where we can read of the requirement of a quorum 
of six thousand Athenians voting by secret ballot in relation to laws ad hominem is 
Andoc. 1.87, in a document reporting this and others provisions.459 The wording there is 
ἐὰν μὴ ἑξακισχιλίοις δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις. At § 89, when Andocides lists 
the documents discussed, this provision is absent. 
It must be noted first of all that the two documents, even though both present the 
clause about the quorum and the secret ballot, do not agree about the provision they are 
expressing. Andoc. 1.87 prescribes that laws ad hominem can be passed if voted by 
secret ballot with a quorum of six thousand. The clause therefore states an exception to 
the prohibition on passing laws ad hominem. The document we are here concerned with 
states instead that laws ad hominem are not allowed, and laws must apply to all the 
Athenians and be voted by no less that six thousand by secret ballot. No exception to 
the rule is stated here. The law asserts instead that a quorum of six thousand voting by 
secret ballot is always required for a law.  
The options here are two: either the second part of the law, present in different 
versions in Andocides and Dem. 24.59, is due to an independent source which provided 
the information missing in the orators, or both these documents are forgeries. In fact, the 
clause, in both its versions, is not above suspicion.  
I will first analyze the text of the law as it stands in the manuscripts of 
Demosthenes. In that version, the law prescribes that no law ad hominem can be passed, 
                                                
459 Cf. for discussion of the documents in that speech in general, and for this provision in particular, 
Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
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and the laws must apply to all the citizens alike and be voted by secret ballot with a 
quorum of six thousand. Such a clause does not make any sense when compared with 
what we know about Athenian legislation. 1) The document does not specify where the 
quorum is required. It is hard to believe that such a quorum was required with the 
nomothetai. If this were the case, we should assume that the nomothetai were at every 
session as numerous as the Athenians taking part in the Assembly meetings, and often 
more numerous.460 We must conclude therefore that the Assembly was to vote by secret 
ballot with a quorum of six thousand. However, Rhodes461 has rightly pointed out that 
the Assembly is not in charge of enacting laws in the fourth century, the nomothetai are. 
Following the decree of Teisamenus (Andoc. 1.83-4) he also claims that this law cannot 
refer to the nomothesia of 404/3, since at the time the nomothetai from the demes were 
in charge. This is probably not true, as I have shown elsewhere, and it is more likely 
that the Assembly was in charge at the time, and the nomothetai only drafted 
legislation.462 However, if we interpret the rule as referring just to the 404/3 nomothesia, 
then we would have a una tantum provision, proposed by the nomothetai to curtail their 
own action, and afterwards improperly used in many instances in the fourth century by 
the orators, although it was no longer valid. 2) There are two parallels for a quorum of 
six thousand voting by secret ballot, and they are very precise about the stage of the 
procedure at which this quorum is needed. Dem. 24.45 and its summary at § 46 
prescribe the requirement of a quorum of six thousand to grant adeia for atimoi to speak 
in front of the Assembly about their reinstatement, and clearly state that it shall not be 
allowed to deliberate about an atimos ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης μὴ 
ἔλαττον ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων ψηφισαμένων. The quorum is required before the matter is 
discussed. At [Dem.] 59.89 a naturalization grant is not to be valid ἐὰν μὴ τῇ ψήφῳ εἰς 
                                                
460 Cf. Dem.20.93 for the requirement for the nomothetai to swear the Heliastic oath, and Aristot. Ath. 
Pol. 24.3, Ar. Vesp. 662 and Suda s.v. πρυτανεία for their number. 
461 Rhodes 1984: 59; 1991: 97-8. 
462 Cf. Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
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τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἐκκλησίαν ὑπερεξακισχίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσωνται κρύβδην 
ψηφιζόμενοι. So the quorum is needed here after the decision has been made, in the 
next Assembly. The text of our law does not give any indication about the stage at 
which the quorum is required: whether it is supposed to be an authorization to deliberate 
or a ratification of the rule. 3) At § 20-32 of this speech the speaker argues at length that 
the procedure for enacting a new law has a very rigid timetable, which must be 
respected. Then he provides very detailed evidence that Timocrates did not follow the 
procedure, and concludes that the way he presented his new law is illegal. Now, if the 
procedure included a compulsory vote by secret ballot with a quorum of six thousand, 
we can be sure that Demosthenes would have mentioned it and charged Timocrates with 
a further breach of the law. Yet no mention of such a rule appears at any point in the 
speech. It is clear that the text of the manuscripts cannot be accepted as a genuine 
Athenian statute.  
The text of the manuscripts, however, is not the version of this document scholars 
have usually commented on. Petit, followed uncritically by all modern editors (Butcher, 
Sykutris, Navarre and Orsini, Dilts), added ἐὰν μὴ before ψηφισαμένων to make the 
text of this document consistent with Andoc. 1.87. With this emendation the provision 
states that no law ad personam can be enacted if it does not address all the Athenian 
citizens, unless so voted by secret ballot with a quorum of six thousand. The rest of this 
chapter will be concerned with showing that this solution is as unacceptable as the 
paradosis.463 
The first point to make concerns the use to which Demosthenes puts the law. His 
argument goes like this: the statute clearly states that a law must be valid for all the 
Athenians; since the law of Timocrates has been drafted with some specific individuals 
                                                
463 The following section of the chapter partly reproduces, partly extends and supplements the discussion 
of Andoc. 1.87 that I have provided in Canevaro - Harris 2012 (forthcoming). 
 209 
in mind, namely Androtion, Glaucetes and Melanopus, the law should be illegal; even if 
the real aim of Timocrates is overlooked, the very wording of its law contrasts with the 
statute, as tax-farmers, lessees, and their sureties are explicitly excluded from its range 
of action. The argument is clearly flawed: the fact that a law must address all the 
Athenians does not mean that laws cannot regulate, or single out, specific categories, on 
the condition that their application is general.464 In this particular case, the law of 
Timocrates does not name any individual, and addresses all the Athenians, in that 
everyone would be excluded from its range of action if he found himself in the position 
of tax-farmer, lessee or surety for these categories. This interpretation of the provision 
must be correct; otherwise laws regulating particular offices would be illegal,465 as 
would the law granting to emporoi and naukleroi the right to bring dikai emporikai 
(Dem. 32.1, 33.1), and the law stating that the archon must take care of orphans and 
epikleroi (Dem.43.75), since all these laws address particular categories.  
Demosthenes was conscious of the weakness of his argument, and accordingly 
focused on one particular provision of his law, the one stating that a law must be valid 
for all the Athenians. The law of Timocrates in fact did not mention any individual, and 
therefore he chooses not to insist on that line of argument, mentioning it just through a 
praeteritio (δι᾽ οὓς μὲν τοίνυν οὗτος εἰσέφερεν, ὑμεῖς οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ χεῖρον 
γιγνώσκετε: ἄνευ δὲ τούτων αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησεν...). Now, this argument, which is 
already weak, would be completely undermined if the clerk had just read out a provision 
stating that a law not addressing all the Athenians can be passed if voted by secret ballot 
with a quorum of six thousand. The rationale given for the statute, that ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς 
ἄλλης πολιτείας ἴσον μέτεστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τούτων (i.e. of the laws) ἴσον 
μετέχειν ἕκαστον ἀξιοῖ, would be blatant nonsense after the clerk has read out such a 
                                                
464 Cf. Hansen 1979: 28-9. 
465 Dem. 21.32-3 explicitly distinguishes between offices and the men who hold them. 
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provision. The only remark Demosthenes would be able to make would be that the law 
of Timocrates had not been ratified by six thousand Athenians. There is no trace of such 
a remark in the speech. 
Some provisional conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the orator's 
argument: first, if the provision about the quorum of six thousand voting by secret ballot 
ever existed, it was unlikely to be in the text the clerk read out to the judges.466 Also, 
since similar arguments are often used in the orators, we should assume that this 
provision was generally unknown to the judges. Even if this was the case, such 
arguments would still be utterly vulnerable: the opponent could easily ask the clerk to 
read out the whole statute, and thus expose the argument as misleading. 
My next points concern the (lack of) rationale behind such a provision, when 
compared with what we know about Athenian legislation, and the (lack of) evidence for 
its existence. This version of the provision is in fact vulnerable to the same objections as 
the paradosis version: 1) again, where was such a quorum required? Not by the 
nomothetai, because we should imagine a body of nomothetai larger than the Assembly. 
Yet the Assembly is not in charge of enacting laws in the fourth century: the nomothetai 
are. 2) Rhodes467 also notes that, whether the distinction between laws and decrees was 
theoretical or pragmatic, a decision concerning an individual is invariably passed in 
Athenian practice through a decree, and not a law.468 3) As I have already noted, the two 
parallels for a quorum of six thousand voting by secret ballot are very precise about the 
stage of the procedure at which this quorum is needed. The text of our law instead, also 
                                                
466 Cf. Wayte 1882: 137. 
467 Rhodes 1984: 59; 1991: 97-8. 
468 Rhodes therefore supposes that this provision was enacted when this distinction was not yet rooted in 
the Athenian practice, and quickly became dead letter. This hypothesis however is vulnerable to the same 
objections I have raised above about the possibility that the clerk did not read it out, and the judges did 
not know it. Moreover, such a solution would be necessary only if we knew from an independent source 
that the statute in this form is reliable. Otherwise, this reconstruction is hardly the most economical. 
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in this version, does not tell whether the vote by secret ballot with the quorum of six 
thousand is supposed to be an authorization to deliberate or a ratification of the norm. 
Hansen on the other hand notes that in three cases we read honorary decrees for 
individuals submitted to the nomothetai for further ratification, and claims that these 
decrees are evidence for the procedure witnessed by this version of the provision.469 The 
reason for the submission to the nomothetai is that the funding of the measure would 
require a modification of the merismos that, being a law, cannot be modified by decree. 
This sort of law, according to Hansen, would be a case of νόμος ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ. Yet the bill 
of the nomothetai ought not to refer to any individual, just to a modification, as noted by 
Rhodes. Hansen on the other hand claims that at least in one case the bill of the 
nomothetai must have encompassed a reference to the individual. The case of νόμος ἐπ᾽ 
ἀνδρὶ mentioned by Hansen (IG II2 222) is dubious. He claims that since the 
nomothetai have to ratify an annual pension for Peisitheides, their decision, that is that 
the apodektai allocate yearly a certain amount of money to the treasurer for the purpose 
of this pension, must have included the name of the honorand in order to be identifiable. 
I cannot see why. According to the decree, a certain amount of money ought to be paid 
daily to Peisitheides by the treasurer. The nomothetai have simply to ratify that the 
additional amount of money needed must be given to the treasurer yearly.470 The point is 
simply to provide the tamias with enough money in his budget to comply with the 
orders of the Assembly. There is no need to identify the money. The modification of the 
merismos is sufficient to account for the ratification by the nomothetai and no mention 
                                                
469 Hansen 1979-80: 90-9; 1979: 39-43; 1985: 360-2. The three decrees are IG II2 222 ll. 41-46; 330 ll. 15-
23; VII 4254 = SIG3 298 ll. 35-41. 
470 IG II2 222 ll. 44-6: τὸν ταμίαν τοῦ δήμου [τὸν ἀεὶ τ]αμ[ι]εύοντα διδόναι Πεισ[ιθείδηι] δραχμὴν 
τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκ τῶ[ν κατὰ ψηφί]σματα ἀναλισκομένων [τῶι δήμωι]· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νομοθέται[ς] τ[οὺς 
προέδρ]ους οἳ ἂν προεδρεύωσιν [καὶ τὸν ἐ]π[ισ]τάτην προσνομοθετῆ[σαι τὸ ἀρ]γύριον τ[ο]ῦτο 
μερίζειν τ[οὺς ἀποδ]έκτας τῶι ταμίαι τοῦ δήμ[ου εἰς τὸ]ν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον. ὁ δὲ τ[αμίας 
ἀπ]οδότω Πει[σι]θείδει κατὰ [τὴν πρυτ]ανείαν ἑκάστην. 
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of any quorum of six thousand is found in the decree; there is therefore no need to see 
here a case of νόμος ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ. 
To sum up, the many problems with this provision, in both its versions, and the 
absence of any mention of it anywhere else, both in literary sources and, as we have 
seen, in inscriptions, point to its inauthenticity.471 The mention in the orators of this 
practice is always found in connection with procedures, adeia and naturalization, 
concerned with a named individual. It is not surprising that a forger, well versed in the 
orators but unaware of the technicalities of Athenian legislation, inferred that the same 
practice must have been used in the case of a νόμος ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ. 
Thus, this document was probably reconstructed by a forger on the basis of 
information found in the orators. The stichometry does not allow us to tell whether it 
was in the Urexemplar of the speech but, given the general reliability of the 
stichometric documents analysed to this point, it is safer to believe that at least the last 
provision, but probably the whole document, was inserted much later. 
 
                                                
471 The last clause has been expunged by Schäfer, Lipsius, Taylor, Dindorf. The document has also been 
considered a forgery by Wayte 1882: 137, and more recently by Lepri Sorge 1979: 316. 
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4.10 Dem. 24.63: another law of Timocrates 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
Τιμοκράτης εἶπεν· ὁπόσοι Ἀθηναίων κατ᾽ εἰσαγγελίαν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἢ νῦν 
εἰσιν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν κατατεθῶσι, καὶ μὴ παραδοθῇ ἡ 
κατάγνωσις αὐτῶν τοῖς θεσμοθέταις ὑπὸ τοῦ γραμματέως τοῦ κατὰ 
πρυτανείαν κατὰ τὸν εἰσαγγελτικὸν νόμον, δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις εἰσάγειν 
τοὺς ἕνδεκα εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐντός τριάκονθ᾽ ἡμερῶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἂν 
παραλάβωσιν, ἐὰν μή τι δημοσίᾳ κωλύῃ, ἐὰν δὲ μή, ὅταν πρῶτον οἷόν τ᾽ ᾖ. 
κατηγορεῖν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἁλῷ, τιμάτω ἡ 
ἡλιαία περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. ἐὰν δ᾽ 
ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῇ. 
 
ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῇ 
P.Oxy.4.701 
 
δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις SPγρ. : δεδόχθαι τοῖς θεσμοθέταις AFY | εἰσαγαγεῖν A | ἐντός ante 
τριάκονθ᾽ SFYP : om. A P.Oxy.4.701 (si spatium respexeris) cf. Dem.21.47 | κωλύσῃ F | ἡ  ante 
ἡλιαία om. YPa | τέως FYP P.Oxy.4.701 : τε ἕως S : τε ἑως A (cf. § 64 τέως FYP P.Oxy.4.701 : τε 
ὡς S : τε ἕως A) 
 
Moved by Timocrates: as many Athenians as are now or will in the future be put in 
prison by an eisangelia in the Council, and whose preliminary verdicts of guilty have 
not been passed by the secretary of the Prytany to the thesmothetai according to the 
law on eisangeliai, it shall be resolved by the nomothetai that the Eleven bring them 
into court within thirty days from the day on which they receive them into custody, 
unless some public business prevents them, and if so, as soon as possible. Anyone 
among the qualified Athenians who wishes so shall be the prosecutor. If the culprit is 
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condemned, the Heliaia shall give him the punishment, pecuniary or otherwise, that 
they think fit. If he is condemned to pay a fine, he shall stay in prison until he has 
paid what he has been condemned to. 
 
It is impossible to calculate on the basis of the stichometry whether this document 
was part of the Urexemplar of the speech or not. It is reported consistently by all the 
medieval manuscripts, and a papyrus from the end of the 2nd century or the beginning of 
the 3rd, P.Oxy. 4.701, is evidence of its existence in at least part of the tradition at that 
stage of transmission. It is preceded in the speech by a document (§ 59) that cannot, as 
we have seen, be considered genuine, and whose last section at least has been forged 
later. The next document at § 71 is a perfect (except for a detail) replica of a section of 
the law of Timocrates already quoted at § 39-40. Both are stichometric documents 
whose text is almost totally consistent with the paraphrases provided by the orator 
through the speech. Our document here on the other hand, which purports to report 
another law previously passed by Timocrates, cannot have been drawn from the context, 
since Demosthenes in his paraphrase mentions only one short clause from it. Its 
assessment must therefore be based on the comparison of its contents with other 
information concerning eisangelia, and its language must be checked against 
contemporary Athenian inscriptions. 
After the reading of the document by the clerk Demosthenes at § 64 encourages 
the judges to pay careful attention and then asks the secretary to read again the last 
passage of the law (λέγ᾽ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάλιν). A further document reporting only 
the few words of the same law ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ 
follows in the speech, and afterwards the orator asks the judges: 'is it possible for a man 
to enact two more contradictory provisions than these: that convicted malefactors shall 
be kept in prison until they have paid their fines, and that these same malefactors may 
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present sureties, and not be imprisoned?'(ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ἐναντιώτερά τις δύο 
θείη τοῦ δεδέσθαι, τέως ἂν ἐκτείσωσι, τοὺς ἁλόντας, καὶ τοῦ καθιστάναι τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐγγυητάς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δεῖν;). Timocrates has therefore contradicted 
himself by passing two laws prescribing in one case that malefactors must stay in jail 
until they pay their debts, and in the other that they can avoid prison by providing 
sureties. This line of argument is undoubtedly relevant. Even more than the fact that 
Timocrates has failed to repeal a statute that conflicts with his law, the judges must have 
found it striking that the conflicting statute has been recently enacted by Timocrates 
himself.472 
The document in this form seems to be an amendment to the nomos eisangeltikos, 
aiming to limit the period for which someone can be held in prison awaiting trial 
following a provisional decision of the Council. This is not the place to discuss the 
procedure of eisangelia, and the (slightly) different interpretations offered by Hansen 
and Rhodes, based on their different understanding of the main focus of Athenian laws 
(procedural or substantive).473 It will suffice to follow the ancient sources and isolate an 
eisangelia to the Council for magistrates guilty of misconduct in office. The existence 
of such a procedure is clearly attested by Ath.Pol. 45.2: κρίνει δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ βουλὴ 
τὰς πλείστας, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὅσαι χρήματα διαχειρίζουσιν: οὐ κυρία δ᾽ ἡ κρίσις, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐφέσιμος εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἰσαγγέλλειν ἣν ἂν 
βούλωνται τῶν ἀρχῶν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις: ἔφεσις δὲ καὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον, ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἡ βουλὴ καταγνῷ. The Council is in charge of judging the 
conduct of the officials, yet their judgment is not definitive: the convicted official can 
appeal to the people's court. Moreover, any Athenian can indict an official for 
misconduct in front of the Council, and again the official has the right to appeal against 
                                                
472 MacDowell 2009: 189-90 considers this the best argument exploited by Demosthenes in the legal 
section of the speech. 
473 Cf. Hansen 1975: 21-8; Rhodes 1979: 106-14; Hansen 1979-80: 93-5. 
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the verdict to the people's court. Further details concerning the phase of the procedure 
held in the Council are provided by Dem. 47.42-3: γενομένης τοίνυν τῆς κρίσεως τῷ 
Θεοφήμῳ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατὰ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἣν ἐγὼ εἰσήγγειλα, καὶ 
ἀποδοθέντος λόγου ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ κρύβδην διαψηφισαμένων τῶν βουλευτῶν, 
ἑάλω ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ ἔδοξεν ἀδικεῖν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ διαχειροτονεῖν ἦν 
ἡ βουλὴ πότερα δικαστηρίῳ παραδοίη ἢ ζημιώσειε ταῖς πεντακοσίαις, ὅσου ἦν 
κυρία κατὰ τὸν νόμον... συνεχώρησα ὥστε τῷ Θεοφήμῳ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι 
δραχμῶν προστιμηθῆναι. The speaker starts an eisangelia to the Council following 
Theophemus' refusal to hand over some trierarchic equipment. The Council hears both 
parties and passes a verdict of guilty. Afterwards the Council votes again on the matter 
of whether to impose on Theophemus a fine no greater than 500 drachmas or to pass on 
the case to the people's court. They choose eventually to impose a fine of 25 drachmas, 
and the case is closed. If they had chosen to inflict a more serious penalty, then the case 
would have been judged by the people's court, and, according to the previously quoted 
passage of the Ath.Pol., the same would have happened if the convicted official chose to 
appeal against the fine. Ath.Pol. 59.4 makes clear that, in case of more serious penalties, 
or of appeals to the people's court, the thesmothetai are in charge of bringing the trial to 
court following the provisional verdicts (καταγνώσεις) of the Council: εἰσάγουσιν δὲ 
καὶ τὰς δοκιμασίας ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἁπάσαις, καὶ τοὺς ἀπεψηφισμένους ὑπὸ τῶν 
δημοτῶν, καὶ τὰς καταγνώσεις τὰς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς. 
Timocrates' law, if authentic, would define the rights of those provisionally 
convicted and imprisoned by the Council. That the Council had the power to imprison 
an individual is clearly attested by Demosthenes at § 144 of this speech, where he 
paraphrases a passage of the bouleutic oath: οὐδὲ δήσω Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα, ὃς ἂν 
ἐγγυητὰς τρεῖς καθιστῇ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τελοῦντας, πλὴν ἐάν τις ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῆς 
πόλεως ἢ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιὼν ἁλῷ, ἢ τέλος πριάμενος ἢ 
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ἐγγυησάμενος ἢ ἐκλέγων μὴ καταβάλῃ. The Council had the power to imprison 
individuals, unless they presented three sureties from the same census class, and in spite 
of their sureties when the charge was one of treason, of attempting to overthrow 
democracy, or when any tax farmer, his sureties or collector were in default. Moreover, 
the use of imprisonment in Athens as a precautionary measure is widely attested, and 
Antiphon's speech On the Murder of Herodes provides clear evidence.474 The document 
here deals with those who have been imprisoned by the Council as a precautionary 
measure, and are awaiting trial. To avoid endless imprisonment due to delay, it 
prescribes that in case the secretary κατὰ πρυτανείαν fails to pass on the provisional 
verdict (ἡ κατάγνωσις) of the Council to the thesmothetai, as prescribed in the nomos 
eisangeltikos, the Eleven, responsible for the prisons (Ath.Pol. 52.1), shall take the 
prisoner to trial in thirty days, unless some serious business prevents them from doing 
so. The document then allows any Athenian to be the accuser, and gives the Heliaia the 
power to decide the punishment.  The provision allowing any qualified Athenian to be 
the prosecutor is necessary since the eisangeltic procedure could be activated in many 
different ways: it could start because an individual presented an eisangelia, but also as a 
result of the apocheirotonia of an official at the kyria Assembly of every month,475 or 
perhaps at a debate in the Assembly invited by the Council after a catastrophe,476 or 
simply in the course of a debate, if the offence was relevant to that debate, or even as a 
result of the Council's supervisory work.477 In some of these cases the prosecutor at the 
trial would obviously be the same person who presented the eisangelia in the first place, 
but in some other cases there would not be any obvious prosecutor. The document ends 
with the provison that if the punishment is a fine, the convicted criminal must be re-
                                                
474 Cf. Rhodes 1981: 580; Hunter 1997: 301-7 and 316. 
475 Hansen 1975: 41-4 discusses many such cases and concludes that 'an apocheirotonia of a magistrate 
was normally the first step towards an eisangelia.' The same opinion is expressed by Harrison 1971: 59 
and Rhodes 1979: 110 n. 69. 
476 Rhodes 1979: 110. 
477 Cf. Hansen 1975: 31-3. 
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imprisoned until he pays it. This is the provision that Demosthenes wants the secretary 
to repeat, in order to stress the fact that Timocrates with his new law is contradicting a 
law he himself enacted. 
As is clear from this reconstruction, the document does not conflict with any other 
account of the procedure of eisangelia, and its provisions are in no way contradictory. 
In fact, it supplements our understanding of eisangelia by covering a blind spot in the 
procedure as we know it: the passage from the provisional verdict of the Council to the 
people's court. If authentic, Timocrates' law would be a sensible and humane provision: 
in Rhodes' words, a habeas corpus law.478 Of course the fact that the document would 
represent a sensible provision does not alone guarantee its authenticity. However the 
choice of two particular technical terms points to this hypothesis. First, the provisional 
verdict of the Council is called κατάγνωσις, which is used in this sense as a technical 
term in Ath.Pol. 59.4 (καὶ τὰς καταγνώσεις τὰς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς). Ath.Pol. 45.2 
consistently states that ἡ βουλὴ καταγνῷ. More importantly, in the document the 
κατάγνωσις must be transmitted to the thesmothetai ὑπὸ τοῦ γραμματέως τοῦ κατὰ 
πρυτανείαν. This official is called in inscriptions γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν only 
after 363/2, whereas earlier the name is invariably γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς.479 Another 
document in this speech (§ 42), which purports to be a statute of the late 5th century, the 
law of Diocles, rightly uses γραμματεὺς τῆς βουλῆς. That document was part of the 
Urexemplar. If we assume this documents is a forgery, we must also assume that a later 
forger was not only aware of this small change in terminology, which is unattested in 
the literary sources and can be appreciated only with a careful analysis of the 
inscriptions, but also correctly dated these two laws. 
                                                
478 Rhodes 1979: 107. 
479 Cf. Rhodes 1972: 134-8 and above pp. 179. 
 219 
Nothing in the document contradicts this impression of careful wording. In fact, 
the language is remarkably consistent with that of inscriptions: the first clause expresses 
the range of application of the measure with ὁπόσοι Ἀθηναίων κατ᾽ εἰσαγγελίαν ἐκ 
τῆς βουλῆς ἢ νῦν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ... ὁπόσοι is well attested in Athenian 
inscriptions as an alternative to ἐάν τις (cf. IG II2 1237 ll. 13-5 Ἱεροκλῆς εἶπε· ὁπόσοι 
μήπω διεδικάσθησαν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν Δημοτιωνιδῶν, διαδικάσαι... and IG II2 
98 ll. 9-11; IG II2 141 ll. 30-4; IG II2 1128 ll. 36-7). The expression κατ᾽ εἰσαγγελίαν 
is attested in Agora 19 Poletai P26 ll. 456-9 (οὐ]χ ὑπακούσαντος Φιλοκράτος εἰς 
[τὴν κρίσιν] κατὰ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἣν εἰσήγγει[λεν αὐτὸ]ν Ὑπερείδης), and the 
mention of the Council in connection with an eisangelia is found in IG II2 1631 ll. 398-
401 (εἶναι δὲ καὶ εἰσαγγελίαν αὐτῶν εἰς τὴμ βουλὴν). τὸ λοιπὸν moreover is very 
typical of Athenian official language, with the meaning 'in the future'.480 
The motion formula δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις is directly followed by an 
infinitive (εἰσάγειν τοὺς ἕνδεκα), instead of being isolated at the beginning of the 
statute (or decree) as usual (cf. Eukrates' law Agora 16 73 ll. 6-7: δεδόχθαι τοῖς 
νομοθέταις· ἐάν τις ἐπαναστῆι τῶι δήμωι...). Although this is unusual, it is not 
unattested: IG II2 244 ll. 6-7, a law (δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις τοὺς μὲν 
ἀρχι[τέκτονας τοὺς παρὰ τῆς πόλειως μισθοφοροῦντας καὶ ἄλλον τὸμ 
βουλόμενον εἰσενεγκεῖν συγγρα]φὰς συγγράψαντας καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων), 
shows the same structure with the infinitive, and many decrees confirm it (e.g. IG II2 
109 ll. 22-5; IG II2 11 ll. 9-11).  
As for the clause introduced by ὁπόσοι preceding the motion formula, we do not 
find a precise parallel, but drawing any conclusion from this would be risky; such a 
structure is meant to define a general category and to introduce a norm generally valid 
for the whole category. Such a norm would necessarily be a law. Yet our epigraphic 
                                                
480 See Harris 2006: 435-7. 
 220 
evidence for laws is very scanty,481 and the only comparable case is, again, Eukrates' 
law (Agora 16 73). Its wording, δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις· ἐάν τις ἐπαναστῆι τῶι 
δήμωι ἐπὶ τυραννίδι... cannot be considered the only possible one. In fact, we have in 
decrees many parallels for such a structure, but also many cases in which the motion 
formula is embedded in the course of the phrase. In honorary decrees for example we 
often find the enactment formula preceded by an ἐπειδὴ clause and followed by an 
infinitive (cf. IG II2 336 ll. 5-15 ἐπειδὴ Ἡρακλείδης Σαλαμίνιος διατελεῖ 
φιλοτιμούμενος πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων [...] δεδόχθαι τῶι δήμωι 
ἐπαινέσαι Ἡρακλείδην Χαρικλείδου Σαλαμίνιον καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι 
στεφάνωι and IG II2 112 ll. a12-16; IG II2 223 ll. a4-6; IG II2 448 ll. 7-12; ). Parallels 
are also structures like ὅπως ἂν ἡ ἀγορὰ ἡ ἐ[μ] Πειραε[ῖ] κ[α]τασ[κε]υασθ[εῖ] [...] 
δεδό[χ]θαι τῶι δήμωι τοὺς ἀγορανό[μ]ους τοὺς ἐμ Π[ε]ιραιεῖ ἐπι[μ]εληθῆν[α]ι 
ἁπάντων τούτων in IG II2 380 ll. 8-14 (cf. also IG II2 407 ll. 7-11; IG II2 487 ll. 10-4; 
IG II2 505 ll. 41-59). 
The expression τριάκονθ᾽ ἡμερῶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἂν παραλάβωσιν is confirmed by IG 
I3 55 l. 7 (πέ]ντε ἡμερῶν ἀφ’ ἑ̑ς ἂ[ν),482 and so is ὅταν πρῶτον οἷόν τ᾽ ᾖ by IG II2 
120 l. 26 (ὅτ[α]ν οἷόν τε ἦι).483  
The final section of the statute is perfectly consistent with the epigraphical 
evidence. The provision κατηγορεῖν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξεστιν is 
very typical (cf. Agora 16.56 ll. 24-5 Ἀθηνα][ίω]ν τῶι β[ο]λομένωι ο[ἷς ἔξεστι and 
SEG 21.493 l. 30 τῷ βουλοµένῳ ο̣ἷς ἔξ[εστι; 22.114 l. 10; 26.72 ll. 32-6). So is the next 
sentence: ἐὰν δ᾽ ἁλῷ, τιμάτω ἡ ἡλιαία περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι παθεῖν 
ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. The expression ἐὰν δ᾽ ἁλῷ is attested in a law (SEG 26.72 l. 35: ἐὰν δὲ 
ἁλῶι), and the following formula is often found in contexts similar to the present one 
                                                
481 See above p. 122 n. 281. 
482 For the use of timelines in Athenian official documents cf. above pp. 179. 
483 Cf. also IG II2 654 ll. 56-7: ὅταν πρῶτον ο[ἷόν] τ’ ἦι. 
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(cf. Agora 16.56 ll. 33 ἐ[πιθέσθω δὲ ἡ] Ἡλιαία ὅτι̣ ἂ̣ν δοκῆι ἄξιος εἶναι παθε̑ν ἢ 
ἀποτεῖσ[αι; SEG 32.81 ll. 4-6 προστιμάτω δὲ [α][ὐτῶι ἡ ἡλιαία ὅτου ἂ]ν δ[οκε]̑ι 
ἄξιος εἶναι ἀπ[ο][τεῖσαι; SEG 31.6 ll. 50-1 τιμάτο δὲ τὸ] δικαστέριον ότι ἂγ χ[ρε̑]ι ̣
παθε̑ν ἒ ἀ[ποτεῖσαι; IG I3 34 ll. 40-1; IG I3 68 ll. 50-2). 
The final sentence ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ ὅ τι ἂν 
αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῇ is partially (until ἐκτείσῃ) repeated word for word in the small 
document that follows the main one, and is confirmed by the orator's account. 
Moreover, it presents no syntactical problems, and its structures are attested in 
inscriptions (cf. e.g. IG II2 43 l. 61 ἐὰν] δὲ θανάτο τιμηθῆι; SEG 32.81 l. 6 καὶ 
δεδέσ]θ[ω ἕω]ς ̣ἂ[ν] ἐκτείσει).484 The only grammatical problem here is τέως ἂν. This 
is never found in Athenian inscriptions, where the form is invariably ἕως ἂν. τέως ἂν 
is also found in the following small document, and in the orator's account. However, 
these three occurrences are far from sure: in the document τέως is found in FYP and 
P.Oxy. 4.701, but S has τε ἕως, and A τε ἑως. In both the occurrences at § 64 τέως is 
found again in FYP and P.Oxy. 4.701, yet S has τε ὡς and A τε ἕως. The form appears 
in this speech also at § 81 in the text, and at § 104 in a spurious document, and in both 
cases the tradition is not consistent. The same happens in Dem. 19.326, 21.15, 56.14 
and Exordia 21.4. It is clear from this account that the medieval copyists tampered a lot 
with these forms, sometimes changing the Demosthenic text from one form, τέως ἂν, to 
the more common ἕως ἂν, and sometimes, probably, doing the opposite for 
consistency's sake. This is likely to be the case here. At any rate, it is impossible to 
choose between the two forms on textual grounds, and therefore no argument for or 
against the authenticity can be drawn from this detail. 
                                                
484 Cf. also IG II2 218 l. 32; 222 l. 36; 233 l. 12; 237 l. 24; 411 l. 13; 435 l. 11; 1196 l. a11; IG I3 61 l. 55; 
149 l. 15 
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To sum up, the document presents a sensible provision whose contents are 
consistent with the extant accounts of the procedure of eisangelia. Its language is 
consistent with that of contemporary inscriptions and no detail betrays a later origin. 
Moreover, some technical terms employed with propriety speak against the hypothesis 
of a later, non-Athenian forger. Therefore the document should be considered authentic, 
and likely to have been part of the original edition of the speech on which the 
stichometry was first noted. 
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4.11 Dem. 24.105: law on theft, maltreatment of parents and desertion 
ΝΟΜΟΙ ΚΛΟΠΗΣ, ΚΑΚΩΣΕΩΣ ΓΟΝΕΩΝ, ΑΣΤΡΑΤΕΙΑΣ 
῞Ο τι ἄν τις ἀπολέσῃ, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτὸ λάβῃ, τὴν διπλασίαν καταδικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ 
μή, τὴν δεκαπλασίαν πρὸς τοῖς ἐπαιτίοις. δεδέσθαι δ' ἐν τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ τὸν 
πόδα πένθ' ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ἴσας, ἐὰν προστιμήσῃ ἡ ἡλιαία. προστιμᾶσθαι 
δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ τιμήματος ᾖ.  
’Εὰν δέ τις ἀπαχθῇ, τῶν γονέων κακώσεως ἑαλωκὼς ἢ ἀστρατείας ἢ 
προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν νόμων εἴργεσθαι, εἰσιὼν ὅποι μὴ χρή, δησάντων 
αὐτὸν οἱ ἕνδεκα καὶ εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν, κατηγορείτω δὲ ὁ 
βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δ' ἁλῷ, τιμάτω ἡ ἡλιαία ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ 
ἀποτεῖσαι. ἐὰν δ' ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ. 
 
δεδέσθαι - ἡ ἡλιαία Lys.10.16 | ποδοκάκκῃ Harp. s.v π 76 Keaney | ’Εὰν δέ - ἑαλωκὼς Sud. s.v. 
ἅλω (α 1371) Adler - ἀστρατείας AB 123.11 
 
ΝΟΜΟΣ A | ΑΣΤΡΑΤΙΑΣ F | αὐτὸ λάβῃ codd. : ἀπολάβῃ Bernard | δεκαπλασίαν codd. : 
διπλασίαν Heraldus | ποδοκάκκῃ S | ἡμέρας δέκα τὸν πόδα (καὶ νύκτας ἴσας om.) Lys. | ἐπαχθῇ 
Sud. | γενεῶν S | ἀστρατίoς Fa | προειρημένων SYP | τῶν νόμων εἴργεσθαι codd. : τῶν νομίμων 
εἴργεσθαι Salmasius | εἴργασθαι Aa | ὅποι χρή (μὴ om.) A | εἰσαγόντων AP : εἰσαγόντων αὐτὸν 
SFY | ἀποτεῖσαι et ἐκτείσῃ Blass : ἀποτῖσαι et ἐκτίσῃ codd. 
 
LAWS ON THEFT, MALTREATMENTS OF PARENTS, DESERTION 
Whatever one should lose, if he recovers it, the punishment shall be twice the value, 
but if he does not, ten times the value in addition to the epaitiois (?). He shall be tied 
in the podokakke by the foot for five days and five nights, if the Heliaia imposes this 
additional penalty. Whoever wants shall impose this additional penalty when the 
penalty is discussed. 
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If someone is subjected to apagoge for entering where he is not allowed, despite 
having been convicted of mistreating the parents or of not reporting for duty or 
despite his exclusion from customary places having been proclaimed (?), the Eleven 
shall imprison him and bring him before the Heliaia. Anyone among the qualified 
Athenians who wishes so shall be the prosecutor. If the culprit is condemned, the 
Heliaia shall give him the punishment, pecuniary or otherwise, that they think fit. If 
he is condemned to pay a fine, he shall stay in prison until he has paid what he has 
been condemned to. 
 
The stichometry indicates that this document was not present in the Urexemplar 
of the speech. The word ποδοκάκκη on the other hand is found in Harpocration with a 
reference to this speech (s.v. π 76 Keaney). Since this word does not appear anywhere 
else in the speech, late 2nd century, the probable date of composition of the Lexicon of 
the Ten Orators, must be considered the terminus ante quem for the insertion of this 
document. 
The context of this document is the discussion of the reasons why the law of 
Timocrates is harmful for the city. The speaker has previously shown that Timocrates 
enacted this law without following the proper procedure, and that his statute contradicts 
many existing laws. Now he is concerned with demonstrating that its effects would be 
harmful for the community. At § 102 he summarizes the last section of the speech: the 
law does not allow courts to impose additional penalties, gives impunity to those who 
have committed crimes against the public, undermines the campaigns in defence of the 
city and destroys its financial administration. In addition to this, it helps criminals, 
parent abusers and deserters. In the next paragraph (§ 103) the speaker develops this 
argument. He attributes the laws that he is about to discuss to Solon, and then claims 
that the ancient lawgiver was a legislator who had nothing in common with Timocrates. 
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In fact, he ordered that a thief, if the assessed penalty for him is not death, can receive 
the additional penalty of imprisonment (προστιμᾶν αὐτῷ δεσμόν). Solon also 
prescribed that if someone convicted for mistreating his parents enters the agora, he 
shall be imprisoned. The same is true for those who after a conviction for desertion 
behave as if they were in possession of their full rights. Timocrates instead grants all of 
them impunity by allowing them to provide sureties and thus avoid imprisonment. At § 
104 Demosthenes asks the clerk to read out these laws (ἀνάγνωθι δὲ καὶ τούτους 
τοὺς νόμους). The plural seems to refer to a law for each category discussed in the 
previous paragraph, and we would expect a law about thieves, one about those who 
abuse their parents and one about deserters. Our document includes only two statutes, 
one about thieves and the second about those who abuse their parents and deserters 
together. My treatment will follow this arrangement, and I will discuss first the section 
of the document purporting to be the law on theft and then the second section. 
At § 103 Demosthenes states that thieves, if they have not received the death 
penalty, can be condemned to the additional punishment of imprisonment. At § 108 
begins a long summary of the legal arguments of the speech. Our section is summarized 
at § 113-5. This summary happens to provide more details about the law on theft quoted 
in our section than does the section itself.485 Demosthenes again claims that Timocrates 
as a lawgiver does not resemble Solon at all. Solon did not help wrongdoers. Instead he 
ordered that if someone steals goods for more than 50 drachmas in daytime, there shall 
be apagoge to the Eleven. If someone steals goods for any value at night, anyone may 
kill him, wound him in the pursuit or employ the apagoge to the Eleven. When a thief is 
subject to apagoge, the penalty is always death. The penalty is also death for those who 
have stolen something worth more than ten drachmas from the Lyceum, the Academy, 
                                                
485 In general about Athenian legislation on theft cf. Cohen 1983 with the correctives of MacDowell's 
review (1984) and Harris 2006: 373-90. 
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the Cynosarges, some gymnasium or the harbours. This description fits very well with, 
and expands, what we know about the procedure of apagoge against kakourgoi. 
Ath.Pol. 52.1 explains that 'the Eleven punish with death those who are arrested as 
thieves (kleptas), enslavers (andrapodistas) and robbers (lopodutas) if they confess, 
while if they dispute the charge, they bring them before the court. If they are acquitted, 
the Eleven release them, and, if not, execute them.' The condition for employing 
apagoge was that the kakourgos was caught ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ ('when guilt is obvious').486 
An alternative, rather shadowy procedure to be employed in the same cases was 
ephegesis, which differed for apogoge only in that the prosecutor himself did not arrest 
the wrongdoer, but had the Eleven arrest him.487 Demosthenes seems to overlook it here. 
Demosthenes continues by stating that if someone is convicted instead in a dike 
klopes, he shall have to pay twice the assessed value of the stolen goods (διπλάσιον 
ἀποτεῖσαι τὸ τιμηθέν) and the judges shall be able to inflict the additional penalty of 
five days and nights of imprisonment, so that everyone will see that he has been 
imprisoned. Demosthenes then explains the rationale of this provision: a thief cannot 
get away with his crime by simply refunding the value of the object he has stolen, 
otherwise stealing would be all in all a good deal. Thus Solon provided that he had to 
pay twice as much, and because of the imprisonment live the rest of his life in shame. 
Timocrates instead enacted a law that allows the thief to pay back the simple value of 
the stolen goods and get away without any additional punishment.488 
From these two summaries the law about theft quoted at § 105 seems to have 
included at least a section on the kinds of theft prosecuted through apagoge and whose 
                                                
486 Isae. 4.28; Dem. 14.81; Aeschin. 1.91; Poll. 8.49; Phot. s.v. ἔνδεκα. For the meaning of the expression 
ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ cf. Harris 2006: 373-90. 
487 Dem. 22.25-7 with Carey 2004 for the correct understanding of the passage. Cf. Hansen 1976: 24 for 
the procedure. 
488 The descriptions of the dike klopes are consistent and must be accurate. This does not mean however 
that Demosthenes' legal argument here works. The law of Timocrates dealt with the additional penalty of 
imprisonment only for public debtors, whereas a thief had to return the money to his victim, not to the 
state. The law of Timocrates would not have applied to thieves. As usual, Demosthenes' reports of the 
provisions of the laws read out are accurate, but their interpretation is not necessarily convincing. 
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punishment was death (at § 103 the very short summary begins with a reference to the 
cases in which penalty is death) and a section on the dike klopes,489 a private procedure 
by which the thief had to refund twice the value of the goods stolen and could receive 
the additional penalty of five nights and five days of imprisonment. 
The inserted document is not consistent with this description. In particular it does 
not include any section concerned with theft prosecuted through apagoge. It could be 
that Demosthenes is here giving a more extensive account, and the quoted law was 
abbreviated so that it included only the procedure that could result in imprisonment, that 
is the dike klopes. It is also possible, and more likely since the document has been 
inserted later, that the editor chose to insert only the section of the law concerned with 
imprisonment. However, it is implausible that a later editor who had access to the 
original law decided to insert only a small portion of it, neglecting to mention the 
provisions that Demosthenes discusses extensively. 
Another discrepancy is that Demosthenes asserts that the main punishment in a 
dike klopes is διπλάσιον ἀποτεῖσαι τὸ τιμηθέν, whereas the document provides that 
'whatever one should lose, if he recovers it, the punishment shall be twice the value, but 
if he does not, ten times the value in addition to the epaitiois.' First, there is no mention 
of such a distinction in Demosthenes' summary (nor in any other ancient source). 
Second, even the phrase stating that 'the punishment shall be twice the value' seems 
mistaken. Demosthenes at § 115 explains the expression διπλάσιον ἀποτεῖσαι τὸ 
τιμηθέν stating that Solon did not accept that one could get away with theft by 
returning only what he stole, but he had to pay twice as much (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν 
διπλάσια καταθεῖναι). Timocrates instead provided that he had to return the simple 
value, and not the double (ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἁπλᾶ μέν, ἃ δεῖ διπλάσια, καταθήσουσιν 
                                                
489 No sign here of the shadowy graphe klopes, mentioned only at Dem. 22.27. Cohen 1983: 45-9 argues 
that this procedure was available only against those who stole public property. MacDowell 1984 is not 
convinced, and believes in a wider range of application. There is no decisive evidence about this 
procedure, and a clear understanding of it is not necessary for the sake of my argument. 
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παρεσκεύασε). This makes it clear that the penalty was to return twice the value of the 
stolen goods, and not twice their value in addition to the stolen goods themselves. The 
document instead provides that if the goods are recovered (simple value) the 
punishment shall be twice their value, that is, in addition to the goods themselves. This 
contradicts Demosthenes' wording.  
Third, the words 'ten times the value in addition to the epaitiois' also present 
problems: a penalty for theft of ten times the value of the stolen goods is unknown to 
the sources. Demosthenes at § 114 clearly states that the penalty was double the value. 
His statement is confirmed by Aulus Gellius (9.18): 'Solon sua lege in fures non (ut 
antea Draco) mortis, sed dupli poena vindicandum existimavit.'490 This passage must 
derive from an independent source, and not from Demosthenes, since Gellius asserts 
that under Solon's law death was no longer a viable punishment for theft, whereas 
Demosthenes lists in his passage plenty of cases of theft for which the penalty was 
death. Heraldus, the old commentator on Petit's Leges Atticae proposed to emend 
δεκαπλασίαν to διπλασίαν, and this emendation has become the vulgata.491 However, 
since the manuscripts are all consistent in reporting the reading δεκαπλασίαν,492 such 
an emendation would de facto correct the text into authenticity. It is methodologically 
sounder to accept the paradosis as it stands, and either to explain δεκαπλασίαν or to 
consider it evidence of clumsy forgery. Cohen has tried to defend the plausibility of a 
penalty of ten times the value of the stolen goods by pointing out that Demosthenes 
himself at § 112 contemplates such a penalty for thieves. However that passage refers to 
magistrates convicted for theft or embezzlement at their euthynai. That in such cases the 
logistai could inflict this penalty is confirmed by Ath.Pol. 54.2, but this has nothing to 
                                                
490 Paying double the value of the goods stolen is the penalty for furtum nec manifestum also in Roman 
law. Cf. Gai. Inst. 3.190; Gell. NA 11.18.15. 
491 Cf. Harrison 1971: 166 n. 5; MacDowell 1978: 148; Saunders 1990: 75; Harris 2006: 380. The recent 
edition by Dilts accepts the emendation. Cf. Pelloso 2008: 108-9 nn. 219-20 for previous bibliography on 
δεκαπλασίαν. 
492 Cf. also Moneti 2001: 101 and Pelloso 2008: 108. 
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do with actual thieves that stole private property and can hardly be used as evidence that 
such a penalty was contemplated when the stolen goods were not recovered.493 The 
penalties for magistrates were obviously different and more severe. This passage, rather 
than a confirmation of the δεκαπλασίαν penalty, is more likely to have been 
misinterpreted by a forger as referring to the dike klopes, and be therefore his source for 
the δεκαπλασίαν fine. 
The paradosis must be accepted as it stands and speaks against the authenticity of 
the document. Yet even if we accept the emendation, the text still conflicts with 
Demosthenes' account. It would in fact provide that in case the stolen goods are not 
recovered the thief must pay twice their value πρὸς τοῖς ἐπαιτίοις. The meaning of this 
expression is unclear. Poll. 8.22-3 explains it as referring to the additional penalties. 
The penalty of paying twice the value of the stolen goods would be inflicted in addition 
to the further penalties, namely, according to the document, confinement in the 
stocks.494 This reading makes no sense. What is the point in inflicting the main 
punishment (payment of twice the value of the stolen goods) in addition to (that is, 
after: πρὸς) a penalty which has not been imposed yet, and perhaps will not be, since it 
is only optional?495 It makes much better sense to accept Reiske's explanation of the 
expression: 'praeter simplum valorem eius rei, quam quis furto avertisse accusatur'.496 
However, if we accept this explanation, we encounter the same difficulty as with the 
penalty for stealing goods later recovered: the payment of twice the value is imposed in 
addition to the payment of the value of the goods themselves. The thief must in fact pay 
thrice as much as he has stolen instead of twice as much as clearly stated by 
                                                
493 Pace Cohen 1982: 62-4 and Pelloso 2008: 108-9 n. 220. The other evidence adduced, Plat. Leg. 914b 
is hardly relevant. 
494 This is the interpretation of Wayte 1882: 173. 
495 Cf. for further reasons to reject Pollux's view Moneti 2001: 102. 
496 Reiske 1822: 344, endorsed by Lipsius 1905-15: 441 n. 79; Harrison 1968: 166 and recently by Moneti 
2001: 102 and Pelloso 2008: 109 n. 221. 
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Demosthenes at § 115. The conflict with Demosthenes' words is impossible to 
eliminate. 
Another suspect feature of the first sentence of the document is that ἐπαίτια is 
never found in Attic inscriptions, nor is the adjective ἐπαίτιος with any of its 
meanings.497 Moreover the verb λαμβάνω is never found in Classical sources with the 
meaning 'to recover'. The proper verb would be ἀπολαμβάνω.498 The sentence as it 
stands can hardly have been part of an authentic Athenian statute. 
The next sentence, δεδέσθαι δ' ἐν τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ τὸν πόδα πένθ' ἡμέρας καὶ 
νύκτας ἴσας, ἐὰν προστιμήσῃ ἡ ἡλιαία ('He shall be tied in the podokakke by one 
foot for five days and five nights, if the Heliaia imposes this additional penalty') seems 
to be confirmed by Lys. 10.16, which quotes some sentences of ancient laws of Solon to 
point out the use and the meaning of archaic words. The first of these quotations runs 
like this: δεδέσθαι δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ ἡμέρας δέκα τὸν πόδα, ἐὰν μὴ 
προστιμήσῃ ἡ ἡλιαία. Lysias explains that ἐν τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ means ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ('in 
the stocks'). In this passage the number 10 has been customarily emended to 5,499 and 
the μὴ athetized500 to make it consistent with our document. However, as correctly 
observed by Carey in his recent edition of the speech,501 eandem legem esse non 
necesse. Carey still athetizes μὴ, but Todd has rightly pointed out that the provision 
makes perfect sense with it: 'the point would presumably be to make the podokkake the 
minimum penalty unless the court imposed anything further'.502 Moreover, in Lys.10.17, 
a couple of lines later a law on theft is introduced with the words λέγε ἕτερον νόμον 
                                                
497 In legal prose the adjective is found only once (Lys. 7.39) with the meaning 'unpleasant' or 
'blameworthy', and therefore its use in this passage has nothing to do with the meaning it carries in our 
document. See Todd 2007: 539. 
498 Bernard has in fact emended αὐτὸ λάβῃ in ἀπολάβῃ, but this is methodologically unacceptable. 
499 First by Taylor 1739: 177. 
500 First by Auger 1783: 212. 
501 Carey 2007: 93. See already Hillgruber 1988: 26, 66-8. 
502 Todd 2007: 680. 
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('read another law'). This suggests that the sentence just quoted does not come from a 
law on theft.503 
Thus there is no reason for identifying the two texts. The text in Lys. 10.16 does 
not seem to come from a law on theft,504 and the provisions of the two texts are 
different: one provides that thieves can receive the additional penalty of confinement in 
the stocks for five days, whereas the other provides that for some unknown category of 
criminals the minimum punishment is ten days in the stocks. The mention of Solon as 
the author of the law on theft at Dem. 24.103 and the provision summarized at § 114 
according to which imprisonment (or confinement) can be imposed on a thief as an 
additional penalty, so that everybody sees that he has been imprisoned (or confined; 
δεσμὸν τῷ κλέπτῃ, πένθ᾽ ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ἴσας, ὅπως ὁρῷεν ἅπαντες αὐτὸν 
δεδεμένον) can have prompted a forger to believe that Demosthenes is here in fact 
commenting on the law quoted at Lys. 10.16, which provides for confinement in the 
stocks. One should also note that at Dem. 24.146 the orator quotes and comments on a 
provision stating that if one is subject to endeixis and apagoge the Eleven shall confine 
him in the stocks (τὸν δ᾽ ἐνδειχθέντα ἢ ἀπαχθέντα δησάντων οἱ ἕνδεκα ἐν τῷ 
ξύλῳ). The mention of the Eleven and of the procedure of apagoge, as in the summary 
of the law on theft at § 113-114, convinced the forger that Demosthenes is referring to 
the same law, and the expression ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ, the same used by Lysias to translate ἐν 
τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ, must have reinforced his idea that the law quoted here was the one 
discussed at Lys. 10.16. So there is no reason to believe that whoever composed (or 
inserted) this document had access to any independent source. The imperfect 
correspondance with Lysias' discussion does not prove the authenticity of the document. 
                                                
503 Hillgruber 1988: 66. Todd 2007: 680 rebuts this argument claiming that in Athens laws were organized 
by procedure and magistrate, and not by substance, and therefore these might be two different laws on 
theft, but see Harris, 'Substance vs. Procedure in Athenian Law' forthcoming in DIKE. 
504 In Pergamum slaves that used springwater in forbidden ways without informing their owner were 
given ten days in the stocks (δεδέσθω ἐν τῶι ξύλωι ἡμέρας δέκα: OGI 483.177 f. = SEG 13.521.190 
f.). 
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It is more likely to be the source of a forger. In fact, since Lysias makes it clear that the 
expression ἐν τῇ ποδοκάκκῃ was not understood in the fourth century, we would 
expect that, if it was actually found in the law, Demosthenes would have explained it. 
The fact that Demosthenes fails to do so is circumstantial evidence against the 
authenticity of the document. 505 
The last sentence of the first law of the document does not make any sense. It 
provides that 'whoever wants shall impose this additional penalty when the penalty is 
discussed' (προστιμᾶσθαι δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ τιμήματος ᾖ). The 
previous sentence stated that the Heliaia must impose the additional penalty. The only 
way to make sense of this sentence is to interpret προστιμᾶσθαι as 'propose the 
additional penalty'.506 This is not in itself impossible,507 but using the same verb twice in 
quick succession with two different meanings is 'a very confused mode of expression'.508 
But even if we accept this interpretation, the provision is still unacceptable. In Attic law 
courts, when the penalty was not fixed by law, it was the accuser and the defendant who 
proposed the penalties at the timesis, not ὁ βουλόμενος. In fact, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that anyone except the accuser and the defendant could propose the 
                                                
505 Hillgruber 1988: 66-9 considers this law a forgery and notes that Demosthenes at § 114 seems to refer 
to imprisonment, and not to confinement in the stocks. Todd 2007: 679-80 counters that the final clause 
ὅπως ὁρῷεν ἅπαντες αὐτὸν δεδεμένον points to stocks in an outside location, where everyone can see 
the prisoner, rather than to prison. Thus also Ruschenbusch 1968: 13 and MacDowell 1978: 257. I am 
dubious about this inference: at § 115 Demosthenes makes this statement clearer by saying that a thief, 
having been imprisoned (or confined), would live the rest of his life in shame (δεθέντα δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ 
τῷ τιμήματι ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ζῆν ἤδη τὸν ἄλλον βίον). The element of shame and deep humiliation was 
present in the penalty of imprisonment as well, and is attested by many sources (Antiph. 5.18; Dem. 
24.87, 125; cf. Dem. Ep. 2.17). Plut. Phoc. 36.1-2 shows that often the procession to the prisons after the 
arrest amounted to a proper spectacle, and the prisoner was sometimes submitted to abuse (cf. Hunter 
1997: 318-9 for an insightful analysis of the social effects of imprisonment). Thus, there is hardly any 
need for a reference to confinement in the stocks to explain this passage. It is more likely that 
Demosthenes is simply referring to prison, as he does throughout the speech. The forger misunderstood 
these passages. 
506 Cf. Wayte 1882: 172, who however concludes that the expression is unacceptable. 
507 This use is not attested for the compound προστιμάω, but is found with τιμάω (e.g. Pl. Ap. 36b; Grg. 
486b; Dem. 25.74). 
508 Wayte 1882: 172. 
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penalty.509 More importantly, this is a dike klopes, not a graphe, and therefore it is not ὁ 
βουλόμενος  that brings the charge, but the victim.510 
The first section of this document therefore does not present any piece of 
information which could not be easily drawn from some passage in the orators. It 
presents on the other hand linguistic forms which are unparalleled in Athenian 
inscriptions. Finally its provisions are inconsistent with other sources about Athenian 
law. It cannot therefore be an authentic Athenian statute. 
The rest of the law read out by the secretary at § 105, or better, the other law(s) to 
be read out, should be concerned with parent abusers and deserters. As we have seen, at 
§ 103, just before the laws are read out, and therefore where the speaker is more likely 
to be trustworthy, Demosthenes mentions only three categories: thieves, convicted 
parent abusers (τις ἁλοὺς τῆς κακώσεως τῶν γονέων) and convicted deserters 
(ἀστρατείας τις ὄφλῃ). We have already dealt with the crime of theft. As for the other 
two categories, according to Demosthenes, if a convicted parent abuser enters the 
agora, or if a convicted military shirker behaves as though he were still in possession of 
full citizenship rights, Solon prescribed that he must be imprisoned. Comparison with 
passages from Andocides' On the Mysteries and Ps.-Aristotle's Constitution of the 
Athenians will provide us with better understanding of Demosthenes' argument. 
Andocides (1.74) lists different categories of atimoi and mentions among others 
those who leave their place in battle (ὁπόσοι λίποιεν τὴν τάξιν), the deserters (ἢ 
ἀστρατείας) and the cowards (ἢ δειλίας), together with parent abusers (ἢ τοὺς γονέας 
κακῶς ποιοῖεν) as atimoi deprived of their personal citizenship rights, but retaining 
their property (οὗτοι πάντες ἄτιμοι ἦσαν τὰ σώματα, τὰ δὲ χρήματα εἶχον). It is 
clear therefore that the punishment for these crimes was loss of rights. Lys. 14.5 also 
                                                
509 Cf. Harrison 1968: 80-2; MacDowell 1978: 254-8. 
510 Cf. e.g. MacDowell 1978: 57-61. 
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informs us that λιποτάξιον and δειλία were listed together with deserters (ὁπόσοι ἂν 
μὴ παρῶσιν ἐν τῇ πεζῇ στρατιᾷ; Lys. 14.7 ἀστρατείας) in the same law. Aeschin. 
3.175-6 lists the same three categories as part of the same law and adds that people 
convicted of these offences could not enter the agora, the temples or wear a crown. 
These are some of the consequences of atimia, so the passage confirms Andocides' 
statement that these categories were atimoi.511 Aeschin. 1.28 also states that atimia is the 
punishment for parent abusers. 
Here Demosthenes lists specific categories of atimoi to make his account more 
vivid, but in fact he refers to imprisonment as the punishment for atimoi who violate the 
conditions of their atimia. This punishment is described in detail in Ath.Pol. 63.3: if 
someone serves as a judge while being a state debtor or an atimos, he is subject to 
endeixis and tried. If convicted, the judges decide what penalty he must pay, and if the 
penalty is a fine, he must be imprisoned until the fine is paid. 
Demosthenes claims that atimoi that violate the conditions of atimia must be 
imprisoned and does not mention that this occurs as the result of a failure to pay a fine. 
However this only shows that he is providing a quick and simplified account of the 
procedure described at Ath.Pol. 63.3,512 not that he is referring to imprisonment at 
another stage of procedure,513 or twisting the letter of the law.514 Demosthenes' point 
                                                
511 Cf. MacDowell 1963: 111-3. 
512 Cf. Rhodes 1981: 703. 
513 Scafuro 2005: 59 states that 'the reference to imprisonment in c. 103 is so elliptical, and follows so 
briskly upon the offense, that it is difficult to view the imprisonment as the result of an inability to pay a 
fine imposed by a court after a trial that is not mentioned, rather than as immediate and custodial 
imprisonment before the trial takes place.' Scafuro therefore claims, first, that Demosthenes here refers to 
'custodial imprisonment before the trial' rather than to imprisonment on failure to pay a fine and, second, 
she concludes that 'Demosthenes' aim once again appears to be a sensational depiction of the 
consequences of Timokrates' law'. It is certainly possible that Demosthenes here is deliberately 'elliptic' to 
give the impression that Timocrates' law has a very wide application. However, custodial (or rather 
precautionary) imprisonment is never mentioned, and if it were, it would be completely out of place, 
since Timocrates' law deals with imprisonment for state debtors, not with precautionary imprisonment. It 
is difficult to argue, without a specific mention of precautionary imprisonment, that Demosthenes would 
here be alluding to a kind of imprisonment that does not fit his argument and ignoring the kind of 
imprisonment that perfectly does. 
514 Mirhady 2005: 71 rightly notes that Demosthenes summarizes this law as if the punishment for atimoi 
trespassing was simply imprisonment, and 'does not dwell on the fact that imprisonment could be 
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here is that imprisonment is an additional penalty for such serious categories of 
criminals, and Timocrates with his law allows them to present sureties and thus avoid 
prison. His argument works because imprisonment in this case is a penalty added on top 
of a fine, otherwise it would not make any sense. Demosthenes' account is, as it must be 
for his argument's sake, consistent with the other sources about penalties for atimoi 
violating the conditions of their atimia. 
Other passages of the speech do not contradict this reconstruction; indeed they 
often confirm it. At § 102 Demosthenes states that Timocrates' law helps malefactors 
(τοῖς κακούργοις), parricides (τοῖς πατραλοίαις) and deserters (τοῖς ἀστρατεύτοις). 
Demosthenes wants to convey the impression that Timocrates' law has a wide range of 
applications, and that it helps very serious criminals. Therefore, thieves become generic 
kakourgoi and parent abusers become parricides. It must be noted however that in our 
sources thieves are the category of wrongdoers most often identified as kakourgoi, and 
the two terms are often used as synonyms.515 So Demosthenes is here probably 
stretching the letter of the law, but his list is still consistent with § 103.516 Similar lists 
recur often in the speech. At § 107, still in the vicinity of the quotation of the law, 
Demosthenes claims that Timocrates should be ashamed, since he subverts the laws that 
protect old age and favours thieves, wrongdoers (τοὺς κακούργους) and deserters 
(τοὺς ἀστρατεύτους) more than his fatherland. Again, there is no need here to read 
τοὺς κακούργους as a further category. It is just a specification of the previous 
category: the thieves. At § 119, in the summary of the previous section of the speech, 
                                                                                                                                          
contingent on failure to pay a fine'. However, this is in my opinion understood, rather than ignored; after 
all, Timocrates' law was about state debtors imprisoned on failure to pay their debt. Again why should 
Demosthenes twist the meaning of a law that perfectly supports his argument as it stands? 
515 Cf. Hansen 1976: 47 with Antiph. 5.9; Dem. 23.26; Xen. Hell.1.7.22. 
516 Scafuro 2005: 58 claims that at § 102 'the misrepresentations are obvious', since patroloiai and 
astrateuoi are punished with atimia, not with imprisonment. Demosthenes is here introducing the topic of 
the new law without entering into detail about the provisions. In the next paragraph he will be more 
precise and explain that imprisonment is the penalty for convicted patroloiai and astrateuoi trespassing. I 
cannot see here any misrepresentation. Timocrates' law, allowing convicted patroloiai and astrateuoi who 
trespass to avoid imprisonment, in fact helps these categories (καὶ τοῖς πατραλοίαις καὶ τοῖς 
ἀστρατεύτοις βοηθοῦντα τέθηκε τὸν νόμον).  
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Demosthenes again mentions the three categories, and gives two terms for each: the 
thieves become also temple-robbers (τοῖς κλέπταις, τοῖς ἱεροσύλοις), the parent 
abusers are called parricides, and therefore become murderers (τοῖς πατραλοίαις, τοῖς 
ἀνδροφόνοις), the deserters leave their place during the battle (τοῖς ἀστρατεύτοις, 
τοῖς λιποῦσι τὰς τάξεις). With some amplification, Demosthenes still sticks to the 
three categories of § 103.517 We should not expect in the law further categories of 
temple robbers, murderers and deserters. 
Some of these categories are also anticipated at § 60: Demosthenes claims that 
traitors to the commonwealth and parent abusers are far worse than tax farmers, 
excluded by Timocrates from the benefits of his law. He seems to add the category of 
those that have unclean hands (οἱ μὴ καθαρὰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔχοντες), and finishes with 
εἰσιόντες δ᾽ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, 'and enter the agora', which can refer either to the last 
category or to all of them. This passage poses many problems: first, what does 
εἰσιόντες δ᾽ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν refer to? Since the punishment for parent abusers was 
atimia and not imprisonment, it is safer to conclude that the specification refers to all 
categories: imprisonment, consistently with the other passages and with external 
evidence, is an additional penalty for trespassers.518 Second, who are οἱ μὴ καθαρὰς 
τὰς χεῖρας ἔχοντες? Scafuro assumes that this must refer to men accused of killing, 
bringing Ant. 5.11 as evidence. However, she notes that Ant. 5.82 and Andoc. 1.95 
show that killers who have not been charged were described in the same way. 
Moreover, Dem. 23.72-3, 37.59 and 36.22 imply that someone convicted of akousios 
phonos and exiled is polluted until the family of the killed person pardons him.519 
Scafuro argues therefore that the allusion is here to homicide, and killers are another 
category to be expected in the laws quoted at § 105. Mirhady on the other hand observes 
                                                
517 This is rightly stressed by Mirhady 2005: 72-73. 
518 This is also the conclusion drawn by Scafuro 2005: 57-8. 
519 Scafuro 2005: 58. 
 237 
that parent abusers elsewhere are called parricides, and at § 119 even become 
ἀνδροφόνοι. The list at § 60 is connected in asyndeton, and there is no way to know 
what is apposition of a previously mentioned category and what is a new category. 
Those with unclean hands might just be an amplification of the previously mentioned 
parent abusers. Mirhady concludes therefore that it is far from clear whether 
Demosthenes is here adding another category, killers, or not. He might just be 
amplifying the crimes of deserters and parent abusers calling them 'traitors' and 
'murderers'. The third problem is: how relevant is this passage for the laws quoted at § 
105? However we interpret the list, the categories are not the same as in the summaries 
of the laws (thieves are missing), and the list appears long before the laws we are 
concerned with are even mentioned. Demosthenes is here picking random categories of 
serious criminals who can take advantage of Timocrates' law to contrast them with 
defaulting tax farmers, who cannot, to show that the law of Timocrates is unfair. 
Whatever the interpretation of the passage, it can hardly tell us anything about the laws 
quoted at § 105. 
To sum up, the second (and a third) section of the document quoted should be 
concerned with two separate categories: parent abusers and deserters. It should state 
that, if convicted parent abusers or deserters transgress the conditions of their atimia, 
they must be tried and, if their penalty is a fine, they must be imprisoned until the fine is 
paid. The document on the other hand states that if someone is arrested by apagoge 
(ἀπαχθῇ) for entering where he is not allowed, since he is a convicted parent abuser 
(τῶν γονέων κακώσεως ἑαλωκὼς), deserter (ἢ ἀστρατείας) ἢ προειρημένον αὐτῷ 
τῶν νόμων εἴργεσθαι (that is, a murderer), 'the Eleven shall imprison him and bring 
him before the Heliaia'. 
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The first problem with this wording is caused by the verb ἀπαχθῇ. This verb 
clearly refers to the procedure of apagoge.520 However, in all our sources the procedure 
used against atimoi that violate the conditions of their atimia is invariably endeixis.521 
Hansen argues that the document as we have it might report just the second part of the 
law, and the apagoge might be the effect of an endeixis previously mentioned. 
However, this explains ignotum per ignotius. Moreover, if the law began with a 
provision allowing endeixis against certain categories, then there would be no reason to 
repeat the categories again in the section preserved.522 Apagoge against atimoi is 
unparalleled in our sources, and its presence here speaks against the authenticity of the 
document. 
The second problematic expression is ἢ προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν νόμων 
εἴργεσθαι. This expression has been traditionally interpreted as referring to accused 
killers subject to public proclamation and excluded from customary places.523 The 
reason for this identification is the almost verbatim correspondence of this expression 
with Ant. 6.34, 35, 40. The same expression refers to killers in Pl. Leg. 871a and 873b, 
in Dem. 23.42 and in Ath.Pol. 57.3. In all these passages νόμων is replaced by 
νόμιμων, and has been therefore emended accordingly in our document by Salmasius. 
The only other case in which the expression occurs, again with reference to accused 
killers, with νόμων is Lyc. 1.65.524  
                                                
520 Cf. e.g Antiph. 5.85, Isae. 4.28, Dem. 23.80, 24.146, 209. For a full treatment of the procedure see 
Hansen 1976. 
521 For reference see Hansen 1976: 94-5 nn. 2-3. MacDowell 1990: 280 and 1985: 73-4 has argued that 
Dem. 21.59-61 might be another case of apagoge against atimoi. However the language used there 
(ἥψατο; ἐξαγαγεῖν οὐδὲ κωλῦσαι; ἐπιλαβόμενον τῇ χειρὶ) is never used for apagoge. Cf. Scafuro 
2005: 55 n. 11. 
522 I rework here an argument formulated for different purposes in Gagarin 1979: 317 n. 49. See also 
Scafuro 2005: 56, who argues that a participle ('If someone [having first been denounced] is arrested...') 
would solve this problem but observes that if this is the case, why would the transcriber of the law have 
elided it? In any case, as I have argued in the introduction, emending the text is acceptable only if the law 
can be deemed authentic on different grounds. 
523 Cf. MacDowell 1963: 26-7; Hansen 1976: 99-100; Gagarin 1979: 315-6; Hansen 1981: 17-21; Scafuro 
2005; Phillips 2008: 129-30 n. 60. 
524 Stephanus corrected it in νόμιμων. 
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Whether the expression is acceptable with νόμων or not, its presence here causes 
many problems. First, as we have seen, killers are never mentioned in the summaries 
and allusions to the law throughout the speech, and should not be here. Second, 
apagoge against killers is described at Dem. 23.80 and the two accounts are heavily 
inconsistent: Dem. 23.80 states that if an androphonos is caught in the sanctuaries or in 
the agora he can be arrested and imprisoned. Once arrested, he shall not suffer any 
harm, but if he is convicted at the trial the penalty is death. If the accuser fails to get a 
fifth of the votes, he is to pay a penalty of 1000 drachmas. The procedure described here 
is an agon atimetos whereas our document prescribes an agon timetos. Moreover, the 
procedure laid down here is alternative to a dike phonou whereas our document's 
procedure is only an interruption of the dike phonou started with the prorrhesis. 
Furthermore, the document, purportedly the origin of Dem. 23.80's account, does not 
mention any 1000 drachmas penalty.525 Hansen has tried to eliminate these problems by 
arguing that the two procedures are different. The androphonos of Dem. 23.80 would be 
only the suspected homicide, and the procedure there described is available only before 
the prorrhesis. After the prorrhesis the correct procedure would be the one laid down in 
the document.526 There is no evidence, nor any clue in the text, that restricts the 
application of the law summarized at Dem. 23.80 to suspected homicides. This is no 
more than guesswork. But even if we accept Hansen's guess, the relationship between 
this law and the one in our document is not straightforward; Hansen himself points out 
that if an unintentional killer trespasses before a proclamation is done, he must be 
punished with death, but if he trespasses after the proclamation, he could be punished 
                                                
525 Gagarin 1979: 313-22 argues that the differences between the document and Dem.23.80 are superficial 
and the two procedures might be the same, but see Hansen 1981: 17-21 and Scafuro 2005: 52-6. 
526 Hansen 1976: 99-100; 1981: 17-21. 
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with a fine and eventually sentenced in the Palladion to exile.527 It is difficult to account 
for such a contradiction.  
Mirhady has tried to defend the document arguing that its wording need not 
necessarily refer to homicides.528 It might refer to atimoi in general and thus prorrhesis 
might be used also for the atimoi by 'requirement' (prostaxis) listed at Andoc. 1.76.529 
This is explaining ignotum per ignotius, and against this hypothesis speaks the fact that 
prorrhesis is never mentioned in our sources for any crime other than homicide. 
Likewise, εἴργεσθαι τῶν νόμων (or νομίμων) is never used for generic atimoi or 
outside the context of homicide charges.530 The expression ἢ προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν 
νόμων εἴργεσθαι must be interpreted as referring to homicides and is therefore out of 
place here. Moreover, the provisions for trespassing homicides found in this document 
conflict with the other sources about apagoge of homicides. 
The next clause in the document, εἰσιὼν ὅποι μὴ χρή, is inconsistent with the 
epigraphical sources. For the expression 'it is not allowed', Attic inscriptions (and 
inscriptions in general) always use the expression μὴ ἐξεῖναι and μὴ χρή is never 
found. 531 
The remaining part of the document seems to reproduce almost verbatim the final 
section of the document at § 63 of this speech, and therefore its wording does not 
present any problem, since that document is likely to be authentic. However, some of 
the provisions are appropriate for that document, but inappropriate here. In particular 
the mention of precautionary imprisonment is absent from the orator's account of the 
law. This is not conclusive evidence that it could not have been part of the law, but it is 
                                                
527 Hansen 1976: 101 and Scafuro 2005: 56. 
528 Mirhady 2005: 74. 
529 Cf. MacDowell 1962: 106-13; Hansen 1976: 82-6; Canevaro - Harris 2012. 
530 In Ar. Vesp. 467 the chorus accuses Bdelycleon: 'τῶν νόμων ἡμᾶς ἀπείργεις ὧν ἔθηκεν ἡ πόλις'. 
The expression here means that Bdelycleon denies the chorus the right to sit as judges (Sommerstein 
1983: 185), and has nothing to do with atimia. 
531 Cf e.g. IG II2 28 l. 11, 43 l. 36, 97 l. 12,141 l. 33. 
 241 
suspect. More importantly, the document states that κατηγορείτω δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος 
οἷς ἔξεστιν. This provision was necessary in the document at § 63, since the topic there 
is eisangelia and such a procedure could be activated in many different ways, 
sometimes following an apocheirotonia of a magistrate in the Assembly or as a result of 
the supervisory work of the Council.532 In such cases there was no obvious prosecutor 
for the trial before the judges. In the context of apagoge however such a provision is 
completely out of place. The sources clearly show that full responsibility of the 
prosecution lay with whoever carried out the arrest in the first place,533 and therefore 
'anyone among the qualified Athenians who wishes so' most definitely could not 'be the 
prosecutor'. This provision is likely to have been copied by a forger, together with the 
entire last section of the document, from the document at § 63. The forger did not 
realize that some of the provisions he copied were out of place here. 
To sum up, the second part of the document, as the section about theft, is 
inconsistent with the orator's account and with external sources about the procedures 
involved. Moreover some of the formulas are inconsistent with the wording of 
contemporary Athenian laws and decrees in inscriptions. The document therefore 
cannot report authentic Athenian statutes. 
 
                                                
532 Cf. above pp. 218-9. 
533 Cf. for full discussion of the sources Hansen 1976: 13-17. 
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4.12 Dem. 24.149-151: the Heliastic Oath 
[149] ΟΡΚΟΣ ΗΛΙΑΣΤΩΝ 
ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων 
καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων. καὶ τύραννον οὐ ψηφιοῦμαι εἶναι οὐδ᾽ 
ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐδ᾽ ἐάν τις καταλύῃ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ λέγῃ ἢ 
ἐπιψηφίζῃ παρὰ ταῦτα, οὐ πείσομαι· οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς 
οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων οὐδ᾽ οἰκιῶν· οὐδὲ τοὺς φεύγοντας 
κατάξω, οὐδὲ ὧν θάνατος κατέγνωσται, οὐδὲ τοὺς μένοντας ἐξελῶ παρὰ 
τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ 
τῆς βουλῆς οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἐάσω. [150] οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὴν 
καταστήσω ὥστ᾽ ἄρχειν ὑπεύθυνον ὄντα ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐννέα 
ἀρχόντων καὶ τοῦ ἱερομνήμονος καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων 
κυαμεύονται ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ κήρυκος καὶ πρεσβείας καὶ συνέδρων· οὐδὲ 
δὶς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα, οὐδὲ δύο ἀρχὰς ἄρξαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν 
τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ. οὐδὲ δῶρα δέξομαι τῆς ἡλιάσεως ἕνεκα οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ 
οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος ἐμοὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλη εἰδότος ἐμοῦ, οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾷ. 
[151] καὶ γέγονα οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα ἔτη. καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε 
κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ διαψηφιοῦμαι περὶ 
αὐτοῦ οὗ ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ. ἐπόμνυμαι Δία, Ποσειδῶ, Δήμητρα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶσθαι 
ἐξώλειαν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, εἴ τι τούτων παραβαίνοι, εὐορκοῦντι δὲ 
πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ εἶναι. 
 
ο]ὐδένα - ἐννέ[α P.Oxy.2.233 
 
1 lemma om. S | 2 καὶ <κατὰ> F | τοῦ Ἀθηναίων SAYP : τῶν Ἀθηναίων F | 4 τὸν Ἀθηναίων SPc 
: τῶν Ἀθηναίων AFYPa | 5 οἰκειῶν SaAa | 6 μὲν ὄντας S | 7 τοῦ Ἀθηναίων SFYP : τῶν 
Ἀθηναίων A | 8 οὐδ᾽ codd. : οὔτ' F | ἀρχὴν codd. : ἀρχεὶν Y | 9-10 τοῦ ἱερομνήμονος codd. : τὸν 
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ἱερομνήμονα Weil | 10 ὅσοι S : ὅσαι AFYP | ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ codd. : τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ Reiske Blass 
| 11 κήρυκος codd. : κήρυκα Weil | 13 ἄλληι Αa | 14 τε om. S | 15 ἀπολογεσομένου F | 
διαψηφιοῦμαι codd. : ἀεὶ ψηφιοῦμαι Cobet Weil | περὶ αὐτοῦ ὧν corr. Max Fränkel coll. 
Aeschin.1.154 | ἂν AFYP : ἐὰν S | 16 ᾖ ἡ δίωξις AFYP sed cf. Dem.45.50 | ἐπομνύναι corr. Bekker 
: ἐπόμνυμαι SAYPa : ἐπόμνυμι Sγρ.Pc. : ὄμνυμι F | ποσειδῶνα S | δήμητραν Aa | αὐτῷ F | 17 
παραβαίνοιμι A | πολλὰ codd. : καλὰ S 
 
[149] HELIASTIC OATH 
I shall cast my vote according to the laws and the decrees of the Athenian people and 
of the Council of the Five Hundred. And I shall not vote for the establishment of a 
tyrant or an oligarchy; nor, if anyone subverts the democracy of the Athenians or 
speaks or makes proposals against the previously mentioned laws and decrees, shall I 
listen to him; nor [shall I vote for] the cancellation of private debts, or the 
redistribution of the land or houses of the Athenians; I shall not restore the exiles, nor 
those on whom a sentence of death was passed, nor shall I expel, in contravention of 
the existing laws and decrees of the Athenian people and of the Council, those who 
are resident here, nor shall I allow anyone else to do so. [150] I shall not put 
someone who is still subject to audit for another magistracy in charge of an office, 
that is the offices of the Nine Archons, that of Ieromnemon, those that are chosen by 
lot on this day with the Nine Archons, that of herald, those of members of an 
Embassy, those of delegates to the Congress of the League; nor shall I appoint the 
same person to the same office twice, nor shall the same person hold two offices in 
the same year. I shall not take bribes in person because of my judicial role, nor shall 
any other man or woman do so for me with my knowledge, by any device or trick 
whatsoever. [151] And I am not less than thirty years old. And I will give hearing to 
the accuser and the defendant alike, and I shall give my judgement strictly on what 
the prosecution is concerned with. [The judge] shall swear (?) by Zeus, Poseidon and 
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Demeter, and invoke utter destruction upon himself and his house if he transgresses 
any provision of this oath, whereas if he keeps his oath, may prosperity come to him. 
 
The stichometry shows that this document cannot have been part of the 
Urexemplar of the speech. It must have been added later. P.Oxy. 2.233, which dates 
from the 3rd century AD, provides a terminus ante quem for its insertion. The scholia 
also comment on the document, which proves that it was known at least from the 3rd 
century AD. 
The context of the quotation pertains to the refutation of one of Timocrates' 
expected arguments. He will quote, Demosthenes claims, the clause 'nor shall I 
imprison anyone of the Athenians' to prove that his law is fair and consistent with other 
Athenian statutes. This clause however, according to Demosthenes, is not part of any 
law; it comes instead from the oath of the Council. The orator explains that such a 
clause in the Council's oath is perfectly sensible, and Solon wrote it there to stop 
politicians from putting free Athenians in prison. Yet this clause is significantly absent 
from the oath sworn by the judges. The lawcourts have indeed the power to imprison an 
Athenian, and those who are convicted must abide by their decisions. To prove his point 
Demosthenes then asks the grammateus to read out the oath of the Heliasts (or of the 
judges, according to manuscript S). 
The Heliastic oath is repeatedly mentioned, alluded to, and sometimes quoted in 
the Attic orators.534 In fact, appealing to the judges' duty to fullfill their oath is one of 
the most widespread strategies employed in Attic oratory, and the orators often try to 
show that if the judges vote against them, they will be breaking their oaths. Therefore 
the material on which one can base a reconstruction of the actual oath is extensive. This 
                                                
534 The oath is called Heliastic at Hyp. 4.40 and in Harp. s.v. ἀρδηττός (α 229 Keaney). Aeschin. 3.6 has 
instead ἐν τῷ τῶν δικαστῶν ὅρκῳ. 
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task was excellently accomplished by Max Fränkel in 1878535 and it is not my intention 
to question his results. I will rather use the evidence collected by him in order to check 
the document against what we know was present in the oath. 
The only clauses of the document that are confirmed by other sources are the first, 
ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ 
τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων, and the later καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ 
τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν, καὶ διαψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ οὗ ἂν ἡ 
δίωξις ᾖ. The statement that the judges shall judge according to the laws is the most 
widely mentioned in the orators.536 Aeschin. 3.6 confirms that this was the first clause of 
the oath: διόπερ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης τοῦτο πρῶτον ἔταξεν ἐν τῷ τῶν δικαστῶν 
ὅρκῳ, 'ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. Laws and decrees are mentioned together with 
this very wording at Dem. 19.179: ὀμωμόκατε ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ 
ψηφίσματα τὰ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων. The mention of the 
decrees is again confirmed by Hyp. Dem. 1. The clause stating that the judges shall hear 
both parts impartially is explicitly confirmed by five passages (Dem. 18.1 τὸν ὅρκον, 
ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἅπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις δικαίοις καὶ τοῦτο γέγραπται, τὸ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν 
ἀκροάσασθαι, 6-7; Isoc. 15.21; Aeschin. 2.1; Hyp. Lyc. fr. 1).537 Finally, the clause 
according to which the judges shall cast their vote strictly on what the prosecution is 
about is explicitly confirmed, with slightly different wording, at least by two passages 
(Aeschin. 1.154: ὑμεῖς δὲ τί ὀμωμόκατε; ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ψηφιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ; 
Dem. 45.50: δικάσειν γὰρ ὀμωμόκαθ᾽ ὑμεῖς οὐ περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ φεύγων ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ᾽ 
                                                
535 Fränkel 1878. His reconstruction is now generally accepted. Lipsius 1905-15: 152 and Mirhady 2007 
accept Fränkel's reconstruction, but with some modification. 
536 Aeschin. 3.6, 31, 198; Andoc. 1.2; Antinph. 5.85; Dem. 18.12, 20.118, 21.42, 211, 22.43, 23.101, 
24.188, 34.45, 36.26, 46.27, 58.25, 36, 59.115; Din.1.17; Hyp. Phil. 5; Isae. 11.6; Isoc. 15.173; 19.15; 
Lys. 22.7. Allusions to this clause might be: Isae. 6.65; Dem. 8.2, 18.6, 22.7, 20, 23.2, 34.52, 39.41, 
43.34, 52.33, 58.56; Hyp. Dem. 39; Isoc. 19.44, 46; Lycurg. 1.143; Lys. 9.19, 10.32. 
537 Dem. 18.7, 34.1, Isoc. 15.17 and Lys. 15.1 seem to allude to this clause. The same principle, expressed 
in different wordings appears at Aeschin. 2.7, 3.57, Andoc. 1.6, Dem. 29.4, Lys. 19.3. 
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ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὧν ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ) and implicitly by many sources.538 Of course, these 
passages do not necessarily confirm the authenticity of the document. In fact, they could 
easily have been the source used by a forger. 
Against the authenticity of the document clearly speaks the absence of two 
clauses stating that, when there is no law on a particular matter, the judges shall judge 
with their best judgement. The presence of the statement that the judges shall vote with 
their best judgement (γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ) is assured by the verbatim quotation of 
the clause at Dem. 23.96, 39.40-1, 20.118, Arist. Pol. 1287a26.539 The clause stating that 
the best judgement must be used when there are no liable laws is attested at Dem. 39.40 
(ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν μὴ ὦσι νόμοι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκατε) and 
20.118 (περὶ ὧν ἂν νόμοι μὴ ὦσι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ κρινεῖν) and is confirmed 
by Poll. 8.122.540 The absence of these clauses strongly speaks against the authenticity 
of the document and guarantees that its text is, at least, corrupted. 
Andoc. 1.91 also reports a short section of the oath sworn by the judges: καὶ οὐ 
μνησικακήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ πείσομαι. This clause is absent from the document. Such a 
provision obviously dates from the democratic restoration of 404 BCE, and Drerup has 
argued that it lost its importance after, at the most, one generation, and then was 
                                                
538 Aeschin. 1.170, 175-6, 179; Dem. 18.56; Hyp. Eux. 31. The same principle is often expressed with 
very different wordings: cf. Lycurg. 1.13, Dem. 22.43, 44.14, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.1. The significance of 
this clause in Athenian lawcourts is analyzed in Rhodes 2004. The sources have ψηφιεῖσθαι instead of 
διαψηφιοῦμαι. Fränkel 1878: 458 considered the verb falsch. Cobet and Weil tried to make the 
document agree with the other passages by emending it in ἀεὶ ψηφιοῦμαι. 
539 Fränkel 1878: 457 lists also Dem. 57.26 but this passage does not refer to the judges, it refers to 
demesmen voting in a judicial capacity. Aristot. Rhet. 1375a29, b16, 76a19, 1402b33 refers to the same 
clause, but the wording is γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ. Passages like Dem. 21.94, Isoc. 19.15-6, referring to the 
duty of the judges to give a just verdict or to vote justly, cannot be used as evidence of this clause, pace 
Fränkel 1878: 455-7 and Mirhady 2007: 50. 
540 The specification 'in matters about which there is no law' is considered part of the oath, after Fränkel 
1878: 455-8, by Ott 1896: 61; Lipsius 1905-15: 151-3; Cronin 1936: 18; Bonner-Smith 1938: 152-6; 
Hansen 1991: 182; Scafuro 1997: 50-1. Mirhady 2007 argues on the basis of Dem.23.96-7, 57.26 and 
Aristot. Rhet. 1375a29, b16, 76a19, 1402b33 that this clause was not part of the oath, but rather an 
interpretation of the orator, and the 'most just understanding' referred to matters of fact, not to matters of 
law. Against this interpretation see Harris 2006a. The wording as understood by Fränkel is actually found 
in inscriptions from other city states: cf. Gauthier-Hatzopoulos 1993: 35-41; IG II2 1126 ll. 2-3; IG XII 
2.526 ll. 9-17; SEG 29.1130bis ll. 28-30. 
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dropped. This is no more than guesswork. All we know is that Andocides states that this 
clause was in the oath, and our document lacks it.  
Moreover, the document reports this sentence: καὶ τύραννον οὐ ψηφιοῦμαι 
εἶναι οὐδ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐδ᾽ ἐάν τις καταλύῃ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ λέγῃ ἢ 
ἐπιψηφίζῃ παρὰ ταῦτα, οὐ πείσομαι. Such a sentence seems to refer to the same 
context as Andocides' passage, and yet, if the document is authentic, this section was 
not dropped. Drerup argued that such a sentence was preserved because it reminds the 
judges of the dangers of tyranny and oligarchy, whereas the οὐ μνησικακήσω clause 
does not make any sense outside that context.541 Lipsius on the other hand argued that 
the document reports sections of the oath from different times, and the oath was never 
sworn in exactly this form.542 This is hard to believe. The document was added after the 
classical times, as stichometry shows. Therefore, the editor who inserted it in the text, if 
we consider the document authentic, must have found a copy of the oath somewhere. 
Lipsius' hypothesis in fact postulates that this editor did not find just one copy, he found 
more than one, from different periods. This defies the laws of probability. If, instead, 
such an editor recontructed the oath from the quotations in the orators and from some 
other sources, then what we have is a patchwork of more or less reliable passages, 
lacking key sections and integrated by the editor with guesswork where the evidence 
was missing. Thus, this would not be an original Athenian oath, but a later 
reconstruction, a forgery in all but intention.543  
In fact, this whole section of the document, in which the judges swear not to vote 
for tyranny or oligarchy, not to cancel the debts nor to restore the exiles or killers etc. is 
more likely to originate from the orator's words right after the oath is read out by the 
secretary (§ 152-4). Demosthenes claims that subverting the verdicts of the tribunals 
                                                
541 Drerup 1898: 261, endorsed by Bonner-Smith 1938: 154-5. 
542 Lipsius 1905-15: 153. 
543 For similar considerations see Ott 1896: 101-2. 
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leads to the dissolution of democracy (δήμου κατάλυσις), since the polis is built on its 
laws and decrees. Moreover, Timocrates' law leads the way toward the dissolution of 
the lawcourts, the restoration of the exiles and other horrible things (περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῶν δεινοτάτων). Demosthenes then alludes to previous occasions on which 
democracy has been overthrown, and claims that it happened in exactly the same way. 
This passage does not refer to the oath just read out; it is rather Demosthenes' own 
argument. Yet its proximity to the quotation might have confused a forger. In fact, the 
document follows closely Demosthenes' argument: δήμου κατάλυσις in contravention 
of laws and decrees is extended, as often happens in the forgeries, by the mention of 
tyranny and oligarchy. Demosthenes then lists restoration of the exiles and 'other 
horrible things', and the document duly lists restoration of the exiles and makes explicit 
the 'other horrible things' with a customary list: 'I shall not restore the exiles, nor those 
on whom a sentence of death was passed, nor shall I expel, in contravention of the 
existing laws and decrees of the Athenian people and of the Council, those who are 
resident here'. It is not necessary to postulate any authoritative and independent source 
to account for this section. Misinterpretation of the orator's words is the most likely 
source of the document here, and accounts better for the fact that the whole section 
seems rather badly suited to an oath of the judges, and could belong more easily to an 
oath sworn in a deliberative assembly, like the Council or the Ecclesia.544 
The next section is also problematic. The document has the judges swearing that 
they will not let anyone get into an office that has not yet been submitted to an audit for 
a previous one, nor will they let anyone get into the same office twice, or have two 
offices in the same year. The only way to explain such a provision is to refer it to the 
dokimasia. The judges had to handle about 700 dokimasiai of newly appointed 
magistrates at the end of each year to assess whether they were fit for office and this 
                                                
544 Cf. Ott 1896: 99-100. 
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section of the oath would give them instructions about their task.545 However, first the 
criteria for the decision are not exhaustive: we know from Ath.Pol. 55.3 that at least the 
archons, presumably all the officials, had to answer for their demes and their parents' (to 
prove that they were citizens), had to name sanctuaries of Apollo Patroos and Zeus 
Herkeios that they attend, they had to state that they properly took care of their parents, 
that they paid their tele and that they had undergone military service, and they had to 
provide witnesses for all these facts. Why would the oath mention only some of the 
requirements for passing the dokimasia, and overlook others? Moreover, hearing 
dokimasiai was only one of the many functions the judges performed. Why does the 
oath mention only dokimasiai?546 Besides, the document lists the nine archons, the 
hieromnemon, all the other magistracies that are filled by lot ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, that is 
'on this day' (and also heralds, ambassadors and delegates to the Congress of the 
League). This would mean that most magistracies were allotted in the same day as the 
judges swore their Heliastic oath (on this day), but this is contradicted by the evidence: 
magistrates were chosen at the end of the year, after the sixth prytany, to allow enough 
time for the dokimasiai to be completed,547 whereas the judges swore their oath at the 
beginning of the year.548 Bekker saw this and proposed the emendation τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ, 
which changes the sense to 'those that are chosen by lot on the same day as the Nine 
Archons'. Even if we accept the emendation, we still have the problem that the list of 
magistrates is not complete. It includes archons, hieromnemones, all the offices filled by 
lot on the same day as the archons, ambassadors549 and delegates to the Congress of the 
League. What about the offices filled by election, like the military commanders, those 
                                                
545 Cf. MacDowell 1978: 167-9; Hansen 1991: 218-20. 
546 Cf. Westermann 1859: III, 3 ff. 
547 Cf. Lys. 26.6 with Hansen 1991: 230-2. 
548 Cf. Isoc. 15.21, 18.34 with Bonner-Smith 1938: 154, 156; MacDowell 1978: 34; Hansen 1991: 181-2; 
Boegehold 1995: 26. 
549 It is also worth noting with Wayte 1882: 213 that πρεσβείας meaning 'the members of the embassy' 
between two concrete nouns 'involves great harshness'. 
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who looked after the training of the ephebes, the Commissioners of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries, the Superintendent of the Water and the most important financial officers? 
These officials are absent from the list, even though they were subject to dokimasia like 
the rest. 
The next sentence in the document, οὐδὲ δῶρα δέξομαι τῆς ἡλιάσεως ἕνεκα 
οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος ἐμοὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλη εἰδότος ἐμοῦ, οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε μηχανῇ 
οὐδεμιᾷ, is not found in any source about the Athenian judicial oath. An inscription of 
the 3rd century BCE from Kalymnos (Tit. Calymnii 79 ll. 30-1) has a wording very 
similar to that of the document. Weil used this inscription as confirmation that the 
document is genuine.550 However, the fact that the formula was used in the 3rd century as 
far as Kalymnos cannot provide any evidence that the document reports the genuine text 
of the Athenian Heliastic oath. The formula might well have been more usual than we 
assume in judicial oaths, and a later forger might have been familiar with it. The 
following statement καὶ γέγονα οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα ἔτη, is nonsensical in an 
oath, and should belong in a law. In the judicial oath it is out of place.551 
Another feature that clearly speaks against the authenticity of the oath is the 
sentence with which the judges swear by the gods: ἐπόμνυμαι Δία, Ποσειδῶ, 
Δήμητρα. Such a clause must certainly have been part of the oath, but the middle voice 
is here out of place, so that manuscipts S and P have corrections into ἐπόμνυμι. A more 
economical emendation is that of Bekker, who opts for the infinitive ἐπομνύναι to 
make the verb agree with the following ἐπαρᾶσθαι. Even if we accept this emendation, 
the names of the gods still contradict the external evidence. Poll. 8.122 states that the 
judges ὤμνυσαν δὲ ἐν ’Αρδήττῳ δικαστηρίῳ ’Απόλλω  πατρῷον καὶ Δήμητρα 
καὶ Δία βασιλέα. This information is confirmed by Schol.Aeschin. 1.114 (Dilts), which 
                                                
550 Weil 1886: 139. 
551 Cf. Westermann 1959: III, 7, Ott 1896: 101. 
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also gives an authoritative source for this piece of information: Deinarchus. Lex. Seg. 
s.v. ἄρδηττος also confirms these gods, naming Zeus, Demeter and Helios (presumably 
Apollo again, since the two gods were identified from the Hellenistic age).552 Indirect 
confirmation of this comes also from Dem. 52.9, where the speaker chooses to swear 
that he is not lying to the judges by Zeus, Apollo and Demeter.553 
To sum up, this document lacks key clauses that we know from independent 
evidence were part of the Heliastic oath. Moreover some of its sections are 
inappropriate in a judicial oath and some features are demonstrably incorrect. Besides, 
no piece of information in the document requires postulating an independent source. 
The document was later inserted in the speech, and was at best a clumsy reconstruction 
from the orators' allusions to the oath, at worst a forgery. In any case, it does not 
represent a reliable source for the Heliastic oath. 
 
                                                
552 Helios was often identified with Apollo (cf. Burkert 1985: 120). The first evidence of such an 
identification is a fragment of Euripides’ Phaethon (781 Nauck). When or whether they were identified in 
classical Athens is unclear (cf. Mikalson 1989: 97-8). However, the later date of the Lex. Seg. justifies the 
use of the name Helios as a synonym for Apollo. 
553 Westermann 1959: III, 14 already noted this. Cf. also Fränkel 1878: 460; Wayte 1882: 212 and 215. 
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5. The Against Neaera (59) 
The documents of the speech Against Neaera have been the object of some 
scholarly attention in the last few years. Two commentaries by Carey and Kapparis554 
have devoted some space to the analysis of all the individual documents, whereas 
Trevett has dealt only with the witness statements.555 These scholars have considered all 
the laws and decrees in the speech authentic, although Kapparis has exposed seven out 
of thirteen witness statements as forgeries.556 Their methodology, as well as their results, 
has encountered some degree of criticism in the reviews of their works. Buckler in a 
review of Carey's commentary and Trevett's volume on Apollodorus claims that 'none 
of the decrees, the acts passed by the assembly, is genuine'557 and Harris in his reviews 
of both Carey's and Kapparis' commentaries doubts the authenticity of most 
documents.558 Carey himself in his review of Kapparis' commentary contests that the 
analysis of the documents lacks a precise methodology.559 Finally, in 2010 I have argued 
in an article that the naturalization decree for the Plataeans preserved at § 104 is a 
forgery.560 
The work on the documents of this speech however started long before. In 1844 
Friedrich Franke, in his review of Schelling's De Solonis legibus apud oratores Atticos 
in the Neue Jenaische allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung,561 argued that some of the laws in 
this speech, in particular that at § 87, are forgeries. Westermann in 1850 exposed all the 
witness statements and the other evidence produced in the speech as forgeries.562 Since 
these works the documents in this speech were generally believed to be forgeries every 
time scholars mentioned them in works concerned with more general matters. As 
                                                
554 Carey 1992; Kapparis 1999. 
555 Trevett 1992: 186-92. 
556 Kapparis 1999: 58-60, 215-6, 221-2, 225-6, 235-6, 239-40, 262-3, 265, 276-7, 316-7, 351-3, 431-6. 
557 Buckler CJ 90/3 (1995): 324-5. 
558 Harris CR 44/1 (1994): 21-3; CJ 96/4 (2001): 439-41. 
559 Carey Phoenix 95/1-2 (2001): 175-7. 
560 Canevaro 2010. The chapter about this document is adapted from this article. 
561 Schelling 1842. Franke 1844: 733-45. 
562 Westermann 1850: 114-29. 
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examples of this attitude, one can mention Van den Es' De iure familiarum apud 
Athenienses,563 Mommsen' Heortologie,564 M. H. E. Meier's and L. Ross' Die Demen von 
Attika und ihre Vertheilung unter die Phylen nach Inschriften.565 In 1885 however 
Kirchner defended the authenticity of the witness statements preserved in this speech, 
and in 1884 and 1886 Otto Staeker and Johannes Riehemann produced two defences of 
the documents of this speech as a whole.566 Finally Drerup in 1898, dealing only with 
the witness statements, endorsed Kirchner's verdict of authenticity.567 Their approach 
was to produce reconstructions of the procedures or of the facts involved where the 
documents could fit, and to use the very fact that such reconstructions were possible as 
evidence of the authenticity of the documents.568 
In the twentieth century the documents have generally been used as authentic. The 
only doubts, apart from the recent reviews I have previously mentioned, have been 
advanced by Parke about the oath of the gerairai and by Hammond, Prandi and finally 
MacDowell569 about the naturalization decree of the Plataeans. This last document 
however has been defended in a lengthy article by Kapparis, and again extensively in 
his commentary.570 
The speech Against Neaera contains 21 documents: 13 witness statements, 3 laws, 
1 decree, 1 oath, 2 diallagai and 1 proklesis. Only the laws and the decree fall within 
the scope of this work. The first two laws quoted in the speech concern marriage of 
                                                
563 Van den Es 1864: passim. 
564 Mommsen 1864: 358-9. 
565 Meier-Ross 1846: 7, 8 n. 1. 
566 Kirchner 1885: 377-86; Staeker 1884; Riehemann 1886. 
567 Drerup 1898: 342-52. 
568 As for the witness statements, beyond the scope of this work, the approach was and is mainly 
prosopographical. If the names mentioned are found elsewhere in inscriptions, the document is deemed to 
be authentic. Against this approach one could note that an Athenian name was composed of three parts: 
name, patronymic and demotic. Most of the names in the documents and in inscriptions present only 
name and demotic. This is hardly enough evidence to justify identifications. If I were to forge a document 
from South Shields (Tyne and Wear), including in it the name James from South Shields, or Mike from 
South Shields would certainly be a safe bet, but that would not guarantee that I mean a specific James, or 
Mike, from South Shields. 
569 Prandi 1988: 112; Hammond 1992: 146-7; MacDowell, CR 35 (1985): 319. 
570 Kapparis 1995 and 1999: 287-8. 
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Athenians with alien women and procreation of offspring. The first law at § 16 is 
quoted to show that marriage between an Athenian and a foreigner is forbidden, and so 
is the procreation of children. This is the law on which Theomnestus based his case 
against Neaera, and Apollodorus571 is here concerned first with proving that she is a 
foreigner, and therefore that she is committing a crime by living as the lawful wife of 
Stephanus. The second law is quoted at § 52 as the base of the action taken by Phrastor 
against Stephanus when Stephanus betrothed to him Phano, allegedly Neaera's daughter. 
The law prescribed the heaviest penalties if one gave in marriage to an Athenian the 
daughter of an alien woman. The next law is quoted at § 87. This law is concerned with 
moicheia and is used against Phano, the alleged daughter of Neaera, who performed the 
sacred rites as wife of Theagenes, the archon king, despite being forbidden as, 
Apollodorus claims, she was caught with a seducer. The naturalization decree for the 
Plataeans is quoted at § 104 at the end of a long excursus about the Plataeans, whose 
aim is that of showing how hard it is to obtain Athenian citizenship, and consequently 
how shameful it is for Neaera to have usurped it. 
 
                                                
571 It is generally accepted that Apollodorus is the author of this speech. Cf. e.g. Trevett 1992: 50-76; 
MacDowell 2009: 99-100, 121-6. 
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5.1 [Dem.] 59.16: the law on marrying foreigners 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἀστῇ συνοικῇ τέχνῃ ἢ μηχανῇ ᾑτινιοῦν, γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς 
θεσμοθέτας Ἀθηναίων ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷ, πεπράσθω καὶ 
αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἔστω τοῦ ἑλόντος. ἔστω δὲ καὶ 
ἐὰν ἡ ξένη τῷ ἀστῷ συνοικῇ κατὰ ταὐτά, καὶ ὁ συνοικῶν τῇ ξένῃ τῇ ἁλούσῃ 
ὀφειλέτω χιλίας δραχμάς. 
 
ἂν R | συνοικεῖ S | οὓς ἔξεστιν R | ἁλόντος FQR | ἔστω δὲ SYRD : ὡσαύτως δὲ FQ | ὀφείλετο S 
 
If an alien man lives together in marriage with a citizen woman by any means or 
device whatsoever, anyone among the qualified Athenians who wishes so shall bring 
a public charge against him to the thesmothetai. If he is convicted, he and his goods 
shall be sold, and one third shall go to the man who had him convicted. And this 
shall happen also if an alien woman lives together in marriage with a citizen man, 
and the man who lives with the convicted alien woman shall be fined one thousand 
drachmas. 
 
This document must be a later insertion, since the stichometry shows that it was 
not in the Urexemplar of the speech. It is supposed to report the law on which the case 
against Neaera is built, as it is quoted at the very beginning of Apollodorus’ synegoria, 
after he has claimed that Neaera is a foreigner and lives with Stephanus as his wife (§ 
16). Apollodorus asks the clerk to read out the law with these words: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν 
τὸν νόμον ὑμῖν ἀναγνώσεται, καθ᾽ ὃν τήν τε γραφὴν ταυτηνὶ Θεόμνηστος 
ἐγράψατο καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν οὗτος εἰσέρχεται εἰς ὑμᾶς ('First, the law will be read to you, 
according to which Theomnestos brought this public charge and because of which this 
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case comes before you'). At § 17 Apollodorus summarizes the provisions of the law and 
states that it forbids an alien woman to live in marriage with a citizen man, or a citizen 
woman with an alien man, or to beget children by any means or device. If one does not 
abide by these provisions, the law allows a public charge before the thesmothetai, and if 
there is a conviction, the alien man or woman must be sold into slavery.572 
The document's wording is close to Apollodorus' summary and the only detail 
missing from the document is the provision on 'begetting children' (οὐδὲ 
παιδοποιεῖσθαι).573 However, as argued by Riehemann and more recently by Kapparis, 
this could also be an addition of the orator, rather than a literal quote, as Apollodorus' 
words at § 122 suggest (τὸ γὰρ συνοικεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὃς ἂν παιδοποιῆται καὶ 
εἰσάγῃ εἴς τε τοὺς φράτερας καὶ δημότας τοὺς υἱεῖς).574 On the other hand, the 
document encompasses a few provisions that are absent from the orator's summary.575 It 
provides that the option to bring a public charge shall be open only to qualified 
Athenians (ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν), that not just the alien man, but also his 
property shall be sold if he marries a citizen woman, that one third of the proceedings 
from the sale shall go to the successful prosecutor, and that if a citizen man is convicted 
of having married an alien woman, he shall pay a fine of one thousand drachmas. None 
of these provisions provides conclusive grounds for or against the authenticity of the 
document. 
                                                
572 For an excellent discussion of this law see Kapparis 1999: 199-206. Kapparis accepts the document as 
authentic, but his treatment of the purpose and features of the law is mostly valid whatever one thinks 
about the document. 
573 That such a provision must have been part of the law was argued by Lortzing 1863: 44. 
574 Riehemann 1886: 40; Kapparis 1999: 198. 
575 Carey 1992: 92 and Kapparis 1999: 198. 
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As for the expression ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν, this is often found in the 
speeches of the Attic orators and elsewhere,576 and although it is likely to be correct, a 
forger could have easily made a lucky guess.  
The provision stating that the goods of an alien man who has married a citizen 
woman must be sold is neither confirmed nor refuted by any source. However, some 
sources show that being sold into slavery was among the penalties for those who 
usurped the status of citizens, and one mentions also the selling of their goods. Ath.Pol. 
42.1 states that if someone at the registration with the deme is found not to be 
eleutheros577 he can appeal against the decision and if he loses he must be sold into 
slavery. Dem. 24.131, with schol. ad locum, and the third letter of Demosthenes (3.29) 
show that a graphe xenias was possible at any point, and if one was convicted for 
usurping the citizen rights he was sold into slavery. The same penalty was provided in 
346/5, following the decree of Demophilus calling for a diapsephisis,578 for those who 
were rejected by their deme and lost their appeal in the lawcourt. We are told this by 
Libanius in his hypothesis of Dem. 57, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Isae. 16), in his 
introduction to a long quotation of a speech by Isaeus (Isae.12), informs us that in that 
context not only was the usurper sold into slavery, but his goods were also sold.579 Thus, 
although these sources do not prove that sale of his goods was the case also for an alien 
man marrying a citizen woman, they suggest that this is at least a possibility. However, 
this does not speak clearly either for or against the authenticity of the document. If this 
                                                
576 Cf. Pl. Plt. 299c3; Aeschin.1.23, 32. This expression is found both in authentic documents like Dem. 
24.63 (cf. above pp. 214-23) and in forged ones: Dem.21.47 (cf. Harris.CP 87 (1992): 77-8, pace 
MacDowell 1990: 266-7), 24.105 (cf. above pp. 224-42). 
577 For the meaning of the word here see Rhodes 1981: 501-2. For some difficulties in this passage cf. also 
Gomme 1934: 130-40. 
578 Cf. MacDowell 2009: 288-93 for the case and 298 n. 1 for the date. 
579 Gomme 1934: 130-40, endorsed by MacDowell 2009: 288 n. 3, made a case for rejecting the evidence 
of these passages. He believed that they were influenced by the compressed account at Ath.Pol. 42.1, 
whereas in fact those who were found not to be citizens were sold into slavery only if they were proven 
not to be free, while the others were only relegated to metic status. However metic status is never 
mentioned in the sources (cf. Rhodes 1981: 502) and § 17 of this speech shows that enslavement was 
indeed a viable penalty for those who usurped citizen status whether they were free or not. 
 258 
piece of information circulated in antiquity, it could have prompted a forger to insert the 
provision. To sum up, we cannot tell with any certainty whether this provision was in 
the law, and even if it were, it does not necessarily prove that the document is authentic. 
The provision stating that one third of the outcome of the sale must go to the 
prosecutor is at odds with what we know about graphai. Dikai in Athens often ended 
with monetary compensation, but graphai were distinctive in that monetary penalties 
took the form of fines to be paid to the public treasury, and the successful prosecutor 
did not receive anything in return. The only public charges that involved monetary gain 
for the successful prosecutor were, as far as we know, phasis and apographe.580 This 
clause could therefore be considered an anomaly, although we cannot exclude that these 
particular charges were exceptions to the rule. 
A small problem with the wording of the document is that in the following 
sentence (ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ξένη τῷ ἀστῷ συνοικῇ κατὰ ταὐτά) the words ἔστω 
[...] κατὰ ταὐτά seem to imply that if an alien woman is convicted for living as lawful 
wife with a citizen man, her goods must be sold too, and one third of the outcome of the 
sale must go to the successful prosecutor.581 However, women in Athens had no control 
over any goods, and even their dowries passed from the father to the husband without at 
any point being the actual possession of the wife. This sentence therefore is suspicious, 
but on the other hand it could just be a very compressed form of expression, not 
impossible to find in legal texts. 
The last sentence states that if a citizen man lives with an alien woman, when she 
is convicted and sold into slavery he must pay one thousand drachmas. This provision 
seems acceptable, if not completely reasonable. Van den Es rejected the document 
because it does not mention the case in which the husband is tricked into marrying a 
                                                
580 Cf. Harrison 1971: 78; MacDowell 1972: 57-61; Hansen 1991: 192-3. Dem. 21.45 and 24.3 state the 
principle that a graphe brought no personal advantage to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor acted for the 
community's sake. 
581 Riehemann 1886: 38-9 has convinsigly argued that κατὰ ταὐτά must refer to the penalties. 
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foreigner (the penalties for this are established in the document at § 52).582 In this case, 
he claims, the one thousand drachmas fine for the husband would be plainly unfair. This 
argument is not conclusive: first, the fact that a law is unfair does not prove that it did 
not exist; second, the specification exempting the tricked husband from the fine might 
have appeared in a section of the law not reported in the document. 
To sum up, the differences between the document and the orator's account do not 
clearly speak either for or against the document. The additional provisions in the 
document, although sometimes at odds with what we know about Athenian legal 
procedures, need not be necessarily unacceptable. 
The language of the document is consistent with inscriptions, with one major 
exception: the expression τέχνῃ ἢ μηχανῇ ᾑτινιοῦν is never found in inscriptions or 
literary sources in this form. In IG I3 40 ll. 22-3 we find οὔτε τέ[χ]νει οὔτε µεχανε̑ι 
οὐδεμιᾶι, and the same formula, with some parts restored, is also found in IG I3 39 ll. 
8-9, 83 ll. 6-7, 247 ll. 5-6, IG II2 111 l. 63, 236 ll. 10-11, 1183 l. 9. Sometimes (e.g. IG 
II2 1289 ll. 14-5), instead of οὐδεμιᾶι we find μηδεμιᾶι, but never ᾑτινιοῦν. 
Apollodorus' summary, consistently with the inscriptions, has οὐδεμιᾷ. In literary 
sources the same expression, either with οὐδεμιᾶι or μηδεμιᾶι, is found in Thuc. 5.18 
and 47 (from which IG I3 86 ll. 6-7 is restored), Pl. Clit. 408e9, Lys. 13.95, Dem. 
24.150 (a spurious document), Theophr. fr. 97.3 (Wimmer). The only case where we 
find a similar expression with ᾑτινιοῦν is Dem. 21.113, a document whose authenticity 
has been doubted.583 Moreover, ὁστισοῦν is never found in Athenian classical 
epigraphical material, and ᾑτινιοῦν is only restored in one Athenian inscription from 
Roman times (1st century AD), Agora 16.337 l. 9. The expression as it stands is difficult 
to accept as part of a classical Athenian law.  
                                                
582 Van den Es 1864: 22. 
583 Westermann 1844; Harris 2008: 127-8. MacDowell 1983 and 1990: 337 accepts the document as 
authentic. 
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To sum up, the document presents provisions not found in Apollodorus' summary. 
These features however are unverifiable, and they could be either authentic provisions 
belonging to this law, or created by a forger on the basis of information found in the 
orators and elsewhere. Our sources do not allow us a conclusive verdict. The document 
might be either a skillful forgery or a genuine statute found by a later editor and inserted 
in the speech. However, if this is the case, some degree of corruption, as shown by the 
word ᾑτινιοῦν, is likely to have intervened before or after the document was inserted in 
the speech.  
 
 261 
5.2 [Dem.] 59.52: the law about giving an alien woman in marriage to an Athenian 
citizen 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
[52...] ἐὰν δέ τις ἐκδῷ ξένην γυναῖκα ἀνδρὶ Ἀθηναίῳ ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν, 
ἄτιμος ἔστω, καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ δημοσία ἔστω, καὶ τοῦ ἑλόντος τὸ τρίτον 
μέρος. γραφέσθων δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας οἷς ἔξεστιν, καθάπερ τῆς ξενίας. 
 
ἐκδιδῷ FQ 
 
If one gives an alien woman in marriage to an Athenian man as though she were 
related to him, he shall be disfranchised and his goods become public property, and 
one third shall go to the successful prosecutor. Those who are qualified shall bring a 
public charge to the thesmothetai, as in a prosecution for being an alien. 
 
This document, according to the stichometric calculations, was not in the 
Urexemplar of the speech and must have been inserted later. It is quoted in the speech 
after Apollodorus has introduced some facts about Phano, according to him Neaera's 
daughter, previously called Strybele. At § 49 Apollodorus claims that Neaera was once 
a slave, was sold twice and in Athens was treated as an alien. Apollodorus mentions the 
story of Phano to prove that Stephanus himself has shown Neaera to be an alien. At § 50 
he claims that Neaera brought his daughter to Athens, and Stephanus gave her in 
marriage to an Athenian, Phrastor, as if she were his own daughter, with a dowry of 
thirty minae (ἐκδίδωσι Στέφανος οὑτοσὶ ὡς οὖσαν αὑτοῦ θυγατέρα ἀνδρὶ 
Ἀθηναίῳ Φράστορι Αἰγιλιεῖ). However (§ 51) Phano misbehaved and refused to obey 
her husband. Moreover Phrastor discovered that, instead of being Stephanus' daughter 
from an Athenian woman before he took Neaera, Phano was Neaera's daughter, and 
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therefore he cast her out of the house, refusing to return the dowry. Stephanus started 
proceedings to have Phrastor pay interest at the rate of nine obols on the dowry, or to 
return it. Phrastor retaliated by bringing a public charge against Stephanus to the 
thesmothetai for betrothing to him, an Athenian citizen, the daughter of an alien woman 
as if she were related to him (§ 52). Apollodorus then asks the secretary of the lawcourt 
to read out the relevant law and at § 53 says that Stephanus dropped the claim to the 
dowry fearing he might incur severe penalties if convicted for betrothing the daughter of 
an alien woman (γνοὺς δ᾽ ὅτι κινδυνεύσει ἐξελεγχθεὶς ξένης θυγατέρα ἠγγυηκέναι 
καὶ ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις περιπεσεῖν). 
The text of the document mostly repeats the words of the orator. The only 
independent details are the penalty of atimia (whereas the confiscation of the goods and 
the reward for the successful prosecutor are found also in the document at § 16) and the 
expression καθάπερ τῆς ξενίας. These details are not unacceptable: atimia was a very 
widespread punishment in Athens, and is mentioned many times in the orators (e.g. 
Dem. 20.156, 23.62); defining a procedure and a penalty in analogy with another statute 
is also an attested practice in Athenian laws (cf. Dem. 20.156 and 24.50). However, as 
both the penalty and expressions like καθάπερ τῆς ξενίας are attested in the orators, 
and since we cannot confirm that they crept into this statute from other sources, it is 
impossible to tell whether these are reliable pieces of information drawn from a 
trustworthy source or details added by a forger on the basis of other passages of the 
orators which are however unrelated to the present statute. 
Some details in the sections of the document confirmed by Apollodorus' summary 
cast on the other hand doubts on the authenticity of the document. First, the document 
uses the verb ἐκδίδωμι for 'to betroth', as does Apollodorus thrice in the speech, at § 
50, 69, 73, However, near the actual quotation of the law, at § 52 and 53, Apollodorus 
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uses twice the term ἐγγυάω. Both are technical terms,584 but the fact that the orator 
twice in the proximity of the law chooses ἐγγυάω suggests that this verb must have 
been in the law.585 Second, the first sentence of the law hardly makes any sense. The 
document goes like this: 'if one gives an alien woman in marriage to an Athenian man 
as though she were related to him, he shall be disfranchised' (ἐὰν δέ τις ἐκδῷ ξένην 
γυναῖκα ἀνδρὶ Ἀθηναίῳ ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν, ἄτιμος ἔστω). τις means 
'anyone', but what is required here is rather 'any Athenian'. This might be understood, 
but certainly an expression like Ἀθηναίος ὢν would make the provision more 
sensible.586 More important, the sentence as it is in fact 'suggests that no familial 
relationship between a citizen and an alien was formally acknowledged by Athenian 
law'.587 If an Athenian has a daughter from an alien woman, the daughter would 
technically be an alien woman herself. And yet he would not be lying if he were to give 
her in marriage 'as if she were related to him' (ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν). She is indeed 
related to him.588 The concept could have been more effectively conveyed with an 
expression meaning 'as if she was of citizen birth'. Carey blames this wording on 'loose 
drafting of Athenian laws', and this is certainly a possibility. However, it is odd that the 
same wording is used by Apollodorus to apply to the specific story of the marriage 
between Phrastor and Phano, and there it makes perfect sense. Stephanus, according to 
Apollodorus, gave the daughter of an alien woman, Neaera, in marriage to Phrastor as if 
she were related to him (§ 52 Ἀθηναίῳ ὄντι ξένης θυγατέρα αὐτῷ ἐγγυῆσαι ὡς 
αὑτῷ προσήκουσαν), whereas she entered his household together with Neaera. The 
fact that the expression applies perfectly to the specific case Apollodorus is describing, 
                                                
584 Cf. e.g. Hdt. 6.130.2, Dem.41.6, Isae.3.70, 8.19, 29, Men. Dysc. 842 for ἐγγυάω and Isae.8.8, 3.8 for 
ἐκδίδωμι. See Wolff 1944: 52, Harrison 1968: 1-2. 
585 Pace Kapparis 1999: 198. Cf. above pp. 42-4 for the reliability of the orators' summaries, and how 
their wording is closer to the actual wording of the laws in their proximity. 
586 Van den Es 1864: 23 and Carey 1992: 113. 
587 Carey 1992: 113. 
588 Cf. Wolff 1944: 70 and Harrison 1968: 26-7. 
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but conveys only imperfectly the meaning required in the law, suggests that a forger has 
drawn it from the text of the speech to the document, rather than the opposite. 
Moreover the clause γραφέσθων δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας οἷς ἔξεστιν is 
unparalleled in Athenian inscriptions and in literary sources. The formula is always ὁ 
βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν.589 The version found in the document at § 16 of this speech, 
γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας Ἀθηναίων ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν, is 
consistent with normal Athenian official language, and allows anyone who wishes so 
among the qualified Athenians to bring a public charge. 
To sum up, the stichometry of the speech shows that the document is a later 
insertion. Although it contains details not found in the orator's summary, none of these 
details needs an independent source, as a forger could have drawn them from other 
passages in the orators. In one case, with the expression ὡς ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν, the 
document's wording follows closely the wording of the orator, and yet this expression, 
which makes perfect sense in the orator's account, is quite out of place in the document. 
In another case, with the expression γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας Ἀθηναίων ὁ 
βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν, the document presents a formula which is unparalleled both 
in Athenian inscriptions and in literary sources, and which goes against what we know 
of Athenian legal procedures. Given these difficulties, it is safer to consider this 
document a later forgery. 
 
 
                                                
589 Aeschin.1.23, 32; Harp. s.v. Ναυτοδίκαι; Agora 16.56 l. 25; SEG 21.494 l. 30; 23.77 l. 10; 26.72 l. 
34. 
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5.3 [Dem.] 59.87: the law on seduction 
ΝΟΜΟΣ ΜΟΙΧΕΙΑΣ 
[87...] ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἕλῃ τὸν μοιχόν, μὴ ἐξέστω τῷ ἑλόντι συνοικεῖν τῇ γυναικί: 
ἐὰν δὲ συνοικῇ, ἄτιμος ἔστω. μηδὲ τῇ γυναικὶ ἐξέστω εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ 
δημοτελῆ, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ἂν μοιχὸς ἁλῷ: ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰσίῃ, νηποινεὶ πασχέτω ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ, 
πλὴν θανάτου. 
 
Anecd. Bek. 140.2-3 μηδὲ τῇ - εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα 
 
MOIK(EIA in ras.) Sa | δὲ om. Fa | ἱερὰ <ταῦτα> Anecd. Bek. 140.3 (cf. § 88) | τὰ δημοτελῆ - ἱερὰ 
ταῦτα  (§ 88) om. SYaR (spatio vacuo relicto) | ἂν μοιχὸς Yc : ἐὰν μοιχὸς FQ | εἰσίῃ YcQsl : εἴη FQ 
 
LAW OF SEDUCTION 
After he catches the seducer, the man who caught him shall not be permitted to 
continue living with the woman. If he continues living with her in marriage he is to 
be disfranchised. And the woman with whom a seducer has been caught shall not be 
permitted to attend the public cult ceremonies. If she enters, she is to suffer whatever 
she suffers, except death, with impunity.590 
 
Stichometric calculations show that this document cannot have been part of the 
Urexemplar. It must have been inserted later. 
Apollodorus quotes this law at the end of the discussion about Phano, allegedly 
Neaera's daughter (§ 49-87). From § 72 to 84 Apollodorus tells the judges about the 
scandalous incident of Theogenes marrying Phano while serving as King Archon. As 
Basilinna, she presided over the Anthesteria festival and carried out religious duties 
with her husband. According to Apollodorus, the Areopagus inquired into the identity 
                                                
590 The translation is from Kapparis 1999: 141. 
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of Phano and found out, first, that she was not Athenian and therefore could not marry 
an Athenian citizen, let alone carry out religious duties as the Basilinna. Second, that 
she had been previously married to Phrastor, whereas the law prescribes that the wife of 
the Archon King must not have been previously married. When the Areopagus found 
out, Theogenes, in order to avoid punishment, immediately divorced Phano and 
dismissed Stephanus (whom he had hired as his assistant). 
At § 85-7 Apollodorus argues that since Phano has also been seduced, not only 
was she not allowed to perform religious duties as Basilinna; she was not allowed to 
attend the public cult ceremonies at all. Apollodorus is here referring to her affair with 
Epainetos, a man from Andros, after Phrastor divorced her. This affair is discussed at § 
64-71, where Apollodorus' argument is however that Phano was a prostitute at that 
stage, and Stephanus and Neaera plotted to catch Epainetos with her in order to claim 
that he was an adulterer and exact money from him. We have plenty of evidence 
proving that the laws on moicheia did not apply to prostitutes,591 and therefore 
Apollodorus' argument is here contradictory; he is, for his argument's sake, interpreting 
the same events in completely different directions at different points in the speech, in 
order to prejudice the judges against Phano and Neaera and multiply the reasons for 
blaming them. At any rate if, as Kapparis has convincingly argued, Phano was not 
actually a prostitute, the law on moicheia was indeed valid for her.592 
In Apollodorus' summary (§ 85-6), the law on moicheia provides that a woman 
with whom a seducer has been caught cannot attend any of the public cult ceremonies 
(οὐκ ἔξεστιν αὐτῇ ἐλθεῖν εἰς οὐδὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν δημοτελῶν). If she does and 
breaks the law, she is to suffer whatever may happen to her, except death, with impunity 
                                                
591 At § 21 of this speech Metaneira, a prostitute, was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries. At § 116 a 
sacrifice is performed on behalf of a courtesan. Cf. also Cooper 1995: 303-18 about Hyp. fr. 30 Blass. 
Prostitutes also took part in the obscure festival called Haloa. Cf. Kapparis 1999: 413-17; Parker 2005: 
199-201. 
592 Kapparis 1999: 295-300. 
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for whoever wishes to punish her (ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰσίωσι καὶ παρανομῶσι, νηποινεὶ πάσχειν 
ὑπὸ τοῦ βουλομένου ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ, πλὴν θανάτου). The law also provides that the 
punishment can be inflicted by whoever happens to be there when the woman 
transgresses the law (καὶ ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος τὴν τιμωρίαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τῷ ἐντυχόντι). 
The law allows any sort of humiliation for the woman caught with the adulterer who 
attends the public cult ceremonies, to prevent them from being polluted. 
The second part of the law is very close to Apollodorus' wording: μηδὲ τῇ 
γυναικὶ ἐξέστω εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ δημοτελῆ, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ἂν μοιχὸς ἁλῷ: ἐὰν δ᾽ 
εἰσίῃ, νηποινεὶ πασχέτω ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ, πλὴν θανάτου. Kapparis has used this 
similarity as the main evidence to deem the document authentic.593 There is no reason to 
doubt that the words of Apollodorus are close to the words of the law, and the 
anacolouthon in ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ μὴ εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ 
δημοτελῆ, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ἂν μοιχὸς ἁλῷ (and again in ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰσίωσι καὶ παρανομῶσι, 
νηποινεὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ βουλομένου ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ) with the sudden change of 
number points in this direction. The orator changes the number every time he switches 
to close quotation. This certainly proves that the law spoke about the woman in the 
singular. However, the fact that the document too speaks about the woman in the 
singular is very unsafe grounds to conclude, as Kapparis does,594 that the summary 
quotes from the text we read in our document. A forger had access to Apollodorus' 
summary, could have easily drawn from it the same conclusions as we do and, 
accordingly, drafted the document in the singular. 
On the other hand, there is in fact a difference between the summary and the 
document: the summary explains that a woman caught with a seducer could be punished 
in any way (but not with death), with impunity, by anyone who wishes so (ὑπὸ τοῦ 
                                                
593 Kapparis 1999: 356-7. 
594 Kapparis 1999: 356. 
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βουλομένου). The next sentence in the summary again stresses that the punishment can 
be inflicted by anyone who happens to be there (τῷ ἐντυχόντι). This double reference 
strongly suggests that an expression such as ὑπὸ τοῦ βουλομένου must have been in 
the law, but the document lacks it.595  
Strong grounds against the authenticity of the document come from Aeschines' 
summary of the same law about moicheia at Aeschin. 1.183.596 This passage, while 
confirming Apollodorus' summary at § 85-6, adds many provisions and details that are 
absent from the document. Aeschines attributes the law to Solon and claims that he τὴν 
γὰρ γυναῖκα ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ἂν ἁλῷ μοιχός, οὐκ ἐᾷ κοσμεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ εἰς τὰ δημοτελῆ ἱερὰ 
εἰσιέναι, ἵνα μὴ τὰς ἀναμαρτήτους τῶν γυναικῶν ἀναμειγνυμένη διαφθείρῃ: ἐὰν 
δ᾽ εἰσίῃ ἢ κοσμῆται, τὸν ἐντυχόντα κελεύει καταρρηγνύναι τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ τὸν 
κόσμον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τύπτειν, εἰργόμενον θανάτου καὶ τοῦ ἀνάπηρον 
ποιῆσαι ('the woman with whom a seducer is caught, he does not permit to adorn 
herself, nor to attend the public cult ceremonies, in order that she should not mix with 
the innocent women and corrupt them. But if she does attend, or adorn herself, he tells 
anyone who meets her to tear off her clothes, strip off her adornment and beat her - it is 
forbidden to kill or mutilate her...').597 The summary uses the singular, as the law is 
supposed to, and Aeschines also switches from the plural to the singular ([...] περὶ τῆς 
τῶν γυναικῶν εὐκοσμίας. τὴν γὰρ γυναῖκα...) when he starts the proper summary. 
The provisions summarized by Apollodorus in his account are all confirmed. However, 
Aeschines' summary adds that the woman caught with an adulterer, in addition to being 
                                                
595 Kapparis 1999: 355 sees this, but claims that such an expression 'was included in one of the omitted 
sections of the law, and it is supposed to be understood here too'. This is no more than guesswork. In fact, 
the previous sections of the law would have dealt with the kyrios of the woman catching the seducer, and 
with the punishment of the seducer. This was not to be inflicted ὑπὸ τοῦ βουλομένου, but by the kyrios 
himself catching him with the woman. I do not claim that such an expression could not appear anywhere 
in the law, but I doubt whether ὁ βουλόμενος was key enough in this law to be understood. At any rate, 
the double reference to this expression in Apollodorus' summary makes sure that the expression was in 
this section of the law. 
596 This was first noticed by Franke 1844: 742. 
597 Tr. from Fisher 2001: 215. 
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banned from the public cult ceremonies, should not adorn herself (οὐκ ἐᾷ κοσμεῖσθαι). 
That this was in the text of the law is confirmed by the fact that the sentence stating the 
punishments starts with ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰσίῃ ἢ κοσμῆται, naming both prohibitions with 
repetitiveness typical of official language. This further specification was not mentioned 
by Apollodorus as it was irrelevant to his point, but was nevertheless in the law. Its 
absence from our document speaks against its authenticity. Moreover Aeschines 
explains that, in case the woman attends the public cult ceremonies or adorns herself, 
the law allows anyone (τὸν ἐντυχόντα again, which confirms that such an expression 
was in the law) to tear off her clothes, strip off her adornment and beat her, but not to 
kill or mutilate her. This list of punishments is absent from our document, which 
follows instead Apollodorus’ account in providing that the woman 'is to suffer whatever 
she suffers'. Apollodorus' seems a very abbreviated version of Aeschines’ list of 
punishments. Apollodorus also adds that the woman cannot be killed, whereas 
Aeschines adds that neither can she be mutilated. The absence of these details from the 
document speaks, again, against its authenticity. 
Kapparis has tried to justify the absence from the document of the list of 
punishments, as well as the absence of any mention of mutilation, by claiming that these 
are Aeschines' interpretations of the concise wording of the law, rather than proper 
provisions. This is no more than guesswork. It is as likely that Apollodorus simply 
summarized the provisions of the law.598 Moreover Kapparis does not take into account 
the prohibition on adornments for women caught with a seducer. This provision, as we 
have seen, is repeated twice, and must have been in the law. Otherwise one should 
admit that Aeschines here is not simply interpreting, but actually lying, for no reason, 
about the contents of the statute. Fisher, who otherwise believes with Kapparis that 
                                                
598 Kapparis 1999: 355-6. Fisher 2001: 338 agrees with Kapparis. 
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Aeschines is here interpreting, accepts this provision as part of the law.599 He justifies its 
absence from the document by claiming that this provision was 'omitted as not relevant 
to his case by Apollodorus'. But the document, authentic or not, was not inserted in the 
speech by Apollodorus. Its absence from the stichometry proves that it must have been 
inserted much later, either after having been forged or after having been retrieved by a 
very conscientious editor. Apollodorus' rhetorical aims cannot have anything to do with 
the wording of the document. Kapparis' and Fisher's arguments are inconclusive, and at 
least one, more likely all of the provisions mentioned by Aeschines were part of the law. 
Their absence from the document speaks against its authenticity. 
Another way to justify the absence of these provisions from the document is to 
claim that the document is just a shortened version of the original law, an excerpt. This 
was the position of Staeker, Lipsius and Harrison.600 This hypothesis, although not 
impossible, is somewhat unlikely. The stichometry proves that the document was not in 
the speech from the beginning, but was inserted later. Therefore the document, to be 
authentic, must have been retrieved by a conscientious editor from some source, such as 
a collection of Athenian laws. When was it excerpted? If we assume that the editor 
shortened the document, we must explain why such a careful editor, after making the 
effort to retrieve the authentic law, would excerpt its provisions to such an extent. Any 
detail about the obligations of a woman caught with an adulterer which is not listed by 
Apollodorus falls from the document. What then was the purpose of retrieving the law 
in the first place, if the result could have been easily drawn from Apollodorus' words? 
The alternative is that the editor found the law already excerpted this way. But it defies 
the laws of probability that an authentic and complete law transmitted autonomously in 
a collection of Athenian statutes ended up showing only those very features that 
                                                
599 Fisher 2001: 338. Cf. also Carey 1992: 129. 
600 Staeker 1884: 36; Lipsius 1905-15: 434 n. 51; Harrison 1968: 35-6 and n. 1. 
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Apollodorus had summarized in his speech. At any rate, as MacDowell observed about 
another document, 'it ought not to need saying that somebody's digest of a decree is not 
the authentic decree'.601 
A more serious argument in defence of the document is that offered by Carey in 
his commentary of the speech. Carey observes that the information provided by the first 
part of the document, namely that a man who has caught his wife with an adulterer must 
divorce her or be atimos, is not found in Apollodorus' summary, and therefore, he 
concludes, 'probably this document is genuine'.602 This argument however is vulnerable 
to two objections. First, this is actually the only evidence that such a provision ever 
existed. Moicheia was, as has been recognized,603 not only an offence against marriage, 
but it also applied to widows and unmarried women. The person responsible for 
punishing the adulterer was not necessarily the husband, but whoever happened to be 
the kyrios of the woman, irrespective of whether she was married or not. The law about 
moicheia applied also if there was no husband. If this was the case, one might wonder 
what is the sense of such a general provision stating that 'after he catches the seducer, 
the man who caught him shall not be permitted to continue living with the woman'. 
Moreover, not a single passage in the orators or elsewhere mentions that a man who has 
caught a woman with a seducer has to divorce her. In fact, in Lysias' On the killing of 
Eratosthenes, where the case is about the killing of a seducer, Euphiletus never 
mentions nor alludes to such a provision.604 This provision might simply have been 
invented by a forger, and we have seen many cases of forgers' ingenuity. In fact, 
                                                
601 MacDowell, CR 35/2 (1985) 319. 
602 Carey 1992: 129. 
603 This reconstruction of moicheia as applying to married women as well as unmarried was first 
formulated by Paoli 1950: 123-82 and endorsed by Harrison 1968: 32-6 and Dover 1974: 209. Cohen 
1984 and 1991: 98-132 argued against this reconstruction for an understanding of moicheia as 'adultery' 
in the traditional, modern sense, but his arguments have been rightly rejected by Cantarella 1991: 289-96, 
Foxhall 1991 and Carey 1995: 407-8. 
604 Cf. Todd 2007: 48 and n. 27. Cohn-Haft 1995: 3 and Fernandes 1999: 106 n. 74 want to find a 
reference to this law in Lys. 14.28, but the passage only states that the daughter of Alcibiades was 
divorced because her brother 'visited her not as a brother, but as a husband', not that he had to divorce her 
because of that (cf. Todd 2007: 48 n. 27). 
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Apollodorus quotes the statute about moicheia in reference to Phano, after having 
described the events that led to her being divorced by Theogenes. A forger could have 
misunderstood Apollodorus' argument and drawn the wrong conclusions, creating a 
provision that imposes by force of law what Theogenes decided to do independently. 
The second objection to Carey's argument is that, even if the provision actually existed, 
this would not prove that the law is authentic. Ancient readers had access to a greater 
number of Attic speeches than we do, and forgers drew information from many sources. 
A forger could have read this piece of information in a speech now lost, and used it for 
his document. 
To sum up, the document is a later insertion and, although it does not present any 
feature absolutely unacceptable in an authentic Athenian statute, is slightly inconsistent 
with Apollodorus' summary of the law, and heavily inconsistent with Aeschines', as it 
lacks key provisions that must have been part of the law. The first part of the document, 
whether such a provision existed or not (and there are reasons to believe that it did not), 
does not suffice alone to prove its authenticity, and could have been invented by a 
forger on the basis of the previous narrative in the speech. 
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5.4 [Dem.] 59.104: the decree of naturalization of the Plataeans 
ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΛΑΤΑΙΕΩΝ 
Ἱπποκράτης εἶπεν, Πλαταιέας εἶναι Ἀθηναίους, ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας 
ἐντίμους καθάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις 
μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ 
γένους, μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων. κατανεῖμαι δὲ τοὺς 
Πλαταιέας εἰς τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς φυλάς. ἐπειδὰν δὲ νεμηθῶσι, μὴ ἐξέστω 
ἔτι Ἀθηναίῳ μηδενὶ γίγνεσθαι Πλαταιέων, μὴ εὑρομένῳ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ 
Ἀθηναίων. 
 
2 ἐντίμους codd. : ἐπιτίμους Cobet at al. | καὶ om. Sa | 3 ante πλὴν Riehemann add. ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν 
ἱερωσυνῶν : Carey lacunam stat. | 4 ante μηδὲ Reiske add. τούτων μὴ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς : Osborne 
ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἱερωσυνῶν : Carey lacunam stat. | post ἀρχόντων Reiske add. λαχεῖν vel γενέσθαι | 
5 post τούτων Reiske lacunam stat. : Osborne add. ἂν ὦσιν ἐξ ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ 
τὸν νόμον 
 
DECREE ABOUT THE PLATAEANS 
Hippocrates proposed that the Plataeans be Athenian, entitled to office from this day 
(enfranchised) like the rest of the Athenians, that they have a share in all that the 
Athenians have a share in, both sacred and civil, except if some priesthood or rite 
comes from the membership of a genos, nor the nine archons, whereas their offspring 
do. And the Plataeans are to be distributed among the demes and tribes, and when 
they have been distributed, none of the Plataeans is to become an Athenian unless he 
gets the grant from the Athenians. 
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According to stichometric calculations this document cannot have been part of the 
Urexemplar of the speech, and must have been inserted at a later date. Apollodorus’ aim 
in this section of the speech (89-92) is to show how important the Athenians consider 
citizenship and how difficult it is for a foreigner to receive it. He therefore recalls the 
relevant provisions of the current legislation about citizenship without quoting them. 
First, citizenship can be granted only to someone who has benefited the city of Athens. 
Second, the grant, after being approved, must be confirmed in a second Assembly with 
a quorum of 6000 and a vote by secret ballot. Even after the second vote, the grant is 
still subject to a γραφὴ παρανόμων. Apollodorus mentions the names of two citizens 
who lost their citizenship after being prosecuted on this charge. The next provision 
mentioned prohibits those who become citizens by decree from holding the archonship 
and any priesthood, but grants their offspring full rights 'if they are born from a citizen 
and legally betrothed woman' (§ 92). 
In the next section, § 93-103, Apollodorus traces the origin of this last provision 
to a specific case, the grant given to the Plataeans. Citizenship was granted to them 
because of the many benefits they brought the Athenians. At the Battle of Marathon 
they were the only ones to fight with the Athenians against Datis, the general of king 
Darius. Later in the Persian War the Plataeans, unlike the Thebans and the other 
Boeotians, fought with Leonidas at Thermopylai, with the Athenians at the Artemisium 
and at Salamis, and eventually with all the Greeks under Pausanias at Plataea. 
Afterwards, when Pausanias insulted all the allies by inscribing his sole name as victor 
over the Persians on the Serpent Column at Delphi jointly dedicated to Apollo by the 
Hellenic League, the Plataeans undertook his prosecution before the Amphictyony. 
According to Apollodorus, this was the reason why fifty years later the Spartans 
attacked Plataea and eventually conquered the city. Even during the siege, the Plataeans 
refused to withdraw from their alliance with the Athenians. After these acts of loyalty 
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citizenship was granted to people who had lost everything, their belongings, their 
children, their wives, in order to maintain their alliance with Athens.  
At § 105-6, after the secretary has read out the decree, Apollodorus summarizes 
its provisions: the naturalized Plataeans must first undergo scrutiny in court, man by 
man, and later their names must be inscribed on a pillar of marble on the Acropolis near 
the temple of the Goddess. No Plataean can claim citizenship by virtue of this decree at 
a later time. Finally, no naturalized Plataean can be chosen by lot for the office of 
archon, nor can he hold any priesthood, but his offspring can if born from an Athenian 
woman who married him according to the law. 
The document is heavily inconsistent with this summary, and its provisions have 
often been emended to solve these disagreements. Moreover, its language is inconsistent 
with contemporary Athenian inscriptions. 
At the beginning of the decree the statement clause (Πλαταιέας εἶναι 
Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας) is not perfectly consistent with the epigraphical 
evidence: in early epigraphical instances of naturalization grants the statement clause is 
usually followed, immediately (D2, D3, D6, D8, D10, D11, D12, D13)605 or after a very 
short motivation clause (D7 ἐπειδή ἐστ[ιν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τὸν δῆμον τ]ὸν 
Ἀθηναίων, D9 ἀνδραγαθίας ἕν[εκα] τῆς ἐς Ἀθηναίος), by the provision for the 
enrolment of the new citizen(s) in demes, tribes and phratries (D2, D3, D6, D8, D10, 
D11, D12, D13).606 In the only case in which a long section divides the statement clause 
from the enrolment clause (D5, for the Samians, 405/404 and 403/402), this happens for 
a very specific reason: the grant is addressed to Samians still living in Samos, and 
                                                
605 The naturalization decrees are hereafter named according to the list provided by Osborne 1981-2: I, 
17-18: D2=IG I3 102; D3= IG I3 113; D4=D5= IG I3 127= IG II2 1; D6= IG II2 10+Addendum p. 665; D7= 
IG II2 19+Addendum p. 659; D8= IG II2 17+SEG 15.84+SEG 16.42; D9= IG II2 25+SEG 15.86; D10= IG 
II2 103; D11= IG II2 109=SEG 16.47; D12= IG II2 207; D13=Hesperia 13 (1944) 229 f. no. 3; D14= IG 
II2 226+Addendum p. 659+O. Walter, Jahreshefte 32 (1940) 1 ff.; D15= IG II2 228; D16= IG II2 
237+Addendum p. 659; D17+ IG II2 336 I. 
606 Cf. Henry 1983: 68-69. 
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therefore πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλωνται (l. 13). It is just an amendment to 
the main decree passed two years later which states (l. 34f) that the Samians living in 
Athens are to be distributed among the tribes.607  
In the document, on the other hand, the statement clause is followed by two other 
sentences stressing the sharing of the citizenship between Athenians and Plateaeans (ll. 
2-3 ἐντίμους καθάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις 
μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων). Luisa Prandi considers this 'abbondanza' 'poco 
pertinente al formulario conciso di un decreto del V secolo.'608 These two formulae 
moreover are both unparalleled in citizenship grants. Again the document is here at least 
atypical. 
More strikingly, the expression ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας finds no parallels at all in 
the surviving examples of naturalization grants, nor in any preserved grant of privileges 
to benefactors. A search through all the Attic inscriptions of the PHI database yields 
only three results, from completely different kinds of documents, which have nothing to 
do with grants of privileges, and none of them dates earlier than the middle of the IV 
century: IG II² 534=Aleshire. Ath. Asklepieion 177.IV=SEG 39.165 (l. 7), a record of 
offers to Asclepius, dates to 274-3 BCE; IG II² 1128 (l. 27), the restatement of Athenian 
privileges in the import of red ochre from the Koresioi, dates to the middle of the 4th 
century; finally IG II² 204 (l. 17),609 a decree from Eleusis concerning the sacred orgas 
(land), dates to 352/1 BCE. The expression is not intrinsically 'unattic', but the scarcity 
of Classical occurrences, also in literary texts,610 shows that it is not typically Attic 
either; it is not, that is, what an Athenian would have used to mean 'from this day on', 
'from now on.' 
                                                
607 Cf. Osborne 1981-2: II, 25-26.  
608 Prandi 1888: 114. 
609 Cf. Scafuro 1999. 
610 This expression is unparalleled in 5th century literary texts, and very rare in 4th century ones. The only 
occurrences are Plat. Lach. 181c3, Plat. Alc. I 135d10 and Xen. Cyr. 7.4.5. None of these instances have 
anything to do with legal language. 
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The reading ἐντίμους of l. 2 ('honoured' LSJ s.v.), attested in all parts of the 
tradition, has been considered wrong on the grounds that the usual meaning does not fit 
the context. All scholars have considered the meaning 'enfranchised' to be required by 
the context, and this word is never found with that meaning, neither in literary texts nor 
in inscriptions.611 It has been therefore corrected by Cobet612 to ἐπιτίμους ('in 
possession of his rights and franchises' LSJ s.v.). However, the correction made by 
Cobet is still an unattested term in naturalization decrees and, although it is common in 
Athenian literary sources, a survey in the PHI database yields no Attic instances at all of 
this adjective (or the noun ἐπιτιμία) with the particular meaning of 'enfranchised.' 
Finally, a study of the occurrences of this word in the literary sources up to the end of 
the IV century shows that both before and after the date of this grant it was never 
employed to refer to rights bestowed upon some non-citizen, be he a metic or a 
foreigner. On the contrary, it was used in opposition to the term ἄτιμος in regard to 
citizens to indicate that they were in full possession of their full rights.613 This 
emendation is therefore unacceptable, since the restored expression does not conform 
with Attic usage. Moreover the correction is based on the assumption that here the text 
needs a word with the meaning 'enfranchised.' Yet this might be wrong: in at least two 
cases, IK Kyme 4 l. 12 and 5 l. 8 (the word is restored also in IK Kyme 7 and 8), both 
citizenship decrees, one dating to mid-3rd century and the other to the beginning of the 
2nd century, we find this word meaning 'entitled to office', together with the specification 
                                                
611 The only dubious evidence for such a meaning is IG IX, I2 3, 718, l. 35 = Nomima, I, no. 43, from 
Chaleon in Locris, yet Meiggs and Lewis 1969 (no. 20) are probably right in preferring the meaning 'in 
office'. 
612 Cobet 1858: 751. 
613 A survey in the TLG yields, up to the IV century, these results, and they all confirm this interpretation: 
Lys. 12.21; Ps.-Lys. 6.13, 44; Ps.-Lys. 20.19, 35; Lys. 25.27; Aeschin. 1.160; Aeschin. 2.88; Dem. 
18.312; Dem. 21.61, 96, 99, 106; Dem. 24.45, 90, 103; Dem. 25.71, 73, 94; Dem. 26. 1, 11; Andoc. 1.73, 
80, 103, 107, 109; Lycurg. 41; Hyp. fr. 27-28 (Jensen); Dein. 5.2. Cf. also Thuc. 5.34; Xen. Hell. 2.2.11; 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.1. The case of Dem. 23.44-45 is a peculiar one, and even there the meaning of 
ἐπίτιμος is 'not confiscated', referring to goods and not to people. A further entry is the Solonian law 
quoted at Plut. Sol. 19.3, and again the term refers to citizens previously deprived of their rights who are 
now restored. 
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εὐθύς (immediately). Our document, if we put a comma before ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς 
ἡμέρας, might have the same meaning. However these parallels are both geographically 
and chronologically remote, and nothing similar is found in Athens, neither in Classical 
nor in post-Classical times, not only in citizenship grants but also in the honorary grants 
preserved in stone. The word ἔντιμος appears only twice in Attic inscriptions (SEG 
23:161 l. 29 and IG II2 7863 l. 9) and in both cases it means 'honored.' As for literary 
texts from Classical times, a search in TLG yields 117 entries, and in all cases the 
meaning is 'honored.'614 The parallels from Kyme show that such a formula might have 
been felt as appropriate in a citizenship grant in later times, and in different places, and 
therefore be added in a forged one, but the expression as it stands does not occur in 
Athenian documents during the Classical period. 
The next expression states the rights of the Plataeans: μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ 
Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων. 615 This formula is not found in any 
of the Athenian citizenship grants preserved in inscriptions, and does not seem to have 
                                                
614 LSJ s.v. ἔντιμος II mentions the meaning 'in office' as appropriate in one Classical place: Pl. Resp. 
564d ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν. Plato is there explaining why 
the drones, present in both democratic and oligarchic states, are less powerful in the oligarchies. It is easy 
to see that the sentence works perfectly with the normal meaning 'honored', and this is how Shorey 
translates it: 'There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office...' The evidence of five other 
places in the same dialogue (528b, 528c, 548a, 554b, 555c) where the word clearly means 'honored' 
strongly advises against reading too much into the present passage. 
615 About the expression hiera kai hosia Kapparis 1995: 395 quotes Wyse 1904: 535: 'this phrase is 
comprehensive enough to embrace all the rights of a citizen'. This is not the place for discussing the 
vexata quaestio of the meaning of hiera kai hosia (cf. in general Maffi 1982 and Connor 1988), meaning 
all the rights and obligations of a citizen, before the IV century. This expression never appears in 
naturalization grants, and the evidence for its usage in official documents is inconclusive. The ephebic 
oath (cf. Rhodes - Osborne 2003: 88), with these words, implies mainly the concept of 'fatherland' (cf. 
Connor 1988:168), and moreover the 'faint echoes' (as Rhodes - Osborne 2003: 449 define them) of the 
oath found by Siewert 1977 in fifth century texts do not include this expression. The expression is used 
by Dem. 23.40 in his comment on Draco’s homicide law, but it is dubious whether the orator was here 
repeating the exact words of the law (cf. Connor 1988:168-169, as the inscribed version of IG I3 104 does 
not present the formula). A more reliable source however could be the law about the nothoi, paraphrased 
at Isae. 6.47 and quoted at Dem. 43.51, even if the authenticity of this document has been questioned (cf. 
for bibliography Drerup 1898: 280-297, who nonetheless considers the quotation an original law). Blok 
2009: 145-6, 159-62 argues for the presence of this expression even in Pericles' citizenship law. I agree 
that its use in official documents is not impossible, but the question is open. In any case the expression 
was widely used in the orators, and probably sounded familiar to any reader of Demosthenes (cf. Dem. 
23.40, 65; 24.9, 11, 82, 101, 111, 112, 120, 137), so its presence in a forgery should not surprise us.  
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been used in Attic inscriptions for any other purpose,616 neither in exactly this form nor 
in a similar fashion. However, it appears in a strikingly similar way in Dem. 23.65: 
Ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Χαρίδημον ἐποιησάμεθα πολίτην, καὶ διὰ τῆς 
δωρειᾶς ταύτης μετεδώκαμεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ νομίμων καὶ 
πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν ('We, Athenians, made Charidemus a citizen, 
and through this grant we bestowed upon him our sacred, civil and legal rights, 
everything we have a share in').617 Yet here Demosthenes is not quoting the actual text 
of the grant to Charidemus, but rather describing the consequences of such a grant. This 
text, far from attesting the usage of this formula in Athenian naturalization grants, could 
possibly be a source the forger used when composing the document.  
Luisa Prandi 114 regards the entire passage as 'quasi un preludio funzionale' to the 
following exclusion of the first generation of new citizens from the genos-priesthoods618 
and archonships. It is accordingly worth noting that in the following comment by 
Apollodorus (§ 106) the corresponding expression to μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ 
Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων of the quoted document is τὸν 
νόμον διωρίσατο ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ὑπέρ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ 
                                                
616 A formula similar to the one found in this passage is attested in many honorary grants (IG XII 3 1296 
ll. 24-5; 5 716 ll. 7-8; 5 717 ll. 6-7; 5 718 ll. 8-9; Suppl. 246 ll. 4-6; 8 264 ll. 9-10; 8 267 ll. 8-9; Suppl. 
355 ll. 3-4; 9 197 ll. 20-4; 9 198 ll. 12-5; 9 317 ll. 10-4; 9 239 ll. 23-5; Eretria XI, 127 8 ll. 13-5; Miletus 
35 ll. 23-5; 38 ll. 30-3; 39 ll. 43-4; 61 ll. 12-5; Magnesia 43 ll. 28-30; Teos 39 l. 1; 40 ll. 13-5; Iasos 68 ll. 
23-4; Priene 62 ll.1 11-4; Kolophon 8 ll. 8-11) connected with citizenship, sympolity, proxeny, ateleia, 
enktesis and isopoliteia from some Aegean islands (Thera, Thasos, Andros, Eretria in Euboea) and from 
Asia Minor (mainly from Caria and Miletus). None of these decrees dates before the 4th century, and most 
of them date from the 3rd century on. This shows that, where such a formula was part of the official 
language, its range of application was wide, and not restricted to citizenship grants. Its absence in Athens 
from all the honorary grants, a wide sample of texts, makes clear that this was not considered an official 
formula there. Its use in later times, and just outside Athens, on the other hand, makes possible, but this is 
just speculation, that a post-Classical forger could consider Demosthenes’ remark in the Against 
Aristocrates as the actual words of the decree, on the basis of his own experience of honorary grants. 
617 A further connection between the two passages, and one which could account further for the derivation 
of the clause of the document from the text of the Against Aristocrates is § 92 of the Against Neaera. 
There we read, with regards to the offspring of a new citizen, τοῖς δ’ ἐκ τούτων μετέδωκεν ἤδη ὁ 
δῆμος ἁπάντων, which shows the same construction as the Against Aristocrates’ passage and the 
document’s one. 
618 Blok - Lambert 2009 point out that this definition is more correct than the traditional 'hereditary 
priesthoods', since these priests were appointed from the members of a particular genos, but were not in a 
narrower sense hereditary. 
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τῶν θεῶν.619 Yet it is not clear whether this sentence is supposed to quote an actual 
clause of the decree, or rather to recall the reason for which Apollodorus has quoted and 
is commenting on this particular decree. In the first case we would expect in the text of 
the decree an allusion to the law which provides rights and obligations to new 
citizens,620 while in the second case Apollodorus would be referring to a particular 
argument already employed in this section of the speech. At § 93 in fact he states that he 
is going to trace back the origins of the provision on naturalization of foreigners he has 
just mentioned at § 92. Then, after the long excursus about the misfortunes of the 
Plataeans, at § 104 he declares that the 'decrees will make the law clear for everyone.' 
According to Apollodorus' argument, this decree actually defines the provisions of the 
law.  
In both cases the language, style, and formulas of the document provide grounds 
against authenticity. They seem rather the attempt of a later editor to paraphrase (with 
some misunderstanding) the summary of Apollodorus and at the same time to link its 
contents to other parts of Apollodorus' narrative.  
These exceptions, namely the prohibition for the Plataeans on sharing genos-
priesthoods, τελεταί and the archonship (ll. 3-5), are important differences between the 
document and the following summary by the orator. Apollodorus states at § 106 that the 
naturalized Plataeans were banned from all the priesthoods, not just from those linked 
with a genos. Because of this inconsistency and the grammatical difficulty of the 
sentence (πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ γένους, μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα 
ἀρχόντων, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων), this part of the document has always been subject to 
                                                
619 'He (the orator who proposed the decree: § 105), in the decree, defined immediately the law which 
applied to them in regard to the city and the gods'. Van den Es 1864: 24 rightly wrote: 'Quid ex prioribus 
vocabulis eliciendum sit, non difficile est dictu: illa pro re publica et pro diis, ὑπέρ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ 
τῶν θεῶν, significant, iis omnium iurum et civilium et divinorum communionem datam esse.' Hence the 
formula μετεῖναι [...] πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων. 
620 Cf. Dem. 20.156 for an instance of a law recalling for particular provisions another law. 
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many emendations, aiming at correcting both its syntax and the phrases that are 
inconsistent with Apollodorus' account. 
On the grammatical side, Reiske posited a lacuna after τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, which 
introduced an exception to the provisions previously stated, and whose ending would 
have vanished in the tradition. The supplement proposed by Osborne (ἂν ὦσιν ἐξ 
ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον),621 on the grounds of the comment 
made by Apollodorus at § 106, might well be correct in principle,622 but it is untenable 
on paleographical grounds. As I have already pointed out, the manuscript tradition of 
Demosthenes does not have a medieval archetype, and the main manuscripts have been 
shown to stem from different ancient editions of Demosthenes, or even better from 
different editions of speeches or groups of speeches. It is significant that the tradition 
exhibits no major variations, and is almost perfectly consistent in all the main 
manuscripts. It defies the laws of probability that such a corruption could originate 
independently in every single ancient manuscript and be then copied in the medieval 
manuscripts. Moreover, as Blok and Lambert have recently argued, there is no intrinsic 
grammatical reason to supplement the text of the document here.623 The only reason to 
do so is thus to make the document match the contents of Apollodorus' summary. But 
this is a petitio principii. 
However, this is not the only attempt to emend this passage. Many scholars have 
considered the sentence as lacking both grammatically and in clarity. This is mainly due 
to the single μηδὲ at l. 4.624 The best attempt to emend the sentence is that of Reiske,625 
based mainly on the corresponding words of Apollodorus at § 106: he alters the text 
after πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ γένους in τούτων μὴ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς 
                                                
621 '… if they are born from a citizen and legally betrothed woman'. 
622 Blok 2009: 166 endorses Osborne's text. 
623 Blok - Lambert 2009: 104 n. 62. 
624 Osborne 1981-2: I, D1; Kapparis 1995: 362-363. 
625 In Schäfer 1824-1833: V, 587. 
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μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων λαχεῖν (or γενέσθαι).626 This solution is unsatisfactory 
too. In the first place the structure of the sentence remains quite involved: the clause 
τούτων μὴ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς merely repeats πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ 
γένους, which is already connected to the previous μετεῖναι (l. 2), and therefore makes 
the sentence utterly redundant. Furthermore, the hypothesis of such a corruption is 
untenable for the same paleographical reasons I have already discussed.  
Kapparis may be right when he claims that the problems here 'should rather be 
attributed to the editor who inserted this document in the text, rather than the scribes'.627 
The problems in the text certainly occurred in the original insertion, whether it was an 
excerpt of the original decree or a forgery. But since, as shown before, every attempt to 
improve this hypothetical excerpt by filling its 'omissions' seems to produce even more 
elaborate versions, it is highly implausible that the problems in the document arose from 
clumsy excerpting.   
The main clue in this direction is far from conclusive: μηδὲ stands rarely alone, 
but the case is not impossible. Denniston devotes two pages to instances of οὐδὲ or 
μηδὲ without a negative preceding.628 This feature is mainly typical of poetry, but it is 
sometimes found in prose texts as well (e.g. Thuc. 7.77.1; Hdt. 1.215.2), with a strong 
adversative meaning. Furthermore, the two exceptions to the single provision καὶ 
μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, expressed (with a strong 
variatio) in the first case by a πλὴν εἴ, and in the second by μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα 
ἀρχόντων held by the previous μετεῖναι, are probably quite unusual, but nonetheless 
grammatically possible. The clause seems for the most part to be grammatically 
consistent. Its intricate style can hardly be explained by the deletion of some phrases in 
                                                
626 '… they are not to have a share in those (i.e. the genos-priesthoods and rites) nor are to obtain by lot 
the office of the nine archons'. Kapparis 1995: 396 does not expressly reject this proposal, even if he 
attributes all the alterations of the text to the original editor of the document. Blok 2009: 166 accepts this 
correction, but Blok - Lambert 2009: 104 n. 62 rightly rejects it as unnecessary. 
627 Kapparis 1999: 396. 
628 Denniston 1934: 191-192. 
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order to produce an excerpt. The text preserved in the paradosis is in this sense original, 
and should undergo a thorough analysis as it stands. 
On the grounds of the content, many scholars have tried to remove the 
inconsistency between Apollodorus’ summary and the document by correcting its text. 
Apollodorus clearly states at § 106 that μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῶν μηδενὶ τῶν ἐννέα 
ἀρχόντων λαχεῖν μηδὲ ἱερωσύνης μηδεμιᾶς ('the new citizens are neither allowed to 
take part in the archonships nor in any priesthood'). The document on the other hand 
claims that they are to have a share in everything the citizens do, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, 
πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ γένους, μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων. So they 
are not excluded from the priesthoods in general, just from those connected with 
belonging to a particular genos. Riehemann629 proposed ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἱερωσυνῶν ('but 
not in the priesthoods') after καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, reversing the sense of the following 
exception: the Plataeans were not to hold any priesthood, except the ones that were 
connected with their own genos. This emendation, although it reconciles the text of the 
decree with the comments by Apollodorus, is very radical and unlikely to be right: the 
Plataeans did not need any authorization to preserve their own traditions.630 On the other 
hand Osborne’s proposal of moving ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἱερωσυνῶν before μηδὲ (Osborne: 
D1)631 is equally difficult to accept. In this case in fact the exclusion from the genos-
priesthoods would become completely tautological, as the genos-priesthoods are 
actually part of the priesthoods in general.632 It seems that every attempt to make the 
text completely consistent with Apollodorus’ paraphrase is therefore doomed to failure. 
The inconsistency cannot be removed by textual surgery and is another reason to reject 
the authenticity of the document.  
                                                
629 Riehemann 1886: 47. 
630 Cf. Kapparis 1995: 362; 1999: 395. 
631 Blok 2009: 166, accepts this proposal, but Blok - Lambert 2009: 104 n. 62 reject it. 
632 Kapparis 1995: 362; 2009: 395. Cf. also MacDowell, CR 35/2 (1985) 319. 
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Kapparis accepts the inconsistencies and explains them as a deliberate distortion 
of the decree by Apollodorus. The real provisions therefore would be preserved just in 
the quoted document. Yet this interpretation too creates some problems. First of all, 
Apollodorus, when talking at § 92 about the provisions of a law on citizenship, tries to 
trace them back to the naturalization grant for the Plataeans, and gives exactly the same 
account of its limitations as in the comment on the decree, with almost the same words: 
'the law expressly forbids that they should be eligible to the office of the nine archons or 
to hold any priesthood; but their descendants are allowed by the people to share in all 
civic rights, though the proviso is added: if they are born from an Athenian woman who 
was betrothed according to the law.'633 The reasons for such limitations provided in that 
passage are then perfectly consistent with the nature of the recorded provisions: new 
citizens are excluded from all priesthoods and archonships, the actual religious 
authorities in Athens,634 'in order to make sure that the sacrifices on behalf of the city are 
performed according to piety' (ὥστε δι᾽ εὐσεβείας τὰ ἱερὰ θύεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς 
πόλεως). Moreover, limiting the exclusion to genos-priesthoods would have been 
nonsense, since this kind of office was by definition limited to members of particular 
gene.635 It is hard to deny that Apollodorus’ account in this respect makes much better 
sense than the quoted document. The discrepancies here point decisively to the 
hypothesis of a later forgery. 
The text of the document, with its involved syntax, reads like an awkward attempt 
to rephrase and supplement the information provided by Apollodorus while at the same 
time making it more precise. The priesthoods in general, because of the prohibition 
                                                
633 The repetition of the provision ἂν ὦσιν ἐξ ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον at § 92 
with almost exactly the same words makes it very unlikely that this is Apollodorus' gloss, as proposed by 
Blok - Lambert 2009: 104 n. 62. 
634 About the religious authorities in Athens see Garland 1984 and Parker 1996: 7-8 on the archons, and 
56-66 on the role of the gene in Athenian religion. 
635 See also Prandi 1988:114-115, n. 61 and Blok 2009: 166-7 n. 107. Kapparis 1995: 369 motivates the 
provision as addressed against Plataeans liable to genos-priesthoods by adoption into the relevant 
families. A similar contingency would have been very unlikely, and therefore it is likewise unlikely that it 
needed a specific provision. Cf. Blok - Lambert 2009: 104 for a similar remark. 
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itself, are misunderstood as those connected with genos, which were by definition 
known as closed to everyone except a few people from particular families. τελεταί are 
then added as a further specification (that is, as a further example of prohibition). The 
word in Attic Greek stands for 'ancestral rites' and is usually (although not invariably) 
employed in ancient texts in connection with mysteries and initiation processes, and 
more generally about very solemn and secret rituals.636 The forger here had probably in 
mind the hieros gamos of the Basilinna with Dionysos, repeatedly described by the 
orator (§ 74-5) as 'secret'. The orator there, in order to explain the reason for which the 
Basilinna must be a citizen woman who has not had intercourse with another man, uses 
these words: ἵνα κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύηται τὰ ἄρρητα ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τὰ 
νομιζόμενα γίγνηται τοῖς θεοῖς εὐσεβῶς. There is a striking resemblance with the 
reason for the prohibition given by the orator for first generation naturalized citizens on 
becoming priests and archons: ὥστε δι᾽ εὐσεβείας τὰ ἱερὰ θύεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς 
πόλεως. It is not surprising that a forger thought of a connection between the two 
passages and considered it appropriate to add the τελεταί, secret rituals, to the list of 
prohibitions for naturalized citizens. It is clear however that the two passages refer to 
different rules, concerned with completely different matters. 
Another difference between the clauses of the document and the account of 
Apollodorus concerns the prohibition on further grants of citizenship to Plataeans (ll. 6-
7), after the scrutiny of the new citizens. At § 106 Apollodorus paraphrases the clause 
with these words: καὶ ὕστερον οὐκ ἐᾷ γίγνεσθαι Ἀθηναῖον ἐξεῖναι, ὃς ἂν μὴ νῦν 
γένηται καὶ δοκιμασθῇ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ('And he does not let anyone be allowed to 
become Athenian subsequently, who at the time did not receive the grant and was not 
scrutinized in court). Kapparis argues that these words imply a total prohibition valid 
forever, while the text of the document more plausibly states that Plataeans are still 
                                                
636 Cf. Harrison 1914; Waanders 1983: 156-159 for specific surveys on the meaning of the term. 
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enabled to become Athenian citizens if so decreed by the people of Athens (μὴ ἐξέστω 
ἔτι Ἀθηναίῳ μηδενὶ γίγνεσθαι Πλαταιέων, μὴ εὑρομένῳ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ 
Ἀθηναίων).637 Kapparis is likely to be right about the improbability of a total 
prohibition: it should have certainly been possible for the people to enact another 
naturalization decree subsequently. Yet the difference is not so great. Apollodorus 
might well have stressed the element of prohibition for his own reasons, but his 
statement can still (and should) be interpreted as referring just to further naturalizations 
by virtue of this particular decree.  This could easily have been the way in which a later 
editor read the statement, and the formulation in the document would be just a 
consistent, and somewhat redundant, rephrasing, which in addition makes explicit what 
in Apollodorus’ account was only implicit. The reason for such a provision is obvious, 
and speaks for a date of the decree following the fall of Plataea and the trial, execution 
and enslavement of its inhabitants: after these events, every Plataean who was still alive 
without having been in Athens at least from the flight of the winter 428/7 (Thuc. 3.20-
24) would have been suspected of treason and collaboration with the Peloponnesians. 
Further differences between the document and the surrounding text speak against 
the document's authenticity. Some provisions occur only in Apollodorus’ account and 
not in the document, namely the scrutiny of the Plataeans and the recording of the 
names of the new citizens to be set up on the Acropolis (it can be added that the 
document does not record the provision granting full rights to the sons of the Plataeans 
just if born from legally betrothed Athenian women).638 It is difficult to explain their 
absence if one considers this an authentic Athenian decree. 
The name of the decree's proposer, Hippocrates, does not help us to determine 
whether the document is genuine or not. Hippocrates was a very common name in 
                                                
637 Kapparis 1995: 364-366. 
638 For the practice of inscribing state decrees on the Acropolis cf. Liddell 2003: 79-81. 
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Athens and in the ancient world,639 and identification of the decree's proposer with 
Pericles’ nephew, the general elected in 426/5 and 424/3 and killed at the battle of 
Delion,640 would be merely an assumption. The name could easily be the product of 
guesswork, like the names of the eponymous archons in On the Crown, created in order 
to enhance the credibility of the text.  
The most striking feature of the document and the only clause not provided by 
Apollodorus is the provision for the distribution of the Plataeans into the demes and the 
tribes (κατανεῖμαι δὲ τοὺς Πλαταιέας εἰς τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς φυλάς). This 
provision has for a long time been considered an obstacle for those who believed in the 
authenticity of the inserted document, 'quia ex titulis apparet, δημοποιήτοις arbitrium 
demos et phylas eligendi Athenis permissum fuisse. Denique nihil in decreto de 
phratriis praeceptum invenimus, de quibus in titulis idem, quod de phylis ac demis 
praecipi solet.' 641 A quick glance at Osborne’s collection of naturalization grants seems 
to confirm this statement, yet two particular cases, D5 (naturalization of the Samians, 
405/4 and 403/2, heavily restored) and D6 (naturalization of the heroes of Phyle, 401/0, 
completely restored) seems to show that in the case of mass grants the Athenians did 
not let the new citizens choose deme, tribe and phratry as usual.642 On the contrary, they 
may have ordered a distribution carried out by the archons (D5, ll. 33-34 νε̑µαι [αὐτὸς 
αὐτίκα μάλα τὸς ἄρχοντας ἐς τὰ]ς φυλὰς δέκαχα, but Lewis in IG I3 127 and in ML 
94 restores differently), as stated by the inserted document. Prandi considers this the 
only clause that preserves 'la lettera del decreto originale', and Lambert notes that 'in 
this respect at least, the phrasing is typical', while Osborne and Kapparis regard it as the 
                                                
639 The LGPN online yields 189 entries, 50 just for Attica. 
640 PA 7640 (specifically D); APF 11811 II; Develin 1983: n. 1419; PAA 538615. 
641 Riehemann 1886: 45. 
642 For the rationale for omission of the phratries from mass naturalization grants cf. Lambert 1993: 51-
53. 
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strongest point in favour of authenticity.643 It must be noted however that our sample 
here consists of only two decrees, and the extensive restorations in both our examples 
should prevent us from drawing conclusions or generalizations about what was typical 
of mass naturalization grants, and from claiming therefore that alleged similarities speak 
for the authenticity of the document. In fact, D4 is completely restored, and D5 allows 
us to read no more than νε̑μαι and φυλὰς δέκαχα. If we still want to claim that the 
typical formula occurs in the two decrees, we should be aware that the wording, where 
the inscriptions are not restored, is not in fact exactly the same: the expected verb would 
have been νεῖμαι, found in D5, instead of κατανεῖμαι, used in classical inscriptions 
mainly with reference to the allocation of seats in the theatre.644 Furthermore, the tribes 
are named with the specification δέκαχα, absent from our decree. Although these few 
discrepancies do not by themselves impugn the clause, they accord with the general 
impression of language inconsistent with documents from the Classical period.  
Moreover, apart from the wording, one fragmentary inscription cannot provide 
grounds to claim that, as for the content, the document conforms to a pattern, since there 
is no pattern we can identify with any confidence. The hypothesis that the parallelism, if 
there is any, might be due to an external source which provided the editor of the inserted 
document with news about the methods of a (or this) mass naturalization grant cannot 
be completely excluded. Yet it must be observed that the extant ancient literary sources 
do not provide any information at all about the enrolment of new citizens in demes, 
tribes and phratries. The only other passage from which it would have been possible to 
find some evidence about the process is Lys. 23.2-3, where a certain Pancleon claims to 
be an Athenian citizen since he is a Plataean. The accuser consequently asks him about 
his deme so that he can summon him in front of the court of the tribe. This passage 
                                                
643 Prandi 1988: 114-5; Lambert 1999: 51-2 n. 116; Osborne 1981-2: II, 13-4; Kapparis 1999: 367. 
644 Cf. e.g. IG II2 456; IG II2 466; IG II2 500; IG II2 512; IG II2 567; IG II2 792;, IG II2 900; Agora 
16.142.1-2, 1; 188.1; Hesperia 43.322.3. 
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names only demes and tribes, and not phratries, exactly as the document does, and does 
not mention whether the Plataeans, or any other naturalized foreigners, actually chose or 
were distributed among them. 
Information from Lysias 23 has been used to argue in favour of the authenticity of 
the clause in the inserted document,645 but this speech could equally have been the 
source used by the forger who composed the document. It is possible then that for an 
ancient forger, trying to supplement the information provided by Apollodorus but 
without any epigraphic evidence available, the possibility of a distribution was as likely 
as the possibility that new citizens could choose their deme. A striking resemblance 
with a very famous (today and probably in ancient times) passage of Herodotus could 
be a possible explanation for the choice of the verb κατανεῖμαι. Hdt. 5.69 recalls that 
Cleisthenes τοὺς δήμους κατένειμε ἐς τὰς φυλάς. The meaning is here completely 
different, since Herodotus is talking about the distribution of the demes among the ten 
tribes, yet the words are exactly the same, and it is not impossible that this was the 
model the forger had in mind when he opted for the clause κατανεῖμαι δὲ τοὺς 
Πλαταιέας εἰς τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς φυλάς. 
To sum up, the document contains many features of language and terminology 
that are inconsistent with those of similar grants of citizenship. Moreover it exhibits 
syntactic features hardly compatible with a decree of the 5th century BCE. The text in 
this form can hardly have been either the actual text of the decree or an extract from it, 
since corrections of its text produce even less credible versions. Furthermore, some of 
the provisions summarized by Apollodorus are not found in the document. This 
                                                
645 Cf. Prandi 1988: 115; Kapparis 1995: 367. Actually the fact that the speaker does not mention any 
enquiry in any phratry list is not very relevant, since Pancleon, in order to be an Athenian citizen, had to 
be a member of a deme anyway. The sole membership of a phratry would not have been enough, and so, 
to prove that Pancleon was not an Athenian citizen (which is the purpose of the accuser), the enquiry in 
the deme was sufficient. 
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document cannot be an authentic Athenian decree. It is safer to consider it a post-
classical forgery. 
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6. Conclusions: the origin of the documents 
This study has shown that in the public speeches of Demosthenes one can find 
two different categories of documents. The documents of the Against Aristocrates and 
part of those of the Against Timocrates were included in the edition to which the 
stichometry refers, whereas the documents of the speeches On the Crown, Against 
Meidias, Against Neaera and part of those of the Against Timocrates were inserted at a 
later date. The two categories contain very different features: the stichometric 
documents usually do not contain any feature that is inconsistent with contemporary 
language and formulas, and their provisions are often confirmed by independent 
evidence. When they contain some errors, these errors can be easily explained as 
mechanical corruption of the text in its transmission, and their quantity and quality is 
coherent with the degree of corruption of the Demosthenic corpus as a whole. The non-
stichometric documents on the other hand are always inconsistent with independent 
historical information, their language and terminology does not resemble that of 
contemporary inscriptions and the information they provide seems to derive from casual 
reading of the orators and (perhaps) of some other source, marred by incomprehensions 
and mistakes. 
This work would not be complete if I did not advance some proposals for setting 
in time and place the origins of these separate categories of documents. The nature of 
these proposals will be hypothetical, but I believe that a study of the tradition of the 
Demosthenic corpus can provide some grounds for understanding the origin of these 
documents. 
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6.1 The stichometric documents 
I have been referring throughout this work to the stichometric edition as a 
Urexemplar, claiming that those documents that can be reckoned inside the stichometry 
were already present in it. There is good reason for giving such a definition of the text 
on which the stichometric marks were first applied. First, the nature of the textual 
tradition of the Demosthenic corpus: scholars now agree that the corpus lacks a 
medieval archetype, and the oldest medieval exemplars of the various branches of 
tradition all stem from different ancient editions of individual speeches.646 The ancient 
papyri confirm this picture: they rarely side in their entirety with one branch against the 
others, and their readings seem to picture an ancient tradition even more confused than 
the medieval one.647 In other words, our medieval branches are likely to derive from 
various corpora recomposed at some point in late antiquity from the mess of individual 
speeches or groups of speeches circulating in individual rolls. These corpora were 
probably organized according to some (different) authoritative catalogues of the corpus 
as a whole.648 
Therefore, whatever feature is present in all the different branches of the medieval 
tradition must stem from before the tradition diverged. Stichometric indications, either 
in the form of marginal marks or of a total of lines at the end of speeches, and 
sometimes in both forms, are found for some speeches in the medieval manuscripts 
SFYBQ. These marks, as I anticipated in the introduction, never correspond to the lines 
of the actual manuscript in which they are reported. They must have been copied 
uncritically time after time, in spite of the fact that they did not mark 100 lines of the 
new manuscripts. When the stichometric marginal marks are present in more than one 
                                                
646 Cf. pp. 47-8. See Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 pp. 65-98 
647 See Pasquali 1934: 281-8 and Hausman 1978-81. 
648 Pasquali 1934: 277; Canfora 1974-2000: vol. I  pp. 80-2, 90-95. 
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manuscript, they agree in pointing to the same section of the text.649 Moreover the total 
stichometries always refer to a text divided according to the corresponding partial 
marks. Therefore they all belong to the same text. Cross contamination can safely be 
excluded as the reason for the appearance of these marks in different branches of 
tradition: stichometry probably was no longer understood in Byzantine times, and the 
copyists often miss a few marks while copying. Moreover stichometries disappear in 
more recent codices. Therefore, the existence of consistent stichometries in different 
branches of the medieval tradition is evidence that the stichometry was unique in the 
whole tradition, and was therefore applied before the tradition diverged.650 
A possible objection to these conclusions is that ancient stichometry was usually 
applied according to a standard line of 16 syllables, approximately 36 letters, 
comparable to the epic hexameter.651 Therefore stichometries applied to different 
editions of a speech were still likely to be consistent with each other. However, a quick 
look at the surviving stichometries shows that this is impossible. The epic hexametric 
line was an approximate measure, and different stichometries show in fact different 
average numbers of characters per line. Among the speeches of Demosthenes, if 18, 19, 
23 and 24 have an average stichometric line of 35-36 characters, the private speeches 
have one of 33-34, and the speech Against Neaera (59) one of 32. Calculations 
conducted with total stichometries found in some manuscripts of Herodotus for books 4, 
5, 8 and 9 point to stichometric lines of 37 characters,652 and marginal marks found in 
one manuscript of Isocrates' Busiris also result in stichometric lines of 37 characters.653 
                                                
649 With just one exception: the marginal marks for the speech On the False Embssy (19) in the 
manuscripts FAQ are different from those in S. The total stichometry found in SFYB is consistent with 
the marks of S. The sections marked by S are also consistent in length with those of the other public 
speeches, whereas the sections of FAQ are very short, and must belong to a later individual edition of the 
speech. See Burger 1892: 7-8, 15. 
650 This is also the opinion of MacDowell 1990: 44-6. On stichometry see above pp. 22-41 and in general 
Ohly 1928. 
651 Cf. above p. 22 n. 26 and in particular Ohly 1928: 9-12. 
652 Burger 1892: 34-42. 
653 Urb. gr. 111. Cf. Fuhr 1882. 
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The partial stichometries of Plato's Cratylus and Symposium in the Clarke codex n. 39 
and in the Marcianus gr. 185 point to average lines of respectively 35 and 34 
characters.654 This evidence alone is enough to show that the fact that stichometry was 
applied to texts according to a particular standard does not result in exactly 
homogeneous lines. It is more likely that these texts were actually written in lines 
approximately equivalent to a hexameter. Therefore the stichometry of the speeches of 
Demosthenes, if applied at different times and independently to different copies, would 
have hardly been perfectly consistent. 
This proves that the stichometry of the Demosthenic corpus was unique in all the 
ancient tradition. When was it applied? The surviving papyri show a very varied and 
divergent tradition of Demosthenes' speeches already in the first century BCE, and they 
are witnesses of their diffusion only in Egypt.655 We could expect an even more diverse 
tradition of these speeches if we had access to ancient manuscripts from all over the 
Greek-speaking world of the time. In order to account for such a tradition we need to 
trace its origins back to the previous centuries. Didymus confirms that the tradition of 
the text of Demosthenes was widespread throughout the Hellenistic period: in his 
commentary of the Philippics (P.Berol. 9780) he refers to previous commentators of 
Demosthenes, and discusses their results and shortcomings.656 His work also comes 
from the first century BCE, but sheds light on a flourishing tradition of reading and 
commenting on Demosthenes stemming from the previous centuries.  
If the tradition was so diverse already in the Hellenistic age, when did it diverge 
first? An initial inference can be drawn from a passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
(who lived between the first century BCE and the first AD): in his De Demosthenis 
dictione, 57.12-3 the rhetorician gives a total number of Demosthenes’ stichoi of either 
                                                
654 Ohly 1928: 77-8 and Irigoin 1998: 229-32. 
655 Cf. Hausman 1978-81. 
656 Cf. Gibson 2002: 26-35 on the previous commentators Didymus refers to. 
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50.000 or 60.000 for a corpus slightly bigger than the one preserved to us.657 The likely 
source for such information is a pinax, a catalogue, like that composed by Callimachus, 
who is known to have given the figures of the stichoi for the works he lists.658 He 
certainly listed Demosthenes' corpus in his Pinakes, and discussed the authenticity of a 
few speeches (fr. 443-6 Pfeiffer). We do not know whether the number reported by 
Dionysius is derived from Callimachus (even though at least an indirect derivation is 
very likely), but we can assume that, since Callimachus reported the stichometry and 
since the ancient stichometry of the corpus is unique, Callimachus' work at the 
Mouseion must be considered the terminus ante quem for the application of the 
stichometry, and therefore for the presence of the stichometric documents in the 
speeches.659 Accordingly, the line count was undertaken some time before Callimachus 
composed his Pinakes, on a collection already available in Alexandria in the 40s of the 
third century BCE. 
Thus the alternatives are: the first edition of the Demosthenic corpus originated 
either in Athens, or very early in Alexandria. Ascribing the first edition of the corpus to 
Callimachus has been very fashionable.660 The fact that Callimachus included 
Demosthenes in his Pinakes is considered sufficient evidence that he undertook 
composing a critical text of his corpus. This assumption is misguided: as Pasquali and 
Pfeiffer have satisfactorily shown, there is no evidence whatsoever that Callimachus 
                                                
657 For the speeches that Dionysius could read see Sealey 1993: 225-7. 
658 Callimachus, fr. 433 Pfeiffer. See Blum 1991: 157-8. 
659 In fact, the figure provided by Dionysius is in itself evidence that the stichometry was unique. Diels-
Schubart 1904: XXII calculate 42000 stichoi for the corpus preserved to us, against the 50000 or 60000 
mentioned by Dionysius. Yet the corpus used by Dionysius included at least four speeches now lost: For 
the Orators, For Satyros, Against Medon, and Against Kritias (see Sealey 1993: 223-5), probably more 
(Dion. Hal. De Demosthenis dictione 57.17-8 also mentions Against the handing over of Harpalus and an 
Apology in the Harpalic trial), and tallying up these additional speeches the figures become incredibly 
close. 
660 This was the predominant opinion in the 19th century, and its reasons are summarized in Drerup 1899: 
546-8, who criticizes Bethe 1897: 11, who advocates instead an Athenian origin. A Callimachean edition 
is still contemplated in Butcher-Rennie 1903-31: vol. 1 p. V and Fuhr 1914: III. More recently 
MacDowell 2009: 8 still attributes the first edition of the corpus as we know it to Callimachus. 
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ever edited any classical text.661 In addition to this there are plenty of reasons to set the 
origin of the corpus in Athens: our collection contains many speeches that cannot be 
attributed to Demosthenes. For some of them our manuscripts preserve the stichometry, 
which means that they were already in the corpus discussed by Callimachus. These 
texts can give us some indication about the environment of the composition of this first 
collection.  
In the case of the demegoriai at least two are known not to be Demosthenic: the 
speech On Halonnesus (7), in spite of its widely-attested stichometry (in manuscripts 
SFBY), has already been shown to be the work of Hegesippus of Sounion by Libanius, 
in his scholarly unexceptionable hypothesis to the speech (among other reasons, 
Libanius notes that 'the man who wrote this speech says that he indicted Callippus of 
the deme Paeanea for an illegal proposal, and it is apparently not Demosthenes, but 
rather Hegesippus who brought said indictment against Callippus' tr. Gibson).662 
Another speech recognised by ancient scholars as non-Demosthenic is On the treaty 
with Alexander (17), about which Libanius reports an attribution to Hyperides, while 
Schol.Dem. 17.2 (Dilts) mentions the opinion, expressed by some critics, that the author 
was again Hegesippus. Whether or not any of these proposals is right, the speech is 
widely recognized as non-Demosthenic.663 The ancient total stichometry of this speech, 
expressed as usual in Attic acrophonic numerals, is preserved in Vat. gr. 69. The 
speeches 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 59 are often attributed to Apollodorus, the son of 
Pasion. Friedrich Blass has been the first and most important defender of their 
                                                
661 Pasquali 1934: 272 and Pfeiffer 1949-53: vol. 1 fr. 443-6. Cf. also Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 pp. 79-
80. 
662 Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 p. 78; Sealey 1993 : 77-8; MacDowell 2009: 343-6. 
663 Cf. recently MacDowell 2009: 380-1. Culasso Gastaldi 1984 makes a good case for considering the 
speech an early Hellenistic rhetorical exercise. She argues that the author is Demochares, who composed 
the speech in the 280s from Demosthenes' notes. If she is right, this is further evidence of an Athenian 
origin of the corpus, and that the person responsible for it was Demochares. See below pp. 302-4. 
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Demosthenic authorship, but most of them are now safely ascribed to Apollodorus.664 
We have an ancient stichometry for 45, 46, 49, 52, 53 and 59. 
Ancient critics worked heavily on the corpus of Demosthenes, and some other 
speeches have a contested authorship: Dionysius reports that both Callimachus and the 
scholars in Pergamum ascribed speeches 39 and 40 to Deinarchus. He disagrees about 
these particular speeches, but, with Callimachus, attributes the Against Theocrines (58) 
to Deinarchus.665 
Let us turn again to the case of the speech On Halonnesus (7), to get an idea of the 
time at which this particular oration was inserted into the corpus. One of the ancient 
arguments in defence of this speech, as far as we know from Libanius, was an allusion 
by Aeschines in the Against Ctesiphon to a subtle distinction made by Demosthenes 
while speaking about Halonnesus. He argued that Philip should not give Halonnesus to 
the Athenians, but rather give it back. Plutarch and Athenaeus confirm that 
Demosthenes took advantage of such a distinction, since they quote a joke about this 
very argument made by Antiphanes in one of his comedies (Antiphanes F 169 Kock). 
Indeed, this is an argument found in the preserved speech. But this correspondence, far 
from representing evidence of the authenticity of our speech, suggests a reason for its 
interpolation. Libanius argues that it is likely that both orators spoke about the same 
matter, and since Demosthenes’ speech was lost, the editor of the collection put 
Hegesippus’ speech in its place. This is a very good explanation for such an 
interpolation, and one that also gives a clue about the environment in which it could 
happen. In fact, the ancient sources do not contain any information about a corpus of 
Hegesippus’ speeches, and I cannot imagine any other context for its find, and its choice 
                                                
664 Trevett 1992: 50-76 in an excellent discussion ascribes all these speeches but 45 to Apollodorus. 
MacDowell 2009: 115-21 ascribes all these speeches to Apollodorus and makes a good case for ascribing 
to him also 47. 
665 MacDowell 2009: 293-8 rejects the attribution to Deinarchus, but argues that the author cannot be 
Demosthenes. It must rather be some contemporary orator, perhaps the actual speaker. 
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as a substitute for the real Demosthenes’ On Halonnesus, than Athens itself. The same 
is true for the speeches by Apollodorus: there is no evidence whatsoever that an 
Apollodoreian corpus had an independent tradition. The only place where such 
speeches could be found is Athens.666 
Other texts in the corpus point in this direction. A very interesting case is that of 
the Prooemia. These short pieces of deliberative oratory, a few clauses apt to open a 
speech, are now generally considered Demosthenic, and could easily have been part of 
the orator’s personal file, ready to be used, in the appropriate circumstances, in the 
Assembly.667 Again I cannot see any possible environment in which such tools, not 
conceived for diffusion and publication, would have been accessible and ready to be 
inserted in the collection, except in Athens. We have also for the Prooemia an ancient 
stichometry preserved in our medieval manuscripts. 
Such texts then, the work of other politicians or Demosthenes’ tools, are likely to 
have been inserted in the corpus in an Athenian context and therefore before the arrival 
of the collection in Alexandria. As shared mistakes in different medieval manuscripts 
help us to reconstruct their common archetype, so the presence in the collection, at the 
time when stichometry was applied, of texts that should not be there, helps us to single 
out Athens, and not Alexandria, as the birth place of the first edition of the Demosthenic 
corpus.668 The presence of these texts is also conclusive evidence that the person 
responsible for this first collection was not Demosthenes himself.669 Otherwise, how 
                                                
666 About Athens as the context in which Apollodorus' speeches entered the Demosthenic corpus see also 
Trevett 1992: 76. 
667 The authenticity of these texts has been disputed by Swoboda 1887, but is now generally accepted. See 
e.g. Rupprecht 1927; Goldstein 1968: 13-24; Clavaud 1974 and more recently Yunis 1996: 247-57; 
Worthington 2004 and 2006: 57-8; MacDowell 2009: 5-7. 
668 Athens was considered the birthplace of the corpus first by Bethe 1897: 11. See also, among others, 
Gernet 1954: 12; Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 pp. 74-9 and 2006: 115; Clavaud 1976: 240-1; Sealey 1993: 
229; Trevett 1996: 441 and 2011 (forthcoming). 
669 Pace Sealey 1993: 229. 
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could we explain the presence of non-Demosthenic texts in it? Surely Demosthenes 
could recognize his own speeches.670 
Before trying to identify more precisely the context of the first edition of the 
Demosthenic corpus, and drawing from it some conclusions about the origin of the 
stichometric documents, there is a further possibility that must be discussed. Some 
scholars, although they recognize Athens as the most likely birthplace of the corpus, 
still assume that the stichometry was applied in Alexandria, since stichometry as a 
system of measurement became fashionable there.671 This hypothesis is uneconomical: 
since the stichometric edition is the archetype of the overall tradition of the corpus, 
assuming that the stichometry was first applied in Alexandria is equivalent to 
postulating that no edition of Demosthenes was ever copied from the original Athenian 
collection, except the one for the Mouseion, from which all the extant testimonies 
would stem. But why should we postulate two archetypes, from two different places, if 
the first is sufficient to account for the subsequent tradition? Also, in spite of general 
ideas about the importance of stichometry in Alexandria, Egyptian prose papyri with 
stichometric indications are very rare (whereas we have plenty of examples of 
stichometry applied to poetry).672 In our medieval manuscripts we have stichometries in 
manuscripts of Plato, Isocrates, Herodotus and Demosthenes. The total stichometries in 
all these cases are expressed in Attic acrophonic numerals, which suggests an Athenian 
origin of the practice (if not necessarily of the stichometries).673 In fact Plato in his Laws 
                                                
670 These considerations are independent from whether Demosthenes published or circulated some of his 
speeches during his life. At any rate, with Trevett 1996 and MacDowell 2009: 7-9 (see also Trevett 2011 
forthcoming). I cannot find any convincing evidence that he did, pace Canfora 1974-2001: vol. 1 pp. 66-
7, 69, Worthington 1991a and 1991b: 425, Tuplin 1998. 
671 Cf. e.g Ohly 1928: 78, 101-3; Clavaud 1975: 247; 1976: 241. 
672 Obbink 1996: 62-3. Cf. Ohly 1928: 31-73 for a list of papyri with stichometry, 56-71 for some prose 
examples. 
673 Obbink 1996: 63 suggests that stichometry in prose texts might be an Athenian practice, rather than an 
Alexandrian one. Total stichometries are conservatively noted in Attic acriphonic numerals down to the 
end of the first century BCE. See e.g Bassi 1909 and Ohly 1924 for some examples from Herculanean 
papyri. For a treatment of acrophonic numerals and their use and diffusion see Tod 1911-2, 1926-7, 1936-
7. 
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seems to allude to this practice when he prohibits erecting stone pillars for the dead that 
contain a eulogy more than four heroic lines long (958e). Certainly Theopompus was 
aware of this system of measurement, and employed it, since he boasted that he wrote 
more ἔπη than any other writer (FGrH 115 F 25). Isocrates also seems to allude to the 
same system when he claims that he only concerns himself with those that do not frown 
upon the length of his speeches, even if they extend for countless ἔπη (Isoc.12.136). 
This evidence suggests that stichometry was current in Athens as early as the beginning 
of the fourth century BCE.674 As I have suggested before, the slight differences between 
the average number of characters per stichometric line in different works, and even in 
different speeches of Demosthenes, point to stichometric marks applied to editions that 
were actually written in lines of approximately stichometric length. Egyptian papyri are 
rarely written according to this standard. On the other hand, the only surviving papyrus 
from Classical times, and from continental Greece, the Derveni papyrus, contains a 
prose commentary written in lines of hexametric size.675 It is difficult not to conclude 
that stichometry applied according to a standard hexametric line originated in Classical 
times, presumably in Athens (note the Attic acrophonic numerals), and was therefore 
current when and where the Demosthenic corpus was first collected. There is no need to 
postulate an Alexandrinian stichometry, nor a second archetype of the corpus edited in 
Alexandria. 
To draw some conclusions, the stichometric edition of the text of Demosthenes 
must be the first overall edition of the corpus, edited in Athens at some point between 
the death of the orator in 322 (otherwise it would be difficult to explain the presence of 
speeches by other orators) and Callimachus' work at the Mouseion in the 240s. The 
                                                
674 See Ohly 1928: 92-4 for a discussion of these passages. Cf. also Kennedy 2010: 4-6 for an interesting, 
if controversial, hypothesis about the actual use of stichometry in Plato's dialogue. 
675 Parsons in Turner-Parsons 1987: 151 n. 113 notes that the Derveni Papyrus 'shows prose written in 
actual hexameter-lengths - the origin of the practice?' 
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stichometric documents were either inserted first in this edition, or were already present 
in the files from which the edition was composed.  
Everything beyond this is doomed to be hypothetical, but it is nevertheless worth 
trying to provide a more precise context for the formation of the collection, which might 
in turn provide some tentative answer to the question of the origin of the stichometric 
documents. Our survey has shown that the person responsible for the first edition of the 
corpus must have been in Athens and with access to the personal files of Demosthenes 
after his death, so that he could retrieve working tools like the Prooemia and mistakenly 
include among Demosthenes' works some speeches by other orators that happened to be 
among Demosthenes’ papers.676 Such a person must have been moved by an interest in 
Athenian history in the age of Demosthenes, by rhetorical interests of his own, by 
particular political purposes that made Demosthenes relevant to him, or by personal 
matters (like a relation with the great orator) and possibly by all these reasons together. 
Demochares of Leuconoe is the obvious candidate for such an undertaking.677 He was 
the son of a sister of Demosthenes, and became the political heir of his uncle. In 322, 
when he was 33 years old, he spoke against Antipatrus’ request to hand over the 
orators.678 His story is the story of the Demosthenic, anti-Macedonian 'party' after the 
death of its leader. He was a staunch opponent of the rule of Demetrius of Phalerus 
(317-307), led the city together with Stratocles of Diomeia for a few years under the 
Poliorcetes (307-304), and was exiled again for ridiculing Stratocles for his extremely 
servile political actions concerning the affair of Cleaenetus (Plut. Demetr. 24.6-11). 
Demochares was recalled only in 286/5, after a peace with Demetrius that assured 
Athens' full independence. A key figure of this age, in 280/79 he advanced a proposal 
                                                
676 Wooten 2008: 170 n. 6 doubts that Demosthenes would have kept old speeches, but see MacDowell 
2009: 8 n. 24. 
677 His name has been proposed among others by Canfora 1974-2000: vol. 1 pp. 74-5, 2006: 115, 
Clauvaud 1976: 241 and Trevett 1996: 441 n. 85 and 2011 (forthcoming) 
678 Marasco 1984: 25-6 doubts the reliability of this information, found in [Plut.] X Or. 847d, but he is 
over-skeptical. 
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for building a statue and granting the highest honours to Demosthenes.679 A similar 
initiative was then undertaken in 371/0 by his son Laches, to celebrate Demochares 
himself, who must have died at some point between the enactment of the two decrees.680 
This is the period in which a democratic and a Demosthenic myth is created for 
the purposes of a contemporary political agenda.681 Demochares as relative and possibly 
heir of the orator had free access to the files of his work, as the writings of Demosthenes 
were presumably inherited after his death. It is likely that he used their material for his 
own speeches, and exploited it as a mine of historical information about the period and 
life of the orator for his Histories, a work that covered the period from the age of 
Demosthenes to Demochares' own years, and represented a complement to his political 
activity, written, as Cicero reports, non tam historico quam oratorio genere (Cic. Brut. 
83).  It is more than likely that such a character, whose life, literary works and politics 
were shaped by the example of his famous uncle, undertook composing an edition of 
the works that he could find in Demosthenes' files. Such an edition was certainly 
composed out of piety, as Gernet observed, but its circulation was at the same time a 
political statement consistent with what we know of the life and work of Demochares.682 
I will not try to narrow the time of composition of the first corpus any further. The 
evidence is too scanty to set it at any specific point in Demochares' life. The task was 
undertaken at some point after Demosthenes' death in 322 and the edition was ready 
before the end of the 270s when Demochares died: that is, in good time to reach 
Callimachus by the 240s and be described in his Pinakes. If this is the case the 
                                                
679 About Demochares' life and political career see Marasco 1984 and Kralli 1999-2000: 153-6. For the 
political context of his activity see Habicht 1997: 67-97 and 124-49, Dreyer 1999: passim and Bayliss 
2011: 94-128 and passim. 
680 The requests for these honours are preserved in [Plut.] X Or.. 851d-f. The documents preserved here 
are probably authentic, see Faraguna 2003. 
681 See Asmonti 2004; Cooper 2009; Bayliss 2011: 49-60. 
682 Gernet 1954: 12 might be right when he states that this edition was rather a collection of what was 
found 'sur place à ce moment', but mistakes and spurious speeches do not mean that the task was 
undertaken unprofessionally. The presence of the stichometry rather points to the hypothesis of 
professional copyists that produced a corpus ready for circulation. 
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stichometric documents could have been either already present in the drafts that 
Demochares edited for his edition, or inserted by Demochares himself. MacDowell has 
rightly observed that Demosthenes had no reason to insert the documents in his drafts, 
and in fact we know that his normal practice was not to include them.683 He had rather 
to provide separate copies for them to be read out by the secretary. One might add that 
since Demosthenes certainly at some point had a copy of all the documents that he 
discusses in his speeches, it is difficult to explain why he should include only a few of 
them, and not the rest. This is even more striking when it happens in a single speech, 
like the Against Timocrates: Demosthenes surely had all the documents with him when 
he composed the draft. Then why would he include just some of them? It is perhaps 
more likely that the person responsible for the inclusion of these few documents was 
Demochares. In this case the presence or absence of certain documents could be 
explained as mainly due to chance: Demochares added to the speeches those documents 
that he found among Demosthenes' papers, or those famous enough for an Athenian 
orator and politician like himself to remember by heart (this could be the case for the 
homicide laws included in the Against Aristocrates, and perhaps for the law of Diocles 
found at Dem. 24.42). Sometimes perhaps he looked for a particular document in the 
archives, or found it on a stele while walking through the agora. Sometimes he 
reconstructed a document from Demosthenes' discussion, through his own refined 
understanding of the workings of Athenian institutions and knowledge of Athenian 
official language, and these are perhaps the cases in which we find some small problems 
with a particular expression (like the name of a deme). Whatever was his method (or 
more probably his methods), his experience as an Athenian politician and litigant and 
his first-hand understanding of the Athenian constitution allowed him to add to 
Demosthenes' speeches documents that are generally reliable. 
                                                
683 MacDowell 1990: 46. 
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6.2 The non-stichometric documents: a provisional hypothesis 
This survey has shown that, while the documents that were part of the 
Urexemplar of the speeches are usually reliable, the documents that have been inserted 
at a later date are generally inconsistent with the summaries provided by Demosthenes 
and with evidence about the same laws, decrees and procedures found in independent 
sources. Moreover they often show language and formulas that are unparalleled in 
Athenian official documents preserved on stone, and betray a later date of composition. 
Throughout this work I have made the point that these documents should not be used as 
evidence for the laws, decrees and procedures they allegedly preserve, and I have 
described them as 'later forgeries'. It is worth trying to qualify this expression, providing 
some considerations and a hypothesis about the date and milieu of their composition. 
This hypothesis will be only tentative, since although its formulation is based on the 
documents, a careful analysis of different kinds of evidence will be needed to verify it, 
one that goes beyond the scope of this work. 
The date of composition of the spurious documents in the speeches of the orators 
was a popular topic in the 19th century. Droysen limited his analysis to the documents of 
Demosthenes' On the Crown (18), suggested a rhetorical milieu, more precisely a school 
of rhetoric, and dated the insertions between the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and 
Cicero, who seem to be unaware of the documents (cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. Ad Ammaeum, 
1.11.54-63; Cic. De optimo genere oratorum, 19), and that of Plutarch, who seems to 
use them (cf. e.g. Plut. Dem. 24.2).684 Wortmann, Schucht, Christ, Drerup, Diels and 
Schubart, and many other scholars extended their analysis to other documents and drew 
various conclusions from analysing passages in Harpocration, the Lives of the Ten 
Orators, Pollux, the scholia and others that seem or seem not to be aware of a particular 
                                                
684 Droysen 1883: 246-53. 
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document, and proposed dates ranging from the 1st century BCE to the 2nd AD.685 In fact, 
apart from the mistakes and methodological flaws in these analyses highlighted by 
Treves,686 the ancient papyri show that most documents were not present in all the 
ancient copies of the speeches (as they are not present in every medieval manuscript), 
and therefore the fact that a particular author seems to be unaware of a particular 
document only proves that his copy of the speech belonged to a branch of the tradition 
where the document had never been inserted. Thus, whether or not an ancient text 
mentions a document is of no help in dating that document. 
As for the milieu of the forgeries, scholars have dealt exclusively with the 
documents of the speeches On the Crown and Against Timarchus, with Wortmann 
arguing in an influential dissertation for an origin in Asia Minor, on the basis of alleged 
correspondences between language and formulas from that area (the author would be a 
vir grammaticus vel rhetor that spent some time in Athens, but was more interested in 
providing his students with models to copy than with reconstructing quam 
accuratissime antiquitates atticas).687 This hypothesis, later endorsed by Treves, was 
rejected with good arguments by Schläpfer, who conducted a careful analysis of the 
'official language' in the documents of the speech On the Crown and remarked that most 
of the features Wortmann identifies as typical of Asia Minor are in fact common to 
most of the Greek world,688 and the forgers seem to have largely used their imagination 
                                                
685 Wortmann 1877: 57-65; Schucht 1892: 27-31; Drerup 1898: 237-8; Diels-Schubart 1904: XLI. 
686 Treves 1940: 141-5. 
687 Wortmann 1877: 57-65. 
688 Some of Wortmann's observations are simply wrong and due to scarce knowledge of the epigraphical 
material: e.g. he claims that δεδόχθαι τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι is typical of Asia Minor, whereas the 
Athenian formula is simply δεδόχθαι τῶι δήμωι (Wortmann 1877: 18-9 and 58-9). Some observations 
are also incorrect: e.g. he claims that πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας χρείας παρέσχεσθαι found in the document 
at Dem. 18.84 is typical of Asia Minor but unparalleled in Athens, but see IG II² 844 ll. 7-8, 1299 l. 52, 
SEG 45 l. 106. The word order ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Μνησιφίλου (found at Dem.18.29, 73, 105, 115, 118, 164 
165, 180) instead of the more Attic ἐπὶ Μνησιφίλου ἄρχοντος is not particularly typical of Asia Minor. 
It is in fact more widely attested in the Aegean islands (e.g. IG XI,2 161) and in central Greece (e.g. CID 
2.45). 
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in composing the documents.689 The occasional similarities with documents from Priene 
or Pergamum are likely to be due to chance. On the other hand, despite the many 
mistakes and unparalleled formulas, the documents in these speeches are still closer to 
Athenian official language than to that of any other area (and this is even more true for 
the documents in the other speeches I have analyzed). Schläpfer concludes that the 
forged documents in the speech On the Crown must have been composed in Athens. We 
have seen however in the previous chapters that documents actually composed in 
Athens are much more consistent with Athenian official language than these forgeries 
are, and one would expect an Athenian with access to some, if not all, official 
documents to do a much better job. Moreover one does not need to postulate an 
Athenian origin for these documents in order to account for the Attic flavour of their 
language. Whoever the forgers were, and wherever they worked, their main sources for 
the language of the documents were the speeches themselves, and careful reading of the 
orators (and possibly of some other source, like commentaries and lexica), as we have 
seen in the analyses of the individual documents, suffices to account for the occasional 
correct legal details and formulas. 
In fact, trying to place the composition and insertion of all the non-stichometric 
documents, or even of all those of a single speech, depends on the assumption that all 
the documents must have been composed together in one place. Yet even a summary 
reading of some of them shows different levels of knowledge and understanding of 
Athenian laws, procedures and official language, and different degrees of historical 
information. The documents of Demosthenes' On the Crown and Aeschines' Against 
Timarchus are dodgy compositions where the occasional correct detail is surrounded by 
incorrect historical information, incorrect formulas, procedural misunderstandings and 
                                                
689 Schläpfer 1939: 220-2, 230; pace Treves 1940: 170-1. Wankel 1976: 79-82 does not express any 
opinion on this matter. 
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language which is inconsistent with Attic practice in the 4th century BCE. As Schläpfer 
has shown, nothing in the documents of the speech On the Crown suggests sources 
other than the speech itself, Aeschines' Against Ctesiphon and perhaps Demosthenes' 
Third Philippic, and most details are due to the forger's imagination.690 Whoever was 
the forger of these documents, he certainly cannot be the same person that composed the 
document at Dem. 24.20-3, a long document that, in spite of the mistakes that give 
away its spuriousness, shows a shrewd understanding of the workings of the Athenian 
Assembly and a remarkable knowledge of Attic official language. Its author even seems 
to have consulted some commentary or lexicon about the number of Assembly meetings 
during the year, and their timing. Similarly, the document at Dem. 24.104, in spite of all 
its problems, shows a certain awareness of the complexities of the procedures against 
atimoi, and uses an expression, προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν νόμων εἴργεσθαι, which is 
used only in regard to homicides and is found in our sources only in Ant. 6.34, 35, 40. 
This document has very little in common with the clumsy law at Dem. 21.94. Even 
inside one single speech sometimes the style of the documents is remarkably different: 
in the Against Neaera three laws whose wording is very close to that of the following 
summaries are followed by a decree ([Dem.] 59.104) which is hardly consistent with 
anything in the orator's paraphrase. 
The evidence from two papyri from the 2nd century AD, P.Haun. 1.5 and P.Oxy. 
42.3009, confirms that the spurious documents were composed by many different 
forgers, and that sometimes alternative documents circulated covering the same gap in 
the text of a speech.691 These papyri both preserve a letter from Philip at Dem. 18.221, 
in a place where none of our medieval manuscripts preserve any document. This shows 
that alternative versions of this speech circulated in antiquity with the same documents 
                                                
690 Schläpfer 1939: 74 ff. and 240-1. 
691 See Wankel 1975. 
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that are preserved in the medieval manuscripts, with more documents and without any. 
More interestingly, the documents preserved for the gap at Dem. 18.221 in these two 
papyri are not the same: one is a letter to the Boeotians, while the other is a letter to the 
Peloponnesians with the same prescript as the letter found at § 157 of the speech. 
Different forgers were in action and sometimes composed different documents for the 
same gaps in the text. There is no point therefore in trying to find a place where the 
documents originated. Yet it is possible to single out a cultural context in which they are 
likely to have been composed, and a date (or at least a terminus ante quem) for their 
composition. 
Droysen, in his seminal work on the documents of the Crown speech, 
hypothesized that the documents might have originated in a rhetorical school, and this 
hypothesis has been supported by, among others, Wortman, Drerup and Schmid.692 
Now, thanks to the work of scholars like Russell, Morgan and Cribiore on ancient 
education and rhetorical tradition, this hypothesis can be qualified and substantiated.693 
In the system of rhetorical education it was standard practice to compose fictitious laws 
and decrees to form the subject of oratorical exercises. Already among the 
progymnasmata, the preliminary exercises694 that developed the student’s skills in order 
to get him ready for the proper declamatio (in greek μελέτη), one of the most advanced 
exercises, the so-called nomos, consisted of arguing for and against a law or a decree 
invented for the purpose by the teacher.695 The progymnasmata were usually more 
                                                
692 Droysen 1893: 246-53; Wortmann 1877: 57-65; Drerup 1898: 241-2; 1923: 108; Schmid 1917: 1538-
40. 
693 Russell 1983; Morgan 1998; Cribiore 2001. 
694 On Greek progymnasmata cf. Clark 1957: 177-212; Kennedy 1983: 52-73; Webb 2001; Gibson 2004. 
For an English translation of all the extant ancient treatises on the topic see Kennedy 2003. Although 
these exercises are safely attested only from the 1st century BCE (cf. Cic. Inv. Rhet., 1.27; Rhet. Her. 1.12) 
their name appears already in [Rhet. Al.] 28, 1436a25, and they were certainly current in the Hellenistic 
age. Cf. Kennedy 1983: 54-55; 2003: XI-XII; Webb 2001: 307; Frazel 2009: 23-70, especially 26-8. 
695 Cf. Theon, Prog., 128-130, where the text ends abruptly. For the rest of the treatment of the nomos cf. 
the Armenian version translated in Patillon-Bolognesi 1997: 99-102. The chapter is mainly concerned 
with arguing about laws, but at p. 102 (Patillon) Theon makes clear that the same exercise can concern 
decrees as well. Cf. also Apth. Prog., 46-51 Rabe; Nic. Soph., Prog., 77-79. The treatise by Theon is 
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concerned with mythology than with historical events, yet the prevalence of 
mythological matters has been overrated, as Craig Gibson696 has recently shown: 
historical themes were already wide-spread at this stage. The topics were mainly drawn 
from the historians, Thucydides and Herodotus in particular, and from the orators, 
Demosthenes being the most popular. The nomos exercise, because of its very nature, 
and since it was the transition between the progymnasmata and the proper 
declamationes,697 is very likely to have presented a range of topics similar to that of the 
declamationes themselves. These more advanced compositions, practised both by 
students of rhetoric and by accomplished rhetores, consisted of deliberative and judicial 
speeches composed for imaginary debates and trials.698  
In Roman declamationes usually just the suasoriae (the deliberative speeches) 
were given a historical setting, with an overwhelming preference for Greek settings. 
The controversiae by contrast were for the most part not concerned with historical 
events and characters, inventing fictitious legal cases based on a mixture of Greek, 
Roman and imaginary laws.699 In Greek declamations on the other hand this subdivision 
was much less stark,700 and both deliberative and judicial speeches could be set either in 
a fantastic Greek city which resembled Athens (cleverly named by Russell 
'Sophistopolis') or in some specific time and place from the historical past of Greece. In 
both models, the habit of making up laws and decrees was very widespread. They could 
be written at the beginning of the declamation, as the law governing the dispute, or 
quoted by the rhetor as evidence on his behalf and subsequently fully explained and 
                                                                                                                                          
usually dated to the 1st century AD, and seems therefore to be the oldest preserved, but recently Heath 
2002-3 has challenged this opinion and placed the treatise in 5th century Alexandria. It would be in any 
case a very typical example of its genre. 
696 Gibson 2004. 
697 Cf. Marrou 1956: 276; Kennedy 1983: 55-56. 
698 Cf. on Greek meletai Russel 1983, and specifically on their origin between the 4th and the 3rd century 
BCE pp. 1-20; Marrou 1956: 277; Cribiore 2001: 232. 
699 Cf. Bonner 1949; 1977: 277-327; Clark 1957: 213-161; Kaster 2001. On the legal settings of Latin 
declamations cf.Lanfranchi 1938; Bonner 1949: 84-85; Sussman 1994: 13-14. 
700 Cf. Russell 1983: 9-10; Cribiore 2001: 232-233. 
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interpreted, as Sopatros warmly advises to do in a defence of Alcibiades (RG 8.13.10-
12). 
These laws did not try, in the speeches set in Sophistopolis, to reproduce a 
specific legal system, and fantastic features often penetrated into the speeches set in 
definite historical contexts as well.701 However the degrees of historical accuracy in the 
rhetores varied. In some authors the 'concentration on the past... was shallow and trivial, 
no better than the superficiality of a bad historical novel or film', but sometimes, as in 
the case of Aelius Aristides, 'it produced a real imaginative grasp of the classical 
world'.702 
Now, if we look at the historical settings usually employed in both the 
progymnasmata and the declamationes it is easy to see that the Peloponnesian War, the 
Persian wars and the age of Demosthenes were the most popular.703 The speeches of the 
ancient orators themselves were read aloud and performed in ancient school classes.704 
Theon in a passage of great pedagogical interest shows the care taken to make the 
performances realistic: 'Above all, we shall accustom the student to fit voice and 
gestures to the subject of the speech. It is this that actualizes the art of the speech. We 
shall present and imagine with the greatest care all that concerns an orator: his actions, 
credibility, age, and status; the place where the speech was delivered, the subject it 
treats, and everything that contributes to the feeling that the speech actually concerns us 
as we read it aloud'.705 As a result, the gaps in the speeches of the orators were to be 
restored, and scholastic editions probably were increasingly filled with documents. 
There is however a chronological problem. The discovery of a papyrus (P.Oxy. 
11.1377) from the 1st century BCE reporting the document that we read at Dem. 18.167 
                                                
701 Russell 1983: 37-39 and 106-128 passim. 
702 Russell 1983: 109. 
703 Cf. Kohl 1915; Russell 1983: 106-128; Gibson 2004: 126-128. 
704 Mostly in Greek school classes, if we can believe Quint. Inst. 2.5. Cf. Webb 2001: 307-310. 
705 Theon, Prog. 103 Patillon (tr. from Kennedy 2003). 
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gives us a terminus ante quem for the insertion of this, and probably most of the non-
stichometric documents. The presence of a papyrus with one of our preserved 
documents in Oxyrhynchus in the late 1st century BCE means that a copy of the speech 
with this document, and presumably with all the other documents that we read in the 
speech, must have circulated for a while before that date (unless we want to believe that 
the documents in the speech On the Crown originated in Oxyrhynchus). Treves has also 
found some independent reasons to predate the insertion of these documents to the time 
of Philip V of Macedon.706  
More generally it must be noted that all our medieval manuscripts, although they 
derive from different ancient editions, when they preserve non-stichometric documents 
in a speech, preserve the same documents, for the same sections of the text (Dem. 18 
until § 187, Dem. 21 until § 169 except § 130, Dem. 24 until § 151). Since, as we have 
seen from the evidence of P.Haun. 1.5 and P.Oxy. 42.3009, different forgers fabricated 
different documents, sometimes for the same gap in the text, this uniformity in the 
transmitted documents of our medieval manuscripts needs to be explained. We must 
postulate that at some point some particular editions with documents of each of these 
speeches became particularly authoritative, and in time became the most widespread, to 
such an extent that they are the only ones represented in the medieval manuscripts. Such 
an edition of the speech On the Crown was already circulating in Oxyrhynchus in the 1st 
century BCE. As for the documents of the other speeches, we do not have any papyrus 
reporting any of them (or in fact covering any section where we could read a document) 
before the 2nd century AD, and those of this century and later always present the same 
documents that we read in the medieval manuscripts. Likewise Harpocration, the 
scholia and other indirect sources, when a document is discussed, always quote the 
documents that we still read, with the same text. This must mean that for all these 
                                                
706 See above pp. 53 for one of these arguments and in general Treves 1940. 
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speeches Zweiterexemplare, that is archetypes of all the later manuscripts with 
documents, must have existed quite a while before the beginning of the 2nd century AD, 
in order to spread to such an extent as to override any other tradition of documents. The 
absence (with the isolated exception of P.Haun. 1.5 and P.Oxy. 42.3009, which must be 
interpreted as copies of a very old apograph) of any additional or variant document at 
this time must mean that the period when these forged documents were composed ended 
well before the beginning of the 2nd century AD, presumably by the end of the 
Hellenistic age, as the terminus ante quem provided by P.Oxy. 11.1377 seems to 
confirm. 
Our main evidence for the Greek tradition of rhetorical declamations and 
progymnasmata however comes from Roman times, in particular from the Second 
Sophistic and later. The first instances are those of Lesboanax of Mytilene, Polemon of 
Laodicea, Adrian of Tyrus and Lucian, followed by Aristides. Later protagonists of this 
tradition, which survives well into Byzantine times, are Libanius, Himerius, Choricius 
of Gaza and others. Quintilian and Seneca the Elder give us more information about the 
earlier Greek rhetorical tradition, and Seneca mentions about twenty-five rhetors from 
the Augustan age or earlier.707 In any case, is it at all likely that the Hellenistic insertion 
of our documents dates to a cultural milieu whose heyday was the time of the Second 
Sophistic?  
Moreover, such a work on the corpora of the orators would suggest an 
environment in which their speeches were extensively studied and discussed. 
Demosthenic papyri however start to appear only from the 1st century BCE. Likewise, 
the first preserved critical evaluations of Demosthenes as an orator are found in the 
works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Cicero, and in P.Berol. 9780, preserving a 
                                                
707 See Russell 1983: 3-9. 
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work of Didymus also composed in the 1st century BCE.708 This has prompted some 
scholars to interpret the silence about Demosthenes in our sources from the Hellenistic 
times as evidence of a change in stylistic taste: Demosthenes simply went out of 
fashion.709 To place the origin of our documents in such a cultural context, when 
Demosthenes was (allegedly) ignored and a proper tradition of progymnasmata and 
declamations was still to come, seems highly unlikely.  
This picture of the rhetorical tradition and of Demosthenes' fortune in the 
Hellenistic age is however misguided. First of all, it is now widely recognized that 
Greek oratory did not die at Chaeronea. The context of the Hellenistic city, as well as 
the role of the ambassadors in the Hellenistic world provided plenty of occasions for 
oratory, and where oratory is alive, rhetorical education must flourish.710 Moreover 
Quintilian (2.4.41) tells us that 'to speak on fictitious cases, in imitation of pleadings in 
the forum or in public councils, is generally allowed to have become a practice among 
the Greeks, about the time of Demetrius Phalereus.' Philostratus (VS 481) contrasts a 
first sophistic, originated with Gorgias, to a second, concerned with the poor and the 
rich men, war-heroes and tyrants and with those named individuals drawn from history, 
which was initiated by Aeschines after he went into exile to Rhodes. Both these sources 
therefore date the birth of historical declamations (and therefore of relevant rhetorical 
education) to the very beginning of the Hellenistic age. They are confirmed by two 
papyri from the 3rd century BCE, P.Hibeh 15 and P.Berol. 9781. Both preserve passages 
of historical declamations much in the style of the well-known later examples: the first 
advocates action against Alexander and the second purports to be Leptines' speech in 
                                                
708 Demetrius' On Style shows a preference for Demosthenes' style, but the date of this work is debated. 
Kennedy 1994: 88-9 places it in the 1st century BCE, Grube 1965: 110-21 around 270 BCE. For P.Berol. 
9780 the bibliography is extensive. See Gibson 2002 and Harding 2006 for the most recent treatments of 
Didymus' work. 
709 Cf. e.g. Kennedy 1994: 96; Cooper 2000: 239. 
710 See Pernot 2005: 73-82, who summarizes the work on this topic produced by Louis Robert. See also 
Erskine 2007: 272-85 and Wooten 1973 about the oratory of ambassadors. 
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response to Dem. 20. Interestingly, both declamations deal with the age of 
Demosthenes, and with topics with which he had been personally concerned.  
As for the fortune of Demosthenes, whatever one thinks of his influence on the 
speeches in Polybius spotted by Wooten,711 Didymus' allusions in the 1st century BCE to 
the shortcomings of previous commentators of Demosthenes is evidence that exegetical 
work on his speeches flourished in the Hellenistic period.712 His work, like all the 
preserved ancient commentaries on Demosthenes, shows a remarkable interest in 
historical, constitutional, legal and generically antiquarian matters: the fragments of 
Didymus in Harpocration contain discussions of 'the layout of the theatre, the shapes of 
classical-era drinking cups, tithing, imprisonment, architectural elements, the 
requirement for advance deposits in court cases, guardianship and attainment of the 
majority, the arrangement of olive trees in groves, and clan-sponsored wedding feasts.' 
P.Stras. 84, a 1st century AD commentary on Dem.22 that certainly relies on Hellenistic 
materials, discusses 'the chairmanship of governmental committees, the Periclean 
building program, fifth-century Athenian finance, treasury officials, the jurisdiction of 
the thesmothetae, and the names and duties of archons and other officials.'713 It is easy to 
see that such antiquarian interest in the orators and the sort of competence that came 
with it (whether the information collected was reliable or not) matches perfectly the 
kind of skills needed to create most of the non-stichometric forged documents. In fact it 
is very likely that the intended readership of these works were exactly those advanced 
students and teachers of rhetoric and declaimers whose practices I have described in the 
previous paragraphs.714 
One of the two 3rd century BCE historical declamations mentioned above, 
P.Berol. 9781, provides an excellent example of how careful legal and antiquarian 
                                                
711 Wooten 1974. On the methodological limitations of his approach see Kremmydas 2007: 22-3 n. 16. 
712 Cf. the excellent discussion in Gibson 2002: 26-35. 
713 I am quoting here Gibson 2002: 40. 
714 Gibson 2002: 42-50. 
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information was used by teachers and rhetors to produce speeches remarkably accurate, 
and yet marred by errors, anachronisms and misunderstandings, quite similar therefore 
to our non-stichometric documents. Kremmydas has provided an excellent discussion of 
this text, noticing how the author is clearly 'steeped in Attic oratory' and draws from a 
variety of speeches, and how his language is usually accurate and reproduces 
successfully the technicalities of Attic oratory and official language.715 The discussion at 
ll. 19-30 of the law on syndikoi is ingenious, and the defence of Leodamas' right to 
stand as a syndikos of the law of Leptines is legally sophisticated: Dem. 20.146-7 claims 
that since Leodamas has been in the past accuser in a graphe paranomon against the 
decree granting ateleia to Chabrias and lost the case, and since the law does not allow 
one to bring the same charge twice, Leodamas cannot legally be syndikos of the law of 
Leptines cancelling exemptions. The author of the declamation rightly retorts that being 
syndikos of a law has nothing to do with being the accuser in a previous graphe 
paranomon. In the declamation however, side-by-side with these remarkable pieces of 
legal understanding and historical accuracy, we find a section (ll. 119-46) discussing 
how inconsistent Demosthenes' position as accuser of the law of Leptines is when one 
considers his own trierarchic reform (Dem. 18.102-6). Yet the trial of Leptines 
happened in 355/4, and Demosthenes' trierarchic reform was not enacted until 340. Ps. 
Leptines sometimes fails to read Demosthenes' speech carefully: at ll. 110-1 he laments 
the risks he is running, and the penalty he will suffer if convicted. Demosthenes at Dem. 
20.144 clearly states that because one year has elapsed since the enactment of the law 
Leptines is no longer personally liable to any punishment.716 
This declamation is evidence that teachers of rhetoric and rhetors from the 
Hellenistic age were remarkably versed in the Attic orators, were informed about 
                                                
715 Kremmydas 2007: 36. 
716 See Kremmydas 2007: passim for a detailed commentary of the declamation. 
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Athenian history and legal and constitutional matters and had access to commentaries 
(and lexica) like that of Didymus. Yet they made plenty of mistakes in their 
reconstruction of Athenian laws and institutions (as Didymus does too). Their skills and 
their shortcomings match the picture of the forgers of our documents, and like the 
documents, their speeches were of uneven quality. 
It is time to draw some conclusions about the nature of the forged non-
stichometric documents and their importance. If my reconstruction of the context of 
their composition is correct, these texts stand at the intersection between rhetorical 
fiction and antiquarianism. The purpose of their 'forgers' was probably not to deceive 
readers, but rather to fill gaps in very important texts. However their aim was not 
properly antiquarian either: they tried to produce plausible Athenian laws and decrees 
for educational and rhetorical, not properly scholarly purposes. An understanding of the 
history and the legal system of classical Athens was a means to the end of mastering the 
corpora of Attic oratory, which provided the highest models for students and rhetors of 
the Hellenistic age (and beyond). Gibson points out that ‘historical declamation [...] 
pursues the truth of history by first rejecting the pursuit of historical truth. It instead 
envisions and constructs alternate histories.' Kremmydas has shown that in P.Berol. 
9781, from the 3rd century BCE, historical detail and legal precision play an important 
part, yet 'what mattered more [...] was historical credibility, not accuracy.'717 This 
observation can be confidently extended to our documents. Those who composed them 
shared skills, education and cultural environment with erudite commentators of the 
orators like Didymus and his predecessors, sometimes they might have been 
commentators themselves. Therefore they had important sources available, and possibly 
a larger number of speeches of the orators to read than we do. In any case, they were 
competent (to various degrees) and well read. Yet they were not trying to find and add 
                                                
717 Gibson 2004: 105; Kremmydas 2007: 28. 
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to the speeches the right laws or decrees.718 Nor were they trying to reconstruct these 
documents with philological accuracy. They wanted to produce credible documents, and 
in most cases they succeeded. These documents are evidence of their skills, competence 
and imagination rather than of the laws, procedures and institutions of classical Athens. 
I will conclude with a general consideration. Scholars have often lamented the 
lack of evidence for Hellenistic educational and rhetorical practices and for the use of 
the orators as models during this age.719 As we have seen, we have only two Greek 
declamations from this period, surviving by chance in fragments of papyrus. There are 
no progymnasmata and no treatises (with the possible exception of Demetrius' On 
Style).720 Moreover, the absence of any evidence for the study of Demosthenes (and of 
the other orators) has led scholars to question his popularity at this time. At the end of 
the Hellenistic age however we find an established canon of ten orators and corpora 
more or less formed, as well as commentaries like that of Didymus that refer to previous 
scholarship. Russell has sensibly pointed out that the coincidence between later Greek 
rhetorical tradition 'and the Roman evidence can only be due to a common source. 
Greeks did not learn from Romans - least of all in rhetoric.'721 We need not be reduced, 
however, to reconstructing rhetorical practices of the Hellenistic age from later material. 
                                                
718 This does not exclude the possibility that they might occasionally have found the right document. 
MacDowell 1990: 46, Scafuro 2006: 180 and others have named Craterus and other scholars who 
collected laws and decrees as the possible sources of the documents. Their collection of laws and decrees 
would have been consulted by the editors of the speeches to find the correct document to fill a gap in the 
text. I am inclined to believe that this must have been the case with the list of names in Andoc. 1.13, 15, 
35, 47, which are confirmed by the epigraphical evidence of IG I3 422 (see Canevaro-Harris 2012). They 
must have been found in some such collection. It is interesting that a list of demioprata from the same 
inscription is preserved in the tenth book of Pollux (passim). Pippin in Pritchett-Pippin 1956: 318-28 has 
argued that Pollux’s source might actually be Craterus, through the mediation of Eratosthenes and the 
anonymous author of the Skeuographicon. This might well be the case, and proves that a copy of that 
inscription did circulate in antiquity and was available to be read in Craterus and other sources. However 
it is now widely-recognized that Craterus' collection of decrees stopped at the end of 5th century, and he 
cannot have provided any help with most of the documents in our speeches, which date to the 4th. See e.g. 
Jacoby FGrHist 342 Komm. p. 97, Erdas 2002: 27-8 and Carawan, BNJ 342 'Bibliographical essay'. And 
in general the mistakes and flaws of our documents suggest that they are reconstructions from various 
sources and from the forger's imagination rather than original Athenian documents. 
719 Cf. e.g. Pernot 2005: 57 n. 1.; Vanderspoel 2007: 124-5; Erskine 2007: 273. 
720 See above p. 314 n. 709 for the most important attempts at dating this work. 
721 Russell 1983: 3. 
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This study, I hope, has shown that Hellenistic material exists and has survived in the 
corpora of the orators themselves. Teachers and rhetors from the Hellenistic age were 
skilled enough to forge credible documents that have been often mistaken for authentic 
laws and decrees from classical Athens. Their most successful declamations might well 
have been good enough to be mistaken for authentic classical Athenian speeches. The 
corpora of the orators are full of spurious speeches that are still dated to classical 
Athens because they look, in spite of many problems, too sophisticated to be later 
compositions. And yet the documents show us that Hellenistic rhetors and teachers were 
certainly skilled enough to produce credible imitations of classical speeches. The 
evidence for Hellenistic rhetoric and for the study of the orators in the Hellenistic age 
might well be before our eyes, in the corpora of the Attic orators themselves.722 
                                                
722 A very interesting attempt is Gribble 1997, who finds models typical of later declamations, as well as 
mistakes and antiquarian interests that are paralleled by those we have found in the documents, in Ps.-
Andocides' Against Alcibiades. 
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